 Good afternoon, everyone. I'm Maaren Leid. I'm a senior fellow here and the director of the New Defense Approaches Project. And I'm very pleased to welcome you all to today's military strategy form event, graciously sponsored by our friends at Rolls Royce North America. So thank them for their support. This is the first of a series of events that we'll be having through the fall with the service vices all coming to talk about the DOD's Efficiency Initiative and how the different departments are planning to implement it. General Correlli graciously agreed to be the first one out of the box. As you're all aware, we're early on in the process and the secretary loves it when people get out and make decisions before he's made them. So we're going to focus our discussion today on process and context and all the rest of that and appreciate General Correlli's willingness to take some risk and come chat with us about how this process is going forward and how the Army leadership is thinking about it. You all, I believe, have General Correlli's bio, which includes mention of the commands he's held at every level, to include two command tours in Iraq, both of the First Cav Division and of multinational corps Iraq. His time as the senior military assistant to the Secretary of Defense and his time as EA and EXO to the commander of UCOM and SHAPE, including during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, as I believe. I wanted to add a couple of things that aren't on his bio. First, you can all form your own judgments about this, but reportedly when he was picking up his uniforms at Rossi Boot Camp, the uniform clerk told him he had the third biggest head he'd ever seen. I don't know what the measurement of his head actually is. Seven and seven eight. Seven and seven, that's big, that's big, which isn't surprising because he's got a lot going on in there. And he's definitely spent some time running with the big brains, including his time in the social sciences department at West Point. But what you can't see from the outside but is immediately clear if you spend any time at all with General Correlli is he has a huge heart. And as the Vice Chairman, he has dedicated himself to trying to address and remediate the problems, the troubling trends that the Army's facing. To some extent the other services, problems with soldier suicides. And that's just one indicator of what I think is the hallmark of his career, which is an absolute passion for soldiers and their families. And it's this passion coupled with his just fundamental decency and humility that makes him an inspiration to everybody he works with in uniform and out. So please join me in welcoming a great soldier, leader and thinker, Pete Correlli. Trying to make ends meet here in Washington D.C. And I'm more than happy to have you out for lunch. My son would be back there but he's mooching on us for the entire summer. First of all, I know the topic of what I'm supposed to talk about today is the Army approach to savings and efficiencies initiative. And I am going to talk about that but you're going to have to bear with me because I really do need to kind of set the stage. Because I think this stage plays really a critical role in why we're doing what we're doing and how we're going to go about this process. And I think it's probably the most misunderstood thing coming out of these nine years of war. I don't really think people totally understand the total impact of the volunteer force, what nine and a half years of war does to a force in more ways than one and really how it is creating challenges for us from personnel management to equipping. And I promise I will get to the process but bear with me will I take about five or ten minutes to set the stage. Next slide, please. I believe and I always get into with the claws of which guys we get into these fights all the time. I really believe though that warfare as we know it has changed forever. It has fundamentally changed. And it will remain a combination of Connecticut and non-Connecticut effects. Albeit many of us would like to go back to simpler times. That's just not the way it is. And these two diagrams show that. I mean I grew up for 31 years in the United States Army believing that somewhere along there there was this imaginary line called the forward edge of the battle area and everybody on the other side was a bad guy. And we normally started to the south for whatever reason I couldn't believe and we tacked to the north and those of us who lived in the north. But anyway. But there were areas in that battlefield that were basically safe. The division rear, army rear areas. And we went into this fight with a bunch of up armored Humvees. I had eight up armored Humvees in the entire division in 2004. Eight up armored Humvees and they all belonged to my MPs. And why? Because they were going to react to any threat in the rear area and they were going to need that armored protection when they reacted to that threat. Lo and behold I had many, many more than eight up armored Humvees. And if you watch the progression of where the Humvee has gone in about six or seven different models and now we're into our second group of MRAT vehicles being fielded you can see that things have really changed and this non-linear fight is totally different. Next slide please. Our soldiers are out there doing offense, defense and stability operations all the time. And as you can see here the probability and the range, everything from non-lethal to lethal. They transition from kinetic fighting to non-kinetic fighting sometimes in a week, sometimes in a day, sometimes in an hour, sometimes in a matter of minutes. And they have to be able to make that transition exceedingly quick. It has changed really where the game changing decisions are made on the battlefield. I like to say they resided with general officers sitting in command posts with perfect visibility of what was going on because the only person that has perfect visibility of what's going on is a soldier down on the ground. And we believe, the Army believes, and our doctrine reads that full-spectrum operations is a combination of all these things. And when we speak full-spectrum we aren't talking the far right side as you look at this, the lethal, the very, very kinetic kind of fight. That to us is not full-spectrum. Full-spectrum to us runs that entire range from non-lethal up to lethal. But one of the questions you have to ask yourself with the protection afforded by the Humvee today, is there any environment, I mean, a good example where we could see employing the Humvee, at least without not having a backup of some other kind of armor vehicle that provides additional particular under-body protection. And these things are happening all the time in various forms. Next slide, please. Now, General Shinseki, I think, really was ahead of his time when he said this. We are a proud organization steeped in history. Yet, as I walk around the building in the time that I've been there, there seem to be many that are determined to remain in the glory days of old, resisting progress and the changes that have been thrust upon us, and they have been thrust upon us. The reality today is that blended formations are the norm in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are blended. Tankers are hot-seating, and I have a rough time even getting that to come off of my tongue, because if you had come to me ten years ago and told me that I have to hot-seat my tank, and for those of you who don't know, that means I don't own my own tank. My tank is part of a pool of tanks, and I get a different one every day, kind of the way an Apache pilot does the same thing. I would have told you, you're crazy. But that is the norm today. We are doing it all the time. Infantrymen from the 82nd and the 101st are riding around in 15-ton vehicles equipped to carry four soldiers. Now, I'm not talking mech infantrymen. I'm talking infantrymen from the 101st and the 82nd. That's absolutely amazing. And what does that do to the battlefield? I mean, just think of the maintenance. A little more maintenance to do on that vehicle than there was in your rucksack, or changing your shocks on the objective, or whatever it might be. It has truly changed. Our IBCTs, our Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, are untested formations. We have not fought a single IBCT the way it was designed in eight-and-a-half years of war. We have not. Every one of them has been fought with the addition of theater-supplied equipment, different equipment, much of the equipment we don't have available during their train-up phase, and we have to issue it to them downrange because of the rapid inclusion of off-the-shelf equipment. The linear force that defined our Army for generations, characterized by distinct formations, exists today only in our TONEs, and on PowerPoint slides briefed in the Pentagon. And I get a kick out of that when people start talking about that. I mean, I have TONEs that list the communications equipment that is in each one of my brigade combat teams. Now, if you believe that, I have got something to sell you, because the proliferation of COTS off-the-shelf capabilities that has been rapidly moved into the theater means that until I go out and actually do an inventory of what that unit is using today, I have no idea what communications equipment is being used. In meantime, we have adopted a modular construct at the brigade level that has enhanced our ability to respond to any situation quickly and effectively. But if you really think about it, when we went from a division-centered or focused formation, and portfolio reviews have pointed this out to me very, very clearly, we went to a much more inefficient way of fielding forces. Just think about logistics. We now have to provide that capability to the brigade combat team, where that truck company located at division was parsed out based on a need. In order to make that available to that brigade combat team, we've had to provide additional wheeled stock to them in order to be able to do what they do. I'm not criticizing it. In fact, I think it is exactly the right way to go, and it is given the success we've had today, but it does change things. Next slide, please. You don't need to... I just want to make sure everybody understands that the Army has changed its force generation model. We have gone to what we call the Army force generation model, and it basically says in simple terms that every unit goes through three cycles. When it comes back from deployment, it goes through a reset cycle. It's run somewhere in the vicinity of 180 days. It goes into a train-ready cycle, and then finally it goes into an available cycle. We plan under this particular cycle to be able to provide for the National Command Authority, one core five divisions, 20 BCT, and 90,000 enablers at any one time. And you can see here with an important piece, once we get to a one-to-two dwell of also being able to provide a contingency force, something in excess of that available force should the nation need it. This is a very important process here that really changes as we look at how we're going to institute efficiencies the way we have to do that. Next slide, please. And this is, again, General Shinseki. And you know, when I left the building, this was the slide, the kind of the money slide. It basically said that we had a legacy force, an objective force, and an internal force, and sooner or later they were going to come together in the objective force. And I left the building to go off to the 1st Calvary Division and then back with 5th Corps back into Iraq for a second time. And I thought I was going to come back and see this objective force. And I'll never forget the very first briefing. And in the eight months in between my two rotations, I got a little briefing on where we were going. Wait a second, that objective force is really now only 15 Brigade Combat Teams. It just proved too expensive. And we were looking at a legacy force, an internal force, an objective force, and some other kind of force. This thing had really split apart. But in reality, General Shinseki was right. What we were unable to do back here has happened in theater. Just about every Brigade Combat Team, no matter how they're organized or set up back here, goes into theater, draws the same equipment, and looks exactly the same. They look exactly the same when you give them their theater-provided equipment. That's what has happened. And that goes back to those infantrymen from the 82nd and the 101st in 15-ton vehicles and tankers without tanks. And that is, in fact, what we're seeing. Next slide, please. This is important when you understand how we're going to try to meet the Secretary of Defense's guidance. The enemy we face has taken a great advantage of simple, affordable technologies such as cell phones and other rudimentary components used to make improvised explosive devices to command and control his forces and usher in a new form of information warfare. And he is using that. And if we don't quickly use it, he will use it against us. I recently had a briefing as part of the Portfolio Reviews, which I'll talk about in a second, where I looked at the different sensor packages that we're putting in our different UASs. And what I found out is that 70% of them are caught off the shelf. Only 30% of them have come through any acquisition system. They are caught off the shelf. And what does that mean for you? Well, that means that they've been brought on board and is not part of that system. They really don't have a sustainability tail to them. We don't necessarily have all the DOTLAM PF worked out for them. We've got to bring them on board to make sure that we can sustain them once we come back and we don't have, you know, OCO funding to rely on to do much of this. And it's not just in sensor packages for UASs. It's in just about everything we have. Next slide, please. Our Army acquisition process was able to keep pace with technology, but I argue today that it is no longer able to do that. We can no longer wait for 8 to 10 years or 12 years in some instances to get something from a requirement to the soldier in the field. I believe that if we want to say relevant and effective in this new strategic environment, we have got to update our processes so that we're able to keep pace with technology. I am waiting to get the email from a particular company that my fourth iteration of their product is available for me to pick up at my local store. I've had four of them in about a three and a half year period, or I will when I get the fourth one. Each one of them has given me more capability at successively less cost. I was recently at a demonstration we're doing for the network and saw someone who had taken a touch, added an app to it, and they were taking the SUG-V and using it as a controller for the SUG-V. Now, you might say, well, that damn thing is not hardened. It's not a soldier banging it all around. For the cost of economy is scaled that the United States could buy a device like that, we could basically give one as opposed to some of the cost we pay for quote-unquote the common controller. There's only common to that which an individual can see in his particular view. If you want to hear what I consider the greatest oxymoron in the United States Army, it's the concept of the common controller. I've got about 15 or 16 common controllers that are currently under development right now. Could I in fact have 15 or 16 apps or 20 apps or 30 apps that allow me to put it on some other kind of a device and control that same thing? And quite frankly, I was able to take this thing and I thought control the SUG-V as well as I could with anything else. But there are some issues we've got to work through. There's no doubt about it, but it really is kind of an interesting way to look at things. But technology is changing so rapidly. And in order to get that to the field, we've really got to look at the way we're doing things. Next slide, please. Now, you've all heard, and now we'll get to the part I think you came here for. Let me talk about what the Secretary said. This was kind of a lead into his speech and we pulled out some of the things. You know, he talked about what Eisenhower said. Indeed, any nation could only be as military strong as it was economically dynamic and fiscally sound. And we in the Army, as you look through this, really felt about last February that, you know, no great sages, but sooner or later we're going to start going down this road. So we began the process of looking how we were going to look at what really is a complicated thing. Because with all these changes that have taken place over time, you also face what I see at my level is this dichotomy between OCO and the base. And if you look at the OCO or what used to be called the supplemental, you would think it's very, very easy in every single instance to determine that which is an actual cost that can be attributed to the war as opposed to that which is not. And quite frankly it's not always as easy as one would like it to be in doing that. And you can read here what the Secretary said. Let's go to the next slide please. This is the one, and this guidance is really the guidance that I feel like we were lucky enough to kind of get out ahead and begin this entire process of what I'll explain in a second, our series of portfolio reviews. But as you see here, the Secretary first makes the point that the base budget is doubled over the last decade with the increase in OCO, and we have seen that. The cost of war is huge. There's no real progress towards saving will be possible without reforming our budgeting practices and assumptions. Too often budgets are divided up and doled out every year as we straight line projection of what is spent a year before. Very rarely is the activity funded in these areas ever fundamentally reexamined. And that is the basis behind what we're doing with the portfolio review, is to go back and take a look. And the last line is really critical. The department's approach to requirements must change. And that is literally what we've been able to start the process of looking at. Now, I won't take, the people responsible for this look quite frankly are the Congress of the United States. Because in an NDAA, they set up a requirement that I was on the front end for what is known as a configuration steering board. Which is the requirement to go back and look at individual weapons systems depending once a year. And I, as a brand new vice at that time, they had put a deadline for us to get to our largest programs and to do this entire process. And I began sitting in these with my acquisition friends. Next slide please. And as I did that, I'll never forget going into one where I was briefed on an individual program in CSB format which was a particular rocket system, a precision guided rocket system and saying, wow, this makes all kinds of sense in the world. This is fantastic. This is exactly what we should be doing. But as schedules go and the way that they had scheduled this, there was another precision briefing that took place about four and a half months later. And when that individual system was laid out to me, it said, wow, this is fantastic. This is really the way to go. And then I went back and I said, but, hey, isn't there some, you know, duplication between this system and the one that was briefed to me four and a half months ago? And are these the only two precision systems, rocket systems the United States Army has? And I sent my guys out to look and, oh, lo and behold, we had all kinds of systems. And as you can see there, the very first one of these did was in the area of precision fires. And precision fires was absolutely essential to us because, you know, it's one thing to have a D-MIL account. And I think you all know what I'm talking about. Ammunition reaches a life where the QASIS guys, at least I call them QASIS guys, but they probably aren't at this level. They're probably something else. Tankers never like QASIS guys because they come and make you clean all the ammunition you didn't shoot. So we normally shot it all. However, as you know, all this stuff has got a shelf life on it, an amount of time that you can keep it. And it's one thing to go ahead and have something roll into D-MIL because you can no longer shoot it if it's a 60 to a $600 round that has reached its life and you've got to go ahead and D-MIL it. But then when you looked at the cost of some of these precision munitions and the numbers we were buying them and you said to yourself, wow, we had better make sure that we don't have a D-MIL account in excess of 20% or 25% because at these costs, that is a lot of money. Now, you can't cut it so thin because we are a nation that has to be reactive, there's situations around the world. But at the same time, when you look at the cost of some of these precision munitions, it became clear to me that we really needed to have a new way of looking at these to make sure that we didn't have redundancy and duplication in the system and that we were buying exactly what we needed. Now, the Port Voleo reviews, as you can see here, are a total service-wide reconciliation of requirements. This is a lot like making sausage. You would think that you could call folks in and say, okay, where did the requirement for this come from? Why are we buying so many of X? But quite frankly, it usually takes three or four sessions for me to finally get down to that. With the additional cost of weapons, what you'll see time and time again is many times the number we're buying is based on a cost curve. And for those of you who understand the neat of the curve, it's just kind of amazing that when you really can't find common sense for why you're buying so much of one thing, that when you ask somebody to kind of lay out when do we hit the knee and the curve, that, oh, God, that number just happens to line up with the number you're buying, let alone where, as all along, I'm sitting there trying to divide the number of tanks into the number of rounds and say, it can carry this many with this many, so many basic loads. Well, none of that, in fact, works. I remember looking at one precision munition where I had more launchers by a factor of two than the missiles I was going to buy in the five-year program. Now, that's an amazing thing. Next slide, please. And these are the portfolios they currently reside. This is what we're working our way through. And we've started this in January. The secretary told the undersecretary of the Army who is in charge of this entire process. I do the sausage making, get through the staff to try to understand what the issues are out here, and then I bring it to the under in what we call a session two, where we get down to a series of recommendations and making sure that he understands what we've got out there, so that he can make the decision on what we will take to the secretary of the Army and to the chief, and that's exactly what happens. We started out with precision fires. We went to aviation. And in aviation, as you can see there, I've listed the three components that we've taken a look at. This has been a very, very interesting thing for me. Aviation is the only area where we are functionally organized. The ability of aviation to answer my questions on requirements is so much greater than any one of the other areas. There's something to that whole process. Our ability to basically put aviators in a one-to-one bogged well, which they are right now, with the demands in Iraq, Afghanistan. If they were organized like any other function in the United States Army, I do not think we would be able to do it. I really am high on the way that Dick Cody and those before me organized aviation. I can go to a single individual who can tell me where every single pilot is, instructor pilot is, who we're pumping through school, where a particular aircraft is and the reset process is absolutely amazing. And if there's anything that's hard to keep on a one-to-one dwell, when you realize the requirements of reset of a very complicated piece of equipment, like a helicopter, it is aviation. We went on to an engineer portfolio. The network is pervasive in all of this today. As you know, I think the network is fundamental to the United States Army. It is the centerpiece of our modernization program. And we started to see pieces of the network, not only in aviation and precision fires, quite frankly, but down into engineers, air and missile defense. You can go right on down the line. Combat vehicle modernization, tactical-wheeled vehicles. That's where I really stumbled onto the fact of, you know, hey, the brigade combat team construct is not as efficient as I looked at our requirements for Humvees and LMTVs as they had grown over time. Radios, I've already talked about the network. There are some exciting things happening there. I was recently out to a demonstration out at Fort Bliss, Texas, where I saw two-watt radios assisted by another two-watt radio, tethered to an aerostat at 700 feet. Two-watt radio, using SRW Waveform, talked 35 to 50 kilometers. 35 to 50 kilometers. Absolutely amazing. And that's just not talk, that's past data. I think of all the times that the National Training Center and other places where I've had to maneuver, you know, some retrance team to a top of a hill, we're strapping the same two-watt radio on shadows that are out looking for other things, and that two-watt radio is extending coverage 35, 40 kilometers all around the battlefield. Exciting stuff. Now, on the right-hand side, you see that portion of the portfolios that are in the generating force. We're working very, very hard now, we've begun this process to look at workforce composition, the size of the operational force, as opposed to what we call the generating force, some folks call infrastructure. We're still living with pre-2001, I believe, definitions of what is in the generating force. We've really got to look at that hard. There are things in the generating force that are on a bog-dwell ratio right now, as great as Army aviation. But because of where they are, they're considered as part of the generating force, and we are in the process now of trying to redefine that so we really understand it. We've moved into the Army training strategy, installation management, 676 programs. I've identified in installation management that we have come up with metrics that we're bouncing them off with so we can consolidate after we have taken a look at what needs, in fact, what is working and what's not working and what soldiers need. Sustainment accounts and organizational structure. Now, those portfolios will change and they have turned into a fire drill for the staff because we realized that we had a very limited amount of time to do this. And it's been tough. We have been riding the staff hard in order to get them out and there's been a lot of front-end work that has had to be done, a lot of work we've had to go to and ask folks to run through models for us to make sure that we've got it right and we can support the decisions we bring to the Undersecretary and to the leadership of the Army. Next slide, please. This is the example. This was the first one I sat down. It was Excalibur. And, man, you can have an Excalibur guy get up there and tell you all the capability of Excalibur and it sounds fantastic and it is fantastic. You just see the cost. Like any one of these systems, they start out pretty expensive. Some of the first ones were much more expensive than $100,000. But then if you buy enough of them, you get them down to $47,000 around. But before too long, you start saying, well, that's opposed to what? 10 meters, okay? As opposed to a good old, dumb, you know, 1.55 round that will get you within 50 meters. Maybe a little bit better with some of the different technologies we can use today. It looks pretty good and you can make a strong case with it when you look at it like that. But then when I said lay out the entire portfolio. Next slide, you see all the different things that we've got doing this. And it's not only all the different things that we've got providing precision effects on the battlefield, but it's the numbers that you're buying. And then you look at Excalibur and you say, wow, that gets me inside 10 kilometers. But then you look at something like PGK is another one we're looking at that doesn't quite have the same kind of accuracy, but comes in as a kit that goes on that old $600 projectile and quite frankly, you know, it's cheaper. Doesn't give you that same inside 10 kilometers, but when are you going to need inside 10 kilometers? And then you go down to the old Mortarman down there with precision mortar and you think about, well, how much do I want to give that E6? How many rounds am I going to give him at whatever cost in order to fire? And they said, well, let's send it out to the field and see what they think about it. Well, I can tell you what they're going to think about. They're going to think about it. It's the greatest thing since sliced bread. That's what they're going to think about it. But the issue is do you have the TTP out there to say when you use that and when you use something else. And as we kind of look at the cost of these and you can see some of the dollars here and now you get into the air and missile defense systems down here, where you're looking at the cost of a THAAD missile, PAC-3 MSE and what those are causing. You've got to make darn sure that you've gone back, looked at the requirement, justified the requirement, made sure the requirement's right. And then the same thing goes with personnel. I mean, as I was looking at the generating force, somebody said, well, let's just go ahead and put a 20% cut and say, okay, we'll let attrition take its way. And attrition's like shaking a dice. Okay, if you go with attrition, you're going to tread out of some organizations that don't have enough and you're not going to tread out of some organizations that are doing the same job that somebody else is doing. That may be a way to get to where you want to go, but you better understand what the requirement is beforehand. And it's pretty simple. But it is so hard when you look at an organization the size of the army to sit down and say we can no longer throw a requirement over the transom to the acquisition community and the process we have to go through to get it over there so they can start to. We can no longer do that without revisiting. And it's not revisiting to gold-plated and make it different. It's revisiting to understand as it goes through its developmental cycle is this rocket that was thought to cost less than $100,000 that maybe now is costing over $300,000. How far down the line would you get before you say, wait a second, red flag needs to go up? We need to review that and say whether or not this is something that the army can afford into the future. And that's literally what we're doing. Final slide, please. Challenges. How do we institutionalize this process? That is my biggest challenge. Because I am honestly of the belief that I need to revisit certain requirements six to 12 months out. Can you go back? Thanks, Martin. That's why I didn't want to do that. And I've got a team now. The secretary, the under, told me that I need to report back to him by December how we institutionalize the process. How do we make this part of the way the army does business at looking at requirements? Again, I think we have to take a look at it in some requirements every six months and see if they're still valid. We need to look harder at incremental bills and get other folks to understand. I get very, very frustrated with the network. My example of the network is we go to somebody with a requirement. I envision 1985. I envision that someday we will have Windows 7 capability. And somebody in the acquisition system looks at you and says okay, when you got Windows 7 capability, you go ahead and field it. So this is 1985 and 2010. I feel that way many times when I look at different systems. We decide that we're going to put on a particular waveform every single radio, every single waveform that's being developed. And it becomes part of the requirement for the system. But then you find out that one of the waveforms has taken a little longer to develop and you end up slowing down the entire system when it's exactly what the soldier needs in the field, we've already built that other waveform but I can't get through the wickets I've got to get through. We need to better identify hidden redundancy and again that's my common controller issue. Is it important to have a common controller for a series of systems or can we do the same with apps? Can we design an operating environment? What is that going to save us in order to get there? And we need to refine the current portfolios because they're not where they need to be. There's an iterative process that we're working our way through and we know we're going to have to do a heck of a lot more to understand dynamically how these work throughout the building both in a process way through the peg process that we have in the United States Army and now that we're going in the budget process. So that quite frankly if I had to sum it up in a couple of words is the Army in trying to do what the secretary has asked us to do has gone to the third bullet he said and that is look at requirements. Are they still valid requirements? Are they still needed by the United States Army and do we have redundancy throughout the system? And with that I'll stop and take your question. Thank you very much General. I want to open it up shortly to everybody in the audience. If you could just identify yourself when you get the microphone and be brief in your question that would be much appreciated. Let me take the prerogative of the chair and ask the first one about the process that you described and the extent to which you include or make assumptions about joint capabilities and how they contribute to your requirement setting. That's absolutely. It is truly a critical piece of this whole thing and one of the things the chief is doing is taking this process and talked about it in the different forums that he has and making the argument that much of this needs to expand into the joint world. What I have found in the area of precision munitions that when I'm relying on a particular let's say munition at the Air Force has a high stake in that when the Air Force makes changes that may add capability that they need in this particular system that the price of that system goes up without me really knowing it and something that was and quite frankly would have cost X amount of money goes up by a factor of two when I'm relying on that joint system. You've got to take a look at this and say I've only in that precision munitions slide shows those capabilities that you are inherent to the United States Army when you take a look at the joint capabilities that are there quite frankly I feel much more I feel much better with some of the decisions we've made given the fact that we will always fight joint and they bring many of those same capabilities to the battlefield. So I really think that that's absolutely critical. Okay people have questions and raise your hands and we'll come around with a microphone. Great talk. And you are? I'm sorry from Penn State University. General Crowley how does this affect the QDR process? It sounds to me like in some ways what you're doing is sort of institutionalizing and it may be very appropriate almost an ongoing continuous QDR because if not you could say to some degree how do you rationalize this continuous process of portfolio review and validating requirements against the requirement every five years just like we did to come up with the QDR which many people become skeptical in itself not necessarily tied in closely with the process. And that's one of the things we've looked at with capability packages. I mean we've literally gone to a new way of working equipment through the palm cycle where we're looking at capability packages that are two-year packages that go out. Marty Dempsey I don't know if you're following any of this stuff he's doing down at TRADOC but if you try to look out and say what we're going to look like 20 years from now that's just too hard. I can't figure that out. I mean the best I can do is two to five years and as we think our way through this. I hate to keep coming to this example but in this phone that I'm going to pick up I've gone from being able to snap a picture and send it over to the internet to this newest model of having high definition capability on it. I mean that's absolutely amazing in a two and a half year period and we're seeing that kind of technology change across the board and that technology has had a huge impact on our enemy's ability to use these pretty simple, cheap systems and quite frankly defeat some of the things that we try to do with individuals who are always talking off the same handset so to speak. So I think I really believe we've got to look at the entire process but quite frankly right now I'm trying to focus on the United States Army and how we're going to eat this bear. It becomes daunting at times. I mean when you look at a generating force that from a a green suitor side has gone from 114,000 to just over 92,000 right now but then if you look at the Department of the Army civilians which have increased by 40,000 over that same time period and oh by the way you go out and look at the other pile which is contractors which are over 100,000 right now do you have repetitive and redundancies throughout a force that's somewhere in the vicinity of 450,000 folks and I got to tell you you do but how do you get at that? You can't get at it through attrition you've got to sit down and look at the individual requirements and figure out a way that you can attack that to see how these things have occurred over time and that's literally it is a daunting task sounds easy up here but it's extremely difficult okay we'll go over here Bill Courtney with CSE a former senior DoD officials had a briefing recently in which he reports that a striker brigade combat team would replace 45 contractors who perform maintenance on the strikers with 71 soldiers is that true and is that being done for efficiency's sake or for some other purpose? Well when we field the striker because of the timeline we were on we relied on contract maintenance we are now moving to soldier maintenance in the maintenance of the striker so we because we did that so quick and didn't do it through the normal DOTLAM PF way of doing things we had to rely on contract maintenance on the front end of that and we are transitioning to soldiers today I believe it will right here in the back the PBS news hour I've heard the Air Force is going to offer a retirement of A-10s in their budget drill how does that impact the Army? I haven't heard that you know I mean you ask in a tanker what it would mean not to have the A-10s that's unfair that's unfair I revere those guys they're my kind of pilots they get down and mix it up with us so I'm a I'm a great supporter of the A-10 but I'm again I'm totally focused on the Army and I have not heard that the Air Force is going to do that sorry back there in the back and then up here Thanks it's Tom Shanker with the New York Times General thanks for your time and the CIS for hosting the session I was curious the effort that you just described is based on the Secretary's vision that Congress will vote a 1% real growth and that your efficiencies will find 3% more in savings to keep this 4% of the Secretary and the Chairman want if you listen to Congress if you listen to the American people we may be at one of those historic tipping points when defense spending is going to drop far more significantly how big of a concern is that to you General are you doing any red teaming on that now and if money drops more than you can save here what does the Army do? well I mean we are a people based organization and when you look at the United States Army and understand costs you've got to look at the cost of people I think you would have to have your head in the saying not to be concerned and looking at those kinds of scenarios I mean we all understand and I think the Secretary in the few phrases that I put up there indicated that we've got some real economic issues we've got to work through but we know what the Secretary has asked us to do that's what we're doing now but I will tell you whatever the efficiencies that we find as we go through this requirements drill of trying to ensure that we've got requirements right we're not going to be tied to anything I think it's the belief and I know it's a belief of the Under Secretary of the Army and the leadership of the Army that we don't want to spend one dime more of the taxpayers money than we have to spend and this drill started out before that with an eye toward doing exactly that making sure that we were spending the money that has been given to us in a way that we can look every taxpayer in the eye and say that this was needed If I could just ask a quick follow up to that because four structures essentially off the table when this efficiencies drill excuse me I have a hard time with this and given how much of a cost driver that is in the defense budget large and certainly for the Army how do you square that circle how far down the path can you go without taking on a personnel cost issue that's why I've got to get through the requirements that is what is so absolutely essential about what I'm doing right now because the easy thing is to go after and say let's take out a brigade because you can quantify that pretty quickly but when I'm sitting on the other hat that I wear in risk reduction health promotion and suicide prevention and I see the stress that's been on this force for nine years stress that I don't think is totally understood outside the Army and those of you who have folks that are in the Army that can attest to what it means to be on your third, fourth or fifth deployment I have to hope that we will get everybody to one to two and what I mean by that is that they have actually experienced a powerful two years back home there's this idea that once you hit the magical one to two and you can say we are currently at a one to two that is only a number that somebody will care about the guy who's down there still isn't at one to two until he's had two years at home that's when he'll be at two years and that's going to be two years after you've hit the mythical one to two and as you well know the chief's goal is to get us to one to three because that's where we really think we need to be so when we started this in February it was an eye towards listen we are an organization that requires people and we better make darn sure that everything we're not spending on people is something we really, really need if we're going to meet the goals that the chief has had for almost four years now or three and a half years and that's getting the Army back in balance two quick questions as you go through your review process here how do you consider how do you consider total system costs to include people and total life cycle costs when you do these reviews and then secondly in any area where you find affordability challenges what process do you have now in the Army that comes back to the industry to say hey look we've got this problem what can you do to help us out here because we've got some challenges the process of the reviews that that's becoming something that we continue to work on I will tell you we take in to account the total cost the life system cost of a particular system that has got to be part of it and we use AMSA and all the other modeling agents we've got to run those models for us to tell us what this really means now you know one of the things that talks about the personnel savings on some of the systems we have was personnel savings were based on a very linear kind of fight a fight where there would be a particular thing that we could put somewhere behind the line and really not provide it the same kind of protection we'd have to be on a non-linear battlefield where anything no matter where it is outside the fob and even to indirect and direct attack inside the fob is a danger so one of the problems I have is many of the requirements that people were looking at was based on that that linear battlefield and when I apply that same system to the non-linear battlefield a lot of things change you know one of the hardest things for me Galen is to get through the role that I can play with industry given the laws that are out there and I got to tell you I've been feared I literally do of somehow doing something where somewhere it is written that I am in fact violating the law so we've learned from the portfolio reviews there are people that are much more able to work with industry and talk with industry than maybe I am in the role that I play in this process the other part I have is a mere issue of time so the political leadership of the army is I believe I'm going to work much much harder with industry to make sure that we're talking to them throughout this entire process but you know it's one thing to say don't talk to me I'm not the one making the decisions I'm kind of the orchestrator now who's trying to tee these things up industry normally talks at levels in excruciating detail about the things they can and cannot do and believe me the people they talk to run it up the flag pool to me almost immediately so I hear it one way or the other but I grant you this is something that we've got to take a hard look at okay Arnaud one of the ball graph CSIS general the two part question first is on tank warfare understand we still have 8,000 tanks being used in the future and the other concerns what general McPeak forecast at the end of Gulf War 1 you said you could see the pilot being taken out of the cockpit within 20 years and on your radar what do you see as the future for robotic warfare do you think it's coming and how soon will it be here I think it's coming at a greater level than we know today I mean we are looking at a multifunctional aviation battalion that relies on a certain portion of it being unmanned aerial vehicles and we think that makes all kinds of sense but does that mean we're going to take the pilot out of the helicopter no I don't believe that at all there's still going to be a key and critical role for that individual to play when it comes to the number of tanks we've got we're I will tell you know the M1 and I had absolutely nothing to do with it but when I look at what we're trying to go with GCV quite frankly that's where I would like to see us what it be able to do to develop a basic system that goes through a series of incremental builds that can have a vehicle that is relevant today on the battlefield as it was 20-25 years ago and I'd be careful of totally riding off the tank I don't think we need the numbers that we possibly have today and one of the things we're doing in our combat vehicle modernization strategy is taking a look at the role of the tank, the Bradley all our systems into the future and what we really need to have I mean General Shinseki's objective force whether or not we're able to do it back here I'm telling you you go down range and you take the patches off of guys you go around and see how they're equipped down there you'll have a rough time figuring out who's who if you understand what I'm saying they the force when it gets over there and draws that theater provided equipment and equipment that's needed for the fight we truly have that objective force and it changes every rotation so to answer your question we're looking at both and we're definitely looking at the role of all our combat vehicles in future conflict go right here in defense news is the army getting enough direction for what kinds of wars to prepare for and a quick follow up how difficult is it to make these kinds of resourcing decisions when preparing for full spectrum operations which seem to require almost everything you know the process is really worked very very well and I feel very comfortable in what we're doing here we're now just sitting around a table and letting a whole bunch of folks pontificate and making some decisions we did the precision munitions mix we sent it out had different models run against different kinds of scenarios to see what availability we would need of certain systems we looked at certain precision munitions that are owned and operated by other services with our reliance on them you know could we in fact get at stockpiles of those and quite frankly the answer many times is no you know you might say we'll have no particular problem with getting a hold of this particular bullet that the Air Force owns because the Air Force will always have some that they can give you well that's not the case but we found when we looked at many of those things if the Air Force owns the bullet or the Navy owns the bullet from the time we need it to when we can get it based on them trying to do the same thing to control their inventories might take one or two years but I think we're getting the guidance and Marty Dempsey is just doing an absolutely amazing job at looking into the future as far as he can see and helping us put together both the doctrine and the organizations we're going to need to understand how the Army has to fight in the future I think that the thing I always have problems with force structure is we're kind of fun to play with we're kind of like a pro football team you can say man if I just had a better left tackle or two more left tackles I would have done a heck of a lot better you know it's a lot easier than saying god dang we need 20 aircraft carriers or is it 10 we need you can adjust us a lot quicker well you used to be able to adjust us a lot quicker but now that we are a volunteer force it takes us a little while longer but kind of messing with Army force structure is you know that's kind of like money morning quarterbacking oh man the Army really screwed up I think really when you look at it if you really have the ability to look into the future and tell me exactly what I'm going to need particularly in the area of force structure or technology is going in some of these particular areas please come and sit in on our portfolio reviews because we really need that kind of thought in there as we try to make some of these decisions but looking into the future with the rapid change we're seeing is becoming more and more difficult okay I think we have time for two more questions so this one and this one and then we'll let the general get back to decision making on that note I've read that the 15 June draft by HR McMaster on the Army concept of operations is talking about force mix and design and suggesting that we push to the brigade level from the division and core level capabilities either to not at that level HR, logistics, engineering so forth that seems to or could have implications for cost savings I know many men, money and materiel get moved from one place to another we're not reducing the top line but we're moving it around to hopefully increase capability war fighting capability does that concept of operations document still in draft seems to me it has serious implications for headquarters like division are they still needed in the same context at the same cost level yeah well that's a great question sir and if you go back to the arphogen model and you realize a certain portion of your force is going to be in reset for 180 days and quite frankly when they're in reset that's what they're doing they're resetting they're going and doing individual training in some instance going to individual schools and so on and so forth is it important that they have the UAV ready to fly well it only is if you don't believe in hot seating okay if you say that gog on it we need to have the ability to send all 547,000 troops to the field at any one time fully operational and ready to go I don't know if we can afford that particularly is the cost of this stuff goes up so one of the things we've done and looked at UASs is we may build more force structure in UASs and we build UASs and it's not just the cost of the UAS it's the cost of the sensor package so in a way if you utilize more UASs in theater unless UAS is back home to train with with all the accrutiments it becomes much easier as technology changes to be able to do the upgrades that are necessary to make sure that you're at the front end of this thing so we're looking at different ways and that you make me feel good that I at least showed that slide that slide has huge implications for the United States Army huge implications in our equipping strategies and that's what we're looking at now yeah and now you start to even see some additional savings that you might be able to garner in a whole bunch of different areas okay, last question right up here thank you, thank you general Sebastian Springer with Inside the Army what have you been told by the Ground Combat Vehicle Red Team about the workability of the 7 year Fielding Strategy they're still working through that right now and I look forward to a full report once they're complete okay that note, thank you very much general for coming, we very much appreciate it thanks I probably wasn't one