 Okay, thank you for joining this session. I fully realize that you had to choose among four very interesting sessions. So I hope we will not disappoint you. I will talk about perceived political representation by ordinary Rwandan and Burundian citizens. And this is a paper quartered by Heginas who's sitting there and by Bert who very sadly passed away in February. And we were working together on the first version of this paper at that time. And now Heginas and I are trying to finish the paper without Bert, so we welcome all of your comments to help us fill his shoes. We are a multidisciplinary team using mixed methods. And this is largely thanks to Bert who collected really a unique life history database. As an anthropologist, it's not so unusual that he collects life histories, but he really collected many of 700 Rwandan and Burundian respondents. Also unique is at least for an anthropologist that he stratified the sample across locations, seven in Havana, six in Burundi. He also stratified a sample across ethnic groups in both countries. And also unique he added a systematic element to the life histories. He asked each respondent to rank his or her level of perceived political representation throughout all life history years on a scale of minus five to plus five. And also very interestingly, every time a respondent reported a change in rank, he or she was asked to explain. So to give a reason for the change. And this gives us a data set of narratives of change. And here you see some examples. To allow us to analyze these narratives, we coded them. And we used the four dimensions of political representation proposed by Hanapitkin. I'm not sure when you're familiar with these four dimensions. Here are some illustrations that hint at them. The first is formalistic representation or the formal acts such as elections and peace accords. Then you have descriptive representation or the resemblance between the representative and the represented. For instance, in terms of ethnic identity, you have the symbolic representation or the feelings and emotions that representation evokes. And then you have substantive representation or the way that the represented benefit from the work of the representative. So policies in short. Other ways of dividing political representation or for instance between input legitimacy, or the standing four dimension and the acting four dimension, whereby acting for an output legitimacy corresponded with substantive representation. So armed with these data sets, we look at the following research question. Who among these ordinary Rwandan and Buhundian citizens reports gains or losses in political representation after mass categorical violence and why? We think this is an important question. Of course, otherwise you wouldn't study it because political representation, as was also said in the introduction, is highly, sometimes highly related to ethnic identity and underlies identity-based political violence and when not resolved, it can reunite violence. In terms of contribution, we think that the main contribution is that we bring in the local perspective because power sharing approaches have been discussed from a theory level from the perspective of elites, et cetera, but not really from the perspective of ordinary citizens. So we bring this in. We do so based on a comparison between Rwandan and Buhundian. These are countries that have some commonalities such as a similar ethnic divide between a Hutu majority and a Tutsi minority. Mass ethnic violence, but also a reversal of ethnic power relations after violence, but there are important differences. After violence, when the Tutsi minority in the form of a Tutsi elite gathered around Kagame actually monopolized power, they introduced a policy of, let's call it ethnic amnesia with unity or reconciliation narrative. So ethnicity is banned from public space and public discourse, but de facto a small Tutsi elite has monopolized power. In sharp contrast, in Buhundi, ethnicity was made explicit in political power relations by means of a network ethnic quota system. So it's the opposite way of dealing with this ethnic antagonism. In addition, also in terms of economic recovery, there is a large divide whereas Hohanna has been applauded for its economic miracles or important socioeconomic achievements after war. Buhundi is rather characterized by economic stagnation and decline. So in the context of these two countries, our general research question translates into the following specific questions. Do Hutu in Hohanna, who before the violence monopolized power, perceive decrease in political representation as they lose descriptive representation? And the same thing for Tutsi in Buhundi, who also monopolized power prior to the violence and then lost power, albeit in this ethnic quota system after violence. Can this loss in perceived political representation due to a decline in descriptive representation be tempered in this approach of an ethnic amnesia or the ethnic quota approach? What tempers the loss in perceived political representation more when there is a reconciliation narrative or when there is a very explicit ethnic quota system? And finally, can the standing forward, the acting forward dimensions or substantive representation compensate for the loss in descriptive representation? Finding one, here are the rankings of perceived political representation for Hutu and Tutsi in Hohanna over time, going from 1985 to 2015. What you see is a sharp decline in perceived political representation for Tutsi in Buhundi, who lost the monopoly on power. So descriptive representation matters for them. The same data, but for Hohanna. Hutu in Hohanna, who also lost their monopoly on power, also feel that their political representation declined, but it's much less a one-unit decline versus a four-unit decline for Tutsi in Buhundi. So what mitigated this decline in Hohanna, where there was also an equally important loss in descriptive representation? To look at this, we again look at the rankings of political representation, but instead of putting levels on the vertical axis, we put changes on the vertical axis. And we look at the periods after mass categorical violence. We look at changes because then it becomes more clear where there were upsurges in the recovery of perceived political representation after mass categorical violence. And you see that formalistic representation matters because at the time of the Arusha courts, when the power sharing design is agreed on, and at the time of the election of Nkuruziza, when it's actually implemented in this ethnic quota system, you see upsurge in perceived political representation, but especially for Hutu, not so much for Tutsi. So you clearly see descriptive political representation when it's materialized at these times of formalistic representation matters, but in reverse ways for Hutu and Tutsi. In contrast, in Rwanda, at the time of formalistic representation, so reconciliation narrative and election of Kagami, you see that both for Hutu and Tutsi there's an upsurge recovery in perceived political representation. So this could mean that in terms of descriptive representation, Hutu and Rwanda are not so much looking at ethnicity anymore. So that ethnicity has lost its salience for ordinary Rwandans, which would mean that this unity narrative is successful. An alternative explanation is that substantive representation compensates for the loss in descriptive representation. So let's look at the narratives of change and the coding that we did into these four dimensions. For Burundi, for Rwanda, and you see that for Rwanda, substantive representation is more important. So the share of narratives that were coded as related to substantive representation take up a larger share in Rwanda, both for positive and negative changes in perceived political representation. Interestingly, the share is highest for Hutu and Rwanda, which already suggests that they feel that in terms of substantive representation, improvements are being made. So 46% of all coded narratives of Hutu and Rwanda were related to positive changes in substantive representation. Bringing now the time dimension and the narratives in one graph, you see something that supports what we have seen so far, because for Burundi, you see that the narratives are mainly concentrated in and around election year, input legitimacy, whereas the narratives for Rwanda are more evenly spread over time, output legitimacy. So this is our conclusion, descriptive representation matters, but much less so for Hutu in Rwanda. This could be due to the ethnic Indonesia policy, which is in line with the fact that we see that moments of formalistic representation are equally appreciated by Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, and we also see that output legitimacy is compensating in Rwanda for a lack of input legitimacy. Now as a result, and this is my last slide, there is convergence in perceived political representation between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda over time. This is not the case for Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi. I know that this is a controversial finding, especially in the debate on Rwanda, there's a lot of polarization, but I think this debate so far has mainly been fed by ideology, theory, expert views, elite views, and not so much by the views of ordinary citizens. So I think that we bring this to the table, you can of course disagree, and I'm looking forward to your comments.