 I would not for the world deprive the translators of the praise which is their due for attempting to increase the vocabulary of our native tongue, but translations from Greek into Latin are not always satisfactory, just as the attempt to represent Latin words in a Greek dress is sometimes equally unsuccessful, and the translations in question are fully as harsh as the essentia and coentia of Plotus, and have not even the merit of being exact. For oratoria is formed like elucutoria and oratrix like elucutrix, whereas the rhetoric with which we are concerned is rather to be identified with eluquentia, and the word is undoubtedly used in two senses by the Greeks. In the one case it is an adjective that is ars retorica, the rhetorical art, like piratic in the phrase Naouis piratica, in the other it is a noun like philosophy or friendship. It is as a substantive that we require it here. Now the correct translation of the Greek Grammatike is literatura, not literatrix or literatoria, which would be the form's analogous to oratrix and oratoria, but in the case of rhetoric there is no similar Latin equivalent. It is best therefore not to quarrel about it, more especially as we have to use Greek terms in many other cases. For I may at least use the words Hilosopus, Musicus and Geometres without outraging them by changing them into clumsy Latin equivalents. Finally, since Cicero gave a Greek title to the earlier works which he wrote on this subject, I may, without fear of rashness, accept the great orator as sufficient authority for the name of the art which he professed. To resume then, rhetoric, for I shall now use the name without fear of capsious criticism, is in my opinion best treated under the three following heads, the art, the artist and the work. The art is that which we should acquire by study, and is the art of speaking well. The artist is he who has acquired the art, that is to say, he is the orator whose task it is to speak well. The work is the achievement of the artist, namely good speaking. Each of these three general divisions is, in its turn, divided into species. Of the two latter divisions I shall speak in their proper place. For the present I shall proceed to a discussion of the first. Chapter 15 The first question which confronts us is what is rhetoric? Many definitions have been given, but the problem is really twofold, for the dispute turns either on the quality of the thing itself or on the meaning of the words in which it is defined. The first in chief disagreement on the subject is found in the fact that some think that even bad men may be called orators, while others, of whom I am one, restrict the name of orator and the art itself to those who are good. Of those who divorce eloquence from that yet fairer and more desirable title to renown of virtuous life, some call rhetoric merely a power, some a science, but not a virtue, some a practice, some an art, though they will not allow the art to have anything in common with science or virtue, while some again call it a perversion of art or cacotechnia. These persons have, as a rule, held that the task of oratory lies in persuasion or speaking in a persuasive manner, for this is within the power of a bad man no less than a good. Once we get the common definition of rhetoric as the power of persuading. What I call a power, many call a capacity, and some a faculty. In order, therefore, that there may be no misunderstanding, I will say that by power I mean dynamis. This view is derived from isocrates, if indeed the treatise on rhetoric which circulates under his name is really from his hand. He, although far from agreeing with those whose aim is to disparage the duties of an orator, somewhat rashly define rhetoric as Pethus de Murgos, the worker of persuasion, for I cannot bring myself to use the peculiar derivative which Aeneas applies to Marcus Sathigus in the phrase Suadai Medullae, the marrow of persuasion. Again, Gorgias in the dialogue of Plato that takes its title from his name says practically the same thing, but Plato intends it to be taken as the opinion of Gorgias, not as his own. Cicero, in more than one passage, defined the duty of an orator as speaking in a persuasive manner. In his rhetoric to a work which it is clear gave him no satisfaction, he makes the end to be persuasion. But many other things have the power of persuasion, such as money, influence, the authority and rank of the speaker, or even some sight unsupported by language, when for instance the place of words is supplied by the memory of some individual's great deeds, by his lamentable appearance or the beauty of his person. Thus when Antonius, in the course of his defense of Manius Aquilius, tore open his client's robe and revealed the honorable scars which he had acquired while facing his country's foes, he relied no longer on the power of his eloquence, but appealed directly to the eyes of the Roman people, and it is believed that they were so profoundly moved by the sight as to acquit the accused. Again, there is a speech of Cato to mention no other record which informs us that Servius Galba escaped condemnation solely by the pity which he aroused, not only by producing his own young children before the assembly, but by carrying round in his arms the son of Silpiceus Galus. So also, according to general opinion, Frine was saved, not by the eloquence of hyperities admirable as it was, but by the sight of her exquisite body, which she further revealed by drawing aside her tunic. And if all these have power to persuade, the end of oratory which we are discussing cannot adequately be defined as persuasion. Consequently, those who, although holding the same general view of rhetoric, have regarded as the power of persuasion by speaking pry themselves on the greater exactness of language. This definition is given by Gorgeous in the dialogue mentioned above, under compulsion from the inexorable logic of Socrates. Theodectes agrees with him whether the treatise on rhetoric which has come down to us under his name is really by him, or as is generally believed by Aristotle. In that work, the end of rhetoric is defined as the leading of men by the power of speech to the conclusion desired by the orator. But even this definition is not sufficiently comprehensive, since others besides orators persuade by speaking, or lead others to the conclusion desired, as for example, harlots, flatters, and seducers. And yet, Apollodorus is not very far off this definition, when he asserts that the first and all important task of forensic oratory is to persuade the judge and lead his mind to the conclusions desired by the speaker. For even Apollodorus makes the orator the sport of fortune by refusing him leave to retain his title if he fails to persuade. Some, on the other hand, pay no attention to results, as for example, Aristotle, who says rhetoric is the power of discovering all means of persuading by speech. This definition has not merely the fault already mentioned, but the additional defect of including merely the power of invention, which, without style, cannot possibly constitute oratory. Hermagoras, who asserts that its end is to speak persuasively, and others who express the same opinion, though in different words, and inform us that the end is to say everything which ought to be said with a view to persuasion, have been sufficiently answered above, when I prove that persuasion was not the privilege of the orator alone. Various additions have been made to these definitions, for some hold that rhetoric is concerned with everything, while some restrict its activity to politics. The question as to which of these views is nearer to the truth shall be discussed later in its appropriate place. Aristotle seems to have implied that the sphere of the orator was all inclusive when he defined rhetoric as the power to detect every element in any given subject which might conduce to persuasion. So, too, does Patrick Lees, who omits the words in any given subject, but since he excludes nothing, shows that his view is identical, for he defines rhetoric as the power to discover whatever is persuasive in speech. These definitions, like that quoted above, include no more than the power of invention alone. Theodoras avoids this fault and holds that it is the power to discover and to utter forth in elegant language whatever is credible in every subject of oratory. But while others, besides orators, may discover what is credible as well as persuasive by adding the words in every subject, he, to a greater extent than the others, concedes the fairest name in all the world to those who use their gifts as an incitement to crime. Plato makes Gorgias say that he is a master of persuasion in the law courts and other assemblies, and that his themes are justice and injustice, while, in reply, Socrates allows him the power of persuading, but not of teaching. Those who refused to make the sphere of oratory all inclusive have been obliged to make somewhat forced and long-winded distinctions. Among these, I may mention Ariston, the pupil of the peripatetic Critolos, who produced the following definition. Rhetoric is the science of seeing and uttering what ought to be said on political questions in language that is likely to prove persuasive to the people. Being a peripatetic, he regards it as a science, not like the stoics as a virtue. While in adding the words likely to prove persuasive to the people, he inflicts a positive insult on oratory in implying that it is not likely to persuade the learned. The same criticism will apply to all those who restrict oratory to political questions, for they exclude thereby a large number of the duties of an orator, as, for example, Panagyric, the third department of oratory, which is entirely ignored. Turning to those who regard rhetoric as an art, but not as a virtue, we find that Theodora's of Gadara is more cautious. For, he says, I quote the words of his translators, rhetoric is the art which discovers and judges and expresses with an elegance duly proportioned to the importance of all such elements of persuasion as may exist in any subject in the field of politics. Similarly, Cornelius Celsus defines the end of rhetoric as to speak persuasively on any doubtful subject within the field of politics. Similar definitions are given by others, such, for instance, as the following. Rhetoric is the power of judging and holding forth on such political subjects as come before it with a certain persuasiveness, a certain action of the body and delivery of the words. There are countless other definitions, either identical with this, or composed of the same elements, which I shall deal with when I come to the questions concerned with the subject matter of rhetoric. Some regarded as neither a power, a science, or an art. Critolos calls it the practice of speaking, for this is the meaning of tribé. Atheneus styles it the art of deceiving, while the majority, content with reading a few passages from the gorges of Plato, unskillfully excerpted by earlier writers, refrain from studying that dialogue and the remainder of Plato's writings, and thereby fall into serious error. For they believe that in Plato's view, rhetoric was not an art, but a certain adrodness in the production of the light and gratification, or, with reference to another passage, the shadow of a small part of politics, and the fourth department of flattery. For Plato assigned two departments of politics to the body, namely law and justice, while his styles the art of cookery, a form of flattery of medicine, the art of the slave dealer, a flattery of gymnastic, for they produce a false complexion by the use of paint, and a false robustness by puffing them out with fat. Sophistry, he calls a dishonest counterfeit of legal science and rhetoric of justice. All these statements occur in the gorges and are uttered by Socrates, who appears to be the mouthpiece of the views held by Plato. But some of his dialogues were composed merely to refute his opponents in art-styled refutative, while others are for the purpose of teaching and are called doctrinal. Now, it is only rhetoric as practiced in their own day that is condemned by Plato or Socrates, for he speaks of it as the manner in which you engage in public affairs. Rhetoric in itself, he regards as a genuine and honorable thing, and consequently the controversy with gorges ends with the words, the rhetorician therefore must be just and the just men desires to do what is just. To this, gorges makes no reply, but the argument is taken up by Polis, a hot-headed and headstrong young fellow, and it is to him that Socrates makes his remarks about shadows and forms of flattery. Then Callicles, who is even more hot-headed, intervenes, but is reduced to the conclusion that he would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and possess a knowledge of justice. It is clear therefore that Plato does not regard rhetoric as an evil, but holds that true rhetoric is impossible for any saviour just and good man. In the feedress, he makes it even clearer that the complete attainment of this art is impossible without the knowledge of justice, an opinion in which I heartily concur. Had this not been his view, would he have ever written the apology of Socrates or the funeral oration in praise of those who had died in battle for their country? Both of them works falling within the sphere of oratory? It was against the class of men who employ their glibness of speech for evil purposes that he directed his denunciations. Similarly, Socrates thought it incompatible with his honor to make use of the speech which Lysius composed for his defense, although it was the usual practice in those days to write speeches for the party's concern to speak in the courts on their own behalf, a device designed to circumvent a law which forbade the employment of advocates. Further, the teachers of rhetoric were regarded by Plato as quite unsuited to their professed task, for they divorced rhetoric from justice and preferred plausibility to truth as he states in the feedress. Cornelius Celsus seems to have agreed with these early rhetoricians, for he writes, the orator only aims at the semblance of truth. And again a little later, the reward of the party to a suit is not a good conscience, but victory. If this were true, only the worst of men would play such dangerous weapons at the disposal of criminals or employ the precepts of their art for the assistance of the wickedness. However, I will leave those who maintain these views to consider what ground they have for so doing. For my part, I have undertaken the task of molding the ideal orator. And as my first desire is that he should be a good man, I will return to those who have sounder opinions on the subject. Some, however, identify rhetoric with politics. Cicero calls it a department of the science of politics. And science of politics and philosophy are identical terms. While others again call it a branch of philosophy, among them isocrates. The definition which best suits its real character is that which makes rhetoric the science of speaking well. For this definition includes all the virtues of oratory and the character of the orator as well, since no man can speak well who is not good himself. The definition given by precipice, who derived it from clientes, to the effect that it is the science of speaking rightly amounts to the same thing. The same philosopher also gives other definitions, but they concern problems of a different character from that on which we are now engaged. Another definition defines oratory as the power of persuading men to do what ought to be done and yields practically the same sense, save that it limits the art to the result which it produces. Areas, again, defines it well as speaking according to the excellence of speech. Those regarded as the science of political obligations also exclude man of bad character from the title of orator. If by science they mean virtue, but restrict it over much by confining it to political problems. Albertius, a distinguished author and professor of rhetoric, agrees that rhetoric is the science of speaking well, but makes a mistake in imposing restrictions by the addition of words on political questions and with credibility. With both of these restrictions I have already dealt. Finally, those critics who hold that the aim of rhetoric is to think and speak rightly were on the correct track. These are practically all the most celebrated and most discussed definitions of rhetoric. It would be both irrelevant and beyond my power to deal with all, for I strongly disapprove of the custom which has come to prevail among writers of textbooks of refusing to define anything in the same terms as have been employed by some previous writer. I will have nothing to do with such ostentation. What I say will not necessarily be my own invention, but it will be what I believe to be the right view, as, for instance, that oratory is the science of speaking well. For when the most satisfactory definition has been found, he who seeks another is merely looking for a worse one. This much being admitted, we are now in a position to see clearly what is the end, the highest aim, the ultimate goal of rhetoric, that telos, in fact, which every art must possess. For if rhetoric is the science of speaking well, its end and highest aim is to speak well. End of Book 2, Chapter 15. Book 2, Chapter 16 of On the Education of an Orator by Quintilian, translated by H. E. Butler. This little box recording is in the public domain. Chapter 16. There follows the question as to whether rhetoric is useful. Some are in the habit of denouncing it most violently and of shamelessly employing the powers of oratory to accuse oratory itself. It is eloquence, they say, that snatches criminals from the penalties of the law. Eloquence that, from time to time, secures the condemnation of the innocent and leads the liberation astray. Eloquence that stirs up not merely sedition and popular tumult, but wars beyond all expiation and that is most effective when it makes falsehood prevail over the truth. The comic poets even accuse Socrates of teaching how to make the worst cause seem the better, while Plato says that Gorgias and Tessias made similar professions. And to these, they add further examples drawn from the history of Rome and Greece, enumerating all those who used their pernicious eloquence, not merely against individuals, but against whole states and through an ordered commonwealth into a state of turmoil, or even brought it to utter ruin. And they point out that for this very reason rhetoric was banished from Sparta, while its powers were cut down at Athens itself by the fact that an orator was forbidden to stir the passions of his audience. On the showing of these critics, not only orators, but generals, magistrates, medicine, and philosophy will all be useless. For Flominias was a general, while men, such as the Gracchi, Saturninas, and Glossia, were magistrates. Doctors have been caught using poisons, and those who falsely assume the name of philosopher have occasionally been detected in the gravest crimes. Let us give up eating. It often makes us ill. Let us never go inside houses for sometimes they collapse on their occupants. Let never a sword be forged for a soldier since it might be used by a robber. And who does not realize that fire and water, both necessities of life, and to leave merely earthly things, even the sun and moon, the greatest of the heavenly bodies, are occasionally capable of doing harm? On the other hand, will it be denied that it was by his gift of speech that Apius, the blind, broke off the dishonorable peace which was on the point of being concluded with pyrus? Did not the divine eloquence of Cicero win popular applause, even when he denounced the agrarian laws? Did it not crush the audacious plots of Catiline, and win, while he still wore the garb of civil life, the highest honor that can be conferred on a victorious general, a public thanksgiving to heaven? Has not oratory often revived the courage of a panic-stricken army, and persuaded the soldier, faced by all the perils of war, that glory is a fairer thing than life itself? Nor shall the history of Sparta and Athens move me more than that of the Roman people who have always held the orator in highest honor. Never, in my opinion, would the founders of cities have induced their unsettled multitudes to form communities had they not moved them by the magic of their eloquence. Never, without the highest gifts of oratory, would the great legislators have constrained mankind to submit themselves to the yoke of law. Nay, even the principles which should guide our life, however fair they may be by nature, yet have greater power to mold the mind to virtue when the beauty of things is illumined by the splendor of eloquence. Wherefore, although the weapons of oratory may be used either for good or ill, it is unfair to regard that as an evil which can be employed for good. These problems, however, may be left to those who hold that rhetoric is the power to persuade. If our definition of rhetoric as the science of speaking well implies that an orator must be a good man, there can be no doubt about its usefulness. And in truth that God, who was in the beginning the father of all things in the architect of the universe, distinguished men from all other living creatures that are subject to death by nothing more than this that he gave him the gift of speech. For as regard physical bulk, strength, robustness, endurance or speed, men is surpassed in certain cases by dumb beasts who also are far more independent of external assistance. They know by instinct, without need of any teacher, how to move rapidly, to feed themselves and swim. Many, too, have their bodies clothed against cold, possess natural weapons and have not to search for their food, whereas in all these respects, men's life is full of toil. Reason then was the greatest gift of the Almighty who willed that we should share its possession with the immortal gods. But reason by itself would help us but little and would be far less evident in us had we not the power to express our thoughts in speech, for it is the lack of this power rather than thought and understanding which they do to a certain exercise possess that is the great defect in other living things. The construction of a soft layer, the weaving of nests, the hatching and rearing of their young and even the storing up of food for the coming winter, together with certain other achievements which we cannot imitate such as the making of honey and wax, all these perhaps indicate the possession of a certain degree of reason. But since the creatures that do these things lack the gift of speech, they are called dumb and unreasoning beasts. Finally, how little the heavenly boon of reason avails those who are born dumb. If therefore we have received no fairer gift from heaven than speech, what shall we regard as so worthy of laborious cultivation? Or in what should we sooner desire to excel our fellow men than that in which mankind excels all other living things? And we should be all at more eager to do so, since there is no art which yields a more grateful recompense for the labor bestowed upon it. This will be abundantly clear if we consider the origins of oratory and the progress it has made, and it is capable of advancing still further. I will not stop to point out how useful and how becoming a task it is for a good man to defend his friends, to guide the senate by his councils, and to lead peoples or armies to follow his bidding. I merely ask, is it not a noble thing by employing the understanding which is common to mankind and the words that are used by all to win such honor and glory that you seem not to speak or plead, but rather, as was said of Pericles, to thunder and lighten. END OF CHAPTER XVI However, if I were to indulge my own inclinations in expatiating on this subject, I should go on forever. Let us therefore pass to the next question and consider whether rhetoric is an art. No one of those who have laid down rules for oratory has ever doubted that it is an art. It is clear, even from the titles of their books, that their theme is the art of rhetoric, while Cicero defines rhetoric as artistic eloquence. And it is not merely the orators who have claimed this distinction for their studies, with a view to giving them an additional title to respect, but the stoic and peripatatic philosophers, for the most part, agree with them. Indeed, I will confess that I had doubts as to whether I should discuss this portion of my inquiry, for there is no one. I will not say so unlearned, but so devoid of ordinary sense as to hold that building, weaving, or molding vessels from clay are arts, and at the same time, to consider that rhetoric, which, as I have already said, is the noblest and most sublime of tastes, has reached such a lofty eminence without the assistance of art. For my own part, I think that those who have argued against this view did not realize what they were saying, but merely desired to exercise their wits by the selection of a difficult theme, like Polycrates, when he prays to Sirius and Clitamnestra. I may add that he is credited with a not dissimilar performance, namely the composition of a speech which was delivered against Socrates. Some would have it that rhetoric is a natural gift, though they admit that it can be developed by practice. So Antonio's, in the De Oratory of Cicero, styles it a neck derived from experience, but denies that it is an art. This statement is, however, not intended to be accepted by us as the actual truth, but is inserted to make Antonio's speak in character, since he was in the habit of concealing his art. Still, Lysias is said to have maintained the same view, which is defended on the ground that uneducated persons, barbarians and slaves, when speaking on their own behalf, say something that resembles an exhortium, state the facts of the case, prove, refute and plead for mercy, just as an orator does in his paration. To this is added the quibble that nothing that is based on art can have existed before the art in question, whereas men have always, from time immemorial, spoken in their own defense or in denunciation of others. The teaching of rhetoric as an art was, they say, a later invention, dating from about the time of Ticias and Corax. Oratory, therefore, existed before art and consequently cannot be an art. For my part, I am not concerned with the date when oratory began to be taught. Even in Homer, we find Phoenix as an instructor, not only of conduct but of speaking. While a number of orators are mentioned, the various styles are represented by the speeches of three of the chiefs and the young men are set to contend among themselves in contests of eloquence. Moreover, lawsuits and pleaders are represented in the engravings on the shield of Achilles. It is sufficient to call attention to the fact that everything which art has brought to perfection originated in nature. Otherwise, we might deny the title of art to medicine which was discovered from the observation of sickness and health and according to some is entirely based upon experiment. Wounds were bound up long before medicine developed into an art and fevers were reduced by rest and abstention from food long before the reason for such treatment was known simply because the state of the patient's health left no choice. So too, building should not be styled an art for primitive men built himself a hut without the assistance of art. Music by the same reasoning is not an art for every race indulges in some kind of singing and dancing. If therefore any kind of speech is to be called eloquence, I will admit that it existed before it was an art. If on the other hand, not every man that speaks is an orator and primitive men did not speak like an orator, my opponents must needs acknowledge that oratory is the product of art and did not exist before it. This conclusion also rules out their argument that men speak who have never learned how to speak and that which a man does untaught can have no connection with art. In support of this contention, they adduced the fact that Demides was a waterman and Eskenes an actor but both were orators. The reasoning is false for no man can be an orator untaught and it would be truer to say that these orators learned oratory late in life than that they never learned at all. Although as a matter of fact, Eskenes had an acquaintance with literature from childhood since his father was a teacher of literature. While as regards Demides, it is quite uncertain that he never studied rhetoric and in any case continuous practice in speaking was sufficient to bring him to such proficiency as he attained for experience is the best of all schools. On the other hand, it may fairly be asserted that he would have achieved greater distinction if he had received instruction. For although he delivered his speeches with great effect, he never ventured to write them for others. Aristotle, it is true, in his griless, produces some tentative arguments to the contrary which are marked by characteristic ingenuity. On the other hand, he also wrote three books on the art of rhetoric in the first of which he not merely admits that rhetoric is an art but treats it as a department of politics and also of logic. Cretolias and Athenodoras of Rhodes have produced many arguments against this view while Agnan renders himself suspect by the very title of his book in which he proclaims that he's going to vindict rhetoric. As to the statements of Epicurus on this subject, they cause me no surprise for he is the foe of all systematic training. These gentlemen talk a great deal but the arguments on which they base their statements are few. I will therefore select the most important of them and will deal with them briefly to prevent the discussion lasting to all eternity. Their first contention is based on the subject matter for they assert that all arts have their own subject matter which is true and go on to say that rhetoric has none which I shall show in what follows to be false. Another slander is to the effect that no art will acquiesce in false opinions since an art must be based on direct perception which is always true. Now, say they, rhetoric does give its ascent to false conclusions and is therefore not an art. I will admit that rhetoric sometimes substitutes falsehood for truth but I will not allow that it does so because its opinions are false since there is all the difference between holding a certain opinion oneself and persuading someone else to adopt an opinion. For instance, a general frequently makes use of falsehood. Hannibal, when hemmed in by Fabius, persuaded his enemy that he was in retreat by tying brushwood to the horns of oxen setting fire to them by night and driving the herds across the mountains opposite. But though he deceived Fabius, he himself was fully aware of the truth. Again, when the Spartan Theopampus changed clothes with his wife and escaped from custody disguised as a woman, he deceived his guards what was not for a moment deceived as to his own identity. Similarly, an orator when he substitutes falsehood for the truth is aware of the falsehood and of the fact that he is substituting it for the truth. He therefore deceives others but not himself. When Cicero boasted that he had thrown dust in the eyes of the jury in the case of Cluentes, he was far from being blinded himself. And when a painter by his artistic skill makes us believe that certain objects project from the picture while others are withdrawn into the background, he knows perfectly well that they are all in the same plane. My opponents further assert that every art has some definite goal towards which it directs its efforts but that rhetoric as a rule has no such goal while at other times it professes to have an aim but fails to perform its promise. They lie. I have already shown that rhetoric has a definite purpose and have explained what it is and what is more, the orator will always make good his professions in this respect for he will always speak well. On the other hand, this criticism may perhaps hold good as against those who think persuasion the end of oratory but our orator and his art as we define it are independent of results. The speaker aims at victory, it is true but if he speaks well he has lived up to the ideals of his art even if he is defeated. Similarly, a pilot will desire to bring his ship safe to harbor but if he is swept out of his course by a storm he will not for that reason cease to be a pilot but will say in the well-known words of the old poet still let me steer straight on. So too the doctor seeks to heal the sick but if the violence of the disease or the refusal of the patient to obey his regimen or any other circumstance prevent his achieving his purpose he will not have fallen short of the ideals of his art provided he has done everything according to reason. So too the orator's purpose is fulfilled if he has spoken well for the art of rhetoric as I shall show later is realized in action not in the result obtained. From this it follows that there is no truth in yet another argument which contends that arts know when they have attained their end whereas rhetoric does not. For every speaker is aware when he is speaking well. These critics also charge rhetoric with doing what no art does namely making use of vices to serve its ends since it speaks the thing that is not and excites the passions. But there is no disgrace in doing either of these things as long as the motive be good. Consequently, there is nothing vicious in such action. Even a philosopher is at times permitted to tell a lie while the orator must needs excite the passions if that be the only way by which he can lead the judge to do justice. For judges are not always enlightened and often have to be tricked to prevent them falling into error. Give me philosophers as judges pack senates and assemblies with philosophers and you will destroy the power of hatred, influence, prejudice and false witness. Consequently, there will be very little scope for eloquence whose value will lie almost entirely in its power to charm. But if, as is the case, our hearers are fickle of mind and truth is exposed to a host of perils we must call in art to aid us in the fight and employ such means as will hope our cause. He who has been driven from the right road cannot be brought back to it safe by a fresh detour. The point, however, that gives rise to the greatest number of these captures accusations against rhetoric is found in the allegation that orators speak indifferently on either side of a case. From which they draw the following arguments. No art is self contradictory but rhetoric does contradict itself. No art tries to demolish what itself has built but this does happen in the operations of rhetoric. Or again, rhetoric teaches either what ought to be said or what ought not to be said. Consequently, it is not an art because it teaches what ought not to be said or because while it teaches what ought to be said it also teaches precisely the opposite. Now, it is obvious that all such charges are brought against that type of rhetoric with which neither good men nor virtue herself will have anything to do. Since if a case be based on injustice rhetoric has no place therein and consequently it can scarcely happen even under the most exceptional circumstances that an orator, that is to say, a good man will speak indifferently on either side. Still, it is in the nature of things conceivable that just causes may lead two wise men to take different sides since it is held that wise men may fight among themselves provided that they do so at the bidding of reason. I will therefore reply to their criticisms in such a way that it will be clear that these arguments have no force even against those who concede the name of orator to persons of bad character. For rhetoric is not self contradictory. The conflict is between case and case not between rhetoric and itself. And even if persons who have learned the same thing fight one another, that does not prove that what they have learned is not an art. Were that so, there could be no art of arms since gladiators trained under the same master are often matched against each other. Nor would the pilot's art exist because in sea fights pilots may be found on different sides. Nor yet could there be an art of general ship since general is pitted against general. In the same way, rhetoric does not undo its own work. For the orator does not refute his own arguments nor does rhetoric even do so because those who regard persuasion as its end or the two good men whom chance has matched against one another seek merely for probabilities. And the fact that one thing is more credible than another does not involve contradiction between the two. There is no absolute antagonism between the probable and the more probable just as there is none between that which is white and that which is whiter or between that which is sweet and that which is sweeter. Nor does rhetoric ever teach that which ought not to be sad or that which is contrary to what ought to be sad but solely what ought to be said in each individual case. But though the orator will as a rule maintain what is true, this will not always be the case. There are occasions when the public interest demands that he should defend what is untrue. The following objections are also put forward in the second book of Cestro's De Oratory. Art deals with things that are known but the pleading of an orator is based entirely on opinion not on knowledge because he speaks to an audience who do not know and sometimes himself states things of which he has no actual knowledge. Now one of these points, namely whether the judges have knowledge of what is being said to them has nothing to do with the art of oratory. The other statement that art is concerned with things that are known does however require an answer. Rhetoric is the art of speaking well and the orator knows how to speak well but it is urged. He does not know whether what he says is true. Neither do they who assert that all things derive their origin from fire or water or the four elements or indivisible atoms nor they who calculate the distances of the stars or the size of the earth and sun and yet all these call the subject which they teach an art. But if reason makes them seem not merely to hold opinions but thanks to the cogency of the proofs adduced to have actual knowledge reason will do the same service to the orator. But they say he does not know whether the cause which he has undertaken is true but not even a doctor can tell whether a patient who claims to be suffering from a headache really is so suffering but he will treat him on the assumption that his statement is true and medicine will still be an art. Again, what of the fact that Rhetoric does not always aim at telling the truth but always at stating what is probable? The answer is that the orator knows that what he states is no more than probable. My opponents further object that advocates often defend in one case what they have attacked in another. This is not the fault of the art but of the men. Such are the main points that are urged against Rhetoric. There are others as well but they are of minor importance and drawn from the same sources. That Rhetoric is an art may, however, be proved in a very few words. For if Clienty's definition be accepted then art is a power reaching its ends by a definite path that is by ordered methods. No one can doubt that there is such method and order in good speaking. While if, on the other hand, we accept the definition which meets with almost universal approval that art consists in perceptions agreeing and cooperating to the achievement of some useful end we shall be able to show that Rhetoric lacks none of these characteristics. Again, it is scarcely necessary for me to point out that like other arts it is based on examination and practice. And if logic is an art as is generally agreed Rhetoric must also be an art since it differs from logic in species rather than in genus. Nor must I omit to point out that where it is possible in any given subject for one man to act without art and another with art there must necessarily be an art in connection with that subject as there must also be in any subject in which the man who has received instruction is the superior of him who has not. But as regards the practice of rhetoric it is not merely the case that the trained speaker will get the better of the untrained for even the trained man will prove inferior to one who received a better training. If this were not so there would not be so many rhetorical rules nor would so many great men have come forward to teach them. The truth of this must be acknowledged by everyone but more especially by us since we can see the possession of oratory to none save the good man. End of Book 2, Chapter 17 Book 2, chapters 18 to 21 of On the Education of an Orator by Quintilian translated by H. E. Butler this LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Chapter 18 Some arts, however, are based on examination that is to say on the knowledge and proper appreciation of things as for instance astronomy which demands no action but is content to understand the subject of its study. Such arts are called theoretical. Others again are concerned with action this is their end which is realized in action so that the action once performed nothing more remains to do. These arts we style and dancing will provide us with an example. Thirdly, there are others which consist in producing a certain result and achieve their purpose in the completion of a visible task such with style productive and painting may be quoted as an illustration. In view of these facts we must come to the conclusion that in the main rhetoric is concerned with action for in action it accomplishes that which it is its duty to do. This view is universally accepted although in my opinion rhetoric draws largely on the two other kinds of art for it may on occasion be content with the mere examination of the thing. Rhetoric is still in the orator's possession even though he be silent while if he gives up pleading either designedly or owing to circumstances over which he has no control he does not therefore cease to be an orator any more than a doctor ceases to be a doctor when he withdraws from practice. Perhaps the highest of all pleasures is that which we derive from private study and the only circumstances under which the delights of literature are unlawy are when it withdraws from action that is to say from toil and can enjoy the pleasure of self-contemplation but in the results that the orator obtains by writing speeches or historical narratives which we may reasonably count as part of the task of oratory we shall recognize features resembling those of a productive art. Still, if rhetoric is to be regarded as one of these three classes of art since it is with action that its practice is chiefly and most frequently concerned let us call it an active or administrative art the two terms being identical. Chapter 19 I quite realize that there is a further question as to whether eloquence derives most from nature or from education this question really lies outside the scope of our inquiry since the ideal orator must necessarily be the result of a blend of both but I do regard it as of great importance that we should decide how far there is any real question on this point for if we make an absolute divorce between the two nature will still be able to accomplish much without the aid of education while the latter is valueless without the aid of nature if, on the other hand they are blended in equal proportions I think we shall find that the average orator owes most to nature while the perfect orator owes more to education we may take a parallel from agriculture a thoroughly barren soil will not be improved even by the best cultivation while good land will yield some useful produce without any cultivation but in the case of really rich land cultivation will do more for it than its own natural fertility had prexitalies attempted to carve a statue out of a millstone I should have preferred a rough block of perian marble to any such statue on the other hand if the same artist had produced a finished statue from such a block of perian marble its artistic value would owe more to his skill than to the material to conclude nature is the raw material for education the one forms the other is formed without material art can do nothing material without art does possess a certain value while the perfection of art is better than the best material chapter 20 more important is the question whether rhetoric is to be regarded as one of the indifferent arts which in themselves deserve neither praise nor blame but are useful or the reverse according to the character of the artist or whether it should as not a few even among philosophers hold be considered as a virtue for my own part I regard the practice of rhetoric which so many have adopted in the past and still follow today as either no art at all or as the Greeks call it a technia for I see numbers of speakers without the least pretension to method or literary training rushing headlong in the direction in which hunger or their natural shamelessness calls them or else it is a bad art such as a styled cacotechnia for there have I think being many persons and there are still some who have devoted their powers of speaking to the destruction of their fellow men there's also an unprofitable imitation of art a kind of mataiotechnia which is neither good nor bad but merely involves a useless expenditure of labor reminding one of the men who shot a continuous stream of vaccines from a distance through the eye of a needle without ever missing his aim and was rewarded by Alexander who was a witness of the display with the present of a bushel of vaccines a most appropriate reward it is to such men that I would compare those who spend their whole time at the expense of much study and energy in composing declamations which they aim at making as unreal as possible the rhetoric on the other hand which I am endeavoring to establish and the ideal of which I have in my mind's eye that rhetoric which befits a good man and is in a word the only true rhetoric will be a virtue philosophers arrive at this conclusion by a long chain of ingenious arguments but it appears to me to be perfectly clear from the simpler proof of my own invention which I will now proceed to set forth the philosophers state the case as follows if self-consistency as to what should and should not be done is an element of virtue and it is to this quality that we give the name of prudence the same quality will be revealed as regards to what should be said and what should not be said and if there are virtues of which nature has given us some rudimentary sparks even before we were taught anything about them as for instance justice of which there are some traces even among peasants and barbarians it is clear that men has been so formed from the beginning as to be able to plead on his own behalf not it is true with perfection but yet sufficiently to show that there are certain sparks of eloquence implanted in us by nature the same nature however is not to be found in those arts which have no connection with virtue consequently since there are two kinds of speech the continuous which is called rhetoric and the concise which is called dialectic the relation between which was regarded by Zeno as being so intimate that he compared the letter to the closed fist the former to the open hand even the art of disputation will be a virtue consequently there can be no doubt about oratory whose nature is so much fairer and franker I should like however to consider the point more fully and explicitly by appealing to the actual work of oratory for how will the orator succeed in panagyric unless he can distinguish between what is honorable and the reverse how can he urge a policy unless he has a clear perception of what is expedient how can he plead in the law courts if he's ignorant of the nature of justice again does not oratory call for courage since it is often directed against the threats of popular turbulence and frequently runs into peril through incurring the hatred of the great while sometimes as for instance in the trial of Milo the orator may have to speak in the midst of a crowd of armed soldiers consequently if oratory be not a virtue perfection is beyond its grasp if on the other hand each living thing has its own peculiar virtue in which it excels the rest or at any rate the majority I may instance the courage of the lion and the swiftness of the horse it may be regarded as certain that the qualities in which men excels the rest are above all reason and powers of speech why therefore should we not consider that the special virtue of men lies just as much in eloquence as in reason it will be with justice then that Cicero makes crosses say that eloquence is one of the highest virtues and that Cicero himself calls it a virtue in his letters to Brutus and in other passages but it may be urged a bad man will at times produce an exhortium or a statement of facts and will argue a case in a manner that leaves nothing to be desired no doubt even a robber may fight bravely without courage seizing to be a virtue even a wicked slave may bear torture without a groan and we may still continue to regard endurance of pain as worthy of praise we can point to many acts which are identical with those of virtue but spring from other sources however what I have said here must suffice as I have already dealt with the question of the usefulness of oratory chapter 21 as to the material of oratory some have asserted that it is speech as for instance gorgeous in the dialogue of Plato if this view be accepted in the sense that the word speech is used of a discourse composed on any subject then it is not the material but the work just as a statue is the work of the sculpture for speeches like statues require art for their production if on the other hand we interpret speech as indicating the words themselves they can do nothing unless they are related to facts some again hold that the material consists of persuasive arguments but they form part of the work are produced by art and require material themselves some say that political questions provide material the mistake made by these lies not in the quality of their opinion but in its limitation for political questions are material for eloquence but not the only material some on the ground that rhetoric is a virtue make the material with which it deals to be the whole of life others on the ground that life regarded as a whole does not provide material for every virtue since most of them are concerned only with departments of life justice, courage and self-control each having their own duties and their own end would consequently restrict oratory to one particular department of life and place it in the practical or pragmatic department of ethics that is to say the department of morals which deals with the business of life for my own part and I have authority to support me I hold that the material of rhetoric is composed of everything that may be placed before it as a subject for speech Plato, if I read him a right makes Socrates say to Gorgias that its material is to be found in things not words while in the Fidris he clearly proves that rhetoric is concerned not merely with law courts and public assemblies but with private and domestic affairs as well from which it is obvious that this was the view of Plato himself Cicero also in a passage of one of his works states that the material of rhetoric is composed of the things which are brought before it but makes certain restrictions as to the nature of these things in another passage however he expresses his opinion that the orator has to speak about all kinds of things I will quote his actual words although the very meaning of the name of the orator and the fact that he professes to speak well seem to imply a promise and undertaking that the orator will speak with elegance and fullness on any subject that may be put before him and in another passage he says it is the duty of the true orator to seek out hear, read, discuss, handle and ponder everything that befalls in the life of men since it is with this that the orator is concerned and this that forms the material with which he has to deal but this material as we call it that is to say the things brought before it has been criticized by some at times on the ground that it is limitless and sometimes on the ground that it is not peculiar to oratory which they have therefore dubbed a discursive art because all is gris that comes to its mill I have no serious quarrel with these critics for they acknowledge that rhetoric is concerned with every kind of material though they deny that it has any peculiar material just because of that material's multiplicity but in spite of this multiplicity rhetoric is not unlimited in scope and there are other minor arts whose material is characterized by the same multiplicity such for instance is architecture which deals with everything that is useful for the purpose of building such too is the engraver's art which works on gold, silver, bronze, iron as for sculpture its activity extends to wood, ivory, marble, glass and precious stones in addition to the materials already mentioned and things which form the material for other artists do not for that reason seize forthwith to be material for rhetoric for if I ask what is the material of the sculpture I shall be told bronze and if I ask what is the material of the maker of vessels I refer to the craft styled Calchaotique by the Greeks the answer will again be bronze and yet there is all the difference in the world between vessels and statues similarly medicine will not cease to be an art because like the art of the gymnast it prescribes rubbing with oil and exercise or because it deals with diet like the art of cookery again the objection that to discourse of what is good, expedient or just is the duty of philosophy presents no difficulty for when such critics speak of a philosopher they mean a good man why should I feel surprised to find that orator whom I identified with the good man deals with the same material there's all the last reason since I have already shown in the first book that philosophers only observed this department of knowledge after it had been abandoned by the orators it was always the peculiar property of rhetoric and the philosophers are really trespassers finally since the discussion of whatever is brought before it is the task of dialectic which is really a concise form of oratory why should not this task be regarded as also being the appropriate material for continuous oratory there is a further objection made by certain critics who say well then if an orator has to speak on every subject he must be master of all the arts I might answer this criticism in the words of Cicero in whom I find the following passage in my opinion no one can be an absolutely perfect orator unless he has acquired a knowledge of all important subjects and arts I however regarded as sufficient that an orator should not be actually ignorant of the subject on which he has to speak for he cannot have a knowledge of all causes and yet he should be able to speak on all on what then will he speak on those which he has studied similarly as regards the arts he will study those concerning which he has to speak as occasion may demand and will speak on those which he has studied what then I am asked will not a builder speak better on the subject of building and a musician on music certainly if the orator does not know what is the question at issue even an illiterate peasant who is a party to a suit will speak better on behalf of his case than an orator who does not know what the subject in dispute may be but on the other hand if the orator receive instruction from the builder or the musician he will put forward what he has does learn better than either just as he will plead a case better than his client once he has been instructed in it the builder and the musician will however speak on the subject of their respective arts if there should be any technical point which requires to be established neither will be an orator but he will perform his task like an orator just as when an untrained person binds up a wound he will not be a physician but he will be acting as one it is suggested that such topics never crop up in panagyric deliberative or forensic oratory when the question of the construction of a ported ostia came up for discussion had not the orator to state his views and yet it was a subject requiring the technical knowledge of the architect does not the orator discuss the question whether livid spots and swellings on the body are symptomatic of ill health or poison yet that is a question for the qualified physician will he not deal with measurements and figures and yet we must admit that they form part of mathematics for my part I hold that practically all subjects are under certain circumstances liable to come up for treatment by the orator if the circumstances do not occur the subjects will not concern him we were therefore right in asserting that the material of rhetoric is composed of everything that comes before the orator for treatment an assertion which is confirmed by the practice of everyday speech for when we have been given a subject on which to speak we often preface our remarks by calling attention to the fact that the matter has been laid before us gorgeous indeed felt so strongly that it was the orator's duty to speak on every subject that he used to allow those who attended his lectures to ask him questions on any subjects they pleased Hermagoras also asserted that the material of oratory lay in the cause and the questions it involved thereby including every subject that can be brought before it if he denies that general questions are the concern of oratory he disagrees with me but if they do concern rhetoric that supports my contention for there is nothing which may not crop up in a cause or appear as a question for discussion Aristotle himself also by his tripartite division of oratory into forensic deliberative and demonstrative practically brought everything into the orator's domain since there is nothing that may not come up for treatment by one of these three kinds of rhetoric a very few critics have raised the question as to what may be the instrument of oratory my definition of an instrument is that without which the material cannot be brought into the shape necessary for the effecting of our object but it is not the art which requires an instrument but the artist knowledge needs no instruments for it may be complete although it produces nothing but the artist must have them the engraver cannot work without his chisel nor the painter without his brush I shall therefore defer this question until I come to treat of the orator as distinct from his art end of book two chapter twenty one book three chapters one to three of on the education of an orator by Quintilian translated by H. E. Butler this LibriVox recording is in the public domain book three chapter one in the second book the subject of inquiry was the nature and the end of rhetoric and I proved to the best of my ability that it was an art that it was useful that it was a virtue and that its material was all in every subject that might come up for treatment I shall now discuss its origin its component parts and the method to be adopted in handling and forming our conception of each for most authors of text books have stopped short of this indeed Apollodorus confines himself solely to forensic oratory I know that those who asked me to write this work were especially interested in that portion on which I am now entering and which owing to the necessity of examining a great diversity of opinions at once forms by far the most difficult section of this work and also I fear may be the least attractive to my readers since it necessitates a dry exposition of rules in other portions of this work I have attempted to introduce a certain amount of ordnateness not I may say to advertise my style if I had wished to do that I could have chosen a more fertile theme but in order that I might thus do something to lure our young men to make themselves acquainted with those principles which I regarded as necessary to the study of rhetoric for I hoped that by giving them something which was not unpleasant to read I might induce a greater readiness to learn those rules which I feared might by the dryness and aridity which must necessarily characterize their exposition revolt their minds and offend their ears which are nowadays grown somewhat oversensitive Lucretius has the same object in mind when he states that he has set forth his philosophical system in verse for you will remember the well-known simile which he uses and as physicians when they seek to give a draught of bitter warmwood to a child first smearing along the edge that rims the cup the liquid sweets of honey, golden-hued end quote and the rest but I fear that this book will have too little honey and too much warmwood and that though the students may find it a healthy draught it will be far from agreeable I am also haunted by the further fear that it will be all the less attractive from the fact that most of the precepts which it contains are not original but derived from others and because it is likely to rouse the opposition of certain persons who do not share my views for there are a large number of writers who, though they are all moving toward the same goal have constructed different roads to it and each drawn their followers into their own the latter, however, approve of the path on which they have been launched, whatever its nature and it's difficult to change the convictions implanted in boyhood for the excellent reason that everybody prefers to have learned rather than to be in the process of learning but as will appear in the course of this book there is an infinite diversity of opinions among writers on this subject since some have added their own discoveries to those portions of the art which were still shapeless and unformed and subsequently have altered even what was perfectly sound in order to establish a claim to originality the first writer after those recorded by the poets who is sad to have taken any steps in the direction of rhetoric is Empedocles but the earliest writers of textbooks are the Sicilians, Chorex and Titius who were followed by another from the same island namely Gorgias of Leontini whom tradition asserts to have been the pupil of Empedocles he, thanks to his length of days for he lived to 109 flourished as the contemporary of many rhetoricians was consequently the rival of those whom I have just mentioned and lived on to survive socrates in the same period flourished Thracymachus of Calcedon Prodicus of Cius Protagoras of Abdera for whose instructions which he afterwards published in a textbook Ewathlas is said to have paid 10,000 denarii Hippies of Elis and Alsidama of Elie whom Plato calls Palomedes there was Antiphon also who was the first to write speeches and who also wrote a textbook and is said to have spoken most eloquently in his own defense Polycrates, who as I have already said wrote a speech against Socrates and Theodorus of Byzantium who was one of those called word artificers by Plato of these, Protagoras and Gorgias are said to have been the first to treat common places Prodicus, Hippies, Protagoras and Thracymachus the first to handle emotional themes Cicero in the Brutus says that nothing in the Ornate rhetorical style was ever committed to writing before Pericles and that certain of his speeches are still extant For my part, I have been unable to discover anything in the least worthy of his great reputation for eloquence and am consequently the less surprised that there should be some who hold that he never committed anything to writing and that the writings circulating under his name are the works of others These rhetoricians had many successors but the most famous of Gorgias Pupils was Isocrates although our authorities are not agreed as to who was his teacher I, however, accept the statement of Aristotle on the subject From this point, the roads begin to part The pupils of Isocrates were eminent in every branch of study and when he was already advanced in years and he lived to the age of 98 Aristotle began to teach the art of rhetoric in his afternoon lectures in which he frequently quoted the well-known line from the phyloctetus in the form Isocrates still speaks to a shame should I sit silent Both Aristotle and Isocrates left textbooks on rhetoric but that by Aristotle is the larger and contains more books Theodactes, whose work I mentioned above also lived about the same period while Theophrastus, the pupil of Aristotle produced some careful work on rhetoric After him, we may note that the philosophers more especially the leaders of the Stoic and Peripatatic schools surpassed even the rhetoricians in the zeal which they devoted to the subject Hermagoras, next, carved out a path of his own which numbers have followed of his rivals, Atheneus, seems to have approached him most nearly Later still, much work was done by Apollonius Molon Aries, Sicilius and Dionysus of Harley-Carnassus But the rhetoricians who attracted the most enthusiastic following were Apollodorus of Pergamus who was the instructor of Augustus Caesar at Apollonia and Theodorus of Gadara who preferred to be called Theodorus of Rhodes It is said that Tiberius Caesar, during his retirement in that island was a constant attendant at his lectures These rhetoricians taught different systems and two schools have arisen known as the Apollodurians and the Theodorians These names being modeled on the fashion of nomenclature involved with certain schools of philosophy The doctrines of Apollodorus are best learned from his pupils among whom Caes Volgius was the best interpreter of his master's views in Latin Atticus in Greek The only textbook by Apollodorus himself seems to be that addressed to Mattius as his letter to the Mishes does not acknowledge the other works attributed to him The writings of Theodorus were more numerous and there are some so living who have seen his pupil Hermagoras The first Roman to handle the subject was to the best of my belief, Marcus Cato the famous censor while after him Marcus Antonius began a treatise on rhetoric I say began because only this one work of his survives and that is incomplete He was followed by others of last note whose names I will not omit to mention should occasion demand But it was Cicero who shed the greatest light not only on the practice but on the theory of oratory for he stands alone among Romans as combining the gift of actual eloquence with that of teaching the art With him for predecessor it would be more modest to be silent but for the fact that he himself describes his retorica as a youthful indiscretion while in his later works on oratory he deliberately omitted the discussion of certain minor points on which instruction is generally desired Corneficius wrote a good deal Stratinius something and the elder Galio a little on the same subject but Galio's predecessors Celsus and Lienas and in our own day Virginius, Pliny and Tutileus have treated rhetoric with greater accuracy Even today we have some distinguished writers on oratory who, if they had dealt with the subject or comprehensively would have saved me the trouble of writing this book but I will spare the names of the living the time will come when they will reap their mead of praise for their merits will endure to after generations while the Calumnes of Envy Still, although so many writers have preceded me I shall not shrink from expressing my own opinion on certain points I am not a superstitious adherent of any school and as this book will contain a collection of the opinions of many different authors it was desirable to leave it to my readers to select what they will I shall be content if they praise me for my industry wherever there is no scope for originality The question as to the origin of rhetoric need not keep us long for who can doubt that Mankind received the gift of speech from nature at its birth for we can hardly go further back than that while the usefulness of speech brought improvement and study and finally method and exercise gave perfection I cannot understand why some hold that the elaboration of speech originated in the fact that those who were in peril owing to some accusation being made against them set themselves to speak with studied care for the purpose of their own defense This, however, though a more honorable origin cannot possibly be the earlier for accusation necessarily precedes defense you might as well assert that the sword was invented for the purpose of self-defense and not for aggression it was then nature that created speech an observation that originated the art of speaking just as men discover the art of medicine by observing that some things were healthy and some the reverse so they observed that some things were useful and some useless in speaking and noted them for imitation or avoidance while they added certain other precepts according as their nature suggested these observations were confirmed by experience and each man proceeded to teach what he knew Cicero, it is true attributes the origin of oratory to the founders of cities and the makers of laws who must needs have possessed the gift of eloquence but why he thinks this the actual origin I cannot understand since there still exist certain nomad peoples without cities or laws and yet members of these peoples perform the duties of ambassadors accuse and defend and regard one man as a better speaker than another Chapter 3 The art of oratory as taught by most authorities and those the best of the five parts invention, arrangement, expression memory and delivery of action the two letter terms being used synonymously but all speech expressive of purpose involves also a subject and words if such expression is brief and contained within the limits of one sentence it may demand nothing more but longer speeches require much more for not only what we say and how we say it is of importance but also the circumstances under which we say it it is here that the need of arrangement comes in but it will be impossible to say everything demanded by the subject putting each thing in its proper place without the aid of memory it is for this reason that memory forms the fourth department but a delivery which is rendered unbecoming either by voice or gesture spoils everything and almost entirely destroys the effect of what is said delivery therefore must be assigned the fifth place those and albutius is among them who maintain that there are only three departments on the ground that memory and delivery which I shall give instructions in their proper place are given us by nature not by art may be disregarded although Thrasymachus held the same views as regards delivery some have added a sixth department subjoining judgment to invention on the ground that it is necessary first to invent and then to exercise our judgment for my own part I do not believe that invention can exist apart from judgment since we do not say that a speaker has invented inconsistent too edged or foolish arguments but merely that he has failed to avoid them it is true that Cicero in his retorica includes judgment under invention but in my opinion judgment is so inextricably mingled with the first three departments of rhetoric for without judgment neither expression nor arrangement are possible that I think that even delivery owes much to it I say this with all the greater confidence because Cicero in his partitiones oratoria arrives at the same five-fold division of which I have just spoken for after an initial division of oratory into invention expression he assigns matter and arrangement to invention words and delivery to expression and makes memory a fifth department common to them all and acting as their guardian again in the orator he states that eloquence consists of five things and in view of the fact that this is a later work we may accept this as his more settled opinion others who seem to me to have been no less desirous than those mentioned above to introduce some novelty have added order although they had already mentioned arrangement as though arrangement was anything else than the marshalling of arguments in the best possible order Diane taught that oratory consisted only of invention and arrangement but added that each of these departments was twofold in nature concerned with words and things so that expression comes under invention and delivery under arrangement while memory must be added as a fifth department the followers of the odoras divide invention into two parts the one concerned with matter and the one with expression and then add the three remaining departments Hermagoras places judgment division order and everything relating to expression under the heading of economy a Greek word meaning the management of domestic affairs which is applied metaphorically to oratory and has no Latin equivalent a further question arises at this point since some make memory follow invention in the list of departments while others make it follow arrangement personally I prefer to place it fourth for we ought not merely to retain in our minds the fruits of our invention in order that we may be able to arrange them or to remember our arrangement in order that we may express it but we must also commit to memory the words which we propose to use since memory embraces everything that goes to the composition of a speech there are also not a few who have held that these are not the words of rhetoric but rather duties to be observed by the orator for it is his business to invent arrange express etc if however we accept this view we leave nothing to art for although the orators task is to speak well rhetoric is the science of speaking well or if we adopt another view the task of the artist is to persuade while the power of persuasion resides in the art consequently while it is the duty of the orator to invent and arrange invention and arrangement may be regarded as belonging to rhetoric at this point there has been much disagreement as to whether these are parts or duties of rhetoric or as Athenaeus believes elements of rhetoric which the Greeks call but they cannot correctly be called elements for in that case we should have to regard them merely as first principles like the moisture, fire, matter or atoms of which the universe is said to be composed nor is it correct to call them duties since they are not performed by others but perform something themselves we must therefore conclude that they are parts for since rhetoric is composed of them it follows that since a whole consists of parts these must be parts of the whole which they compose those who have called them duties seem to me to have been further influenced by the fact that they wished to reserve the name of parts for another division of rhetoric for they asserted that the parts of rhetoric were panagiric figurative and forensic oratory but if these are parts, they are parts rather of the material than of the art for each of them contains the whole of rhetoric since each of them requires invention, arrangement, expression memory and delivery consequently some writers have thought it better to say there are three kinds of oratory those whom Citro has followed need to have taken the wisest course in terming them kinds of causes End of Chapter 3 Book 3 Chapters 4 and 5 of Anti-education of an Orator by Quintillion translated by H. E. Butler this LibriVox recording is in the public domain Chapter 4 There is however a dispute as to whether there are three kinds or more but it is quite certain that all the most eminent authorities among ancient writers following Aristotle who merely substituted the term public for deliberative have been content with the three-fold division still a feeble attempt has been made by certain Greeks and by Citro in his De Oratory to prove that there are not nearly more than three but that the number of kinds is almost past calculation and this view has almost been thrust down our throats by the greatest authority of our own times Indeed, if we place the task of praise and denunciation in the third division on what kind of oratory are we to consider ourselves to be employed when we complain console, pacify, excite, terrify, encourage, instruct, explain obscurities, narrate, plead for mercy, thank, congratulate, reproach, abuse, describe, command, retract, express our desires and opinions to mention no other of the many possibilities. As an adherent of the older view I must ask for indulgence and must inquire what was the reason that led your writers to restrict a subject of such variety to such narrow bounds. Those who think such authorities in error hold that they were influenced by the fact that these three subjects practically exhausted the range of ancient oratory. For it was customary to write panegyrics and denunciations and to deliver funeral orations while the greater part of their activities was devoted to the law courts and deliberative assemblies. As a result, they say, the old writers of textbooks only included those kinds of oratory which were most in vogue. The defenders of antiquity point out that there are three kinds of audience. One which comes simply for the sake of getting pleasure. A second which meets to receive advice. A third to give judgment on causes. In the course of a thorough inquiry into the question, it has occurred to me that the tasks of oratory must either be concerned with the law courts or with themes lying outside the law courts. The nature of the questions into which inquiry is made in the courts is obvious. As regards those matters which do not come before a judge they must necessarily be concerned either with the past or the future. We praise or denounce past actions. We deliberate about the future. Again, everything on which we have to speak must be either certain or doubtful. We praise or blame what is certain as our inclination leads us. On the other hand, where doubt exists in some cases we are free to form our own views and it is here that deliberation comes in while in others we leave the problem to the decision of others and it is on these that litigation takes place. And ex-simonies regarded forensic and public oratory as genera, but held that there were seven species accretation, dissuasion, praise, denunciation, accusation, defense, inquiry, or as he called it excetasticon. The first two however clearly belong to deliberative, the next to demonstrative, the three last to forensic oratory. I say nothing of protagonist who held that oratory was to be divided only into the following heads. Question and answer, command and entreat it, or as he calls it, eucolea. Plato, in his Sophist, in addition to public and forensic oratory introduces a third kind with his styles which I will permit myself to translate by conversational. This is distinct from forensic oratory and is adapted for private discussions and we may regard it as identical with dialectic. Isocrates held that praise and blame find a place in every kind of oratory. The safest and most rational course seems to be to follow the authority of the majority. There is then, as I have said, one kind concerned with praise and blame, which however derives its name from the better of its two functions and is called laudatory. Others however call it demonstrative. Both names are believed to be derived from the Greek in which the corresponding terms are encomiastic and epidetic. The term epidetic seems to me however to imply display rather than demonstration and to have a very different meaning from encomiastic. For although it includes laudatory oratory it does not confine itself thereto. Will anyone deny the title of epidetic to panagyric? But yet, panagyrics are advisory in form and frequently discuss the interests of these. We may therefore conclude that while there are three kinds of oratory all three devote themselves in part to the matter at hand and in part to display. But it may be that Romans are not borrowing from Greek when they apply the term demonstrative but are merely led to do so because praise and blame demonstrate the nature of the object with which they are concerned. The second kind is deliberative. The third forensic oratory. All other species fall under these three genera. You will not find one in which we have not to praise or blame to advise or dissuade to drive home or refute a charge. While conciliation narration, proof exaggeration, extenuation and the molding of the minds of the audience or laying their passions are common to all three kinds of oratory. I cannot even agree with those who hold that laudatory subjects are concerned with the question of what is honorable deliberative with the question of what is expedient and forensic with the question of what is just. The division thus made is easy and neat rather than true for all three kinds rely on the mutual assistance of the other. For we deal with justice and expediency in Panagyric and with honor in deliberations while you will rarely find a forensic case and part of which at any rate something of those questions just mentioned is not to be found. Chapter 5 Every speech however consists at once of that which is expressed and that which expresses that is to say of matter and words. Skill in speaking is perfected by nature, art and practice to which some add a fourth department namely imitation which I however prefer to include under art. There are also three aims which the orator must always have in view. He must instruct, move and charm his hearers. This is a clearer division than that made by those who divide the task of oratory into that which relates to things and that which concerns the emotions since both of these will not always be present in the subjects which we shall have to treat. For some themes are far from calling for any appeal to the emotions which although room cannot always be found for them produce a most powerful effect wherever they do succeed in forcing their way. The best authorities hold that there are some things in oratory which require proof and others which do not a view with which I agree. Some on the other hand as for instance Celsus think that the orator will not speak on any subject unless there is some question involved in it. But the majority of writers on rhetoric are against him as is also the whole division of oratory unless indeed to praise what is allowed to be honorable and to denounce what is admittedly disgraceful are no part of an orator's duty. It is however universally agreed that all questions must be concerned either with something that is written or something that is not. Those concerned with what is written are questions of law. Those which concern what is not written are questions of fact. Hermagoras calls the letter rational questions, the former legal questions for so we may translate logicon and nomicon. Those who hold that every question concerns either things or words mean much the same. It is also agreed that questions are either definite or indefinite. Indefinite questions are those maintained or impugned without reference to persons, time or place and the like. The Greeks call them theses, Cicero propositions, others general questions relating to civil life, others again questions suited for philosophical discussion, while Atheneas calls them parts of a cause. Cicero distinguishes two kinds, the one concerned with knowledge, the other concerned with action. Thus, is the world governed by providence is a question of knowledge, while should we enter politics is a question of action. The first involves three questions, whether a thing is what it is and of what nature. For all these things may be unknown. The second involves too, how to obtain power and how to use it. Definite questions involve facts, persons, time and the like. The Greeks call them hypotheses, while we call them causes. In these the whole question turns on persons and facts. An indefinite question is always the more comprehensive since it is from the indefinite question that the definite is derived. I will illustrate what I mean by an example. The question, should a man marry is indefinite? The question, should Cato marry is definite and consequently may be regarded as a subject for a deliberative theme. But even those which have no connection with particular persons are generally given a specific reference. For instance, the question ought we to take a share in the government of our country is abstract, whereas ought we to take part in the government of our country under the sway of a tyrant has a specific reference. But in this latter case we may say that a person is tacitly implied. For dimension of a tyrant doubles the question and there is an implicit admission of time and quality. But all the same you would scarcely be justified in calling it a cause or definite question. Those questions which I have guessed indefinite are also called general. If this is correct we shall have to call definite questions special questions. But in every special question the general question is implicit since the genus is logically prior to the species. And perhaps even in actual causes wherever the notion of quality comes into question there is a certain intrusion of the abstract. Milo killed Claudius. He was justified in killing one who lay in wait for him. Does this raise the general question as to whether we have the right to kill a man who lies in wait for us? What again of conjectures? May not they be of a general character as for instance what was the motive for the crime hatred, covetousness or are we justified in believing confessions made under torture? Or which should carry greater weight, evidence or argument? As for definitions everything that they contain is undoubtedly of a general nature. There are some that hold that even those questions which have reference to persons in particular cases may at times be called thesis provided only they are put slightly differently. For instance if Orestes be accused we shall have a cause whereas if it is put as question namely was Orestes rightly acquitted it will be a thesis. To the same class as this last belongs the question was Cato right in transferring Marcia to Hortensius? These persons distinguish a thesis from a cause as follows a thesis is theoretical in character while a cause has relation to actual facts since in the former case we argue merely with a view to abstract truth while in the latter we have to deal with some particular act. Some however think that general questions are useless to an auditor since no profit is to be derived from proving that we ought to marry or to take part in politics if we are prevented from so doing by age or ill health. But not all general questions are equal to this kind of objection for instance questions such as is virtue an end in itself or is the world governed by providence cannot be countered in this way further in questions which have reference to a particular person although it is not sufficiently merely to handle the general question we cannot arrive at any conclusion on the special point until we have first discussed the general question for how is Cato to deliberate whether he personally is to marry unless the general question whether marriage is desirable is first settled and how is he to deliberate whether he should marry Marsha only it is proved that it is the duty of Cato to marry there are however certain books attributed to Hermagoras which support this erroneous opinion though whether the attribution is furious or whether they were written by another Hermagoras is an open question for they cannot possibly be by the famous Hermagoras who wrote so much that was admirable on the art of rhetoric since as is clear from the first book of the rhetorical of Cicero he divided the material of rhetoric into theses and causes Cicero objects to this division contends that theses have nothing with an orator and refers all this class of questions to the philosophers but Cicero has relieved me of any feeling of shame that I might have in controverting his opinion since he has not only expressed his disapproval of his rhetorica but in the orator the de oratore and the topica instructs us to abstract such discussions from particular persons and occasions because we can speak more fully on general than on special themes and because what is proved of the whole must also be proved of the part in all general questions however the essential basis is the same as in a cause or definite question it is further pointed out that there are some questions which concern things in themselves while others have a particular reference an example of the former will be the question should a man marry should an old man marry or again the question whether a man is brave will illustrate the first while the question whether he is braver than another will exemplify the second epilodoras defines a cause in the following terms I quote the translation of his pupil valches a cause is a matter which in all its parts bears on the question at issue or again a cause is a matter of which the question in dispute is the object he then defines a matter in the following terms a matter is a combination of persons circumstances of place and time motifs means incidents acts instruments speeches the letter and the spirit of the law let us then understand a cause in the sense of the greek prophecies or subject and a matter in the sense of the greek puristasis or collection of circumstances but some however have defined a cause in the same way that epilodoras defines a matter Isocrates on the other hand defines a cause as some definite question concerned with some point of civil affairs or a dispute in which definite persons are involved while Cicero uses the following words a cause may be known by its being concerned with certain definite persons circumstances of time and place actions and business and will relate either to all or at any rate to most of these