 Itamar Rabinovich was Israel's negotiator with Syria, among many of his other accomplishments. He was ambassador to the United States, which was not about accomplishment either. He's been a teacher, head of Tel Aviv University. He's vice chairman of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, among many other things. And Itamar, you've been here many, many times. Israel has a new government, but a new set of relationships here. So over to you, please. Thank you. I will begin with the new Israeli government and then talk more broadly about the region. Two years ago was a very optimistic time in Arab-Israel relations. The Abraham Accords were signed. It was seen as a milestone, secondly, in Israel for the first time, an Arab party and Muslim Brotherhood, the softer version of the Muslim Brotherhood, joined the coalition. First time that an Arab party in Israel was part of a government coalition. And it seems that Arab-Israel relations were looking up. Nowadays, the perspective is far darker. The Abraham Accords are there. They did not develop into a larger regional structure. Summit of the Negev was mentioned. Some people thought that this would be the core of a Sunni-Israeli coalition against Iran and its Shiite Axis. It doesn't seem to be the case. The Abraham Accords are limited to actually very positive development in bilateral relations with the Emirates, with Bahrain, and with Morocco. Sudan is not so important in this context, but it's not the nucleus of any regional structure. In Israel itself, a good government that represented the gamut of Israeli politics all the way from the left to moderate right, and including an Arab party, collapsed after a year and a half. And not just the right wing, but the extreme right wing won the last elections. And it's probably going to form a very nationalistic government with probably negative implications for Israeli politics, Israeli society, Arab-Jewish relations inside Israel, and Israeli-Arab relations, Israeli-Palestinian relations in general. It is important to bear in mind that the elections were decided by very few votes. Actually, there was a plurality for the center-left block in the popular vote. But Netanyahu is a very good politician, election strategist. He put the right wing together in a very cohesive way. They did not lose a single vote. Center-left lost quite a few votes. And the result is that we have this perishing change in Israeli politics. Will it hold? I doubt it. I think that this government is likely to implode. The policies that the two extremist right wing parties and the ultra-orthodox parties are trying to impose on the country will lead either to implosion or to massive popular protests. I doubt that this will remain the case for very long. But we are in, I think, for a difficulty year in Israeli politics, Israeli-Arab relations inside Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian problem in a broader way. Now, let's remember one thing. Netanyahu is on trial. He's being tried for serious criminal charges, corruption, breach of faith. And what interests him the most is his own legal situation. He depends on these partners in order to be in power. He remembers that when Prime Minister Olmert left the government, he went to jail. He doesn't want to go to jail. And he wants to be in control, and he wants to reshape the legal system. This is what drives him in the first place. Let me now move more broadly to the region. And I would use the word flux. I think the region is in flux. On all three levels of politics, domestic, regional, and international. Domestic, six failed states in the region. Other countries on the eve of elections as in Turkey, in thermal, like Iran, and so forth. Originally, there is no structure. There used to be a structure. The last time we had a structure was during the Syrian Civil War and the Arab Spring when people spoke about the Saudi axis of Sunni states versus the Iranian axis. This is no longer true. There is no axis. What is very significant in regional politics is that the region has been joined by two large, powerful states, Iran and Turkey. They were not part of Middle Eastern politics most of the previous century. Only after the Iranian Revolution of 79 did Iran join Middle Eastern politics in Turkey with the first years of this century when Erdogan realized that Turkey was not going to be accepted into the European Union and he was looking for influence elsewhere, what is known as neo-automanism. So we have two countries of about 100 million people with strong economies, highly developed civil societies, strong militaries that punch at their weight in the region. What is more recent and very interesting is that these two countries are now trying to play a larger global role. Turkey has been active all the way from Azerbaijan to Libya, in East Africa, in Yemen. And Iran now, of course, joined Russia very closely and became part of the war in Ukraine. So this is not something that we were used to. We were used to larger international powers coming to the Middle East to control the Middle East. Suddenly we see Middle Eastern countries trying to play a larger role. One point you asked Mona about where is Egypt. I think there's been a shift in the Arab world from the traditional centers of Arab nationalism in Egypt, in Iraq and Syria. Egypt is sort of unto itself, Iraq and Syria in basically two failed states. And I think the focus is shifting to this part of the Arab world in the Gulf where you have stable, wealthy, highly developed countries that are now playing a much more important role in the larger Arab world. Internationally, Russia will have to see what the implications of the war in Ukraine are for its position in Syria and its ability to be effectively active in the Middle East. And the U.S. always raises the familiar question, is the U.S. pivoting away or is it not? In fact, a number of U.S. troops in the region has not declined, but the message is not very clear. And the U.S. has, I think, a hard time of finding a solution to what Minister Gargash presented eloquently yesterday. That is to say the tendency of Middle Eastern countries to say, yes, basically we are pro-Western, but we allow ourselves sort of a polygamy that you, Washington, needs to be able to live with. Thank you. Can I bring you just back into the Israeli interior for a second, just with one question? The great experiment of the previous government, which was Israeli Arabs or Israeli Palestinians, whichever you choose to say, getting involved with an Israeli government, is that experiment over or do you think it could come back again? No, it's not over. The Arab minority in Israel is 20, going up to 21, 22%. And the majority and the minority will need to find a long-term way of living with one another. Now, inside the Israeli minority, there are two contradictory trends. You see a growing middle class, a growing professional class. In my own university, Tel Aviv University, the number of Arab students rose from 4% to 16%. In the Technion in Haifa, which is Israel's MIT, it is 37% Arab students in the student population. So you see a trend of younger people moving up, becoming professional, moving to leaving their towns and settling in Tel Aviv and Haifa, and seeking integration. This is what Mahmoud Abbas and his participation in the coalition, in a way, represented. But there is a hard core of people who still oppose the very essence of the state. This will continue. It needs to be addressed by an Israeli government that will come to the Arab minority and say, listen, this is a Jewish state, but you are a significant minority of 20%. We need to find a definition of the relationship. Say cultural minority. But obviously, this is not the government that will do that in the coming year. And of course, it would help if there finally were a settlement and two states, because then people could decide where they really belonged. But we don't have to get into that right now. Our last.