 Good morning. My name is Robin Wright. I'm a joint fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Woodrow Wilson Center and I want to welcome you all to the third in our series on the Iran Forum. We're meeting at a make-or-break moment with the deadline now only 12 days away and there are stories this morning out of Vienna that Secretary of State Kerry is due in Vienna very soon along with the foreign ministers of the other five P5 plus one countries so This is a series that is unprecedented in Washington. We have formed a coalition of eight think tanks to Provide perspective on the different issues involved in a nuclear deal the first one which Joe Cerencione was a member Looked at the issues of what does a nuclear deal look like? The second looked at what the Iranians have to do this morning We're looking at the third and final piece of this puzzle and that is what the U.S. Has to seed in a nuclear deal to make it work The eight think tanks include the U.S. Institute of Peace the Woodrow Wilson Center the Stimson Center the Rand Corporation the arms control Association the Center for New American Security plow shares and partnership for a secure America I'm honored to be joined this morning by three real experts on the sub on the subject of sanctions To my left is Suzanne Maloney who's a senior fellow at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution Very well-known expert on Iran in this town. She's a former member of the State Department's policy planning staff and Has covered all the key issues in in the region, but particularly on the political economy of Iran Before joining the us For joining both the US government and the Brookings Institution. She was a senior Middle East advisor to Exxon mobile Ken Katzman is a senior Middle East analyst at Congressional Research Service with a special focus on the Middle East and South Asia he reports to and briefs members of Congress and their staffs on U.S. Policy his publications include the Warriors of Islam Iran's Revolutionary Guards Liz Rosenberg is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security She's also director of its energy environment and security program She served from 2009 until 2013 as a senior advisor at the Department of the Treasury on issues of terrorism financing and financial crimes so Just as a brief rundown we had a couple of slides to show you To give you some perspective and we've included it in a fact sheet we put on every one of your chairs There's a fact sheet as well as a flyer on the Iran primer Which is today the most comprehensive website in the world on on Iran both from U.S. perspective and from covering Iranian issues and The full bios of each of our speakers but one of the kind of Basics that everyone should know is as we deal with the issue of sanctions there have been 16 executive orders and 10 congressional laws that have imposed sanctions on Iran Sanctions have had a crippling effect on Iran's economy First sanctions imposed in 2006, but it's really since 2012 where they've had an impact and we've picked just three Issues to reflect the scope of the impact oil revenues down 60 percent Currency has dropped plummeted 60 percent And it's cost Iran an estimated 100 billion dollars since 2011 So we want to do this as a Q&A format Make this comfortable for all of us We're going to I'm going to ask one opening question to each one to follow up But then I want to open it up to you in the audience to get your participation To address the issues that that are that are of interest to you So we begin with Suzanne the very basic question of what impact have sanctions had What do the Iranians want as? sanctions relief in a nuclear deal how much is the United States actually willing to seed and How can the differences be reconciled? So why don't we start with Suzanne and if you could give us an overview that'd be great I will do my best. Thank you so much Robin and thank you very much to you its instituted piece and to the other Cosponsoring organizations for putting together not just this panel with a couple of experts and a moderator whose experience on Iran far exceeds My own but also the series that I think has really been a very nice package of Issues that are really central to this whole question of what kind of deal can we get? and as we Are in the sort of wind down phase of the negotiations. I'm glad that we've got to the real question of the money Which obviously is crucial to why it is we are at this point today We have had a system of sanctions a regime of sanctions imposed on Iran To greater and lesser extents since November 1979 since the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran But we've never seen the level of impact or the immediacy of American measures and The scope of unilaterals multilateral cooperation with those measures and with imposition of separate measures By the international community As we've seen over the course of the past four years. It's really been quite unprecedented and remarkable It's probably led to some Perhaps overly ambitious Understandings of what sanctions can in fact achieve But we know as you've cited through some of these statistics that the Sanctions that have been imposed particularly the financial measures that have begun to constrict Iran's ability to repatriate It's oil revenues to sell its oil abroad as well as to deal just generally with the international financial community Have had a very significant impact on Iran's economy. They've contracted the economy quite significantly. They've led to all kinds of Product shortages to rising inflation to increasing unemployment to factory shutdowns You name it there has been direct evidence of these sanctions impact on the pocketbooks of ordinary Iranians as well as on the government revenues And that has been quite substantial and really I think An issue that there's that there's very little debate about The question of what the Iranians would like out of a deal I think is quite simple what the Iranians want and what they need is the ability to do business with the world in Something that approaches a normal fashion as it is today Iran's trade is restricted in many respects to barter trade and constricted to those countries with which it has significant oil revenue Deposits because of this difficulty in repatriating the revenues What Iran needs is to be able to transact its business with the rest of the world through the international financial system the use of the swift electronic payments mechanism ability to access its resources that are in international banks around the world and An ability to attract foreign investment and begin to see some sort of growth in its economy All of these things are what the Iranians want what they're likely to get is I would imagine Quite significantly less than that and I think we're gonna have some discussion about what some of the specifics may look like over the course of this conversation But I think what's likely is that any sanctions relief is going to be pegged to specific actions on the Iranians part With respect to concessions on the nuclear program So if and as Iran adheres to whatever commitments it may make in a deal Under those circumstances sanctions relief will be Accorded so we've seen something like this over the course of the past six months negotiating period as you're probably familiar The interim agreement that was concluded last November included a number of measures for sanctions relief including the release of a relatively modest amount of assets and Some term-limited relief to particular sectors of the Iranian economy We've seen those assets release take place if and only as Iran has reciprocated with its own commitments to Specific measures on its nuclear infrastructure, and I think we're going to see something very similar With respect to any kind of a final deal every single element of the sanctions relief package Will have to be pegged to fulfillment of commitments on the part of the Iranians I think it's also quite clear that we're unlikely to see a significant change in the comprehensive embargo that applies to American businesses that That has been in place really since the Clinton administration Because so many of the US sanctions have been applied for reasons that transcend just the nuclear issue and in fact in many cases Predated the comprehensive embargo. I would imagine under no circumstances would be Released and so we are likely to in the best of all circumstances and only over a gradual period of time see some kind of a sanctions regime that is quite disproportionate between How it applies to American businesses and how it applies to international businesses But that's only under the best of all possible circumstances And I think it's quite clear that significant differences remain between the two sides at this time about what is possible to achieve in these negotiations Thank you Ken explained to us What the president would have to do in terms of dealing with? Executive orders and then what Congress would have to do in dealing with legislation the difference the difficulty And the time that it would take to do this and maybe even touch on a little bit of the politics of what it would Involve at a time of deep polarization in Washington Thank you very much Robin. Thanks to the organizers for inviting me And I knew I was in Washington, DC when I saw this crowd to discuss Iran sanctions First I thought it was maybe a premiere of a Transformers movie or something like that There's a few points I want to make about If there is a deal how it would be implemented what would be required what would happen? We Suzanne touched a little what is Iran going to demand be lifted My formulation is basically any sanction that was imposed after Resolution 1929 of June 2010 This was a date when sanctions ratcheted up dramatically In an effort to force Iran to the bargaining table which arguably arguably worked So what does that mean? Basically Iran is going to demand the lifting or suspension and we'll get into the difference of US secondary sanctions in other words US sanctions that apply to foreign companies foreign entities That are doing business with Iran. So as was mentioned The the locking up of Iran's oil revenues overseas They're certainly going to demand that that be the ease the sanction from the fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act on Which has cut Iran's oil exports from two and a half million barrels a day down to one million barrels a day They're certainly going to demand that the ceiling on their oil exports be lifted They're certainly going to demand that sanctions on their petrochemical industry petrochemical products equipment metals Be lifted all of these were imposed after 2010 Which gets me to my second point? The the joint plan of action the interim agreement stipulates that those sanctions would be lifted that are nuclear related Well, what's a nuclear all the US sanctions all the sanctions are incredibly interrelated Most of the sanctions legislation have multiple titles Which apply to Iran's use of terrorism and human rights? and Obviously the nuclear program so it's incredibly difficult to separate nuclear related from other sanctions But the issue is if you if you if you take my formulation and say those sanctions after 2010 Then I think that makes sense because Iran would demand that any Sanction imposed for the purpose of getting Iran to the nuclear bargaining table must be lifted And those are the ones that I that I stipulated the ones earlier such as investing in Iran's oil Infrastructure the US trade ban. I think Iran is not likely to immediately demand that those be lifted because those were imposed most primarily because of Iran's use of support for international terrorism and Particularly with regard to US companies my understanding is that the US ban on trade would probably not be lifted Until other issues with Iran are resolved, you know regional issues His bala Hamas, etc so What does that mean? Let's say we get a deal basically the president is likely to I would say issue basically suspend sanctions through waiver authority almost all of the sanctions laws Because of the constitutional separation of powers give the president the ability to waive suspension of that law He must certify that it's in the national interest to do so and many of the laws stipulate other Certification requirements, but still the president can waive the application Now the the issue is can the president promise to waive them in other words these laws the way these laws work The president must determine that somebody has violated and then say I'm waiving the law because it's in the national interest The question is as part of a deal can an administration say I am henceforth no matter Before I investigate any specific violations. I am going to automatically be waiving the penalties That's an issue that is very hotly debated right now because the way the laws work There has to be a determination and then a waiver It's it's not supposed to work where the president just says well from henceforth. I'm going to waive automatically That said it has happened it has happened if you recall there was a project in 1998 involving Total Petronas and Gazprom to develop Southpaw's gas field That was determined to be sanctionable the EU threatened to take the United States to the World Trade Organization and file a Case the United States and the EU settled it By saying if the EU cooperates with the United States on Iranian terrorism and Iranian proliferation All subsequent EU similar projects will be waived So there is precedent for this automatic automaticity of waiver Now to then get to the issue of down the road obviously Iran is going to demand well Okay, you keep waving and you know every six months, you know, when do we get permanent relief? This is going to come up So my view is basically, you know, there'll be a period. Let's say a year. Let's say two years Iran will comply They'll Will have a deal the I the International Atomic Energy Agency will certify. Yes Iran is meeting its commitments under the deal and Maybe a year or two Iran will say, okay, we've been complying for a year or two Why don't we get we need permanent sanctions relief? And then that's when the issue comes the rubber meets the road of whether You know the Congress would at that point act to actually repeal any of these sanctions laws or Rewrite them in such a way to give Iran permanent sanctions relief Great. So Liz Talk to us about the both the reality and the psychology of sanctions relief How would the international community? respond To sanctions relief is this going to happen overnight is this something after all these years of sanctions that Companies corporations are likely to be a little bit cautious about in other words How quickly would this translate into the re into a reality for Iran and actually make a difference, right? Well, thank you Robin and thanks to our USIP hosts. It's great to be part of this panel on this consortium of events So the quick answer to your question is the floodgates are not going to open immediately even under the best-case-deal scenario There will not be an immediate Collapse of the sanctions regime and pouring back into Iran a private business So I'm going to talk a little bit about let me offer a few thoughts about sanctions relief and in on paper and in practice and The reason why I think this is important is because they're not the same thing that distinction is really important Iran is surely an incredibly attractive potential investment opportunity as an emerging market. There's 80 million people It's a relatively young and well-educated Population there's a middle class with the desire for additional consumer goods from abroad It has the fourth largest oil reserves second largest gas reserves. They are of a conventional nature They're relatively inexpensive inexpensive to produce There's also historical trading ties with the Middle East and with Europe elsewhere It's an incredibly attractive opportunity and Iran knows this. They've been courting Potential investors from all over the world. We've seen them host a lot of trade delegations and go To go abroad to discuss potential opportunities and new contract formulations with investors elsewhere and it's clear that with a Good amount of sanctions relief possibly what could be included in a deal Even if it's not as much as they would like it could have quite a significant structural impact on their economy being a real game changer for Iran allowing the generation of revenue to make quite significant changes in their Their economic growth rate and a variety of other economic performance indicators So There's a potential windfall there and there's a lot of investor enthusiasm but there's also a lot of caution on the part of international companies and the international private sector about going into Iran and this is because of concerns about Continuing illicit activity in Iran and the maintenance of sanctions going forward And also a very well-engrained culture in the international private sector of sanctions compliance So I'll go through five main reasons for investor concern that will slow down The potential investments they may make in Iran under potential opening of Sanctions or lifting of sanctions in a deal scenario. So first there's a lot of uncertainty about Whether a potential deal will hold and whether the Iranian regime will remain in power and continue to enforce it over the course of time and That factor is one reason that has prevented Cheating more cheating. We haven't seen much cheating. It doesn't appear that way during this six-month period of the interim deal under the Joint Plan of Action and this reason this Uncertainty about what the future will hold will also mean that some of the first deals that occur in a potential Iran sanctions Lifting scenario will be short-term. They will feature a short payback period so that companies know that they will be paid for their investments Second reason sanctions will still exist no matter what in a best case deal scenario as has been alluded to by my fellow panelists. So not just nuclear sanctions which would be as the international negotiators the P5 plus one negotiators have indicated Relieved in stages over time so those sanctions that would eventually be lifted as part of a deal It will take time for them all to be lifted They won't happen all on the first day and also sanctions imposed for terrorism Human rights violations regional destabilization those will stay in place no matter what they're not part of the terms of the deal and those apply to companies financial institutions Agencies of the Iranian government negotiating those sanctions still in place will be a due diligence challenge for any potential investors in Iran The third reason is that Penalty violating sanctions is expensive and it's very damaging to the reputation of international companies So late last month we saw French Bank BNP agreed to pay nine billion dollars for sanctions violations and agree to cease US dollar clearing activities for a period of time that's a very substantial and painful penalty for violating sanctions and that follows on Penalties 1.9 billion that HSBC agreed to pay in 2012 standard Charter Bank Royal Bank of Scotland and others and even during this interim period the six month interim period We've seen the Treasury Department impose sanctions for impose penalties and name Cheaters for sanctions violations. So we know that Even while negotiators are moving towards a potential deal. There's still an interest in a commitment to enforcing sanctions on the books Another reason for investor caution is that Iran presents a challenging business environment corruption is well documented and widespread Iran will need to Make changes to its investment regime It's regulatory regime in order to the contracts that it offers in order to be quite hospitable to international investors Relationships need to be rebuilt. They are fresher for some European and Asian companies, but but there's still a need to Prospect opportunities and reestablish business ties and that's something of course has been going on during all these trade missions To Iran and and the visiting of potential business counterparts and finally Congress could undermine a potential deal, of course, whether that be by rejecting a deal that the P5 plus one in Iran do come to or by imposing new sanctions not related to the nuclear nuclear concerns So for example related to Iran's support for terrorism as a nuclear deal is beginning Iran is unlikely to distinguish between the economic pain imposed by nuclear sanctions or Terrorism related sanctions I think they will see any imposition of new sanctions as an act of ill will or ill faith on the part of the P5 plus one And an attempt to sabotage the potential for a deal so at a minimum the private sector would need to respond to that with Increased attention due diligence to navigate a new landscape Constructed by more actors than they may have thought more actors than just those negotiating in the P5 plus one in Iran for engaging in business in Iran and another final point that that will that creates Caution and concern for potential investors looking towards business opportunities in Iran is that they're hoping to see a Coordinated multilateral Lifting of sanctions whether that's small amount or a large amount. It really matters that there is a Harmonization and attempt towards harmonization made Internationally, there's a couple of main reasons for this and they involve the fact that for example if a European company Sees that Europe has this is a hypothetical scenario, but lifted sanctions on doing oil business with Iran Including the shipping and insurance provisions that would need to go along with and financial repatriation provisions that would need to go along with that That company might face sanction under the US under US sanctions So if they have an interest in doing business in the United States or in the US dollar They face losing that business if they violate US sanctions in practice I think most companies in Europe and Asia elsewhere that are interested in doing business in Iran Also have an interest in doing business in the US dollar or in the US So they will try not to violate US sanctions if they don't have a big legal presence in the United States and they are sanctioned They won't have ability for a legal recourse in the United States another major incentive towards acting To move into Iran when it hasn't been made permissible under a lifting of US sanctions Just and a couple of final points the first I want to just reiterate There won't be a flood of business into Iran on day one in best case-deal scenario and sanctions lifting scenario It's going to take time a greater degree of legal certainty And I think a signal from the US Congress that it will at least tolerate a deal And additionally the P5 plus one given all of these challenges I've just laid out that have to do with engaging a new business in Iran They'll need to be very careful in how much sanctions relief they promise if they over promise and the private sector Underperforms there's a real credibility problem for the P5 plus one Iran will look at this scenario and think that the P5 plus one is not doing its part to uphold its part of the deal And the P5 plus one will risk losing some leverage and future relations with Iran Finally, I think there's quite a good chance that we'll see in a potential sanctions lifting scenario Some legal guesswork done on the part of international companies some overconfidence overreach recklessness Ignorance and that will be met by the United States in particular the US Treasury With an effort to crack down on such instances of sanctions cheating as a way to show And to strongly signal to the private sector exactly which kinds of business are available under sanctions relief and which are not so If there is a nuclear deal if there is sanctions relief for Iran We will still see quite a lot of I think aggressive enforcement of existing sanctions which will have again a disrupt not a disruptive a Chilling effect on some of those that may look to enter Iran it may cause them a bit of Concern and slow them down a bit as they're planning their reentry. Thank you very much Liz Let me ask Suzanne We there's been an allusion to it in each of your presentations about the issue of the phases of a deal Now when the United States talks about a deal It talks in terms of a decade a generation that they want something that's in place over a long period of time Can you address how sanctions might? be Might coincide with each stage are we talking about 20 years 10 years 20 years of lifting sanctions in a very gradual way How realistic is that and secondly the kind of broader question? I was in Tehran. I've been in Iran twice in the last six months, and I've been struck by The fact its sanctions have not had the impact it did during the Iran-Iraq war when you Because of rationing of meat and gasoline, you know, there were huge shortages of basic commodities today Iran you can find literally anything I went to a Porsche dealership, and it was not the only one and they sell a Porsche I learned more about Porsches in Tehran than I did here they buy a Carrera 9-11 s for $300,000 and they can't keep them in stock. I mean there is There is money at the same time Amin Inajad did such damage to the economy That when you consider that more than half of all the oil revenues Iran has made Since oil was discovered were earned during Amin Inajad, and he basically blew right through it So there's this kind of disconnected there's a nervous wealth But there's also a sense that that mismanagement was as much a factor As sanctions really we like to think that sanction was the pivot But in fact, it's this intersection of the two phenomena So if you could address that how how vulnerable is Iran today economically just in general And then the issue of the phases and how that might work We saw a little bit of it, but you know what time frame are we talking about? Thank you. Those are two really interesting wide open questions You know, I think the timeline will very much depend on what the overall timeline for the deal is And we know that this is one of the sort of sleeper issues sleeper Potential bomb shells within the deal and it's been discussed in some of the prior iterations of These panels that US IP has helped to organize There's a big difference between what the United States Administration as well as what the Congress might consider to be a tolerable sort of rehabilitation period for for Maintaining these very extensive constraints on Iran's nuclear activities and infrastructure and what the Iranians are looking to get out of this deal with Intact so, you know, I think the the timeline for sanctions and the phasing of sanctions will be very much pegged to Where the final decision comes out on on this time frame and I can't tell you I'm confident on where that's going to be I think it's obviously going to be shorter than what some of the very extensive multi-decade Time horizons have been suggested on on our side But it's also not going to be the sort of snap of the fingers that clearly many on the Iranian's Side are both demanding and anticipating And I think this gets into this whole question of psychology And how this deal has been sold both within Iran as well as within the international community Disexpectation as Liz said both cultivated by the Iranians But also I think used on this side as an argument against Diplomacy that somehow business is going to rush back into Iran that's a it's a really a double-edged sword for the Iranians because As Liz suggested, it's really not proven to be the case over the course of this interim period But it has set some very high expectations on the part of the Rouhani Administration from the Iranian side and among the Iranian people for whom the deal last November was really sort of the deal You know, they're not focused on numbers of centrifuges or particular Installations what they're focused on and and I know this from my own time on the ground now quite dated within Iran is on this ability to interact normally with the rest of the world And this has been brought home to them in a very clear way how restricted and how constrained they've been over the course particularly as has been said over the past four years since 1929 and so I think that you know those expectations those very expansive Expectations for a peace dividend as a result of the you know sort of measures Public diplomacy that we saw on the part of Rouhani when he came to New York He published not bad in the Washington Post He accepted the phone call from President Obama perhaps solicited the phone call from President Obama No one's ever quite clear about that You know these were all breakthroughs from the Iranian perspective and it came at a time when Iranians were beginning to see some improvement in the economy at home Because Rouhani was able to put back in place a number of Technocrats who'd been forced out of the Iranian government by Ahmadinejad and the people around him It's really ironic that the most constrictive period of international pressure on Iran Came at this during the same period that oil revenues boomed despite the 2008 drop Ahmadinejad's Ten year as well as the sort of whole time frame of the nuclear dispute and the revelation since 2002 coincided with this sort of epic boom and as you said, you know more than half the Iran oil revenues earned since 1908 by the Iranian since the discovery and and Marketization of oil in Iran were earned during the Ahmadinejad period. So there's a lot of cash in this economy There's a lot of resources and as Liz said, it's a well-educated population It's got all the the the fundamentals for a sort of future takeoff But that future takeoff is going to be delayed has been delayed And I think we're already starting to see a certain degree of frustration With Rouhani with the international community and it will break every way there will be no beneficiary of it For those who think that in fact intensifying the pressure is likely to lead to a better outcome You know, I think that's that remains considerably unclear But the issue of how do we create a stable time stable horizon stable expectations? I think is also quite difficult and something that needs to be contemplated as we construct this deal First of all, we know the sanctions a heck of a lot better than the Iranians do They've been very adept over the course of the past 35 years in managing Under international pressure whether it was the pressure of their own self-imposed Retraction from the international economy after the revolution whether it was the pressure of the war and The logistical constraints that were imposed on their trade with the rest of the world or the various forms of US sanctions that have been put in place since 79. They know how to mitigate them They know how to get around them. They know how incredible smuggling networks But they don't know the legalities and they don't know the bureaucratic procedures and they don't have any Appreciation for how difficult and how time consuming and how intricate the process is going to be And how many ways the structure of that process can be used to slow investment to slow their own return to the International economy and I think you know that that's one issue that we all need to be concerned about because to the extent that Leverage on our side. It also creates as has been said potential for imbalance And as we know there have been periods in Iranian history where the political elite has become frustrated with what they expected with Back in after the 2003 and 2004 concessions on the part of the Iranians with respect to uranium enrichment and Decision was made less than two years later in 2005 to restart the enrichment program precisely because they felt They hadn't gotten what they'd been promised from the Europeans at that time And I think we don't want to set ourselves up for a scenario in which the Iranians in part because of lack of understanding and lack of familiarity with the very Intricate bureaucratic and legal processes around these sanctions are likely to find themselves in six months to a year Feeling as though they have been sold a bill of goods. It's not just problematic because it would undercut a deal I think it's problematic because it would undercut us Credibility and the credibility of the p5 plus one in doing a good a deal in good faith And I think that's that's going to be particularly important As Ken said there are ways in which sanctions waivers ways in which the president can use his authority To create new opportunities to open the path Without necessarily working through Congress directly But much of that has to be done very very carefully and even if you look back to the to the total the waiver that of Iran Libya sanctions act that was Written for total back in 2000 It didn't actually give blanket authority to European companies to invest in the Iranian energy sector was constructed very carefully And so while many interpreted as a sort of yellow light to go in it still wasn't a hindrance on on investment in Iran And I think that that this is a really interesting moment in terms of how we move forward with the sanctions relief Both with respect to the Iranian political environment, but also with respect to how we use sanctions Toward other adversarial countries and in other Entrenched problems because it's not a spigot that you can turn off and on very easily And we have found that the sort of reach and scope of American law even to Companies that have very limited access to the American market is so severe and the intimidation factor is so high right now That we may have a great deal of difficulty in actually encouraging the kind of investment We may want to see at some point in the future I think that's very true Ken. Uh, I on both of my trips I saw the foreign minister Javad Zarif and talked about the issue of sanctions and lifting them and how you do it And so forth and he made clear Both times that Iran wants Congress to act that he that it wants not just presidential waivers It wants Congress to be a part of the process for fear that with a new president. There would be Just new sanctions imposed or that that you have to deal with the toughest nut to crack And that means the political will on the hill They need they want something that says it's not just the White House behind that you that you have Kind of the American people as well so maybe you can talk to us for a little bit about a the mood on the hill about sanctions relief and and You avoided my question the first time around about the Polarization on the hill and and how that might complicate The process of Fulfilling what Iran wants out of a deal Well, let me answer it as I'm sort of allowed to you know it's I Mean what I would say is I Would say Iran needs to do, you know, I don't doubt that this Porsche dealership, you know The IMF said their economy shrunk six percent in 2013. That is severe Our economy here shrunk about what four percent in the 2008 crash and it was dramatic I mean, you know unemployment went to ten percent here six percent is huge it is huge and now They need money because they're propping up mr. Assad and they're propping up mr. Maliki as well So they need even more money These these things cost money. That's their foreign policy. That's their right to have their foreign policy the way they want It costs money So they need I would say sanctions relief now We talked about the stepwise I mean to my mind a Lot of sanctions would have to be eased Suspended at once because it doesn't you can't it's it's it's it's all interlocked You you can't allow them to export back to two point six million barrels a day But the revenue is still locked up in foreign banks and you can't allow that without allowing them to use the swift system Because then they can't bring the money back to Iran so all these To my mind all these would have to be lifted quickly This is what the Iranians would demand now You know we can get to the issue of maybe allowing investment in Iran down the road that could be maybe sequenced later because it's not immediate but You know again dealing in precious metals dealing in hard currency Shipping shipping insurance all of these it seems to me would need to be as part of a deal lifted Very quickly in the process. Otherwise it does Iran no good Terms of Congress you know again, I'm in the CRS capacity here to my mind, you know Congress I think What they are looking for in this in this deal is does it take the issue of an Iranian nuclear weapon off the table or not? If it does take it off the table Then I think Congress is more likely to you know If down the road Iran demands that Congress act or they're going to abrogate the deal Then you know I think I think Congress might be more willing to look at that if if it doesn't Completely take the idea of an Iranian nuclear weapon off the table, you know, then I think there's going to be skepticism now now, you know Obviously, I don't can't get into the politics of you know There was a proposal to have new sanctions That would go into effect after the interim agreement expired. Mr. Obama threatened to veto it and it didn't come it wasn't brought to a vote I Can't go any more than that, but You know this is a priority issue for the administration a deal is a priority Issue for the administration now and the issue of waivers though to your point about what Zarif said If there is a deal and waivers are issued to allow the United States to implement its commitments under this deal I'm not a constitutional lawyer, but I would say that that is binding on the next president There is not under under the way the Constitution works a new president Does not come in and say I don't like the deal that mr. Obama negotiated And I'm and I'm not issuing these waivers because I don't like the deep it just that system here Does not work that way now there have been international agreements I think it was NAFTA, please somebody correct me Where a president can come into office and say let's review the deal or let's let's renegotiate certain aspects of the deal that could happen and Then we'd have to go back with the Iranians and p5 plus one and look at it if that were to happen But the idea I think of a of a next president coming in and saying I am not issuing these waivers That would be viewed I think as an abrogation of the u.s. Commitment, and I don't see it happening, but he could issue new executive orders To do no, you know the answer to this Sure, and a new president could issue any executive order they want, but I was just gonna just to cut it still I would respectfully disagree with the The suggestion that a new president would be bound to use the same way waivers in the same way is that that president Obama has used but I Go ahead. No, I mean, I just well we could disagree on it. That's fine. It's just Because because the deal would be viewed not extending the waivers or issuing contradicting executive orders that would have the effect of Basically abrogating the deal. I think would not would not fly. I just think it would not fly Go ahead, and then I have a separate question for you as well I Think that you know a treaty a formal treaty I agree would certainly bind the next president to the terms of a treaty although of course the new president could revisit that and and do what they would but That I see as binding it through through continuation to a new administration, but with respect to the use of waivers or and the way that they may be effectuated through a change in regulation or in Licenses, I think that there's a great discretion on the part of a next Administration next president to be able to make modifications if they don't want to however I certainly agree that if that happens it would be seen as not in the spirit of the agreement made and the promises Committed to in the context of a deal in which case Iran Says okay, we're abrogating and they sent you if you just get plugged back in, you know, it just doesn't The case in point is the is in fact Ilsa the fact that the Bush administration came in in 2001 Sort of debating and reviewing Ilsa, but in fact despite the fact that it supported the congressional reauthorization of Ilsa It also continued to uphold the sort of implicit agreement in the total waiver that Ilsa would not be aggressively enforced and it was only and took until the Obama administration came into office and The environment changed substantially on the hill that we saw Renewed pressure to in fact enforce Ilsa So I think once waivers are put in place they have a certain degree of staying power even if a president has some ability to I want to open it up to your questions, but just one quick question to Liz We've been running a list on the Iran primer of all the countries that and all the delegations that have shown up in Iran and one of the the most ironic was that was from the French the French who had at the It last November when they were negotiating the final terms for the the interim deal threw in a new demand at the last minute to the surprise of the Americans as and everybody else and And of course the French were the first ones to send in a delegation of over a hundred businessmen to Tehran to talk about deals in January and so It's it's clear that the Europeans have in some ways more to gain short term out of a deal than American businesses and that the Iranians are in many ways looking to the Europeans they are They've been buying a lot from Asia in the absence of because of geography and bartering and and You know their arrangements with Iran with China on oil and so forth, but they they're Dare I say this they're quite Western in their appetites and Are really want whether it's you know fashion or cars or appliances or whatever there. They really like the Western Goods better. They'd like to do deals with the West more and if they're not going to do them with the United States Anytime soon and Europe is this great market. So maybe you can talk to us just very briefly about What Europe might have to do to lift sanctions and is this really where Where we're likely to see more movement. Do they have the same constraints? That we do even a lot of the the sanctions they've imposed are similar to ours Yes, that's true except there's aren't extraterritorial so It's true that Iran is very interested in Engaging in deals with European or even American countries, although I certainly agree that that's that's not US companies will not be first movers into into Iran for a variety of reasons. We've discussed and the reasons for that are because European companies US companies have Technological Sophistication they have project management experience that is incredibly attractive. They have real comparative advantages in those Areas. So for example in the energy sector Iran like many resource Endowed countries energy resource in doubt countries They would like to have European or American companies come and develop their energy resources because of that to technical and project management experience and sophistication so Recently when Iran kicked out CNPC for underperformance and it's an oil field service to an oil field development Many people looked at that as an indication that in fact they are freeing up opportunities hopefully for European companies that they'd like to come in instead and do that oil field rehabilitation and expansion in the future So France to your point about France They have been very interested and committed of course to the p5 plus one process and Instrumental in the use and position of sanctions on Iran. However, they Have sacrificed a lot to do this bank Tejrat. For example, it's Location in France is one of the most recent to be sanctioned that hurt for France So did auto sector sanctions that is a jobs issue in France in particular Total is one such company French company that has quite a lot of support from the French government That would be well-placed to do business in Iran and has a history of work of course in the region What it would take for Europe to lift sanctions so they There are sanctions largely parallel sanctions the United States has in place, but for the reasons that I mentioned before about the need for Coordinated multilateral lifting of sanctions Europe will have a significant interest in working Cooperatively with the United States to make sure that sanctions are lifted in a way that doesn't create major conflict of law problems for European companies. They are acutely aware that their that European companies will be entangled in US sanctions if they move out ahead of where US sanctions lifting may make those opportunities that US sanctions lifting may create for international companies in Iran, so We've already discussed some of the most attractive Opportunities are most attractive sectors for for which Iran in which Iran would like to see relief energy autos which by some Counts is the second largest industry in Iran of course the ability to move money and The EU holds a very significant card when it comes to sanctions on Iran the imposition in the imposition that it has on use by Iranian Banks of its swift payment messaging system and that is locked up under EU sanctions not US sanctions. Thank you. I want to open it up to your questions if you'd identify yourself and Your organization in the back right up there. Wait for the mic Hi, I'm Wallace Hayes Independent energy consultant My question is about is there a distinction between waivers and licensing because on the total Issue we and and the Ilsa investment issues We had one waiver and then there were half a dozen to a dozen other investments that were treated as if They were part of that same waiver, but never actually got waivers And so that's why they were able to go back and reexamine those issues in the Obama administration So is there a difference? Could can you? Issue do you have to issue waiver by waiver on every single? Transaction or can you do something like issue a general license that allows for example for the Lifting of Iranian crude. Thank you. Liz. You want to take that? Sure So you just may not satisfy you, but it may depend a little bit on what you call waiver and what you call fine license and so in general Using a waiver may not be enough to get business moving you may need to The way that it then takes effect To to actually make companies see that there is an opportunity there is by changing regulation or issuing licenses And those licenses can be general licenses. They can be specific licenses for an individual transaction That's probably a specific license or an individual waiver And it again depends on the underlying Sanctions authority that you're talking about what kind of statute it's linked to or or other vehicle You want to if either of you want to speak to the specific example he mentioned? Well, I mean, I would just say that that reach back authority and the extent to which we've seen sanctions enforcement Take place retrospectively Is one of the really major factors in the fear that has been I think entrenched now within the international financial community within the international energy sector and other key areas That the Iranians might be looking to tap as they begin to reopen their their economy to the world There are so many companies that look at whether it's being a or standard charter or any number of other firms that have been Subject to significant penalties as a result of activities with regarding Iran or that took place in Iran It stretched back several years That is I think going to continue to deter companies from investing even after we see Regulations in place when and if there's a deal it will take not just weeks not just months But years and this is what different will differentiate the Iranian case from other cases of sanctions Relaxation or lifting We've been through this before with respect to Iraq with respect to Libya and a couple of other Cases in point but none have been under this continued scrutiny None have continued to have the the scope of the sanctions that are likely to remain in place With with respect to Iran. I think that was true even of South Africa that it took a long time despite You know the the kind of epic transition it underwent to lift some of the sanctions that were imposed during the apartheid era George hi George Lopez a vice president here at USIP in the academy If if I were thinking about that the US would cede some things one of the areas I'd look at is The UN Security Council resolutions. I was glad to hear Ken talk about the 1929 as a as a figure point there, but You know the Iranians could put the US in a situation in which if the IAEA Verifies that things have been closed down in in agreement with 1929 and in 1984 Resolutions then you ask for a vote in the Security Council to ease those sanctions which takes a hundred and forty Entities and individuals off the list and any number of things and you don't have to really worry about Congress and you put the US in What might be seen by some as a favorable position of bringing UN Security Council resolutions to a close or the unfavorable situation of maybe vetoing The relaxation or suspension of those resolutions where we've really Negotiated the deal that the conditions for the original resolutions are met So I'd like your observations on that any of you on the panel. Thank you The the resolutions would not in themselves be be binding Let's say on Congress and the the resolutions are a mandate or an authority particularly 1921 which was more of an authority than a mandate Which which give member states the the authority to take certain steps The Congress and then you know the Congress took certain steps on its own and the administration signed these laws So lifting the resolutions would not necessarily mean Automatically that Congress would then be you know mandated to act to repeal these sanctions So I just want to add on the licensing issue the the Iran sanctions act You know when you're talking about the United States administration doesn't license foreign company the US Government only licenses American companies the US government has no jurisdiction over foreign So it would be it wouldn't be a license It would be a promise to as was done in 1998 a basically a pledge To waive penalties under the Iran sanctions act for deals like that under certain circumstances Yes, I think that that actually would be welcome in some orders here in Washington because 1929 is actually quite a bit more expansive than the Interim agreement is in terms of what it requires so I think if anything it actually Imposes more on the Iranians and nets them less in terms of actual sanctions relief because as we all know the brilliance of 19 of the UN Security Council resolution passed in 2010 was not so much in the specific entities or penalties that it imposed But in the fact that it served as a platform for the European Union as well as for a number of other states around the world To implement their own unilateral sanctions on Iran using the UN Security Council 1929 as a justification for those unilateral measures So I don't see in fact that that saying that lifting of the UN Security Council resolutions actually Brings real relief to the Iranian economy and it actually would probably Revive or give more authority to be some of the technical questions that have come up over the course of the negotiations particularly the missile issue if we were to in fact to To revert to that as the basis for the negotiations rather than the joint plan of action Barbara Thanks very much Barbara Slavin from the Atlantic Council. Thank you for a really interesting discussion I wanted to first brief advertisement Ken We have copies of your paper outside Ken wrote a paper called unwinding US sanctions on Iran For us at the Atlantic Council and it's outside and with something in it Ken you didn't mention I wondered if you would talk a little bit about it and that is the impact of allowing the Iran sanctions Act To sunset at the end of 2016 how much that would mean for the Iranians Also, whether your definition of nuclear related sanctions as being anything post-july 2010 is that Widely accepted or is that just just your own formulation Suzanne others. Do you know if that's also the way the US government is looking at the sanctions issue? Thank you the the web What I was trying to get at with this post 2010 is to say a lot of the sanctions passed after that Do not say anything about nuclear weapons or nuclear tech the oil exports shipping To define a nuclear-related sanction narrowly as only any sanction that mentions nuclear weapons nuclear equipment The Iranians that's will not fly with the Iranians there the Iranian view. I think is That you know any sanction that was imposed to compel Iran to a nuclear bargain is To them a nuclear-related sanction, so I was just trying to Make that point Expiry the Sunset the Iran Sanctions Act under current law Sunsets on December 31 2016 So it is possible to hypothesize a situation Where there is a deal let's say this year and and there is you know a year and a half or so of Two years more than two years of compliance. Let's say the Iranians comply in 2015-2016 Where the Iranians say you know we now insist that the Iran Sanctions Act which bans the investment in Iran's energy sector Be we insist that it be allowed to sunset Congress has to act to extend the sunset if they want to which means President Obama could theoretically veto That legislation and and insist that it's sunset So I was I was pointing that out as a possible mechanism because the Iran Sanctions Act does trigger Many different sanctions particularly on the energy sector Can I sure speaking to the point about what is a nuclear sanction? It's you yes, you could read it narrowly, you know what says nuclear nuclear material Etc. EO the executive order 1-3a2 on proliferation activities is one that we classically think of as nuclear But of course it's broader than just nuclear proliferation if we think about a distinction from 1929 until the present those sanctions that Have been issued during a period of greatest international concern about Iran's nuclear activities You could call that nuclear and certainly there have been great pains made by the those in the P5 plus one to draw a connection between The economic sectors that have been sanctioned in Iran and Iran's nuclear ambitions in that Revenue from these sectors enrich the regime's ability to pursue its proliferation activities and there have been a Nuclear related or proliferation related transactions intermingled or disguised in transactions in these other sectors however in to my mind What's less important that how exactly you read what nuclear is is Less important than the flexibility that it affords to p5 plus one negotiators And in fact they have declined when asked to define Nuclear because it's very useful to have the flexibility to define it themselves And in fact what ultimately will be a nuclear sanction will be a function of What sanctions relief p5 plus one negotiators need to offer in order to get Reasonably offer in order to get what what they want to see when it comes to nuclear concessions on the part of Iran Thank you. Yeah, very quickly just I don't think 2010 is really the cutoff for the way the Iranians are looking at this because if you Examine what has been so powerful about these sanctions. It really began in 2006 with the with the designation of Banqasar Arash and the continued designation of individual banks under both 1332 and 224 Two executive orders that were passed the the second of which we haven't talked about is is explicitly related to terrorism It wasn't in fact crafted with Iranians in mind at all, but it's been quite powerful in terms of cutting off Iran's individual financial institutions from the international financial System and I think from the Iranian perspective what they're looking for is their banks to be able to do business with the world and You know obviously it's not going to happen all at once, but I don't think that any scenario in which their banks are continued remain under some sort of Indefinite suspension from interaction with the rest of the international financial system will be acceptable to them I will add though that I was surprised at what they accepted back in November They by my standards, I think they sold relatively cheap Perhaps they thought that this sort of crack of the sanctions relief that was offered under the interim accord and the real honey effect and the improvements he was making at home in the economy and the Put putting in place of a bunch of technocrats who were outselling and contract models for the energy sector Would just lure investment back and that companies would would wink and nod as they did to a certain extent Back in the late 1990s. They had to take the risk that I'd actually decide to impose this And so I think that you know, it's unclear I you know what they would accept what what my definition of what would be a reasonable deal from the Iranian side They may actually sell cheap once again It depends I think on on your definition of just how eager they are for a deal Just what the political conditions within Iran at this stage might be My own calculation all along has been the fact that they signed on to the interim deal meant they were in for the full bargain Because they got so little and because effectively the the regime not just from honey Not just a reef, but the regime itself has banked its credibility on this deal Common aid continues to distance himself as we know in his speech yesterday And in suggests some very high standards for what would be acceptable But ultimately if they have to walk away from this entire year of diplomacy with nothing other than this six-month sanctions relief the Ronnie Presidency is torpedoed and we know from Historical experience that how many does not like to see that level of discord within the system itself Well, it's interesting comedy speech yesterday. He also talked about he how he supported the negotiating team and so You get this mixed message. He's both good cop bad cop, and he's going to have it both ways And that's the way he's always played played everything But for those of you who don't know the remember the details of the interim deal They took four point two billion dollars of cash with another two or three billion in Sales and things they could they could do but it was four point two billion of their money That was been trapped in foreign banks. It's their oil revenue And that's four point two of one hundred billion that they have trapped in foreign banks And so in some, you know, you have to wonder if they would be satisfied in that opening stage just to get their own money back You know not to even worry about getting, you know, the French companies or whatever that that in that opening stage or that opening year Or two that they get their hundred billion back. That's a lot of money And that takes them a long way in digging them out of the hole that President Rouhani said shortly after he took office and a speech to the nation that the country's coffers were empty I mean it was an unbelievably candid moment when They had not gotten the interim deal to make that statement and the striking thing about being in Iran these last two times Was how the public Really accepts the fact that it's kind of a done deal even though it's not a done deal that the country is going to make that and that The supreme leader is not ignorant of public sentiment He saw that in the polls and I think there is a sense that well they were ready to move on with it and I think their only disappointment is that it hasn't moved faster and So to delay the process Would be I think a stunning development not just a political setback for Rouhani, which it would be And it would really torpedo as Suzanne rightly said the kind of not just his administration But the kind of the hopes of anything else happening domestically anything because if you can't get this he has no leverage He looks like a failed president So anyway more of your questions In the back Yes, thank you Leandra Bernstein Ria Novosti I'd just like to ask for the panel's remarks on the Iranian and Russian relationship which a lot of people have described is very positive in particular the the work Russia has done on Iran civilian Nuclear program, but how you see how you see the Russian Iranian relationship in the context of these upcoming this upcoming agreement and Whether the strains between us and Russia could Somehow play out to affect that Who would like to take that? Okay, if you've heard people describe the Iranian Russian relationship as a positive one you probably haven't been talking to any Iranians Iranians have you know historical suspicions well ingrained about Russian intentions and the states went back well before the regime well before the century and They have been entrenched and exacerbated by what they see is what Iranians at least see as duplicitous Russian behavior In the course of this nuclear issue the Russians have slow rolled Incredibly slow rolled the development of Boucher while of course being very Prepared to take Iranian cash And the Russians have supported and gone beyond their obligations under the UN Security Council resolutions that have led to these This multilateral sanctions regime that is so powerful So I don't think any Iranians trust the Russians any further than they can throw them They they see the Russians occasionally as a useful tool in trying to split the unity of the p5 plus one That unity is really unprecedented for most of our 35-year experience in trying to sanction Iran We had little to no international support whatsoever and that included the most Severe moments of the hostage crisis and other moments under which you might have expected to see ready European support so the Russians can prove a useful wedge and I think some of these You know very public discussions about massive oil deals and things with the Russians are intended to do just that Clearly the Russians also recognize that Iran is an issue of considerable significance to the Obama administration and it is a way to at least signal that there can be costs as as what associated with American actions toward Moscow in response to other crises So I think that you know both sides have a kind of utilitarian perspective on on how to use this But I see very little likelihood that anyone in Tehran is looking toward Moscow as their economic savior They recognize and I think the very basis for this deal has been or for these negotiations It's been a recognition that they need the international financial community They need in particular Europe and hopefully someday as well the United States to do business with they can't simply turn Eastward and they certainly can't rely on Russia Yeah, I agree with all that and I'll just add As you mentioned many people have looked at the at the news of a potential Russian Iranian oil deal for 500,000 barrels per day, which is of course an extraordinary amount of oil given that a that's 50% of what Iran exports now and B Russia has absolutely no need for oil because it is a major global producer itself So that deal it appears to be there's there appears to be truth to that some truth to that so it then looks as though It's a kind of oil money laundering deal. I've heard various theories about why Why this should be going on apparently Russia has over committed its oil sales and needs to drum up some additional oil to deliver to customers in any case the US officials at the highest level have come out and said This cannot happen under it would be a violation of sanctions. It cannot happen now. It cannot happen and violate It would be an act of bad faith and violate our sanctions and it looks as though Russia has Backed off from this deal. So let that be a lesson to us in where Russia sees certain strategic advantages in the current context and who its closest friends are when it comes to Moving forward with this deal and these terms in this particular set of strategic calculations Great. I would just offer a little counterpoint Russia and Iran are cooperating very pretty closely in Syria to keep Assad in there Now there's cooperation on Iraq as well Russia's delivered Sukhoi's Iran is returning the jets that Saddam flew to Iran at that start of Desert Storm. So Could be a little bit of a turn from some of this mistrust Maybe almost a quarter century ago. Let me take a couple of questions what right here and woman right there Hi, Ben gross global solutions org. My question is that I know You know like the potential like if we reach if we can reach a deal What kind of effects that could have in the coming years? I know that you said it might take a while to implement But in the coming years like the next like three to five years if there would there be any effects that we could You know easily see and second of all What effect would reaching this kind of deal have on like the average Iranian? Do you think that this would make a big difference in terms of how they view America or their willingness to kind of support us? and And just separately at Martha Matzah from crisis action Could you elaborate more on how any easing of sanctions would affect Iranian policy towards Syria and Iraq? So I can start with that first one the the effects of a deal so It depends the sanctions relief that we see depends on under a potential deal scenario depends on the concessions that Iran is willing to make and the pace Will be matched as well. I think that In order to All sides will want to see a substantial enough move early enough in the process under a potential nuclear agreement Such that there's real incentive to stay committed and to move towards greater incentives for their own so that means that the first Trunch of sanctions relief won't be Tiny it will have to be substantial enough to create enough public support for this process and moving forward Towards further sanctions relief in the future It's really impossible to put a number on what that will be because we don't know what the provisions will be in order do we know International companies will fair as they try and navigate all those speed bumps that I talked about those challenges for For engaging. It's it's sort of like an FCPA nightmare to try and do business They're not that US companies subject to such restrictions will be the first movers But I don't want to underestimate those challenges even while it's an attractive environment as far as How Iranians will see a deal I think if there is some substantial amount of initial relief And so that could look like a greater ability to sell To export its reserves Excuse me export oil part of its current production capacity. So not to expand Oilfield production capacity, but just to export more get back to its, you know 2.5 2.6 Levels that it was exporting at before the toughest round of most recent sanctions Plus the ability to repatriate that revenue and move it around the international system more easily even if not unlocking a hundred billion that would be favorable that would be a very favorable outcome and that will have an impact for I think it will have a positive impact and public sentiment in Iran People there I think, you know when it's difficult to move around money like an inheritance or something from In within Iran to family members outside even those transactions are very difficult You can buy a fancy car in Iran, but you really have difficulty Sending money, you know that are humanitarian transactions things that are have been exempted from the US sanctions and and are not subject to sanctions if Those kinds of transactions become easier as part of sanctions relief I think there will be a real positive sentiment That will be appreciated by the Iranian people and more broadly the second question just I mean Yeah, I mean as I said before I mean the financial Requirements for what Iran is Iran's activities on on Iraq and Syria are quite substantial I mean there they have to give Hezbollah more money to fight on behalf of Assad They are paying the Iraqi Shiite groups more money to get in the game against ISIS in Iraq They again they they had integrated these Iraqi jets into their Air Force They are now drawing those down and giving them to to mr. Maliki. They've lost an Iranian pilot They are losing men in Syria and now they've lost some in Iraq and each time somebody gets killed they have to pay widow's benefits and orphan's benefits and Hezbollah, you know, they fund Hezbollah who has lost a lot of men and Iran ultimately funds those widow's Payments, so you know this this adds up. I mean, it's not all cash transactions Obviously that they need dollars or euros or yen or something, but it's a drain So I think a deal would help them on these issues. I actually think that ISIS may be the kind of dark horse factor in these negotiations that the one thing that I heard over and over and over from Iran is how they're afraid of What's the kind of Salafi circle surrounding Iran now? That's no longer the Shiite Crescent and it's whether there's the potential return of the Taliban in Afghanistan the rise of ISIS and other Extremist groups. It's the Wahhabi movements the Salafi movements in Central Asia that on every border they feel increasingly vulnerable and ironically in part because of the US withdrawal and they think when I even went to see the the ringleader of the takeover of the US Embassy in 1979 and he talked about how he's spent all of his time as a young activist trying to end US influence and manipulation of Iran and how today he's spending all of his energy devoted to trying to get the two sides together again because they have this common threat from Extremists and it was you know a lightning bolt So I think that one of the things that's kind of hanging over looming over these talks is they actually have a common security concern in the region and that the closer every ISIS development begins to kind of add to the The sense of what are the threats? You know they had a nuclear developed a nuclear program in part we think because of Saddam Although no nuclear stuff isn't going to work against ISIS. You know, this is the security threat has changed as well Let me take two. Yeah, sure. I think that actually it creates Multivalent pressures on the negotiations and I think the confluence of this crisis at this crunch time The negotiations is going to be a fascinating and be very precipitous Because I think you know if I'm an Iranian hardliner and watching what's happening around the region the last thing I want to do right now is engage in a major concession on a major security and existential security program to the United States Certainly many of the reformist activists who are involved with the Embassy seizure in 79 have come out a very long distance from that from their perspective on Washington But the hardliners have not and what they see I think is is much an argument for a greater defense a more aggressive offense in the region and for a stiffer spine toward the international community and real concern about appearing to capitulate at a time when there's regional weakness and and that's the sort of mentality that Characterizes many of those in the security establishment. I think you heard how many speaking to some of that yesterday in his talk So I'm less persuaded. I think they'll also look at the the oil markets and wonder if in fact the Possibility certainly not the probability or the inevitability But the possibility that a rocky oil exports could be impacted by what's happening might be a new opening for sanctions Busting on their part without actually having to do a deal So I'm worried about, you know, the the the countervailing tendencies and the way that it impacts Iranian negotiators But I just wanted to say in terms of you know, what we can expect to see To the questions that were posed, you know How we how we could expect relief to go if there is actually a deal, you know Look back in history look back to the Iranian decision in 1988 really the Predated the ceasefire the decision that Iran needed to reengage with the world And it took quite a number of years before we saw the fruits of that began to pay off because there were so many internal contests about how to go about that and because internationally the fact that Iran hadn't really changed its its form policy or at least not its regional policy meant that Iran was still subject to reversal these oh those openings were still subject to reversal so if in 1988 Iran decided that it was time to lure international companies into its oil sector It wasn't until 1995 that we saw the first really big upstream contract offered to Conoco and then of course Precipitated the US sanctions that was in part because when it was offered to an Italian and Japanese consortium a few years earlier The export financing was pulled because of concerns about Iran's Domestic economic stability and because of of issues of Iran's involvement with terrorism. And so I think that we're likely to see a similar process and and and as we said far worse because now you've got to add on to that the layers of complexity of Removing or relaxing or waving or licensing And the bureaucracy and the legal procedures involved can I can I Sure, I think I would be remiss if I didn't add this regarding oil company Interest so when you see international oil companies that feel comfortable managing challenges and Risks in Iraq for example or Nigeria or Russia It's clear that international oil companies they need opportunities major field opportunities in order to perform well economically or commercially and Iran even with tremendous risks that exist and doing business there is absolutely Right there on the table looks attractive if there's enough relief to go in there By comparison to Arctic or ultra deep drilling Iran. I think presents a Risk that oil companies would want to get their arms around at least in an initial bid or lease sale process So it may be slow. It may be tough going but if they feel comfortable in Iraq and Nigeria They will feel comfortable in Iran Western diplomat I saw in Tehran said to me Iran's the last gold mine on earth right and everyone wants to get back here And it's very true Unfortunately, we've run out of time. I would love to have taken other questions But I would please join me in thanking Suzanne Ken You can all you've all learned this morning how difficult this is going to be even for us to work a deal I hope you will join us if we get a deal because we plan to continue our series in forming People on what a deal means. What's next the implications and all the other things that will come with it So thanks again