 Your ambassador for your kind introduction and thank you all for joining this roundtable. This is not roundtable. Sorry, my presentation today This is my first time to visit W. I'm first time in Ireland So it's really honored to be part of the this IIE community And I'm contributing to some of my analysis to the discussion As an ambassador said I'm gonna speak about the rules-based order What challenges what kind of the problems it had in the past 20 years? And I will discuss of what how Japan perceived those challenges and discuss the Japan's free and open the Pacific vision in that context and First of all in terms of rules-based order, I have to define it in some way Role-based order is the order that the old entities including government and then private sectors Abide by the existing rule. So it's based on the principle rule of law Once we agree on the rules, we have to abide by it and why it is necessary It's because it can increase the predictability of any issues Of course for business sectors if we can agree on the rules and everyone thinks that everyone Entity would abide by this and people can expect or predict what's happened or even if the Violation of rules incur some cost for the violators. So there's an incentive for all the participating members to follow the rules and this is actually not in an international arena or International relations. There's no perfect rules-based order Individual state or sovereign state has still has its own autonomy and its policy There's no principle of the non-intervention and a quality of the states in the West Faryon system So I cannot say that there's a perfect international rules-based order in the in the post 1945 But still compared to the pre-war time. There is better system in this world We had the United Nations. We had a Breton system including WTO, IMF and work. Sorry WTO is not in the Breton system, but the World Bank and IMF There's an international arbitration system United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, ANCROS, for example, preserves the predictable and free and open maritime order in the world So we had a better system and now another key characteristic of this rules-based order in the post 1945 is that Inclusivity is that that countries any countries can be included when they satisfy with the several conditions Even Japan, which is the loser of the Second World War could join the post-war order and it can be the beneficiary and At the end of the day it became the exemplary student of the rules-based order Despite the some atrocious past So this is I think the my definition of the rules-based order and then in the past 20 years There's a several challenges in this order. First of all, there's a changing balance of power Which can be the foundation of this rules-based order in 1989 to 1991 the Cold War ended and After that, there's a unipolarity over the United States. US is a predominant economic and military power in the world And they preserved the system But it's changed maybe after 28 the Global financial crisis and then China and then this is the second factor the China or the other emerging countries had a more Economic presence in the region in the world. No, it's not just China, but it's also the India and others And finally, there's some challenges within the liberal international sort of rules-based international order or the concept of liberalism There's a of course the some Discussion now in 1990s that History is the history ends the end of the history discussion by Francis Fuguyama the Western idea including liberalism capitalism and democracy Cannot all gonna be challenged by the communism or the competing ideas But now after maybe say global financial crisis the liberalism concept itself incurred some problems and Global of course in the United States. There's a huge economic disparity and you know exactly to receive a huge amount of money compared Whereas the other people who are working in McDonough. I cannot get enough Saudi and democracy also Demonstrates some of the difficulty to manage the populist movement We don't have to refer to Brexit or the president Trump But there's a some conceptual challenge to the democracy as well So this is sort of the three challenges I observed in the last 20 years in terms of the intercontext the rules-based order and Japan from Japanese perspective This challenge is a severely critical for its security Japan is Well, the third largest economy in the world, so I cannot say the small country, but compared military is big and it's the fifth largest, so it's not small, but Japan is not necessarily Independent military power because it doesn't have the nuclear power. It doesn't have the completely normal military so Let me say that Japan is the dis-trained great power and for that state or for Japan's neighboring countries Which is smaller than Japan the rules-based order is the only one guarantee that they can They can face the great powers One by one with the same footing equal footing so say for example the Philippines and China they Have the dispute in the South China Sea but Philippines could blow the issue to the international uncross arbitration and There's a equal there's a quality in this arbitration and I can I can go back to the US Nicaragua case or Bangladesh India case There's the guarantee for small the rules-based order is critical for the smaller states to resolve some issues with a great power Without resulting to military power or economic coercion But this is challenged and I already mentioned South China Sea case But in the East China Sea Japan is facing China's increase in aggression They sent and China sent the ships Well, it sets a coast guard ships to the surrounding area of the Senkaku island in the East China Sea and Japan's coast guard have to take care of them every day almost every day United States was fine under the Well, I shouldn't say anyone fine under anyone. I think we saw the president Bush ignoring Well, taking a unilateral action apart from the United Nations Security Council in Middle East and President Obama was a very vivido person, but when it comes to China He didn't take this tough action at the beginning So Japan Japanese government complained to Obama administration in the beginning that you should be more serious about China Most should more realistic about China and now after 2016 or 2017 January 2017 We got the new president of the United States there. I mean from my perspective the his policies to a China are partially Something Japan asked for the United States doing In putting cost on China's changing status quo in the South China Sea or East China Sea and rejecting the some malicious investment from the region and Reducing the risk of the potential information leaking through Chinese company Which installed the 5g or 4g These are the policy that Japan wanted But at the same time the problem of the current administration for the jet From Japanese perspective is that they the United States again Doesn't respect multi-rotorism Paris Agreement and TPP trans-pacific partnership So this is the challenge behind the current Japanese foreign policy Then what Japan is doing is the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy or free and open the Pacific vision What is Japan doing in this strategy? It sounds like beautiful the free and open Indo-Pacific It's a broader region of free and open. That's good, but Essentially according to the government official. There's a three pillars one is the protecting the maritime security and protecting security Then second is bringing the prosperity through better connectivity and the third one is this Prevailing the universal values including rule of law democracy and freedom of press These are the three pillars according to the government, but it's still not clear enough for me So I would say I would rephrase why Say that this free and open the Pacific strategy has a three Constituencies from my perspective again. One is the diversification of the partnerships Traditionally Japan relies on the United States US Japan alliance for its own security There's no alternative to this yet but After nine after 2016 after the free and open the Pacific vision is released or even a little bit before Japan expanded the security partnership with other like-minded countries starting from Australia India Philippines, Vietnam and South Asian states, I mean, ASEAN as a whole and Doing more with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and extending to Africa. Oh, well in terms of Africa still there's much work to do So this diversification of policy would be necessary for Japan to have Sort of better bargaining position against the United States This is a some new trend and that can be seen in the economic policy as well Japan agreed on the TPP with the United States So originally there's a 12 members of the TPP But United States withdrew on the first day of the president Trump took office they withdrew from the TPP and I thought That's the end of the TPP Traditionally in the history of Japan's falling policy after 1945 It was very possible or I Cannot expect anything that Japan can do without the United States especially in those policy, which US considered a sensitive But Japan together with Australia Agreed on the TPP 11 the CP TPP comprehensive and progressive TPP without the United States That's again part of the diversification It's diversification of the the alliance in the United States as well as the diversifying our economic reliance on China Japan experienced the economic coercion by China after 2010 that there's a collision incident in Senkaku Island that the China Chinese ship fishing boat Collided with the Japanese coast guard and China stopped the rare ethics boat to Japan at the time It was already planned beforehand, but they implemented at the time So we experienced the economy coercion much before other countries experienced So this the first is a diversification of the partnerships and second is they again protect the multilateralism or regionalism This TPP discussion especially is important in this context Japan's Policy toward a WTO for example is that they have to have the multilateral trading system without this Japan cannot sustain its economic growth and All the potential economic economic potential with Asia Pacific or Indo-Pacific cannot be achieved without the multilateral trading system so I Think even though the Prime Minister Abe has a good relationship with President Trump superficially It has some Complaints about the American policy and Even though Japan supports some of the US policy toward China it doesn't support the unilateral imposition of the tariffs on Chinese product and Recently agreed US China deal seems for me that it's the Resurgence of the Japan US trade deal in 1990s It's weird if we embrace the multilateral trading system. It's quite strange That the two government decide a specific numbers for imports or the export so again, Japan doesn't say this Officially to the American colleagues, but I think if Japan follows the principles, this is a very big problem and Japan Well, although I said Japan is embracing the multilateralism That's also that that's also true that Japan can not necessarily say the right thing every time they need to say So this is maybe the challenge for Japan to do more and they need more people like me in the government It's vocal and sometimes too provocative. So but anyway, and finally self empowerment is the pillar of the free and open to Pacific Self empowerment means that they Japan should have the more autonomous foreign policy and Autonomous military security policy with necessary resources Unfortunately, Japan still spend 1.2% of the GDP on its military expenditure. It's still lower than the 2% average 2% of NATO Japan's Well that amount of military budget is equivalent to 5% of a national budget Whereas we spend 33% of on the social welfare services 25% on the interest of the national debt and we just spend the 3% on the education. So I Cannot say that Japan is doing enough in this self empowerment pillow, but I think Prime Minister Abe is trying to direct Japan to invest more in the not just military, but also new technology There's some news that Japan will promote the development of the 6g without investing in the 5g that's a little bit I hope the dreams comes true, but it's a little bit idealistic, but it's really important to have to explore new area, especially the sophisticated technological area and Government will promote those technological education and investment so I have Of course, I have to I want to touch more upon the Japan-China relations and Japan-US relations and Of course, Japan's effort in the Southeast Asian was specific way But I think I spend almost 20 minutes now So I will stop here and then want to have the more questions. Well, thank you very much for a very comprehensive presentation of how you see Japan in its region as you say Certain aspects of it Could be developed further and no doubt will be in the question and answer session It is striking to us also That as you mentioned the 2008 financial crisis Was after the end of the Soviet Union The main catalyst for the kind of problems we are all faced with now Because it itself gave rise to populism But is also showed as I think you mentioned That China could isolate itself could insulate itself from this kind of development and could develop so far further The diversification of partnership after 2016 is indeed striking Because as you say In my time in Japan there was already talk of Putting out feelers to Australia and India, but it's extended further to the Philippines Bangladesh Sri Lanka and indeed asian which is also always an important partner for Japan Regionalization in the sense of Continuing with the trans-specific partnership without the United States is also a striking development in regard to Japan and self-empowerment Well, I think that Japan has failed The same kind of dilemmas as Germany is when it comes to self-empowerment if Japan now spends 1.2 percent of GDP on defense It has to be put against the background of Japan being What the third biggest economy in the world? 1.2 percent of Japanese GDP is a very big figure indeed And if it were to go up to 2% it would in itself Pause a problem. So this by way of Summarizing what you have said Hannah the Sam I told the floor open to questions and comments on Subjects Build partnerships with countries in and around Japan in light of Things that happened in the 20th century and secondly what sort of strategies has Japan and other nations in the region be Considering in terms of trying to be robust towards economic coercion because to me it seems like Japan and perhaps India Are the most robust this but many nations Many in Asia specifically are incredibly almost that that seems to be a Great questions Well regarding the difficulty of building partnership with the country which had the historical deficit deficit with Japan from Japanese perspective I think There I'd like to compare two cases the Japan's relationship with the Southeast Asia and Japan's relationship with South Korea in terms of Japan's relationship with Southeast Asia it's actually Becomes really substantial after the Fukuda Doctrine was released in 1970s The doctoring means that Japan promised that Japan will never be the military power doesn't Become the economic most monger in Southeast Asia and promote the people to people and the heart-to-heart relationship with South Southeast Asian states and Japan paid a compensation for those states and also Squary faced a history based on the based on the evidence is that all Available in that's basic. I mean all available evidences Now Southeast Asian states including the Lee Kuan Yew who passed away unfortunately Said that we never forget the history, but we will move forward based on you know memory and so Japan What I want to say in this is the two-fold one. Japan Squary faced a history and didn't necessary things and there's a forgiveness by substitution states and In terms of South Korea as you write maybe no as you may know There's a difficulty in Japan's South Korea partnership On the one hand Japan apologized South Korea several times for its atrocities and colonization and I myself think that we should continuously and maybe forever squary faced a history and Use that history for as a lesson for our foreign policy or any policy that that's my own belief and But at some at the same time There's a problem in Japan that some conservative politicians said the denialist statement about history And also and then that statement is picked up by South Korean media and there's a big issue So Japan cannot be innocent in this sense at the same time there's a I don't feel strong sense of the forgiveness from South Korea maybe from their perspective It's because of Japan lack of the apology or the not sincerity But South Korean domestic politics sometimes uses the history issue for just getting support from General public so unless and then I don't know I'm still struggling why they still uses the 70 years ago history for Current general action or a pleasure election and Of course one of the interpretations that South Korea Was unfortunately part of the Japan and at the end of the war so they were the losing side Unfortunately because of the Japan's of course policy, but so they couldn't fight the independence war independent war against Japan Japan was defeated by United States China and the other allied states, so they missed opportunity I hope they would no longer use the history issue for the current station to our current policy We can continue this continue the discussion on the history. I mean as I said forever But we should separate this issue from The current issue and that attitude is still missing I think That's maybe the difference between Japan and South Japan's relation with the SEA and South Korea And in order to be resilient to the economic coercion or any other coercion Actually there should be alternative so I talked with a Cambodian expert several times last year and they said Cambodia doesn't want to rely on China They want to rely or they want to have the other power or other countries joining the Cambodian market or infrastructure project and From their perspective Western country Rejected I mean didn't come or impose their own values universal values on Cambodia And because of their elections way way of doing an election They I mean Western country didn't invest or almost a prohibitive for us to invest in Cambodia Then they just rely have to rely on China because Thailand Vietnam they all enjoyed economic growth Whereas the Cambodia is all isolated so Japan's free and open to Pacific strategy is providing the alternative and Sometimes Japanese government said the free and open the Pacific and Belt and Road initiative are not in competition There they can be in harmony, but it's I think from perspective. It's a competition Because two companies are selling the same product similar product in the market, right? Then the one side it's a cheap and then less tight but a little bit less resilient or environmentally And very degradable and the other one is expensive high quality But something and sometimes there's a political tie So the two come to products two companies are competing in the same market at this moment and I think in order for the In order for Japan to be sorry in order for the Regional countries in the Indo-Pacific be more resilient to China's coercion or even American coercion The Japan's or other countries like-minded countries support for becoming for providing the aid and Then infrastructure project, which is more based on the private sector would be helpful for them to be resilient And of course then second thing is the keeping the rules based order again If there's a rules, I'm sorry if there's in some Area that we don't have rules we have to create the rules according to foreign minister Motegi He made a speech in December at the my Institute The Japan's definition of the rules-based order or Japan's way to protect the rules-based order is first of all keeping preserving the principle rule of law Second abiding by the existing rules and third creating the rules for necessary place and the reforming so if we Challenge this first principle we could be called as a revisionist country But if we just try to change and make this rules better, it's just a reformist It's the constructive attitude toward the rules-based order and that's Japan is doing I think John thank you very much. Thank you for a very interesting presentation You say that Japan is Trying to diversify its security interests by building new Relationships with countries like Australia and India My question is to what extent these new relationships include a security cooperation to mention and What is the attitude if they do what is the attitude of the United States? Happy with this Thank you, I Think you are your question is about the servicetutability also the US perception on the diversification as far as I see Current diversification is designed for complimenting US-led order As I just had a discussion with ambassador before coming here But Japan's what Japan want in terms of international order is a horizontal order That's why the rules-based isn't very important But we are not naive to believe that the rules-based order can be sustained without any balance of power We need balance of power and the favorable balance of power Then Japan still have the faith in the US-led order, especially in the Asia Pacific theater or Indo-Pacific theater Given the increasing influence of China. We think the United States is The presence is indispensable so Japan's diversification is basically trying to complementing this balance of power with principle of the rules-based order and as far as Japan is For example cooperating with Australia together with the United States. I mean, there's a My tri-lateral maritime exercise and there is a tri-lateral investment cooperation agreement between among the three countries US doesn't oppose US welcomes and with India we have the Madabara exercise this maritime exercise Conducted in the Bay of Bengal or Sea of Japan. That's also with the United States. So Maybe the term of diversification is not necessarily true, but it's still it's complementing the alliance with different means or the new means So The question or dilemma that Japan should face in the future is that if the United States doesn't respect this horizontal international order just prefer the America first hierarchical order with the hierarchical balance of power What can Japan do? That's the dilemma and At this moment Even though the supreme leader of the United States or in the executive leader Occasionally a free country this regards the Multilateralism or loose-based order. We have still the strong bureaucracy strong military I mean the military people who have the Who embrace the loose-based order? US-Japan alliance is not fragile to one individual president of the United States can destroy but if this kind of Selection of the leader Continues in the United States that would be really difficult for us and in that situation Real diversification might be necessary Are broken is their consequences because I don't see the point of having view based order without consequences for example America is he has pulled out of many things which he shouldn't have but when it comes to America Violate any Treaty doesn't want and they are consequences For example, it went to Iraq in 2003 when the United Nations has And instead of Holding us You So That's a really good question. I think That's unfortunately the case in the South China Sea We got the uncross arbitration in July 2016 which denies a line-dash line over China's claim over the South China Sea but Whatever the situation now in the South China Sea China still have the artificial island and the militarized them and What's the cost for China? Maybe that's your point. I think it's not maybe you talked about the United States But maybe it could be same for China as well That Mm-hmm, well, I think what you said is the perfect rules-based order, I think if I mean if we can have power to constrain Great powers and make them force them Abiding by the existing rules. I think that's perfect rules-based order That's same as the domestic governance system. We have the code We have the police and if someone made a claims that could be arrested and they be sent to the court That'll be the perfect. I mean ideal rules-based order, but unfortunately in the international system I don't think that we can have it We as I said, it's the limited form. So there's some ignorance by great power Iran case Iraq case and China's South China Sea case That's the two examples that the great power just ignores and doesn't abide by the international law and so Then but that two cases or other cases among Two cases among many cannot be the reason why we shouldn't seek the international rules-based order Say for example the WTO again So I'm studying the international economic rules and the international regional integration and China is very much abiding by the WTO rules and If there's a some panel established and discuss the China's Violation not violation but Subsidies to the domestic state on the enterprises and if the result is even if the result is unfavorable to China As far as I understand they China has abided by this ruling and that's actually increased the China's Creatability in the international economic system and that of course the incentive is that the China can lose Investment from other countries if they don't abide by the WTO So I think I agree with you that we needed some cost we cost imposing strategy on the violation by the great powers And unfortunately no single middle-sized country can do this If even if Japan in trying to impose a cost on the United States That's really limited, but what about the Japan Australia, you know India EU all stand together and that's actually what the Japan US and EU did it against China in the WTO field So coalition building among like-minded country is critically important and that's still I'm not too pessimistic about this and then Great power in the multi-polar system No single great power can decide everything as you rightly said they sometimes ignore the rules But it doesn't mean that they can decide everything so In order to prevent the one country or two great powers like China the United States decide everything The third pillar or the coalition of the states I think it still has a potential to Preserve the limited form of in rules based on it. I think But it's an interesting one It's a trusted more trusted security partner integration with Europe I'm curious what would be the procession from Japan of the current precarious position that you're representing so the way between Two great poles of power between the US and China were sort of vaguely opposed to each other and the choice of providers Just Thank you question in Europe It's the matter of the expectation from Japanese perspective It means that we cannot expect Europe to be standing all issued to the out of a Japan in the Asian Indo-Pacific theater Say for example, Japan has the issue with China in the East China Sea Sankaku Island But we don't expect Europe to be standing with us or even the use in the military means to You know protect Japan's territory. That's over expectation. We don't have it What we I mean I personally think The importance of EU is a normative power normative influence I Cannot count up the all the cases that Europe made a great leadership in making rules in the international arena and they are Maybe one of the my friends in Japan who work on you said that it's because they are always discussing rules within you So they have they can just it's quite easy for them to go international arena and make the rules And then that's actually some weakness of Japan We are trying to improve our capability to be normative leader or rule maker Rather than rule taker, but still unfortunately It's not enough. So we expect EU and Japan to cooperate more in this rulemaking Maybe it's not neutral escaping place it's Even if we have the I mean because of the US-China rivalry as I said in my previous answer the cooperation among the The rest of the countries will be important. So Maybe I'm not necessarily answering to your question, but that's my perception on you Am I answering to your question? Ah In terms of 5G Japan's policy is following the United States rejecting the Huawei from the critical security, sorry, critical digital infrastructure. According to Japanese government official statement, it doesn't name China, it doesn't name Huawei, it says that the companies which may have the relationship with the government shouldn't be the vendor of the 5G network. But at the same time, according to Japan's economic newspaper, actually Japanese companies trading with the Huawei, 70 billion dollars last year, it's huge 70 billion yen, sorry, 70 billion yen, so 700 million dollars. So we had the huge economic interest in keeping the Huawei arrive, or that's really difficult, but if Huawei wants to be trusted by, say for example, many European countries of Japan, there are still things they can do. They still have the data center in China, and China has the national information law which can ask all the entities in China provide information if government asks, if that exists in China, that law is existing in China and Huawei still put the headquarter in China, maybe we cannot trust. So unfortunately it could be seen as intervention from China's perspective, but because of some domestic law that China, PLC has, their companies are losing benefit and opportunities. So maybe we have to continuously encourage the Chinese companies, as well as the Chinese government, to reconsider those authoritative or more controlling type of laws, and that's I think, it's not happening yet, but I think that's maybe necessary. Thank you very much. Thank you for coming. It's great to see Japanese intellectual coming here, and it should happen more often. Anyway, a quick question about the US relationship with North Korea, thinking, current thinking in Japan, and about what is going on there, if you'd like to speak about something. That's a really difficult question. I want to ask help for him, but first point, we should have more visit by Japanese, yes, and that's maybe the good comment for the embassy staff here, so, ita kura san. Regarding North Korea, we, I mean, even at the time 2016 to 2017, when there's a discussion, negotiation between US and North Korea, Japan was not optimistic about the future prospect. American request for North Korea was the dismantlement of the nuclear facilities, nuclear capabilities that North Korea possess, but North Korea just asked the United States to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. So from the beginning, they're saying the different things and trying to seek the agreement. That's actually difficult. I mean, I thought it's almost impossible. And now, that said, North Korea continues its missile and nuclear development, and still, as Japan, which Japan is very close to North Korea, and we can't even allow North Korea to possess the short or medium-range ballistic missile, which can deliver the nuclear warhead to Japan. Unfortunately, President Trump, at some point last year, I think in summer, said that short or medium-range ballistic missile is not our concern. And that was big shock for Japan, and we are continuously pushing this issue in the Washington D.C. But I can't predict the future scenario. But from Japanese perspective, the ideal scenario is that US and North Korea agree on the dismantlement of all new North Korea's short and medium-sized ballistic missiles together with the nuclear warhead. And the worst-case scenario is that in North Korea, we launch the missile against Japan. And from this spectrum, maybe we are now seeking the freezing the nuclear development and then missile development in North Korea together with the United States. And there are some unpredictable variables with China's policy. And we saw the US-China cooperation before 2016. But now, I'm not quite sure how China deals with North Korea situation. To be very honest, I'm not familiar with the current negotiation or Japan's perception very well. So I can just say basic things. But that's my view. Sorry. I'm not expert on this. Sorry. What is the current state of the Prime Minister Abe's attempt to change the constitution? Yeah. Prime Minister Abe, in his speech in January, this month, still mentioned the constitutional amendment and was one of his agenda until, I mean, by 2021. But I personally think that is difficult. Maybe there's two reasons. One, domestic support is not enough. Half of Japanese people want to have the change of the constitution, but 80% or 70% to 80% still opposing to change in Article 9, which prohibits, sorry, not prohibits, but it renounces the military policies. Of course, the first paragraph is fine. Japan doesn't resolve to war as a means to resolve international dispute. This part is completely fine, but the second paragraph is a problem. But general public, and there's no enough sufficient discussions in public space about this. And second is Abe's political capital, whether he has enough capital to change this. He is now, he's basically busy in terms of international issues. He is busy for Russia, territorial dispute with Russia. And he also said he is ready to negotiate with North Korea for abduction issue. And continuously busy with Trump administration, keeping the relationship, and we have to observe the next presidential election. And domestically, he got a little bit scandal issue recently, but it's not severe enough to change Abe administration, but he has to spend some political capital on this. So I cannot expect the change of the constitution. And even in the post-Abe era, I don't know. And after 2015 peace and security restoration, Japan now enacted the limited form of a collective self-defense with the United States. So in terms of peacetime security cooperation, Japan already reached the necessary point. May the question is how we can deal with wartime scenario? Can we really defend ourselves with this constitution? This is the discussion the security communities are doing, but not necessarily pre-varying. Good. I asked a final question. In relation to the Chinese One Belt, One Road initiative, we had a couple of people from the research community from Japan here a few years ago, and they were very opposed to the idea that Japan might participate in the One Belt, One Road initiative. If I understand correctly, the Japanese position has evolved a little since then. When you describe the diversification of partnership post 2016 that has taken place in Japan, it looks very much to be constructed along the format of the One Belt part of the Chinese initiative, which of course has to do with very sensitive choke points in transport, in maritime transport. But the One Road part of the Chinese initiative, I know many people say that it doesn't have the same impact that it seemed to have five or six years ago, but it's still very important, and it goes across Central Asia to the Middle East. What is the Japanese position in regard to this particular Chinese initiative? The basic position is that Japan free and open the Pacific and Belt and Road has a space for cooperation, and Japan clearly set the four conditions for cooperation, one, transparency, openness and financial sustainability of the recipient country, and economic viability of the project. If the project satisfies with the four conditions, even, well, regardless whether that was developed as a BRI project or not, Japan can cooperate with China. This is the position, and actually this is consistent with Japan's infrastructure investment policy even before the emergence of the BRI, and actually there's a sign of Japanese cooperation in third country at the private level. So I'm a little bit critical that the Japanese government asks the private sector to cooperate with the Chinese contractor in the third country. It's something the private sector would decide based on the cost-benefit analysis. So at this moment Japan opens the opportunity of window opportunity for China to come with us with the satisfying conditions, and then still nothing happened. So does Japan participate in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank? Not yet, and then I don't think so as far as the United States is out. Well, I'm here to say that Japan is very autonomous and independent country, but as a matter of fact, it many times follows the United States in its decisions. So AIB things are, and also Japan has a significant interest in the ADB. Of course. All the president of the ADB, Agent Development Bank, is a former or the incumbent officer of the Ministry of Finance. So it's the significant benefit interest that Japan has in the ADB. So the benefit of joining the AIB is still not so much and not enough for Japan to take the different policy with the United States. And of course Japan's concern is two-fold in terms of BRI. One is the depth trap, the so-called depth trap. In Hanban Tota of Sri Lanka, that was the particular case that China's BRI wouldn't satisfy with the conditions that Japan wanted. There's a discussion. Of course, Japan was shocked when Japan lost in the high-speed railway in Indonesia from Jakarta to Bandung, and China got the deal actually. That was a shock, but after that Japan's approach is investing the metro system in Jakarta with a high-quality infrastructure. And in Indonesia, high-speed railway, for example, doesn't make any progress because China didn't do the sufficient examination of environmental damage and negotiation with the local communities. So I think we have to be concerned about depth trap, but at the same time, if there's any problems in the project planning, we don't have to do anything. They will just fail, or they don't make the sufficient progress, unfortunately, for the recipient country. From Japan's perspective, quality matters the quantity. Japan doesn't have the sufficient capital to invest in all the regional countries, but based on the selective and very deep analysis by JICA, JICA is the Japan Economic Cooperation Agent, they are always examining the potential risks and then economic viability of the project. So once they started investing, they would make some result, and this quality infrastructure idea is our setting point. And maybe in some cases, if China is getting closer to our principle, maybe there's a potential cooperation area, but at this moment Japan doesn't make any compromise in these conditions, I think, to the VRI. And I hope the other European countries also be requiring China, or encouraging China to be more risk-based, and then promote the high-quality infrastructure through the VRI. Well, we are participants in the infrastructure investment bank, as indeed, I think, are most European countries. Hannah, thank you very much for your presentation. I was struck by your remark on the possibility of a development in Chinese American trade, which would parallel what happened in Japanese American trade some 40 years ago. This is the setting up of quotas on quantitative ceilings for trade. I recall very well the scene where I think representative Patricia Schroeder took an act to a Toshiba radio outside the Capitol building in Washington. This was the stage of Japanese American trade relations some 40 years ago, and thankfully the United States recovered from this feat. But I think you quite rightly say the possibility of their relapsing into such a situation has not disappeared. I thank you for the openness with which you dealt with the questions and the comments. I think because you were open, it has been very enlightening for all of us, and I thank you for coming. Thank you very much.