 Book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain, the Nicomachean Ethics, by Aristotle, translated by Thomas Taylor. Chapter 1 After these things, making another beginning, it must be observed by us that there are three species of things which are to be avoided in manners, viz, vice, incontinence, and brutality. But the contraries to two of these are indeed evident, for we call one of the contraries virtue and the other, continence. To brutality, however, it will be most appropriate to say that the virtue is opposed, which is a certain heroical and divine virtue, as Homer represents Priam saying of Hector that he was a very good man, quote, wretch that I am my bravest offspring slain, you the disgrace of Priam's house remain, mist or the brave, renowned in ranks of war, with toiless, dreadful in his rushing car. And last great Hector, more than man divine, for sure he seemed not of terrestrial line. Hence, if, as it is said, men from being men become gods through excess of virtue, the habit which is opposed to a brutal habit will indeed be such as this, for as there is neither the vice nor virtue of a brute, so neither is there of a god, but the one habit indeed is more honorable than virtue, and the other is of a different genus from vice. Hence, however, the existence of a divine man is rare, bracket, just as the Lacedemonians, when they very much admire a man, are accustomed to say, oh divine man, close bracket, thus also the brutal nature is rare among men, but when it does exist it is principally found among the barbarians. Some men, however, become brutalized through diseases and mutilations of the body, and we thus denominate, by a defamatory appellation, those who surpass other men in vice, but of such a disposition of the soul as this we shall hereafter make mention, and we have before spoken concerning vice. Let us now, therefore, speak concerning incontinence and effeminacy, and luxury, and concerning their opposites, continence and endurance, for each of these must not be considered as if they were the same habits with virtue and vice, nor yet as if they were of a genus different from them. It is necessary, however, as we have done in other things, having first premised what is apparent, i.e. what is commonly admitted as true, and proposed doubts, in the next place to show everything which is especially probable about these passions, but if not about everything, at least the greater part, and the principle. For if such doubts as are difficult are dissolved, and those things which are probable are left, we shall have sufficiently accomplished our purpose. Continence therefore, and endurance, appear to be among the number of worthy and laudable things, but incontinence and effeminacy among the number of things bad and blameable. And the continent man, and he who abides in the decision of reason, are the same person, and the incontinent man is the same with him who departs from the decision of reason. And the incontinent man, indeed, knowing that the things are bad, does them through passion, but the continent man, knowing that desires are bad, does not follow them, inconsequence of being obedient to reason. And all men, indeed, admit that the temperate man is continent, and possesses the virtue of endurance, but with respect to a man of this description, some say that he is in every respect temperate, but others say that he is not. And some confusedly say that the intemperate man is incontinent, and the incontinent man is intemperate, but others say that they differ from each other. But with respect to the prudent man, sometimes they say that he cannot be incontinent, and sometimes that certain persons who are prudent and skillful are incontinent. And farther still, men are said to be incontinent of anger, of honor, and of gain. Such therefore are the assertions concerning continents and incontinence. It may, however, be doubted how he who thinks rightly can act incontinently. Some say, therefore, that it is impossible for a man to act incontinently who knows that he ought not, for it would be a dreadful thing when science is inherent, as Socrates thought, that anything else should have dominion, and draw the man about like a slave. For Socrates, in short, opposed reason by this opinion, as if there were no such thing as incontinence, since he said that no one acted contrary to what he apprehended it was best to do, except from ignorance of what was best. This assertion, therefore, is adverse to those things which are clearly apparent, and it is requisite to inquire concerning the passion, if anyone acts incontinently through ignorance, what the mode of this ignorance is. For it is evident that he who acts incontinently does not think he ought so to act, till he is under the influence of the passion. There are, however, certain persons who admit some of these things, but not others. For they grant, indeed, that nothing is better than science. But they do not admit that no one acts contrary to what appears to him to be better. And on this account they say that the incontinent man, not having science, but opinion, is vanquished by pleasures. If, however, it is opinion, and neither science, nor a strong but a weak hypolepsis which resists, as it is in those who are dubious, pardon is to be granted to him who yields to strong desires. But improbity is not to be pardoned, nor anything else which is blameable. The incontinent man, therefore, is vanquished by desire. Prudence at the same time resisting, for this is most strong. But this is absurd, for the same person will be, at the same time, prudent and incontinent. No one, however, will say that it is the province of a prudent man to perform voluntarily the most base actions, to which may be added, what we have before shown, that the prudent is a practical man, for he is conversant with particulars, and possesses the other virtues. Again, if the continent man consists in having strong and base desires, the temperate man will not be a continent man, nor the continent a temperate man, for it is not the province of the temperate man to have too much desire, or to have base desires, but it would be requisite that he should, if this were admitted, for if, indeed, the desires are good, the habit which prevents a man from following them is bad, so that not all continents will be good. If, however, the desires are weak, but not bad, there is nothing venerable in continents, and if they are bad and weak, there is nothing great in it. Further still, if continents gives permanency to every opinion, and even to false opinion, it is a bad thing, and if incontinence produces a departure from every opinion, there will be a certain incontinence which is good, such as that of Neoptolomus in the Philactites of Sophocles, for he is to be praised for not persevering in what he was persuaded to do by Ulysses, because it was painful to him to lie. Again, that reasoning of the Sophists, which is denominated lying, or dissembling, is perplexed with doubt, for with these men, inconsequence of wishing to produce an ascent to paradoxes, in order that, when they obtain their end, they may appear to be skillful persons, the syllogism formed by their reasoning becomes very dubious. For the discourse of energy of reason is bound, when the person whose ascent they wish to procure is unwilling to persist, because the conclusion does not please him, but is unable to proceed because he cannot dissolve the argument. From a certain reason, however, it may happen that imprudence, together with incontinence, is a virtue. For a man, through incontinence, may do the contrary to what he apprehends ought to be done, but he apprehends that good things are evil, and that they ought not to be done. Hence, he will do what is good, and not what is evil. Again, he who performs and pursues what is delectable, inconsequence of being persuaded, and deliberately choosing so to do, will appear to be a better character than the man who does so, not from reasoning, but from incontinence. For he may be more easily cured, because he may be induced to change his opinion. But the incontinent man is obnoxious to the proverb in which we say, quote, when water suffocates, what occasion is there to drink? Close quote. For if, indeed, he were persuaded to do what he did. If he had been induced to change his opinion, he would have desisted. But now, not being persuaded, he nevertheless acts in this manner. Further still, if incontinence, incontinence, are conversant with all things, who is the man that is simply incontinent? For no one has every species of incontinence, and we say that some persons are simply incontinent. Such therefore are the doubts which happen on this subject. Out of these, it is necessary to take away some, and to leave others, for the solution of a doubt is the discovery of what is investigated. Chapter 3 In the first place, therefore, it must be considered whether the incontinent act knowingly or not, and in what manner they act knowingly. In the next place, with what kind of things the incontinent and the incontinent man are conversant. I mean whether they are conversant with all pleasure and pain, or with certain definite pleasures and pains, and whether the continent and the enduring man are the same, or different characters. And in a similar manner, we must consider such other things as are allied to this theory. The beginning, however, of the speculation is whether the continent and incontinent man differ in the things with which they are conversant, or in the mode in which they are conversant with them. My meaning is this, whether the incontinent man is alone incontinent or not, because he is conversant with these particular things, or whether it is because he is thus affected or not, or whether it is from both of these. In the next place, whether incontinence and continence are conversant with all things or not. For he who is simply incontinent is not conversant with all things, but with those things with which the intemperate man is conversant. Nor is he denominated incontinent from being simply affected towards these, for, if he were, incontinence would be the same with intemperance. But from being affected towards them in this particular manner. For the intemperate man indeed is led by his desires from deliberate choice, thinking that it is always necessary to pursue the present delight. But the incontinent man does not think this is necessary, yet pursues it. With respect, therefore, to the assertion that it is true opinion and not science, through which men act incontinently, it is of no consequence to the present discussion. For some of those who form opinions of things entertain no doubt of their truths, but think that they know accurately. If, therefore, those who form an opinion act in a greater degree contrary to their opinion, then those who have a scientific knowledge, because they believe negligently, science will in no respect differ from opinion. For some persons believe no less firmly in things of which they form an opinion than others in things which they know scientifically. But this is evident from Heraclitus. Since however, we say that a man knows scientifically in a two-fold respect, for both he who possesses science indeed but does not use it, and he who uses it are said to have scientific knowledge. It makes a difference whether a man possessing science but not contemplating does what he ought not to do, or whether possessing science and contemplating he acts improperly. For, this appears to be absurd, but it is not if he does not contemplate. Again, since there are two modes of propositions, i.e. universal and particular propositions, nothing hinders but that he who possesses both these may act contrary to science, using indeed the universal proposition, but not the particular one, for particulars are practicable. There is a difference also as to the universal, for one difference indeed is in the man himself, but the other is in the thing. Thus for instance, a man may know that dry food is beneficial to every man, and that this person is a man, or that a thing of such a kind is dry food, but whether this is a thing of such a kind he either does not know, or he does not energize as if he did know. There is an immense difference therefore according to these modes, so that no absurdity follows, or a man thus to know, but for him to know in any other way it would be wonderful. Farther still, science may be inherent in men in a way different from that which we have just now mentioned, for we see that habit differs in possessing, indeed but not using science, so that a man possesses in a certain respect and does not possess science, as is the case with him who is asleep, or insane, or intoxicated, but in this way men are disposed who are under the influence of the passions, for anger and the desire of venereal pleasures, and certain other things of this kind evidently produce a change in the body, and in some persons also they produce insanity. It is manifest therefore that the incontinent man must be said to be affected similarly to these persons, nor is it any indication of the contrary if such persons utter sentences which are the progeny of science, for those who are under the influence of these passions will recite demonstrations, and the verses of Empedocles, and those who first learn of science, connect indeed the words, but do not yet know their meaning, for it is necessary that science should increase with advancing age, but this requires time, hence it must be admitted that the incontinent speak after the manner of players, i.e. without attending to the meaning of what they say. Again, the cause of this may also be physically surveyed as follows, opinion indeed is either universal or particular, of which latter, sense is now the mistress, but when one reason is produced from both these, it is necessary that, so far as pertains to theory, the soul should enunciate the conclusion, but so far as pertains to practice, should immediately act. Thus, for instance, if every sweet thing ought to be tasted, but this thing is sweet as being someone of particulars, it necessarily follows that he who is able and is not impeded must at the same time that he says this, act, i.e. taste the sweet thing. When therefore, the universal proposition is indeed inherent, which prohibits a thing from being tasted, but another proposition says that everything which is sweet is delectable, and another, that this particular thing is sweet, and this causes the man to energize, and when also, desire happens to be inherent, then the universal proposition indeed says this thing is to be avoided, but desire leads to the fruition of it, for each of the parts of the soul is able to move or excite. Hence it happens that a man acts incontinently, both from reason, in a certain respect, and opinion. The opinion is not essentially, but from accident, contrary to reason. For desire, but not opinion, is contrary to right reason. Hence, on this account, also, brutes are not incontinent, because they have not a perception of universal, but an imagination and memory of particulars. Hence respect to the manner, however, in which ignorance is dissolved, and the incontinent man again becomes in possession of scientific knowledge. The reasoning is the same as concerning him who is intoxicated, or asleep, and is not peculiar to this passion, but the explanation of it must be obtained from physiologists, because, however, the last proposition is the opinion of the sensible object, and is the mistress of actions. He who is under the influence of passion either has not this proposition, or he has it in such a way that, from possessing, he has not a scientific knowledge of it, but merely enunciates it. Just as he who is intoxicated recites the verses of empedocles, and likewise, because the last proposition is not universal, and does not appear to be similarly scientific, it's the proposition which is universal. That also, which Socrates investigated, appears in this case to happen, for the passion is not produced when that which is science, properly so-called, is seen to be present, nor is this science drawn about, so as to cooperate with passion, but this must be asserted of the sensitive power, and thus much concerning the knowledge and ignorance of the incontinent man, and how he may act incontinently, accompanied with knowledge. Chapter 4. But whether anyone is simply incontinent, or all that are incontinent are partially so, and if there is anyone who is simply incontinent, what the things are with which he is conversant must in the next place be shown by us. That the continent therefore, and men of endurance, and the incontinent, and effeminate, are conversant with pleasures and pains, is evident. Of those things, however, which produce pleasure, some indeed are necessary, but others, though they are eligible of themselves, yet have excess. But necessaries indeed are things which have reference to the body. I mean such things as pertain to food, and the use of venereal pleasures, and such like corporeal concerns, about which we place intemperance and temperance. Other things, however, are not indeed necessary, yet are eligible of themselves. I mean such as victory, honor, wealth, and such like good and delectable things. Those therefore, who exceed in these, contrary to the right reason, which is in them, we do not indeed denominate simply incontinent, but with an addition we call them incontinent of riches, of gain, of honor, and of anger, but we do not call them simply incontinent, as being different from those that are so, and denominated from similitude. Just as the name of a certain person who was victorious in the Olympic games was Anthropos, i.e. man, for he had as a proper the common name of man, and yet at the same time he was different, from man universal, or the species man, as being an individual. As an indication of this, incontinence indeed is blamed not only as an error, but also as a certain vice, either simply or partially. But no one blames those who are incontinent of honor, or gain, etc., as simply bad. With respect, however, to those who are conversant with corporeal enjoyments, with which we say the temperate and intemperate man are conversant, he who without deliberate choice pursues the excesses of delectable, and avoids the excesses of painful things, viz, hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and everything pertaining to the touch and the taste, yet contrary to deliberate choice, and the reasoning power, is called incontinent. Not with an addition of this or that thing as of anger, but he is only simply called incontinent. But as an indication of this, those who are conversant with the one are called effeminate, but not those who are conversant with the other. Hence, we arrange the incontinent and intemperate, and also the continent and temperate man, in the same class, but not those who are incontinent of honor, or gain, etc. Because they are, in a certain respect, conversant with the same pleasures and pains. Though, however, they are conversant with the same things, yet not after the same manner. For the intemperate, indeed, pursue depraved pleasures, from deliberate choice, but the incontinent do not. Hence, we rather call him intemperate, who either, not at all desiring, or desiring slightly, pursues excess of pleasures, and avoids moderate pains, than him who pursues the one, and avoids the other in consequence of being influenced by vehement desire. For, what would the former character do if he were impelled by robust desire, and suffered violent pain from the want of necessary things? Since, however, of desires and pleasures, some rank in the genus of things beautiful and worthy. Four of things delectable, some are naturally eligible, others are contrary to these, and others have an intermediate subsistence, agreeably to the division we have before made, and these last are, such as riches, gain, victory, and honor. In all these, therefore, and things of the like kind, and in those that have an intermediate subsistence, men are not blamed for being merely influenced by the passions, and for desiring and loving, but for the manner in which they are influenced by them, and for indulging them to excess. Hence, with respect to those who are vanquished by the passions, or pursue anything naturally beautiful and good, contrary to reason, such as those who pursue honor more than is proper, or are irrationally attached to their parents and children, for these also rank among the number of things that are good, and those who pay attention to these are praised, yet there is at the same time a certain excess even in these things, if anyone, like Naiobi, contends about them even with the gods, or like Satyrus, who, for his attachment to his father, was called Philopator. For he appeared through this attachment to be very infatuated. There is, therefore, no depravity, indeed, in these things, for the reason already assigned, because each of these things is naturally eligible of itself. But the excesses of them are bad, and are to be avoided. This, however, is not the case with incontinence, for incontinence is not only to be avoided, but is also among the number of blameable things. But from the similitude of the passion, in speaking about each of these, it is usual to add the term incontinence, just as we say, that a man is a bad physician, or a bad player, whom we should not simply call a bad man. As, therefore, we did not hear call these simply bad men, because each of these is not a vice, but similar to vice from analogy. So likewise there, viz, in the immoderate pursuit of honor, gain, etc., those things only are to be considered as incontinence and continence, which are conversant with the same things as temperance and intemperance. But with respect to incontinence and anger, we speak of it from similitude. Just also, by making an addition, we say that a man is incontinent of anger, just as we say that he is incontinent of honor, or gain. Chapter 5 Since however, some things are naturally delectable, and of these some are simply so, but others to the genera of animals and man, but other things are not naturally delectable. But some things are pleasing in consequence of mutilations, and others are so, partly from custom, and partly from depraved natures. This being the case, similar habits may be perceived in each of these. But by savage habits, I mean such a habit as that of the woman, who is said to have cut open the bellies of pregnant women, and to have devoured the fetus. Or such habits as certain savage nations, about Pontus, are said to possess. For of these, some are delighted to feed on maw, and others on human flesh, and others at banquets feast each other with their own children. Or such a habit as Phalaris is said to have possessed, for he is reported to have eaten his own son. These habits, therefore, are savage. Some of these habits, however, are produced in certain persons from disease and insanity, as was the case with him who emulated, and ate his mother, and also with him who ate the liver of his fellow servant. But other savage habits either originate from disease, or from custom, such as evulsions of the hairs, biting the nails, and besides these eating coals and earth, to which may be added the venereal connection of males with males. For these habits are produced in some persons by nature, but in others from custom, as being accustomed to them from childhood. No one, therefore, would call those in whom nature is the cause of these habits incontinent, as neither are women called incontinent, because in the venereal connection they are not active, but passive. And in a similar manner, those are not called incontinent, who are in a diseased condition from custom. The possession, therefore, of each of these is something beyond the boundaries of vice, in the same manner as a savage nature. But when possessing these propensities to subdue or be subdued by them, is not simple continents or incontinence, but is only so from similitude, just as he who subsists after this manner with respect to anger is incontinent of this passion, but passion is not to be called incontinent. For every vice, folly, timidity, intemperance, and ferocity, when excessive, is either savage or the effect of disease. For he who is naturally so disposed has to be afraid of everything, even though a mouse should make a noise, is timid according to a savage timidity, but he who is afraid of a cat is timid from disease. And among the number of the stupid, those who are most irrational from nature and live only from sense resemble savage animals, as is the case with some nations of remote barbarians. But those who are so from disease, such as epilepsy or insanity, these are in a morbid state. It is, however, possible that someone may sometimes possess these habits and yet not be vanquished by them. I mean, as if, for instance, phalaris, desiring to eat his son, should refrain from so doing, or should abstain from absurd venereal pleasure. And it is not only possible to have these propensities, but also to be vanquished by them. As, therefore, with respect to depravity, that which pertains to a man is simply said to be depravity, but that which subsists with an addition is said to be a savage or diseased depravity. But it's not simple depravity, after the same manner, with respect to incontinence. It is evident that one kind is savage, but another the effect of disease, while that alone is simply incontinence which subsists according to human intemperance. It is evident, therefore, that incontinence and continence are alone conversant with those things with which intemperance and temperance are conversant, and that another species of incontinence subsists about other things which is denominated metaphorically and not simply. Chapter 6. Let us, however, now consider whether the incontinence of anger is not less base than the incontinence of desires. For anger, indeed, seems to hear something of reason, but to hear it negligently. Just like hasty servants who run away before they have heard the whole of what is said to them and thus air in the performance of what they are ordered to do, or like dogs who bark at a noise alone before they perceive whether who makes it is a friend or not. Thus also anger, through the heat and celerity of its nature, hears indeed reason, but does not hear its mandates in consequence of impetuously tending to vengeance. For reason indeed, or the imagination, renders it evident that something has been done attended with insolence or contempt. But anger, as if syllogistically concluding that it is necessary to be hostile to one who has acted in this manner, is immediately enraged. Desire, however, if sense or reason corrupted by sense, only says that a thing is delectable, rushes to the enjoyment of it. Hence, anger, in a certain respect, follows reason, but desire does not. Desire therefore is more base than anger, for he who is incontinent of anger is after a manner vanquished by reason, but he who is incontinent of desire is subdued by desire and not by reason. Again, it is more pardonable to follow the natural appetites, since such desires, as are common to all men, are more pardonable, and so far as they are common. But anger and asperity are more natural than desires which are excessive and which are not necessary. Thus one who was accused of striking his father said, as an apology for it, that his own father, and even his grandfather, committed the same fault, and pointing to his child he likewise said, he will strike me when he becomes a man, for this is a family failing. A certain person also, being dragged about by his son, ordered him to stop at the gates of his house, for he likewise had dragged his father as far as to that place. Further still, those who act more insidiously are more unjust. The irascible man, therefore, is not insidious, nor is anger, but he is open in what he does. Desire, however, is fraudulent, as it is said of Venus, quote, the Cyprian goddess, skilled in weaving wiles, close quote, and, as Homer says, speaking of hercestus, quote, in this was every art, and every charm, to win the wisest and the coldest warm, fond love, the gentle vow, the gay desire, the kind deceit, the still reviving fire, persuasive speech, and more persuasive sighs, silence that spoke, and eloquence of eyes, close quote. Hence, if this incontinence is more unjust, it is also more base than that which pertains to anger, and this is simply incontinence, and in a certain respect vice. Again, no one who is pained acts insolently, i.e., lasciviously, towards another person, but everyone who acts from the impulse of anger acts with pain. He, however, who conducts himself insolently towards another acts with pleasure. If, therefore, those things with which it is especially just to be angry are more unjust, the incontinence also which subsists through desire is more unjust, for anger is not attended with insolence. Hence, it is evident that the incontinence which is conversant with desires is more base than that which is conversant with anger, and, also, that continents and incontinence are conversant with corporeal pleasures. The differences, however, of these must be assumed, for, as we said in the beginning, some desires are human and natural, both in their genus and magnitude, but others are savage, and others subsist from mutilations and diseases. But with the first of these, temperance and intemperance are alone conversant. Hence, we neither call brutes temperate, nor intemperate, except metaphorically, though one genus of animals differs in short from another, in insolence, in salaciousness, and in veracity, for they have neither any deliberate choice nor reasoning process, but they revolt from nature in the same manner as insane men. Ferocity, however, is a less evil than vice, but it is more terrible, for that which is most excellent is not corrupted through this, as it is in men, but those that labor under this malady are deprived of it, i.e., of reason. It is just, therefore, as if that which is inanimate should be compared with that which is animated, in order to know which of the two is the worse. For, the improbity is always more inoxious, which is without a principle, but intellect is a principle. Hence, a similar thing takes place, as if injustice should be compared with an unjust man. For, it is possible that the one may be worse than the other, for a bad man may be the cause of an infinitely greater number of evils than a brute. CHAPTER 7 With respect, however, to the pleasures and pains which subsist through the touch and the taste, and also with respect to the desires and aversions pertaining to these, about which intemperance, and temperance have been before defined, it is possible, indeed, that a man may be so disposed as to be vanquished by those pleasures and pains to which the multitude are superior, and it is also possible that he may vanquish those by which the multitude are vanquished, but of these characters, he who is vanquished by pleasures is incontinent, and he who vanquishes them is continent. He also who is vanquished by pains is effeminate, but he who vanquishes them is a man of endurance. The habits, however, of most men are between these, though they rather verge to the worse habits, since, however, of pleasures some are necessary, but others are not, and those that are necessary are so to a certain extent. But the excesses and defects are not necessary, and the like also takes place in desires and pains. This being the case, he who pursues the excesses of pleasures, or who pursues pleasures excessively, or from deliberate choice, and on their own account, and not from anything else which may happen, is an intemperate man, for this man will necessarily not repent of his conduct, so that he is incurable. But he who is deficient in the pursuit of pleasures is opposed to this character, and he who subsists in a medium between both is the temperate man. In a similar manner also, he is intemperate, who avoids corporeal pains, not because he is vanquished by them, but from deliberate choice. But of those who pursue pleasures, yet not from deliberate choice, one indeed is led to the pursuit through pleasure, but another through an avoidance of pain, so that they differ from each other. It will, however, be obvious to everyone that he is a worse character, who, not desiring, or desiring but slightly, does anything which is base, than him who desires vehemently, and also that he who not being angry strikes a man is a worse character than the man who strikes another through the impulse of anger. For what would such a one do, if he were influenced by passion? Hence the intemperate is worse than the incontinent man. Of the characters, therefore, that we have mentioned, the one has more the form of effeminacy, but the other is incontinent. But the continent is opposed to the incontinent, and the man of endurance to the effeminate man. For endurance, indeed, consists in resisting, but continence in subduing. It is one thing, however, to resist, and another to subdue, just as it is one thing not to be vanquished and another to vanquish. Hence, continence is more eligible than endurance, but he who fails in those things in which the multitude resist, and are able to resist, is effeminate, and luxuriously delicate. For luxurious delicacy is a certain effeminacy, as, when a man draws his garments on the ground, lest he should be pained by the labor of holding it up, and, by his manner of living, imitates one who is ill, yet does not think he is miserable, though he resembles one who is miserable. The like also takes place with respect to continence and incontinence, for it is not wonderful if a man is vanquished by strong and transcendent pleasures or pains, but he deserves to be pardoned if, though vanquished, he makes a resistance, like the phylloctetes of theoctetes, when bit by a viper, or the cercian of carcinus in his allope, or like those who, endeavoring to restrain their laughter, burst forth into a profuse laugh, as it happened to Xenophantus. But he is very blameable who is vanquished by those pleasures which the multitude are able to resist, and is unable to oppose them, and this not through the nature of his race, or from disease, as is the case with the Persian kings, with whom effeminacy is hereditary, and who, on this account, are as females when compared to males. The Jacoce man also appears to be intemperate, but he is effeminate, for jesting is a relaxation since it is a repose from serious and laborious pursuits, but the Jacoce man ranks among the number of those who exceed in this relaxation. With respect to incontinence, however, one kind is precipitate, but another is from imbecility. For some indeed, having deliberated, do not persist in what they have deliberated, on account of passion, but others, in consequence of not having deliberated, are led captive by passion. For some persons, just as those who have previously tickled themselves, are not tickled by others, so these, in consequence of previously perceiving, and foreseeing the future perturbation, and having pre-excited themselves, and their reasoning power, are not vanquished by passion, whether it be delectable or painful. But persons of acute feelings, and those who are melancholy, are especially incontinent, according to precipitate incontinence. For the former, indeed, through celerity, and the latter through vehemence, do not wait for the decision of reason, because they are disposed to follow the imagination. Chapter 8. The intemperate man, however, as we have before observed, is not inclined to repentance, for he persists in his deliberate choice. But every incontinent man is inclined to repent, hence the thing is not as we doubt it might be. But the intemperate man, indeed, is incurable, and the incontinent man is curable, for depravity appears to resemble the diseases of the dropsy and consumption, but incontinent seems to resemble the epilepsy. Since the former, indeed, is continued without interruption, but the latter is not a continued improbity. And in short, the genus of incontinence is different from that of vice, for vice, indeed, is latent. But incontinence is not latent. But of these characters, the precipitately incontinent are better than those who possess reason, indeed, but do not abide in its decisions. For the latter are vanquished by a less passion, and not without previous deliberation, like the former. For the man who is incontinent from imbecility resembles those who become rapidly intoxicated, and from a little wine, and from less than that through which most men become intoxicated. That incontinence therefore is not a vice is evident, but perhaps it is partially so. For incontinence is contrary, but vice is conformable to deliberate choice. The intemperate and the incontinent man, however, are similar in their actions, just as Demodocus said, of the Malaysians, viz, quote, the Malaysians are not indeed foolish, yet they act as if they were so, close quote. Thus also incontinent men are not indeed unjust, yet they act unjustly. Since therefore, the incontinent man is one who does not pursue corporeal pleasures in excess and contrary to right reason, from persuasion, but the intemperate man, because he's intemperate, is persuaded to pursue such pleasures. This being the case, the former is easily induced to change his opinion, but the latter is not, for virtue preserves the principle of right conduct, but depravity corrupts it, and in actions that for the sake of which, or the end, is the principle, in the same manner as hypotheses are principles in the mathematics. Hence, neither in the mathematics, nor here, are principles to be taught, but virtue, either physical or ethical, is the cause of right opinion concerning the principle of conduct. A man of this description therefore is temperate, but the contrary character is an intemperate man. There is also a certain person who, through passion, departs from right reason, whom passion indeed so subdues that he does not act conformably to right reason, but yet passion does not so far subdue him as to cause him to be persuaded, that pleasures of this description ought to be largely pursued. This person is the incontinent man, who is better than the intemperate, and is not absolutely a bad man, for in him that which is best, the principle of right conduct is saved, but there is another person contrary to this, vis the continent man, who persists in the decision of reason, and is not diverted from it through passion. From these things, therefore, it is evident that one of these habits is worthy, but the other bad. Chapter 9 Whether, therefore, is he the continent man, who persists in any kind of reason, and in any kind of deliberate choice, or he who persists in right reason? And whether is he the incontinent man, who does not persist in any kind of deliberate choice, nor in any kind of reason, or he who persists in a false reason, and in an erroneous deliberate choice, as it was doubted by us before? Or shall we say that the continent man is one who persists from accident in any kind of reason and deliberate choice, but essentially in true reason, and right deliberate choice, but that the incontinent man does not thus persist? For if anyone chooses, or pursues, that thing on account of this, he pursues indeed and chooses this thing per se, but the former thing from accident. We speak, however, of that which is per se simply. Hence, it is possible that the one may persist in any kind of opinion, but that the other may abandon any kind of opinion, but the one simply persists in true opinion, and the other does not. There are, however, some persons who are disposed to persist in an opinion, and these are those who are called pertinacious, such as the obstinate, and those who are not easily persuaded to relinquish their opinions, who have indeed something similar to the continent man, in the same manner as the protocol has to the liberal, and the audacious to the confident man, but in many things they are different. For the confident man, indeed, is not changed through passion and desire, since, when it so happens, he is easily persuaded, but the pertinacious man is not persuaded by reason, since most of this description admits desire, and are led by pleasures. Those persons, however, are pertinacious, who have certain opinions of their own, and also unlearned and rustic men, and those, indeed, who have certain opinions of their own, are pertinacious through pleasure and pain, for they rejoice when they are victorious, if they are not induced to change their opinion, and they are grieved when their opinions, as if they were decrees, are without efficacy. Hence, they resemble the incontinent more than the continent man, but there are certain persons who do not persist in their opinions, yet not through incontinence, such as Neoptolomus in the phylloctetes of Sophocles, since he did not persist in his opinion, yet not on account of pleasure, but on account of the beautiful in conduct. For to him it was beautiful to speak the truth, though he was persuaded by Ulysses to lie. For not everyone who does anything on account of pleasure is intemperate, or a bad, or an incontinent man, but he is intemperate, who does it on account of base pleasure. Since, however, there is a character of such a kind as to be delighted less than is proper with corporeal pleasures, and not to abide in the decisions of reason, the continent man is a medium between this character and the incontinent man. For the incontinent man, indeed, does not abide in the decisions of reason, because he is delighted with corporeal pleasures more than is proper, but this man, because he is delighted with them less than is proper. The continent man, however, abides in the decision of reason, and is not changed through anything else. It is also necessary, if continents is a good thing, that both the contrary habits should be bad, as it appears that they are. Because, however, one of these characters, Viz, the man who is delighted less than is proper with corporeal pleasures, exists but among a few men, and is rarely seen. Hence, as temperance appears to be contrary to intemperance alone, thus also continents to incontinence, but since many things are denominated from similitude, the continents also of the temperate man follows according to similitude, for both the continent and the temperate man do nothing contrary to reason through the influence of corporeal pleasures, but the one, indeed, Viz, the continent man, possesses, but the other does not possess the prey of desires, and the one, indeed, is a man of such a description, as not to be delighted contrary to reason, but the other is delighted, indeed, it is not led by this delight. The incontinent and the intemperate man also resemble each other, though, indeed, they are different characters. Both, however, pursue corporeal delights, but the latter, indeed, thinking that it is proper, and the other, not thinking that it is proper to pursue them. Chapter 10. Nor is it possible that the same person can, at one and the same time, be prudent and incontinent, for it has been shown by us that a prudent man is, at the same time, a man of worthy manners. Again, a man is not only prudent from knowing what ought to be done, but also from acting properly, but the incontinent man does not act properly. Nothing, however, prevents the incontinent man from being skillful. Hence, also, sometimes, certain persons appear to be prudent, but incontinent, because skillfulness differs from prudence in the way we have before explained, and these, so far as pertains to reason, indeed, are near to each other, but they differ according to deliberate choice. Neither, therefore, does the incontinent man possess reason, as one who knows and contemplates, but as one who is asleep, or intoxicated, and he acts, indeed, voluntarily, for after a certain manner he acts knowing both what he does and for the sake of what he acts as he does, but he is not depraved, for his deliberate choice is good, so that he is half-depraved and not unjust, because he is not insidious. For one incontinent man, indeed, i.e., the man who is incontinent from debility, does not persist in what he has deliberated, and he who is of a melancholy temperament, i.e., the man who is precipitately incontinent, is not, in short, disposed to deliberate. The incontinent man, therefore, resembles a city which decrees, indeed, everything that is proper, and has good laws, but uses none of them, as Anaxandrides revilingly said, quote, the state consults, but its own laws neglects, close, quote. But the bad man resembles a city which uses, indeed, laws, but uses bad laws. Incontinence, however, and continents are conversant with that which exceeds the habit of the multitude, for the continent man persists more, but the incontinent man less, then the multitude are able to do, in the decisions of reason. The incontinence, however, of the melancholy, is more easily cured, than the incontinence of those who deliberate, indeed, but do not persist in doing what they have deliberated to do. Those also who are incontinent from custom may be more easily cured than those who are naturally so. For it is more easy to change custom than nature, for on this very account it is difficult to change custom, viz, because it resembles nature. As Evinus also says, quote, by long attention custom is produced, and is at length as nature to mankind, close, quote. We have shown, therefore, what continents and incontinence, and also what endurance and effeminacy are, and how these habits subsist with reference to each other. Chapter 11. The discussion, however, of pleasure and pain, pertains to him who philosophizes about the political science, for he is the architect, as it were, of the end, looking to which we say that one thing is evil, but another is simply good. Again, it is likewise necessary that we should make these the objects of consideration. For we admit that ethical virtue and vice are conversant with pleasures and pains, and most men assert that felicity is accompanied with pleasure. Hence also, they denominate the blessed man from especially rejoicing. To some, therefore, no pleasure appears to be good, neither essentially, nor from accident, for good and pleasure are not the same thing. But to others, some pleasures appear to be good, but many of them to be bad. Others, again, in the third place assert that though all pleasures were good, yet at the same time, that which is most excellent cannot be pleasure. In short, therefore, they say, pleasure is not good, because all pleasure is a generation tending to a sensible nature, as to its end, but no generation is allied to ends, as no act of building a house, i.e. the energy of building, is allied to the house. Again, the temperate man avoids pleasures. Farther still, the prudent man pursues a freedom from pain, and not the delectable, to which may be added that pleasures are an impediment to the energy of prudence, and this in proportion to the delight which they afford, as is the case with venereal pleasures, for no one, when engaged in this pleasure, can intellectually perceive anything. Again, pleasure is not the offspring of art, though everything which is good is the work of art. Farther still, children and brutes pursue pleasures, but that all pleasures are not worthy is indicated by this, that some are base and disgraceful and pernicious, for some pleasures produce disease. It is also evident that pleasure is not the best of things, because it is not an end, but generation. Such, therefore, nearly are the assertions respecting pleasure. Chapter 12 That it does not happen, however, from these arguments, that pleasure is neither good, nor the best of things, is evident from the following considerations. In the first place, indeed, because good is predicated in a two-fold respect, for one kind of good is simply and absolutely good, but another is good to a certain person, and natures and habits receive the same division, so that this will also be the case with motions and generations. With respect to these pleasures, likewise, which appear to be bad, some indeed are simply bad, but are not bad to a certain person, but to him are eligible, and some are not pleasures to this person, except once and for a short time, but they are not eligible to him, and some are not pleasures, but only appear to be so, fizz, those which are attended with pain, and are for the sake of a remedy, such as those of the sick. Again, since of good, one kind is energy, but another is habit, those pleasures which restore their possessor to his natural habit are delectable. In desires, however, there is the energy of an indigent and imperfect habit and nature. There are also pleasures which are unaccompanied with pain and desire, such as the energies of contemplation, nature in these not being indigent, but that some pleasures are delectable of themselves, and others only on account of the indigence which they remove is indicated by this, that men are not pleased with the same delectable thing when the indigence of nature is removed, and when it is not, for in the former case they are delighted with things simply and absolutely pleasant, but in the latter with their contraries, for they are then delighted with things sharp and bitter, none of which are either naturally or absolutely delectable, so that neither are they pleasures, for as things delectable are to each other, so likewise are the pleasures produced by these. Further still, it is not necessary that something else should be better than pleasure, as some say the end of generation is better than generation, for pleasures are not generations, nor are all of them accompanied with generation, but they are energies, end and end, nor do pleasures happen when things are passing into existence, but from the use of things, nor is the end of all pleasures something different from them, but of those only, which lead to the perfection of nature, hence it is not well said that pleasure is a sensible generation, but it must rather be said that it is the energy of habit, according to nature, and instead of saying that it is a sensible, it must be said that it is an unimpeded generation. It appears, however, to be a certain generation, because it is properly good, for they fancied that energy is generation, but it is different from it. To say also that pleasures are bad, because some delectable things produce diseases, is what may likewise be said of things delubrious, for some of these are bad, as to pecuniary affairs. In this respect, therefore, both will be bad, and yet they are not on this account bad, for contemplation is likewise sometimes injurious to health, yet the pleasure proceeding from each habit is neither an impediment to prudence, nor to any habit, but the pleasures which are an impediment to these are such as are for them, since the pleasures arising from contemplation and discipline produce in a greater degree contemplation and learning, but it reasonably happens that no pleasure is the work of art, since neither is there an art of any other energy, but of power, though the arts pertaining to unguents and cooking appear to be the arts of pleasure. With respect to the assertions also, that the temperate man avoids pleasures, and that the prudent man pursues a life unattended with pain, and that children and brutes pursue pleasure, all these are solved after the same manner, for since we have shown how all pleasures are, in a certain respect, simply good, and how they are not good, hence children and brutes pursue such pleasures as are accompanied with desire, and pain, and are corporeal, and the prudent man pursues a freedom of pain from these, for of such a kind are these pleasures, viz, they are accompanied with pain. Children and brutes also pursue the excesses of these according to which the intemperate man becomes intemperate, hence the temperate man avoids these, since there are also pleasures which belong to the temperate man. Chapter 13 It is also admitted that pain is an evil, and is to be avoided, for one kind of pain indeed is simply evil, but another in a certain respect, because it is an impediment. That, however, which is contrary to what is to be avoided, so far as it is something to be avoided and is evil, is good. Pleasure, therefore, is necessarily something good, for the solution of spusipis is not appropriate, viz, then pleasure is contrary to pain, just as the greater is contrary to the less, and the equal, since no one will say that pleasure is a certain evil, but nothing prevents a certain pleasure from being the best of things, if certain pleasures are bad, just as a certain science, viz, wisdom, is the best of sciences, though some sciences are bad. Perhaps, too, it must necessarily be the case that if of every habit there are unimpeded energies, whether felicity is the energy of all habits, or of some one of them, this energy, if it is unimpeded, is most eligible, but this is pleasure, so that a certain pleasure will be the best of things, many pleasures, if it should so happen, being simply bad, and on this account, all men are of opinion that a happy is a delectable life, and they reasonably connect pleasure with felicity. For no energy is perfect when it is impeded, but felicity is among the number of perfect energies. Hence, the happy man requires the goods pertaining to the body and external possessions, and also good fortune, lest the want of these should be an impediment to his felicity. Those, however, who say that a man, if he is a good man, may be happy, though he should be tormented in a wheel, and fall into the greatest calamities, say nothing to the purpose, whether they assert this willingly or unwillingly, because, however, happy man requires good fortune. Prosperity appears to some persons to be the same with felicity, though it is not the same. Since prosperity, when it is excessive, is an impediment to felicity. Perhaps, likewise, it is no longer just to call prosperity when it is excessive good fortune. For the definition of prosperity has a reference to felicity, that all brutes too, and all men pursue pleasure, is an indication that pleasure is in a certain respect the best of things. Quote, that fame which crowds of humankind extol will nare completely perish. Close quote. Because, however, neither the same nature nor the same habit either is or appears to be the best, neither do all men pursue the same pleasure, though pleasure is pursued by all men. Perhaps, also, they pursue not the pleasure which they fancy, nor that which they say they pursue, but the same pleasure, for all things naturally possess something divine. Corporal pleasures, however, obtain the inheritance of the name because men are for the most part occupied in them, and all animals partake of them. Because, therefore, these pleasures alone are generally known, these are the only pleasures which are fancied to have an existence. It is, however, evident that unless pleasure is good, and also energy, it will not be possible for the happy man to live delectably. For, on what account would delight be requisite to a happy life, if it is not good? But, it would also be possible for life to be happy, though attended with pain, for pain will neither be evil nor good if pleasure is not good. Why, therefore, is pain to be avoided? Neither, therefore, will the life of the worthy man be more delectable unless his energies are more delectable? Chapter 14 With respect, however, to corporeal pleasures, we must direct our attention to the assertions of those who say that some pleasures are very eligible, viz, such as are worthy, but not corporeal pleasures with which the intemperate man is conversant. Why, therefore, are the pains contrary to these pleasures depraved? For, good is contrary to evil, or, shall we say, that necessary pleasures are so far good, because that which is not evil is good, or that they are good to a certain extent. For, in those habits and motions in which there is no excess of that which is better, there is no excess of pleasure, but in those in which there is an excess of what is better, there is also an excess of pleasure. But, of corporeal goods, there is an excess, and the bad man becomes bad by pursuing the excess of pleasure, and not necessary pleasures. For all depraved men are delighted with meats and wine, and venery, but not in such a manner as is proper, and they are affected in a contrary way with respect to pain, for they do not avoid the excess of pain, but pain altogether, for pain is not contrary to excess, but to him who pursues excess. Since, however, it is not only necessary to speak the truth, but also to assign the cause of a false assertion, for this contributes to credibility. Since, when the cause why a thing seems to be true, though it is not, appears to be reasonable, it then gives greater credibility to the truth. This being the case, it must be shown why corporeal pleasures appear to be more eligible. In the first place, therefore, they appear to be so because they expel pain, and because excessive, and in short, corporeal pleasure is pursued on account of the excesses of pain as a remedy, but the remedies are vehement, and on this account, corporeal pleasures are pursued because they become more apparent when placed by that which is contrary to them. Pleasure, therefore, does not appear to be good for these two reasons, as we have before observed, because some pleasures indeed are the actions of a depraved nature, either from the birth of the animal, as those of a brute, or they originate from custom, such as those of bad men, but other pleasures are remedies because they are the pleasures of that which is in want, and it is better to have them than for them to be passing into existence, and others happen to be pleasures of that which is in a perfect condition. From accident, therefore, they are worthy pleasures. Again, pleasures that are vehement are pursued by those who are incapable of being delighted with other pleasures. These, therefore, procure for themselves certain thirsts. Hence, when pleasures are inoxious, they are not to be represented, but when they are inoxious they are bad. For those that pursue these pleasures have no other with which they are delighted, and if neither these nor any others are present, the vulgar are in pain, through the indigence of nature. For the animal always labors, as physical arguments testify, since, as physiologists say, to see and to hear are painful, but we are now accustomed to these energies and, therefore, do not perceive the pain. In a similar manner in youth, in consequence of the augmentation which then takes place, we are affected, like those who are intoxicated, and youth is a delectable period of human life. But the melancholic naturally always require a remedy. For their body experiences a continual molestation, from its temperament, through the acrimony of the bile, and they are always agitated with vehement appetite. Pleasure, however, always excels pain, as well the pain which is contrary to pleasure, as that which is casual. If the pleasure is strong, and on this account, the melancholic becomes intemperate and depraved. But the pleasures which are without pain have no excess, and these are such as are derived from things naturally delectable, and which are not accidentally so. I mean, however, by things delectable from accident, remedies, for, because it happens that we are cured of a malady, the part which is sane performing something, on this account, the remedies appear to be delectable. But by things naturally delectable, I mean those which produce the action of such a nature, i.e. which produce an energy essentially adapted to such a nature. Nothing, however, which remains the same is always delectable, because our nature is not simple, but there is also something in it different, according to which it is corruptible. Hence, if the one part does anything, this to the other nature is preternatural. But when both the parts are equalized, that which is performed, neither appears to be painful nor pleasing. For if there is any being, the nature of which is simple, to this being, the same action will always be most delectable. Hence, God always rejoices, according to one simple pleasure, for there is not only an energy of corporeal motion, but also of immobility, and pleasure exists more abundantly in rest than in motion. But mutation is the sweetest of all things, according to the poet, through a certain depravity. For, as a depraved man is mutable, so likewise is the nature which requires mutation, for it is neither simple nor good. And thus we have spoken concerning continents and incontinence, pleasure and pain, and have shown what each of them is, and how some of them are good, but others bad. It now remains that we speak concerning friendship. End of Book 7 Recording in memory of Mitchell at