 Welcome to NewsClick. I have with me today former National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon and we're going to ask him a number of questions about what has been happening in Ladakh. Thank you Mr. Menon for giving the viewers of NewsClick your time. Thank you for asking me. Okay now I've been reading some of your interviews. You were India's envoy to China between 2000 and 2003 but while you were with the Ministry of External Affairs between 1992 and 1995 when India's Prime Minister was Mr. Narasimha Rao, you negotiated the first boundary related agreement between India and China which was in a sense the route of subsequent agreements and by and large there was peace on the board and there were maybe a few minor issues but nothing major. You were also when Dr. Manon Singh was the Prime Minister of India, you were a special representative on the boundary issue between 2010 and 2014 and over the years I mean all the way from 1974 onwards you've been closely working on this whole issue with the government of course on the India-China boundary as well as India-China relations. Now the differences that India has had on the line of control goes back almost eight decades you know. We had a war in 62 for more than 70 years India and China haven't been able to agree on a fully demarcated border unlike the line of control with Pakistan. Now the question that I have for you is what has changed? What has changed that you today assert that India-China relations will have to be reset and we cannot go back to the situation that prevailed earlier and what do you understand and would you like to explain what do you mean by relations between the two most populous countries on the planet that these need to be reset? Well the reasons I mean there's three big reasons why I think our relations with China need to be reset and why I think what happened in Ladakh this spring is a symptom of the need to reset the relationship because we've as you said we've had almost 40 years of relative peace the border has stayed exactly as it was by and large and the relationship has been calm if not very warm but at least steady until recently until a few years ago and but the reason I think today we're in a different situation is because India has changed China has changed and so has the environment in which we operate when we did the basic framework which or the modus vivendi which which guided the relationship for the last 30 plus years and formalized it during the Rajiv Gandhi visit in 1988 to China at that time India and China had roughly equal GDPs we were coming to the end of the Cold War Soviet Union was about to collapse China was in internal stress Tiananmen happened six months after the Rajiv Gandhi visit to China and this was the US's unipolar moment was clearly upon us both countries India too was going through a transition we were trying to reform radical reform happened in 91 as a result of the crisis but we had already started trying to change our economic course it was clear that we were trying to increase our international options not just with China Rajiv Gandhi went and visited Pakistan later that month in December 88 but since then both countries have grown China has grown faster than India today the Chinese economy is more than four times bigger than ours China is an economic superpower militarily she's a regional part she's invested very heavily in developing that military capability and today actually it's also a very different China Dunshafings China in in the 80s 90s and the first part of first five years or so of the century was a China which concentrated on its own internal economic development almost to the exclusion of everything else politics everything was subordinate to that economic development that is no longer the case reform in China has actually stalled since 2013 and today there's a whole different environment Dunshafings China was a China which worked very closely with the US are no longer today today the US is pushing back at China's rights and China US relations are much more contentious our interests have grown in 1991 when we started reform most of our foreign trade which an external merchandise trade accounted for only about 15.3% of our GDP in 91 and most of that went west through Suez whereas by 2014 external merchandise trade was something like 49.6% of GDP that's almost half our GDP and and or a little less than 40% of that went east through the South China Sea so suddenly now freedom of navigation in the South China Sea becomes an Indian interest becomes a significant Indian interest in the same period China is defining that South China Sea as their territorial sea and is building is militarizing it building bases claiming it's a core interest so we're rubbing up against each other in ways that we never did before so therefore I say because India has changed China has changed and the situation in which we are has changed completely I think we do need to reset the relationship all right Mr. Menon if we looking at the big picture the bigger global geopolitical picture you know these words these phrases their implications you know about India being part of the quad together with Japan and with Australia the word non-alignment what it meant then you yourself have talked about non- alignment versions do the question is does an overtly pro-american stunts that India adopts against China does it diminish or even destroy our strategic autonomy rightly or wrongly China perceives that India has today more pro-united states perhaps than before and so if you look at the bigger political picture what has really changed that has led to what we've seen the denouement that we see in the to the wire you've said this is not comparable to 2013 or to 1986 that is summed around true or depths on but what you've seen is multiple incidents multiple moves forward with China occupying spaces which yet never occupied before along the line of actual control and for you it is worrying this guy's way according to you this is very different Chinese behavior I mean what do you think has changed because we are today seeing the first time we had a face-off on the 15th 6th of May then we had the co-commanders meeting on the 6th of June but 20 Indian soldiers were killed including a commanding officer Santosh Babu we do not know how many Chinese were killed the Chinese or at least global times say we don't want to talk about winners and losers but what really has changed that has led to the current face-off but I think it's clear that Chinese behavior on the border has changed we can only speculate about Chinese motives I mean you've listed all the ways in which that behavior has changed after all somebody Indian soldiers being killed on the border this last happened in 1975 etc etc this push to try and change the LAC I said try now frankly nobody actually knows the real situation because we have inspired leaks and all kinds of interpretations of satellite pictures and so on but authoritatively neither the government of India nor the government of China has actually said what the real situation is on the LAC in the western sector both sides say they have not crossed the LAC but we know they have differences in perception of where the LAC is but Chinese behavior has changed now when we try and speculate on the reasons for me there's several explanations that are offered in India which I find unconvincing people in India say it's what the government of India did in Kashmir changing the status of the dark etc Storgas frankly only Indians offer that explanation no Chinese let me interrupt just just mentioned the US yeah let me just go through the list of okay you mentioned the US I want to interrupt you because what happened is that we had a home minister in parliament saying we will take back every square inch of territory from Pakistan and China now September 2009 the writing down of article 370 Jammu in Kashmir state becoming two Union territories now are these I mean if our home minister thought this was meant for a domestic audience no certainly there was certain international ramifications yes please there are international ramifications Chinese reacted to it they took the issue to the Security Council they tried again after that to do it all that is true but does it explain that change in behavior on the LAC no even the Chinese don't offer that as an explanation and frankly I don't see the connection you make statements Chinese made statements Chinese tried to raise the issue in the Security Council they dealt with that separately the other explanation that we hear very often is what you just said oh it's because of India's increasing closeness with the US but surely this kind of pressure on the LAC and the Chinese know this would only guarantee more of the same it actually pushes India into working even more closely with the US so surely pushing on the LAC is not the answer to India's closeness with the US so for me these are not sufficient explanations nor is the limited tactical gains on the ground in LAC that China may or may not have achieved through this push that I don't think explains it so then you are left with much larger explanations you are left with either Chinese hubris over confidence they think this is a moment when they can achieve what they want they see a world and India reeling under a pandemic and they think this is a time where they have come out of it first maybe this is an opportunity or the opposite that China like everybody else is in crisis and therefore there is no question that she needs an external distraction and this offers itself if you look at Chinese behavior since the COVID pandemic started China has pushed forward whether on Hong Kong by passing a security law on her own without consulting anybody in Hong Kong she's pushed forward she's much more assertive in her behavior in Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait in the South China Sea East China Sea and now on our border so it seems to be part of a larger pattern of Chinese behavior but it's frankly we are still looking for a proper explanation and you know this is a question of reading the tea leaves of trying to understand why China has done this but I don't think that frankly what we may or may not do in the quad if anything what China has done in the dark means that the quad is likely to be more active and is likely to be activated further and I'm sure the Chinese could see that for themselves but they probably calculated that as well. Mr. Madan you know both sides India China have built have constructed infrastructural projects in areas where the LSE was never ever clearly defined as we've already discussed. Now why didn't then China react initially when the dollars big oldie road was being built or being open I'm asking you questions because I don't understand what was the provocation so you say it's not just limited tactical gains I'm quoting your interview with Suhasini Hyder which was published in the Hindu I think if I remember correctly it was the 11th of July correct now you said it's not just limited tactical gains 1458 kilometers so it's a far bigger political and a diplomatic act that's what you say that just some local military tactical gain now strengthening of ties not just with China what I mean you have suggested that this could be sending also messages to our own neighbors and not just Pakistan to Bangladesh we've seen a more belligerent Nepal to Sri Lanka that the message being you can't rely on India that India can't even take care of its own territory and you've also alluded to older issues how China see China's policy according to you has been two steps forward and then you take one step backward and you sort of make it out as if it's a victory and you yourself are sort of talking about why whereas both sides India and China the government's strategic communications according to you has been abysmal spins leaks motivated articles but nevertheless we are really at a juncture when we don't really know what what are the lessons that we have to learn I mean is China saying you know you can walk away with a propaganda victory that's all you think it remains smoke and mirrors spin propaganda all the way but right now I think we're still in the middle of the crisis so I don't think we can today say you know oh it's been done this is what happened secondly if we focus entirely on what is China's motive why has China done this you'll always be guessing Chinese are going to tell you what they actually think they don't open their archives so even 20 years from now 30 years from now you're not likely to have a conclusive answer to that you will only come to a certain general understanding based on watching that behavior and what they actually say in the negotiations what they seek to keep what they seek what they give up as part of the negotiation that will give you some sense of why they did this and all that we don't know yet so I think frankly it's too early to answer that question today all I said was if you look at the pattern of Chinese behavior in other cases and even with us in the recent past then I think you we need to be careful of a situation where the Chinese take as I said two steps forward and then offer one step back and everybody is happy and goes home for instance we have agreed now apparently according to the media to disengagement all along the line now that's a very useful first step because it prevents clashes which might escalate and could become outright conflict so disengagement is useful but it's only a first step because ultimately what we have been seeking and what we have always sought when there have been Chinese intrusions is a restoration of the status quo as it was before because the commitment in the 1993 agreement is to maintaining the status quo irrespective of how clear or undefined or defined the LAC is or whether we agree on where it is the commitment is to maintaining the status quo in other words you might have different opinions on where the LAC is in a particular spot but that doesn't give you the right to change the situation on the ground and therefore that is what we should ultimately be aiming for but even if you obtain the restoration of the status quo that does you can just ignore what's happened all this happened how did we respond all that we need to look at study and answer the questions that you asked but we can't do it today not in the middle of the crisis we don't have enough knowledge and certainly sitting outside you and I don't have enough knowledge to do this okay now I want to contrast the statement that has been attributed to you in the Hindu where you actually say it's dangerous in today's today at this press at the present juncture to talk about disengagement pullback withdrawal buffer zones at this particular point of time and I want you to comment specifically on Prime Minister Narendra Modi's statement made to members of various political parties as so-called all-party meeting on the 19th of June and I put him and and by the way this little bit is not available so easily on his website but he made it in public it's been shown on television and he said in Hindi nahi hua ha maara seema mein khus aaya hai nahi koi khusa hua hai nahi humari koi post kisi dosre ke kabze mein hai loosely translated to be neither has anybody intruded into our territory no have any of our posts been captured and then the Chinese were please just punch with this statement what do you make up mr. Modi statement on the first part of your question about it's dangerous I said if the Chinese have pushed forward along the LAC and we then only do disengagement buffer zones and so on then we are already negotiating at a disadvantage we are then actually creating buffer zones disengaging in territory which has always been under our control and that's why I consider that dangerous that's not the same as restoring the status quo and so that was the that so actually you have to see that dangerous within a context and what I was saying is if this has happened then this is not enough it's not enough to insist on just disengagement or buffer zones and I do think that we should still be pushing for restoring the status quo though it will take a lot of time I mean it's not going to happen overnight and it can take and some don't you it took you know over seven years to actually achieve a change which was acceptable to us on Prime Minister Modi statement I think you know there was then a clarification the next day by the PMO saying that what he said applied only to Galwan and there have been subsequent statements by NEA and so on none of us is in any position to either confirm deny whatever the accuracy of what he says I presume that if it's only applied to Galwan and then that it may have been accurate at the time he said it whether it's still accurate who knows and I really think that at this stage when you are in the middle of a negotiation with the Chinese Chinese will use anything they can they will use it in whatever form they they can to and global times therefore is you know and that's global times purpose in life it is an external propaganda organ it's it's not read in China it's written in English and it's written for you and me to influence opinion abroad but the fact that they use something or not that is neither here nor there I think more important and this brings me back to what I've said earlier is that there needs to be better strategic communication between government and the Indian people I'm sure that in the negotiation with the Chinese they're probably very clear but they need to to be clear about what's happening and about what we are trying to do with our own people so that you know rumor misinformation misinterpretation all this stops otherwise it becomes a party political football kicked around and the truth is the first casualty then I actually think it helps the government in its negotiation with the Chinese if it were more open with our own people because it also can make clear to the Chinese what the red lines are in the negotiation but that's something that frankly government has to decide Mr. Menon I'm actually going back to a question that I asked you because I want you to elaborate on it I all like all good diplomats you said India's relations with one country is never exclusive of India's relations with other countries in this case it may be Russia it may be China but something to that effect I mean all diplomats say you want me to give you a more exact quote of your I'm surprised that I said that anyway no no no the word you use is it's never been binary the word you use is binary US Russia US China you know that kind of thing either or choice I'm saying the opposite I'm saying that you can actually have relationships with all of them at the same time okay now I'm sort of stepping back a little bit to go back to a question that I asked you because I have to explore two other themes with you at a later point of time that's trade and defense equipment but before that the fact is Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping have met 18 times after Mr. Modi became Prime Minister in 2014 they had one-on-one meetings at Wuhan April 2018 they had Mahabalipuram October 2019 they sat on the swing on the banks of the Savarmati and some commentators are drawing parallels between what happened Pandit Johlal Leru Chowenlai Indichini Bhai Bhai followed by a war and I go back to the question I asked what is the meaning of what are the what is the meaning of these words non-alignment non-alignment version to strategic autonomy and I go back to the question does the perception that India has a pro-US stands vis-a-vis China does it or does it not diminish or destroy our own strategic autonomy so there are really two parts to the question yes well firstly I you said you know are we back in what happened in the late 50s the leading up to the war my own sense right now is that all three options are possible that India-China relations could either go like they did from 86 to 88 86 the Chinese came into Sundaram Chu sat there we had a crisis on the border which we dealt with both militarily diplomatically and we declared Arunachal as a state granted statehood to Arunachal Pradesh finally Rajiv Gandhi went we started a dialogue with the Chinese Rajiv Gandhi went in 88 December we created a new framework for the relationship which worked for more than 30 years or else it could go the way 59 to 62 a steady downward spiral where public opinion gets more and more agitated the media parliament paying for you know retaliation etc and third option of course that we sort of muddled through a more adversarial relationship no war no peace a sort of and we deal with the individual issues but overall a much harder relationship between India and China so right now in the middle of a crisis I think it's too early to say which way we're going clearly I mean I don't think that the downward spiral is a good way to go but there's always a risk of that and you can't minimize human folly unfortunately but I do think and I do think that a reset is called for in the relationship and this involves both sides actually agreeing about it that what about strategic autonomy you know it every government of India by one name or another has basically followed a policy of ensuring that we are not strategically entangled that we decide on issues on their merits and how they affect India's enlightened self-interest and that we have the freedom to make that choice that is why we've stayed out of alliances because alliances commit to beforehand two certain choices and alliances where they involve more than two or three parties actually result in a collective decision which you will then have to follow because you're an ally and so whether you call it non-alignment genuine non-alignment or strategic autonomy basically all governments of India including the present one have followed a similar policy that hasn't stopped us from cooperating in defense in intelligence and security maritime security counter terrorism on all these things with whichever partners we find to work with and I mean it doesn't get the height of the Cold War we were buying fighter aircraft from from the Soviet Union and from France so for me that's strategic autonomy being able to take the decision yourself and I think that is still true of us now we started transforming our relationship with the US when the Chinese had a much deeper relationship with the US than we did in fact the Chinese worked together with the US virtually as allies whether it was in the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets right through the 70s 80s and most of the 90s the Chinese actually worked very closely it was just after the collapse of the Soviet Union that that blue in their relationship went down but you look at the quality of the Chinese US economic relationship it's orders of magnitude bigger and deeper than anything that we have enjoyed with the US so it can't be it can't be that all the transformation of India US relations is the trigger for Chinese actions no it should not be it's different if you are talking about a situation where there is actually an actual China US conflict but we're far from that today okay today their relations are more contentious but it's not a question we don't have to choose between them okay we have relations with both and we work both that's what I said when I said it's not binary okay it's not either or we'll talk about that trade war US China trade war India India China trade or whatever you want to call it investment trade the problems and the differences but let's come to one special specific point which you referred to or purchase of aircraft purchase of defense equipment in your interview to the Hindu you said that the in the US has a law it has an act which says that if you buy weapons from Russia they can you know impose all kinds of energies and sanctions but they haven't applied this to India and there is a common interest and Russia is still a major source of military equipment for us and it's not that we can suddenly decouple from Russia and why should be Russia has been a reliable trusted friend etc etc so I think I do think that one consequence of what we've seen happening in Ladakh and the whole reset of India China will be stronger India Russia relations as well in fact our defense minister Mr. Rajnath Singh in the middle of all this crisis the only major country he went to was in fact Moscow I mean the only major visit he made now I'm asking you a slightly bigger question what does this imply greater dependence on the West for military equipment vis-a-vis Russia including Israel when I say West I include Israel and what does this mean for Mr. Modi saying Atman Nirbhar Bharat self-sufficiency in defense equipment I mean it has been argued that the manner in which India bought the the dust Rafale aircraft from Dassault was a blow a huge blow to in Busan aeronautics limited I mean we hear this going headlong into privatization including privatization now what does this mean what are the implications that of what has been happening in the recent past your views on our dependence on imports for weapons platforms and for our defense equipment I mean that's something that I think should worry all of us and I think that is an area where we certainly need to be self-reliant where Atman Nirbhar is really the goal that we should be working for but it's not a goal that anyone has found possible overnight are actually if you look at the proportion of our dependence on imports for our defense supplies that's actually diminished over time but it's still unacceptably high and the source of our major platforms is still Russia but we have diversified sources of supply we now get weapons weapons and defense equipment from the US as well from other as you said Israel from other other partners but I think what we are seeing increasingly is that even though we might be getting equipment from abroad we will try and make sure that it's made in India that the technologies also come to India now whether it is public or private frankly that's an efficiency decision if the private sector is more efficient in providing this in India good luck to them and I think that we should that is a decision that we should take on our own which is separate I don't think that privatization or frankly using public sector especially you know the ordinance factories to do consumer goods for instance that made no sense and we've moved out of that we've moved away from that in the past if you look at the example of our space program it is fed today essentially by a whole series of private companies and firms who not only have the technology but also compete among themselves and I think that kind of ecosystem if we can build an India where public sector private sector but internal competition to promote efficiencies in defense equipment supplies and production I think that's really the way to go no but the question I had sir and I'm interrupting you here is that whether this is actually happening or are we it is or are we just off is why I said weakening it's happening if that is why I said that if you look at the proportion of imports in our total equipment supplies defense equipment supplies it's actually going down over time and that's a long-term secular trend over the last 10 15 years that proportion has reduced over time but it's a slow process and it needs to be accelerated considerably okay I want to know your views about what has been happening on the trade front you've talked about US China trade relations being very strange some people say this is a new third world war you know except that is not being fought with guns and missiles and bombs it's being fought by trade it's been formed at the fight is on issues like related to information technology but that's not it alone I mean look as far as India's concern that nobody should have any illusions is who's going to get hurt if hypothetically we stop all trade with China you know we've already placed restrictions on investment and it's not just a question of banning you know 59 computer applications like tiktok the fact is India's imports from China comprise barely 3% of China's total exports India's exports to China account for less than 1% of China's total imports but for India it's very important and let me just flag one issue and there are many issues in this active pharmaceutical ingredients 70% of our total active pharmaceutical ingredients that are used by India's pharmaceutical companies are imported from China now and that includes 100% of particular certain life-saving drugs including paracetamol including ibuprofen so you know it's one thing to say you know stop Chinese trade don't buy their LED bulbs don't buy their Modi masks don't buy their kite flying manja etc etc but the issues are really very very deep and I mean and and at a time when the world and India and China and all of us are going through this unprecedented healthcare crisis the pandemic there are very very major implications of this so-called trade standoff well two things you know you started by saying trade war I think unfortunately we now cheapen the word war to use it for everything war on terror war on COVID trade war everything but for me this is worrying because this suggests the whole militarization of the way we think war is not a joke and certainly these are not wars these might be struggles they might be you know you there are other words and I think we need to find more accurate ways of dealing with this of describing this because if you start thinking of it as a war you start coming up with the wrong solution then there are victors losers etc you impose your will and I think the whole context changes with India China obviously this is an unsatisfactory economic relationship that we have with China the imbalance is really far too great over 56 billion dollars last year out of a total of about 93 billion dollars total two-way trade you said that we account for only 3% of China's exports but we also that accounts for that 56 billion dollars accounts for I was corrected by somebody 16% of China surplus so that does constitute a certain amount of leverage and I think what's happened now gives us a chance as part of the reset to reject the economic relationship into something that works better we have had some success especially in the last six years in attracting Chinese investment in India almost about 26% of 26 billion US dollars worth of Chinese investment came in 2014 total cumulative Chinese investment was only about 1.8 billion dollars and most of that actually in startups in FinTech in in actually software other companies and in startups like Zomato and so on but a lot of our payments digital payment systems for instance depend not just on Chinese investment but on Chinese technologies so we do have dependencies power equipment telecom equipment apis you said 68% so far there is a whole set of dependencies what I would expect is frankly that on consumer goods it depends on the Indian consumers appetite and willingness to pay more for alternatives and to actually put his money where his mouth is and to stop buying Chinese goods and that is something that you can't predict whether this is purely a price sensitive market or not that's something else but there are areas where I think government has a major say telecom and especially where these dependencies have been created or have grown over the years I think those are areas where you will probably see government intervention already you mentioned government is already put in prior approval for investment from China but how do you work this in a globalized world where frankly capital is fungible I mean you talk about telecom equipment I mean let's be specific you know who why and and and the Z company the monopolize certain kinds of telecom equipment not just in India across the world no but I think what you can do in telecom is very simple you don't try and protect everything there are things the way you only build in resilience but you protect your core interests in these networks until you know 2016 I think it was even Cisco routers were all made in China so as you this is a globalized world where you have to build your own defenses and decide what to defend and choose which bits to harden which pits where you will learn to live with some disruption and build in resilience so that knowing that people will attack these systems things will happen you can still go on so there are ways around this problem and I think we will find them and you know I'm in this area actually I'm less worried because there is enough Indian know-how ingenuity and capability especially in telecoms and so on now electronics is an area where there's a huge dependence on things from China auto parts and some of these are original equipment manufacturers you know let's say Mercedes Benz building cars in India importing from their plant in China those kinds of things will not stop because they're not going to cut their global supply chains just to suit your sentiment so what I foresee is a mixed picture there's never going to be a complete decoupling there will be some rejigging of the relationship and certainly the parts which are amenable to government control and and and management those parts I think will will be redone as part of our commitment to do everything 100% yourself all right it means that you have a choice and you have options and that's I think the situation we need to work to be more than 45 minutes into our conversation Mr. Menon this is positively my last question to you and in a sense I'm going back to where we started looking at the big bigger geopolitical picture and I say you are placed in a situation where given your long years of experience and not just as a national security advisor but as a diplomat and as a person who's dealt with issues like public policy or national security disarmament and so on and so forth in their relations let's look at the bigger picture once again and and we know we are not happy with the China Pakistan economic corridor we're looking at the claims the counterclaims not just on Aksai Ching and Gilgit Baltistan and Arunachal Pradesh but India was the only major Asian country that opposed the Belt and Road Initiative and you know the movement to the warm water ports the Guadal to Kashgar you know what I'm here saying is that we're seeing what's happening in Iran Bangladesh that submarine port in that in the in the Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar area Sri Lanka the port in Sri Lanka China's famous string of birds all the way from the South China Sea to the Horn of Africa so when you talk about the reset of India-China relations where do you go from here and and you have and I quote you here what you just said that there is a distinct possibility and you cannot rule out a return to the situation that prevailed in the late 50s and in the early 60s where we move downwards from here that the that the spiral the India-China relations move downward from here so I would like you to make my own sense of the least likely outcome of the crisis from my point of view is the downward spiral yes more likely for me is a positive outcome with a new framework for the relationship a reset but most likely is actually muddling through with a more adversarial sort of no-one-no peace kind of relationship but you mentioned the neighborhood and China's increasing role in our neighbors increased commitment to Pakistan a purchase or involvement in ports around the Indian Ocean all it certainly matters and it is a material change in the situation that we have to deal with but I don't think we should underestimate our own capabilities and interests in within the subcontinent for instance our affinities are very strong and we need to work we need to step up our game no question but what we need to work for is a much closer integration economically of the countries of the subcontinent and this makes sense from our own in point of view and we need to make sure that India is seen by them as a source of stability and security in the subcontinent and in the extended neighborhood the Indian Ocean region and that I think involves much more engagement not less not a drawing in words not a cutting off of our links with the rest of the world so my larger answer to this new situation to the more assertive China to what we are facing now would be strengthen ourselves at many but yes certainly but integrate the neighborhood work do much more in our extended neighborhood and do external balancing with work with the powers who also have interests like you in maritime security throughout the Asia Pacific Indo-Pacific whatever you want to call it whether it's Russia whether it's Iran whether it's the US Japan Australia work with Indonesia Singapore Vietnam I mean the list of partners available to you is huge I have a mantra which I use over and over again is do issue-based coalitions of the willing I mean this is it's hard work it's very hard work but you've done it in other cases you did a solar reliance for instance and it the partners you work with will vary depending on the issue but pick an issue say whether it's maritime security or whether it's counterterrorism and and find partners who share your interests and have the willingness and capability to do something about I am not I am an optimist I actually think that every crisis creates opportunities gives you a chance to change unsatisfactory realities and I think we have another such opportunity today actually we've heard that before sir but time alone will tell whether your optimism is ground in reality whether the muddling through of India-China relations which you see as a very likely possibility that no or no peace kind of a scenario where that will take us so on behalf of all the viewers of news critic thank you very very much for giving us your valuable time and sharing your views on a host of issues that me and novice I barely understand international relations I was clearly not true thank you so much thank you very much so I stopped the recording now sir thank you and and do keep watching news click