 With your permission as a professional Middle East historian I'd like to take a broader view and then come to the Israeli-Palestinian point. I think much of several of the points I'd like to touch upon have been touched upon by earlier speakers but I'd like to put a somewhat different angle on them. The title of our session is Trends in the Middle East and I'd like to speak very briefly aware of the time of these trends. First I think was touched by, it's two eyes and start, the change in American and U.S. and Russian policies in the Middle East. The Russian case is very clear, Russia is back successfully exploited American disengagement and the Syrian crisis and came in very effectively in Syria and plays games with Turkey and Saudi Arabia's successful diplomacy. With regard to the U.S. in addition to what two eyes and start described about the trends in the U.S. there's a bigger question that I think preoccupies everyone who looks at American policies and how effective is this president? What does this president want? What kind of foreign policy does he have in mind? What does he want to accomplish in the Middle East? Does he have the foreign policy team to implement this policy and doesn't have the temperament to make policy and implement policy? And I'm worried, for instance, he came to the Middle East, his first visit outside the United States, gave a big speech in Riyadh. The main point was how to stop Iran. I think he's trying to stop Iran in the wrong place. I mean just playing games with the agreement on the nuclear issue is I think has been pointed out very complicated. There is a better place to stop Iran. It's called Syria in the main effort of Iranian policy in the last decade has been in Syria and Lebanon and to build direct access from Iran through Iraq through Syria to Lebanon to the Mediterranean. And if you are a superpower who looks at the global map and you want to stop Iran, the place would have been Syria. But Trump is only interested in defeating ISIS. He's not interested in what happens in Iraq and there is all when ISIS is defeated. It's the wrong policy. With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he says, keep saying that this is the ultimate conflict, the one he would, the ultimate deal he would like to make. But we have not seen the seriousness that is required for making that deal. And let me emphasize, without active effective participation of the United States, no Arab-Israeli agreement has been reached to date. Second important trend, Iran and Turkey's coming back to the Middle East. It seems surprising, but for much of the 20th century they were not there. Turkey wanted to look at Europe. Iran was preoccupied with domestic issues and with the Soviet threat. Since 79, Iran is back. And since the first decade of this century, Turkey is back. Now, two large, powerful countries, 80 million each, with sophisticated elites, military power, economic might, are in the game. And therefore, the whole arena of the Middle East has changed, not always for the better. Iran is an expansionist power in Germany. And Turkey's policy began ambitiously. One spoke about neo-automanism, about Mr. Davuto Ru. I may or may not speak to us here today, coined the term of zero conflict with our neighbors. Turkey is now preoccupied with the Kurdish issue, both in Syria and Iraq. It's not been very effective in its Syria policy, very much preoccupied with this issue. And its impact as a regional power is still limited, but the potential is there. Third is the future of the Arab state. We are now in what we call the post-Arab thermal phase. We had an Arab spring. We then had the Arab thermal. And the foundations of several Arab states have been shocked. Syria and the Civil War, Iraq, remember that ISIS almost captured Baghdad, Libya, Yemen, Sudan, secessionist trends with Kurds. There was talk at some point about the Alawites succeeding from Syria and creating their own state led. This may have been checked. We now have a fairly effective government in Baghdad. Assad, for good or bad, is going to remain in Syria. Still, Libya, of course, Sudan and Yemen are with a problem, but the future of the Arab state that has been put in question, I think that issue may be checked. On social economic issues, one major effect. The discrepancy between demography and resources. It's undermining the Arab world. Egypt is our country of 100 million people. And if you look 20, 30 years down the road, 320 million Arabs are going to be half a billion Arabs. Who is going to feed? Who is going to find employment without massive investment in industrialization and development? That's a major trend. Finally, Arab-Israeli. Like you, I would say I see positive and negative trends. Negative is the fact that Iran has joined the fray. It's beginning to become not just an Arab-Israeli conflict, but almost a Muslim-Jewish conflict. And that's very bad. Because in political and diplomatic conflicts, you can find compromise more easily than in religious conflicts where everybody sticks to an absolutist position. And Iran is not a good influence. So, as I said, it's right. We've had the most right-wing government that we ever had, with people who are basically annexationists with regard to the West Bank. But here I'd like to point out a positive development from my perspective. This week is the first time that the polls in Israel show that the center-left block is doing better than the right-wing block. This is fresh news from two days ago in Israel. And that, of course, is good news for those who would like to see an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. And of course, the reconciliation between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority is good news. But the question mark is, will the United States play the role that it must play in order for it to step forward to be taken? So I joined all day in a rare display of Palestinian-Israeli unity in being slightly optimistic with regard to this situation. Thank you.