 The idea of Australia 360 is very much about advertising one of the ANU's strengths and that is that it encompasses, like no other institution in this country, an expertise on Australia's foreign relations, not only on Australian foreign policy itself, but on the region in which Australia exists and must make its way in the world. Of course, when the ANU was founded back in 1946, the Commonwealth Parliament at the time charged the ANU with developing a world-class expertise on Australia's region and the ANU began building that expertise back then in the late 1940s and continues to foster that. The modern incarnation of that is the College of Asia and the Pacific at the ANU, which is very proud to have the largest collection of specialists on Asia and the Pacific anywhere in the Western world, and we will continue that strength. The idea, as Nick said, of Australia 360 was to showcase the expertise within one of the schools in the College of Asia and the Pacific, the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs. The Coral Bell School brings together five very old and very distinguished departments looking at some aspect of Australia's international relations. It has the Department of International Relations, Australia's oldest department of international relations. It has the Strategic and Defence Study Centre, which looks at military and strategic affairs, the Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy, the State Society and Governance in Melanesia Program, which is the world's largest collection of experts on the South Pacific, and the Department of Political and Social Change, which contains great expertise on Southeast and Northeast Asia. All of this means that the corridors of the Coral Bell School are constantly abuzz with discussions about what is happening in detail in those societies around Australia that have a great influence on what happens to this country in the world. And not that I've been there for the last 10 months or so, but I would think that in the last 10 months, the last six months, the corridors of the Coral Bell School would have been buzzing with conversations about what is going on in the world and how can we make sense of what's happening. It is something that Coral, herself, Coral Bell, after whom the school was named, would have had a great deal to ponder and a great deal to say. It's been the case, I think, that up until January of this year, we were watching a fairly rapid power transition go on in our part of the world. But I think you would have to say a fairly predictable power transition. The rise of certain Asian powers, led, of course, by the astounding rise of China's wealth and power, and the way in which the United States, as the dominant power in the region, was handling that particular power transition and, of course, the fate of a range of smaller countries, including Australia, in trying to manage in their own interests that particular power transition. Well, in the past six months, it seems that one of the elements of that rapid but predictable power transition has been thrown very much up in the air. We've seen elected to the presidency of the United States a very different presidential candidate, and one that even Coral with her remarkable powers of being able to look into and talk authoritatively about the future probably could not have predicted. There has been a sudden lurch, you might say, in the role of the United States in the world, brought about by, I think, the most extraordinary election and election campaign in living memory. What we have in Donald Trump goes beyond the fascination, the purile fascination, I must say, of some of the antics in the White House and what gets tweeted at three o'clock in the morning. What we have seen has been a United States that has stepped back and perhaps repudiated for good. That is one of the big questions that we face, a 70-year-old attachment to the philosophy of liberal internationalism and building order around liberal internationalism. The question that I'm talking about is whether the United States, whether the election of Trump in the United States heralds a blip and whether in four or eight years we will see the United States return to normal, return to a candidate whether Republican or Democrat that espouses strongly those liberal internationalist principles around which United States foreign policy has been built or whether the United States electorate has now moved to a stage where it has fairly permanently repudiated the principles of liberal internationalism and the America first doctrine, whether of the Republican variety or the Democrat variety, is the new normal for the United States. What we've seen of the Trump presidency tells us some fairly important things about American foreign policy for the next three and a half years. A few of the principles that I think I can start to define from Trump's behavior and certainly not from his speeches or any of the things, any policy documents that he's developed are as follows. Firstly, I think that if we're holding our breath and waiting for a coherent Trump doctrine to emerge, we'll be waiting in vain for the next three and a half years. But Trump having a strategy is a bad strategy. Certainly having a strategy that you enunciate clearly is a bad strategy because it makes you predictable and it makes you exploitable. And so American foreign policy is something that we will have to watch and it will have to be episodically watched over time. Secondly, it appears that for the United States under this president, the closer you are to the Americans, the more suspicious they will be of you. It was during the election campaign and sometimes afterwards that America's closest allies came in for some of the greatest criticism from the United States. For Trump, foreign policy is a series of sequential deals. Trump, the businessman Trump, the president deals with foreign policy issues as they arise. He doesn't go out looking for foreign policy issues to work on and to deal with. And for Trump, a country matters and the amount a country matters really depends on the balance sheet that exists with the United States. If the United States is generally doing better in a particular bilateral relationship then that country sits much higher in the president's view of the world than if a country is doing better from the deal than the United States is. And as we've seen in Trump's dealings with China over North Korea in recent weeks and months, if a country is seen to have reneged on or not holding up the deal or the end of the deal as Trump sees it then everything is put back on the table and the deal is recast. And so this is a major change in US foreign policy in this particular part of the world. US foreign policy for the past century or more has been built around four principles. Firstly, commercial access. The United States must have commercial access to Asia on conditions that are conducive to the American way of doing business. And I think you can see the continuities of that principle stretching from the open door policy towards China announced in 1899 all the way through to Obama's Trans-Pacific Partnership. Secondly, American foreign policy engagement in the region must be cost effective. It must take place according to which America gets more out of the deal than it puts into its role in the region. Thirdly, stability over principle. The United States has never been particularly concerned with the domestic governance of particular countries in this part of the world. Rather, it would prefer to see predictable governments investing in development rather than perfectly democratic and liberal governments in this part of the world. And finally, US dominance in Asia has been built on a domination of the commons. Freedom of navigation, the dominance of the United States Navy, dominance of information systems, technology systems and investment systems. Trump looks confusing to many because in some ways he is consistent with these principles. Certainly, the cost effectiveness of America's commitments in this part of the world and stability over principle, that looks very much and certainly access on terms conducive to the United States way of doing business. But the issues around the domination of the commons, the United States has become very uncertain about. And it's very hard to tell exactly where it stands on those issues, particularly given a president that is not willing to enunciate a very clear strategy in the region. And so Australia suddenly finds itself in a very unpredictable position. And it's a very unpredictable position that it shares with most of the countries of Southeast Asia, some of the countries of South Asia and some of the countries of North Asia as well. Our region, Australia's region sits poised at a really important point in our history. There are three possible directions that the region will go in in the years ahead. One possibility is that the region will simply swap American primacy for Chinese primacy in the years of the Trump presidency. There are those who think that the Trump presidency, its chaos, its lack of strategy, its lack of resolve, presents China with an ideal opportunity to maximize its strategic gains, to convert its commercial dominance in the region into strategic dominance. And so one possible future in the region is that American primacy slides easily and fairly uncontested into a system of Chinese primacy. A second option for the region is that it lurches towards what I would call a rivalrous bilateralism. This is a future in which the United States attempts to muscle up to China, in which Trump decides that the way to deal with the Chinese challenge is to double down on American military power, to invest very, very heavily in naval power, in its nuclear forces, and in other forms of American power in the region, and try and coerce China back into its box. That is a future that is equally unpalatable. It is dangerous, it will be unstable, and my belief is that any attempt to coerce China back into its box will not work. A third future, which is a much more palatable future, but much more difficult to get there, is a future in which the region moves towards a managed multilateralism. A future in which the United States and China are powers in this region, but they're not the only controlling powers in this region. The Japan plays an important role, India plays an important role, Indonesia plays an important role as well. And of course, the smaller countries, including Australia, have an important managing role as well. That's a very difficult future to get to. It requires convincing the United States and China to moderate their demands and their expectations for their roles in the region, as well as getting other countries, such as India and Indonesia and Japan, to step up and play a responsible role in a multilateral order in the region. This is a future that Australia must work hard towards if this is what it wants to bring about. It places enormous demands on Australian foreign policy. These are real challenges for the managers of our foreign policy, and I can say that they place enormous importance on getting to know the countries of our region with whom we have to deal if we're going to bring about this important future in a very, very sophisticated way. That is a way of saying we need institutions like the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs as we've never needed them before. We need their expertise and we need their deep engagement in the policy process. So ladies and gentlemen, I'm looking forward to the day's discussion. I'm looking forward to hearing the Bell School's expertise on a range of challenges that face Australia and I look forward to the question and answer sessions and your views as well. Thank you.