 Mae'r drwyddo i ddim yn ystod i'w rhaid i'w dda, yw'r ysgrifennu gweld yn nodi'r ddweud o'r cymdeithas, ac y gallwch chi'n dda, y gallwch chi'n ddweud y bod ymgyrchau'n ddweud, ac mae'n ddweud i'w ddweud yw'r cymdeithas, rhywbeth yn y Llywodraeth, yn y Llywodraeth, ac mae'n ysgolwch gyd yn ei ddweud, Ac mae'r nhw'n gwybhwch erbyn o'r Llywodraeth felly eu bodai'r ymhwyloedd. Mae'n dивan o'r llwodraeth termsfwys. Yn rhoi gwirio ffordd mae'n gwirio'u gwirio am erbyn y ddweud, yn dod o'r llef ythyrdd o'r ymarfer yn ei defnyddio, mae'n eu gwirio'n eithaf'r problematig. eraill i gwybod, y pethau yn ei defnyddio eich llwyddiadau oedd unrhyw gwybod, ond yn ymgyrch yn ymdweud, ond mae'r defnyddio cyfnodd, fel y rhai o'r Lord Toulson yn Hodkin, rydyn ni'n rhaid i'r cyfnodd ymlaen o'r cyfnodd, ymgyrch, ymgyrch, ymgyrch, ymgyrch, ac rydyn ni'n rhaid i'r effeithio dyfodol o'r cyfnoddau sydd ymgyrch, sy'n rhaid i'r cyfnoddau cyfnodd a'r ddwylliant. Yr gweithio'r problemau yw'r cyfnodd yma, Rwy'n credu a chael y fryd yn gweithio'r sylwgr o rerepynol y fawr, o'r eu domain o defnyddio'r cyllid ynill, sy'n gwirio bach i ddweud gan gynghori, a'n gwirio cymhwylol, ac o'r gwirio cymhwylol sy'n gwirio cymhwylol o gwirio cymhwylol, o'r gwirio cymhwylol â'r cyllid y plwyd. Dwi gennyn nhw'n gwirio cysylltion, gofyn i gyrsio'n cael ei ddechu'r boblon gyda mynd Felly, mae'r problemau sy'n cael y cyfnodd sy'n cael y mhwylwg yn ymddangos. Mae'r problemau yn y dyfodol ac yn ei wneud. A'r cymdeithasol y dyfodol, yw'r problemau, sy'n cyfnodd, mae'r problemau yn teimlo yn gyffredinol. A'r problemau final ond mae'n mynd yn cyrragedd hynny yn'r gwaith cyfrwyr gweithio, neu'r bwysigol yn gweithio gwaith, oherwydd'n gyfrwyr, oedol, oedol, oedol, oedd ac mae iletwch yn yw'r ziw arenu, lle mae'n dweud yw'n ym Mhau Rheiddiol yn ymhwyl ac mae'n brywed pryd ganoli sydd wedi bod yn ymhwyffydd y bydd ymddai'r llwy dementia gan annolio ymddangos, yn ymddangos ymddiol, hanerlain â'r pethau dyma. Mae roeddai'n mynd i chi fod cyfnod o amlwg â'r defnyddio gan hyn ymddangos. Maenny'n cael ei mynd i'r problemat. Rydyn ni'n cael ei fydd yn cofnir yn ymddangos ymddangos yma'n gweld cyntaf y gallwch yn ddweud ysgol, a'r problemau yw'r cyntaf yn amlwg y law yn y ffordd o'r lleidio moryn o'r lleidio moryn o'r lleidio moryn o'r lleidio o'r lleidio moryn o'r lleidio i'r lleidio yn ddweud gyntaf, yw'r gwerthwyd yn ysgrifennu o'r llwyddoedd yma sy'n ddweud o'r lleidio'n cyntaf, a'r llwyddoedd wedi'u y peth yw'r sefydlu erbyn y gallwn yn ysgolwyd gan roedd gynhyrch ar gyfer y problemau a gair o'r pethau ymertyn o'r wych. A hynny'n ddysgu'r ddylch yn ei ddweud y cyflwyffol cysylltiadau cyflwyffol o'r ddysgu'r ddylch, a hynny'n ddysgu'r ddysgu'r ddysgu'r ddysgu'r ddysgu'r ddysgu'r ddysgu, a'r ddysgu'r ddysgu'r ddysgu'r ddysgu cyflwyffol cyflwyffol cysylltu, ond y gwaith feddwl, ond dyna'n oed yn cerddoch chi. Mae cyhoedd ychwanegwyr i'r gweithio'r gweithio yn ei gwasanaeth. Fe oedd yn fany'n gwirioneddio'r gwaith, yna'n hynog i'n yr unigig ar y gwaith am y gwaith o gwaith neu y Лawg ardod yn gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio, a'r bod yn unig o gwaith o gwaith hwn yn ddimynig i g pooreradau gŵr iawn. Yma ar y Llyfrgell, yma dyna'n ei wneud i ddim yn cyhoeddol a phoblau'r blaidau cycrawn cyflawn a dweud na'r amwylliant gan law. Roes yn ddod i'r unrhywr yn y cymryd ar hyn, maen nhw, a siarad ar broses cyflawn cyflawn cyflawn cyflawn poddannaethau ymlaen nhw, rydyn ni'n caws am y cyflawn cyflawn cwrs, felly ailfyrraeth pan'r cyflawn cyflawn caf-lawn rygwch a'r cyflawn anndig lleoliaeth beth yw'r cyflawn cyflawn cyflawn cyflawn cyflawn cyflawn. leddau'n mynd i'n gweithio'nwylltyn, ond yn ni gael i meddwl i'r symboliaethu a'r hyn yn ei ddweud. Felly, mae'n dressesiai Rosa Park iawn i'ch gweld am y dyfodol yma, wna wedi'u wneud i gyda chi'r insyebu wahanolau morheimlo. Pwysig eich cyfsaith yn y cyf Griffoli a gweithio'n cyflodol eraill yma. Mae'n gweld i'r cyflodol sydd wedi cyffredinol gan ei cyflodol. specificallyashing the right to freedom of conscience where needs and independent justice has done to protect that survivors against the law. But I think that this is very niche concern of freedom of conscience. I think is a good argument that we should be protecting certain sorts of political protest of that form but they don't actually address the question of what freedom of conscience estos was transition or refusal has a hely for a relationship to Freedom of T zeith Age because here the argument is that the individual should not have been exposed to the objectionable duty in the first place if you can earning potential refusal as a right to an exception or right to an exemption what you're doing is proposing a second rate solution to the problem of moral conflict. If we take the classic end-of-life cases in medical law, like abortion law or euthanasia father, there may well be doctors who refuse to participate in an abortion or in an act of euthanasia. There may well be doctors who think that they are, in certain circumstances, obligated to carry out an act of abortion or an act of euthanasia. I don't think freedom of conscience is telling us how to design our general law or an abortion or a law on euthanasia—it doesn't help us, particularly. If we were to think about that at all, we'd probably think about it under the perspective of a right to life. The question of freedom of conscience is this, here we're getting to the meat of the matter, is what conscience-related value ought to inform lawmaking in general, lawmaking, policy formation, administrative decision taking in general? Now, there's a branch of freedom of conscience which is the discussion of civil disobedience and there's a branch of freedom of conscience which is the question of exemptions, individual exemptions from general laws, but I'm trying to get behind that and ask what in general does freedom of conscience require of a legislature? If they are to legislate in a way that respects freedom of conscience, what is it that we are requiring of them? Now, I approach this in my paper in three stages. I think first of a general right to freedom of action. The German constitution protects that. It's very, very broad. It's a right to do or not to do anything you please, subject to constitutional limits. Narrowing down a bit, I don't think freedom of conscience is a right to private judgment. I think the right to private judgment reverses the usual assumption of law, which is that legal obligations are to be followed unless you have good reasons not to. So the right to private judgment is too broad. A right to freedom of conscience, I would suggest, depends on the value of conscientious citizens internalising norms and imposing them on themselves. So in that sense, conscience is essential to the possibility of law. Law depends upon self-imposition and mutual enforcement. And so the conscientious citizen is somebody who internalises the requirements of law and political life and integrates them into her own understanding of moral obligation and ethical standard. Law depends on the majority of us being like that, being conscientious citizens internalising requirements of law. At this point, I want to draw an analogy with the rule of law. So we can think about the rule of law subjectively and objectively. Objectively, the rule of law is about ensuring governance in a certain sort of way, according to rules. Subjectively, it's about a willingness to be governed by rules. Longfellow wrote a lot about this. So we have this objective dimension. Objectively, we need law to take a certain sort of form, general standards, well publicised, et cetera, et cetera. Subjectively, we need to be people who are willing to comply with law. It's the same with freedom of conscience. Subjectively, we have to be people who are able to and capable of integrating legal requirements into our own understanding of moral duty. Objectively, it means the law must be crafted in such a way that we are capable of following it conscientiously. There's an obligation on the law not to become too rigid, too prescriptive, to enforce certain attitudes which conscientious citizens will find burdensome, will find difficult to adhere to. Matthew Harding has written a recent piece in the law quarterly review on equity and the rule of law, and I think I'm making a similar argument in relation to freedom of conscience and equity. So the idea of equity is that we have to have a body of doctrine that softens legal requirements, makes them flexible so that the good citizen can follow conscientiously. The purpose is to enable the conscientious citizen to fulfil their legal duty. I'll unpack this in a bit more detail in a moment. That leads me basically to a three-fold structure of the right to freedom of conscience. At the core of the right to freedom of conscience is a right of conscientious performance, a right to fulfil your legal requirements in a way that you can see complies with all your other normative obligations as well, whether moral or political or whatever. So it's a right to be able to take law seriously as one of several moral resources, the right of conscientious performance. Now, there may be a problem there and we might have to conclude that the law is still justifiable even though some people have a problem with conscientious performance. That then raises the question of exemption. We only get to the question of exemption once we've addressed the question of conscientious performance. Only when there are people who say, I can't conscientiously do this, do we ask the second question, well, should we be making an exemption for them or not? And I think that's a more narrow question. And then when we get to the final level, even if we don't make an exemption, there's a third question which is, should they have a defence if they engage in an act of civil disobedience? Now, in my paper, I talk very much about a broad concept of scope and a broad concept of limits. I take that classic model of rights that you have a question, initial question, of whether you're within the scope of the right and then the question of whether or a limit of that right is justified by reference to proportionality analysis. In the case of the scope, I don't want to say too much here, there's a lot that could be said about the scope of the right of conscientious performance, but particularly thinking about the way in which courts recently have understood belief in the context of non-discrimination or quality law, there are some criteria that the courts are introducing which I think go too far. So, for example, the courts have said that for a belief to count for purposes of non-discrimination law, it has to be, quote, not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available. This derives from that case involving the magistrate who didn't want to place children for adoption, the same-sex couples, and argued that it was detrimental to the welfare of children and was met in response, not with the rebuttal that it isn't detrimental to the welfare of children, but that because that's an allegation of fact, it doesn't constitute a belief and therefore it's not protected. So the very strict belief fact divide, again it's part of this strand in English case law which treats religion as non-rational. You get protection if you're non-rational, you don't get protection if you're trying to be rational and base your allegations on questions of fact. I think that has no place in a right to freedom of conscience. A properly informed conscience is attuned to evidence clearly. So that's a restriction that I think we should ditch. Another one which comes up in Peter's and actually Cecil's paper as well, is whether we should have a threshold criterion of the moral acceptability of your views. Should we knock out certain views because they're so reprehensible or so immoral? And there are some arguments both ways about whether we deal with that problem of morally reprehensible views at the first stage of analysis or the second stage. What I want to do I think might be more helpful in the time is to give an example of what I mean by the right to conscientious performance and how we might think that through in a two stage model of freedom of conscience. And the example I pick is the legal ban, potential legal ban on parents smacking their children. I pick that example because I think it's inconceivable that you could argue for a right of conscientious exemption. Suppose the Scottish government were to ban smacking on children. Could we imagine litigation? Could you imagine arguing for a right to be exempt from that if you have certain beliefs? I can explain later on why I think that's implausible. But I think it does raise a question of freedom of conscience. Because it raises a question of conscientious performance of one's duty as a parent. So as a parent you have a whole host of duties, you have legal duties, you have moral duties, all sorts of sources of normativity. And the question is how do you conscientiously perform your role as a parent? And that's anyone who's a parent faces that question. And clearly a parent who thoughtlessly or out of frustration hits their child is not engaged in conscientious performance and they're not within the scope of the right. But it's easy to imagine a parent who reasons that firstly that chastisement of some form is necessary. It's very hard to bring up children and not use some form of punishment. And of course there are all sorts of different forms that punishment of children can take. One could consider relational deprivation, sending them to their bedroom, shaming, sitting on the naughty step, things like that. And you could imagine a parent arguing that both of those, relational deprivation and shaming, are more hurtful and longer lasting than brief and mild pain. A smack may be exactly the right response if a child is persistently trying to do something that will cause them or others greater and more lasting pain. And these were just examples that sprang to mind as I was writing, sticking their hand in the toaster running into the road poking their little sister in the face with a stick and many other more creative expressions of toddlerhood. So a law which criminalises smacking in all circumstances infringes quite plausibly on the parental right to perform their duties as a parent conscientiously as they see most fit. Now that's not the end of the analysis because we can ask whether the ban is justified. And you could imagine a law pursuing a whole host of different aims seeking simply to abolish all forms of parental chastisement would not, I think, be legitimate. And a bannet smacking wouldn't be capable of achieving that. You couldn't imagine a law being based on mere preference for one form of chastisement over another, say in relation to the legislation of his own children. There has to be some cognisable harm to be avoided. It's hard to construe pain itself as a harm. Indeed, in general, pain is highly beneficial. More plausibly, the harm is injury. So good parents do not injure their children and smacking can lead to injury. But we might think that not all smacking does lead to injury so the question then turns to one of necessity is a ban on smacking the least restrictive way of preventing injury. Perhaps it is and perhaps the clear simple message of never hit your child under any circumstances is the only effective one to prevent injury. But we might then consider other lesser measures such as rules directly criminalising the causing of injury or making unlawful the use of any object in chastisement or banning smacking to certain parts of the body such as the head and so on. The point is that a necessity analysis will have to consider those less restrictive means if it is to justify the law in question. The point there is that we have an example then I think of something which does raise a question of conscientious performance of a particular duty in a way which admits of the classic two-stage analysis by way of calling within the scope of the right and then of the exception. Then in my paper I move on to the question well suppose we do have a law and we accept that it's justified what are the circumstances under which an individual could argue that there is an exception from that law. So to carry on with the example suppose we go through the proportionality analysis and decide that the ban on smacking is the least necessary means to prevent certain forms of harm to children, injury to children then could you argue for a conscientious objection. And I think a lot of the problems in this area are problems of finding an appropriate test of complicity. So we have the case of the individual who argues they don't want to fulfil their legal duty because it makes them complicit in some sort of wrongdoing or what they see to be wrongdoing. And the question is how do we address this problem of complicity. We need to develop I think a test of complicity that could be used in such cases. The resources for thinking through conscientious objection I think there are two resources. One group that are quite often referred to are the historic examples of exemptions in English law. So exemptions from military service, exemptions from inoculation exemptions from being a trade union member those things we can think of the examples in English law exemptions from abortion. There's another body of material we can draw on as well which is the whole issue of votes of conscience. So the vote of conscience materials as a political right of individual MPs is interesting because it derives also from a concern with tender consciences. So the Labour Party in the early 20th century obviously had quite strong non-conformist Christian roots and had to struggle with the question of what is party policy what do Labour MPs have to vote on the party line and what things do we allow them freedom to vote on. And then you see the non-conformist Christian conscience coming through because it was things like Sunday legislation Sunday trading, gambling, prostitution issues like that which were treated as those sort of moral issues that there wouldn't be a party line on. What we can see in both the legal examples and that political resource is this sensitivity towards tender consciences. The idea that there are people who feel that they need to be particularly ethically rigorous or they need to preserve a certain sort of moral purity. And I think we would make progress with questions of conscientious exemption if we identify both the interest that they think they are attacking if they do what the law requires them to do and the question of complicity. So to make out your claim of conscientious exemption you have to show how what you would do if you followed the law somehow undermines an important moral interest and also makes you complicit in the undermining of it. That's why I don't think smacking raises an issue of conscientious objection because the parents who is told not to smack a child would be hard pushed to show that that makes them complicit in immoral behaviour. How does that make you in some sense tainted by wrongdoing if you can't use one mode of chastisement of your child you have to use a different mode of chastisement and say I don't think it quite works. It doesn't get over the threshold. In the paper I tried to give an example of how I would work through this problem of complicity. I think the test of complicity which is derived essentially from criminal law is that a person is complicit if they reasonably believe that their act will encourage or assist another to engage in what they take to be an immoral act and if they reasonably believe that they will engage in that act so you have to reasonably believe that your behaviour will encourage or assist another and you have to believe that when you do that thing they will actually then as a result engage in an immoral act and I use that test of complicity to distinguish between two cases which I'm sure will come up later on today the hoteliers who refuse to let a room to a same-sex couple and the Asher's Bakery case, the same-sex marriage case in Norfolk Island because it seems to me that in the case of the Asher's Bakery case the argument from complicity is quite easy to make out. If you think that promoting same-sex marriages in some sense wrong or immoral or political then of course producing a cake with a slogan that promotes that cause makes you complicit that the argument from complicity is an easy one to follow it's much less clear to me that you are complicit by letting a room out to people there are some interesting problems there as to what exactly the hoteliers thought they were complicit in whether they thought they were complicit in a certain sort of relationship or whether they were complicit in discrete sexual acts now I think that's clear at all it makes quite a lot of difference actually so the analogy would be if a man walks into a hotel with a known prostitute and tries to book a room under what circumstances would the hoteliers be morally complicit in the act of prostitution would they be complicit if they said we will let you have two single rooms but we won't let you have a shared room is it reasonable to believe that would make any difference to the behaviour of the couple remember the test of complicity is you have to reasonably believe it's going to have the effect of promoting immorality one suspects probably not it probably makes no difference at all it's just a minor inconvenience if you have one type of room rather than another so by reflecting on complicity I think we can start making some distinctions between the sorts of case where a claim for conscientious exemption is plausible and the sorts of claim where perhaps it's not and I finished the paper then which thinking about conscientious civil disobedience and the circumstances under which we might tackle the problems of civil disobedience but as I said I think that's very much a separate issue that can be kind of bracketed off and did dealt with as a discreet issue within the field of freedom of conscience now that I'm aware is a whistle-stop tour of the paper and there are all sorts of things in there which I haven't been able to cover and it gives you a sense of the outline of the rights to freedom of conscience that I'm trying to develop thank you very much