 Part 1, Definitions and Axioms of the Ethics by Spinoza. The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza, translated by R. H. M. Elves. Part 1, Definitions and Axioms. Part 1, Concerning God. Definitions. 1. By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent. 2. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature. For instance, a body is called finite, because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body. 3. By substance, I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself. In other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception. 4. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance. 5. By mode, I mean the modifications, footnote, aficionis, and the footnote of substance, or that which exists in and is conceived through something other than itself. 6. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality. 7. Explanation, I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind. For, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be denied, but that which is absolutely infinite contains in its essence whatever expresses reality and involves no negation. 7. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action. 8. By eternity, I mean existence itself, and so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal. 9. Explanation, existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of a thing, and therefore cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end. 1. Everything which exists exists either in itself or in something else. 2. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself. 3. From a given definite cause, an effect necessarily follows, and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect can follow. 4. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause. 5. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other. The conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. 6. A true idea must correspond with its idiot or object. 7. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence. End of Part 1, Definitions and Axioms. Part 1, Propositions 1-5 of the Ethics by Spinoza. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza, translated by R. H. M. Elles. Part 1, Propositions 1-5. Propositions. Proposition 1. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications. Proof. This is clear from definitions 3 and 5. Proposition 2. True substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common. Proof. Also evident from definition 3. For each must exist in itself and be conceived through itself. In other words, the conception of one does not imply the conception of the other. Proposition 3. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other. Proof. If they have nothing in common, it follows that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other, Axiom 5. In there four, one cannot be the cause of the other, Axiom 4. Quad era demonstrandum. Proposition 4. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the substances or by the difference of their modifications. Proof. Everything which exists exists either in itself or in something else, Axiom 1. That is, by definitions 3 and 5, nothing is granted in addition to the understanding except substance and its modifications. Nothing is therefore given besides the understanding by which several things may be distinguished one from the other except the substances or in other words, in other words, see Axiom 4, their attributes and modifications. Quad era demonstrandum. Proposition 5. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute. Proof. If several distinct substances be granted, they must be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of their attributes or by the difference of their modifications. Proposition 4. If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the difference of their modifications, as substance is naturally prior to its modifications, Proposition 1, it follows that setting the modifications aside and considering substance in itself, that is, truly, definitions 3 and 6, there cannot be conceived one substance different from another, that is, by Proposition 4, there cannot be granted several substances but one substance only. Quad era demonstrandum. End of Part 1, Propositions 1-5. Part 1, Propositions 6-10 of the Ethics by Spinoza. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza, translated by R. H. M. Ells. Part 1, Propositions 6-10. Propositions 6. One substance cannot be produced by another substance. Proof. It is impossible that there should be in the universe two substances with an identical attribute, that is, which have anything common to them both. Propositions 2. M, therefore, Propositions 3, one cannot be the cause of the other. Neither can one be produced by the other. Quad era demonstrandum. Corollary. Corollary. Hence, it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything external to itself. For in the universe, nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications, as appears from Axiom 1 in definitions 3 and 5. Now, by the last proposition, substance cannot be produced by another substance. Therefore, it cannot be produced by anything external to itself. Quad era demonstrandum. This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the contradictory. For, if substance be produced by an external cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its cause, Axiom 4. And, by definition 3, it would itself not be substance. Propositions 7. Existence belongs to the nature of substances. Proof. Substance cannot be produced by anything external. Corollary of Propositions 6. It must, therefore, be its own cause. That is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence belongs to its nature. Proposition 8. Every substance is necessarily infinite. Proof. There can only be one substance with an identical attribute, and existence follows from its nature. Propositions 7. Its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or infinite. It does not exist as finite. For, by definition 2, it would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which would also necessarily exist. Propositions 7. And there would be two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd. Propositions 5. It, therefore, exists as infinite. Quad erat demonstrandum. Note 1. As finite existence involves a partial negation, and infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given nature, it follows, solely from Propositions 7, that every substance is necessarily infinite. Note 2. No doubt it will be difficult for those who think about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Propositions 7. For such persons make no distinction between the modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and are ignorant of the manner in which things were produced. Hence, they may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe in natural objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes make complete confusion, think that trees might talk just as well as men, that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed, and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human, readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long as they do not know how passions originate in the mind. But if people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no doubt about the truth of Propositions 7. In fact, this proposition would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism, for by substance would be understood that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself. That is, something of which the conception requires not the conception of anything else, whereas modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the thing in which they exist. Therefore, we may have true ideas of non-existent modifications, for although they may have no actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their essence is so involved in something external to themselves that they may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truth substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in their existence, because they are conceived through themselves. Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and distinct, that is, a true idea of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was false, a little consideration will make this plain, or if anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same as saying that a false idea was true, in short, the height of absurdity. It must then necessarily be admitted that the existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth, and we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning that there is but one such substance. I think that this may profitably be done at once, and in order to proceed regularly with the demonstration, we must promise. 1. The true definition of a thing neither involves nor expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. From this, it follows that. 2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number of individuals in as much as it expresses nothing beyond the nature of the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangle expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle. It does not imply any fixed number of triangles. 3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a cause why it should exist. 4. This cause of existence must either be contained in the nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated apart from such definition. It therefore follows that if a given number of individual things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less. For example, if 20 men exist in the universe, for simplicity's sake I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have had no predecessors, and we want to account for the existence of these 20 men, it will not be enough to show the cause of human existence in general. We must also show why there are exactly 20 men, neither more nor less. For a cause must be assigned for the existence of each individual. Now, this cause cannot be contained in the actual nature of men, for the true definition of men does not involve any consideration of the number 20. Consequently, the cause for the existence of these 20 men, and consequently of each of them, must necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence, we may lay down the absolute rule that everything which may consist of several individuals must have an external cause. And as it has been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of substance, existence must necessarily be included in its definition. And from its definition alone, existence must be deducible. But from its definition as we have shown, notes 2 and 3, we cannot infer the existence of several substances. Therefore, it follows that there is only one substance of the same nature. Quod era demonstrando? Proposition 9. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the number of its attributes. Definition 4. Proposition 10. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself. Truth. The attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence. Definition 4. And therefore must be conceived through itself. Definition 3. Quod era demonstrando? Note, it is thus evident that though two attributes are in fact conceived as distinct, that is, one without the help of the other, yet we cannot therefore conclude that they constitute two entities or two different substances. For it is the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself in as much as all the attributes it has have always existed simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other. But each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is then far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one substance, for nothing in nature is more clear than that each and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity. Consequently, it is abundantly clear that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence. If anyone now asks, by what sign shall he be able to distinguish different substances, let him read the following propositions which show that there is but one substance in the universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign would be sought in vain. End of Part 1, Propositions 6-10. Please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Dr. Wu. The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza. Translated by R. H. M. Elles. Part 1. Propositions 11-15. Proposition 11. God or substance, consisting of infinite attributes of which each expresses eternal and infinite potentiality, necessarily exists. Proof. If this be denied, conceive if possible, that God does not exist. Then his essence does not involve existence. But this, Proposition 7, is absurd. Therefore, God necessarily exists. Another proof. Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason must be assigned, either for its existence or for its non-existence. Exempli gracia. If a triangle exists, a reason or cause must be granted for its existence. If, on the contrary, it does not exist, a cause must also be granted which prevents it from existing, or annulls its existence. This reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be external to it. For instance, the reason for the non-existence of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it would involve a contradiction. On the other hand, the existence of substance follows also solely from its nature, and as much as its nature involves existence. See Proposition 7. But the reason for the existence of a triangle or circle does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the order of universal nature and extension. From the latter it must follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is impossible that it should exist. So much is self-evident. It follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists if no cause or reason be granted which prevents its existence. If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the very nature of God, or be external to him, that is, drawn from another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God, by Proposition 2, and therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy his existence. As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine nature, such cause must perforce if God does not exist, be drawn from God's own nature which would involve a contradiction. To make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect is absurd. Therefore, neither in the nature of God nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be assigned which would annul his existence. Therefore, God necessarily exists. Quad erot demonstrandum. Another proof. The potentiality of non-existence is a negation of power, and, contrary wise, the potentiality of existence is a power, as is obvious. If, then, that which necessarily exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously absurd. Therefore, either nothing exists or else a being absolutely infinite necessarily exists also. Now, we exist either in ourselves or in something else which necessarily exists. See axiom 1 and proposition 7. Therefore, a being absolutely infinite, in other words, God definition 6, necessarily exists. Quad erot demonstrandum. Note, in this last proof, I have purposely shown God's existence a posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily followed, not because from the same premises God's existence does not follow a priori. For as the potentiality of existence is a power, it follows that in proportion as reality increases in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength for existence. Therefore, a being absolutely infinite, such as God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence, and hence he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there will be many who will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from external causes. Of such things they see that those which quickly come to pass, that is, quickly come into existence, quickly also disappear, whereas they regard as more difficult of accomplishment, that is, not so easily brought into existence those things which they conceive as more complicated. However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here show the measure of truth in the proverb, what comes quickly goes quickly, nor discuss whether, from the point of view of universal nature, all things are equally easy or otherwise. I need only remark that I am not here speaking of things which come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of substances which, by Proposition 6, cannot be produced by any external cause. Things which are produced by external causes, whether they consist of many parts or few, oh, whatsoever perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of their external cause, and therefore their existence arises solely from the perfection of their external cause, not from their own. Contrary wise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by substance is due to no external cause, wherefore the existence of substance must arrive solely from its own nature, which is nothing else but its essence. Thus the perfection of a thing does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it. Imperfection, on the other hand, does idolate. Therefore we cannot be more certain of the existence of anything than of the existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect, that is, of God, for inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection and involves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his existence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question is given. This, I think, will be evident to every moderately attentive reader. Proposition 12 No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided. Proof The parts into which substance, as thus conceived, would be divided either will retain the nature of substance or they will not. If the former, then, by Proposition 8, each part will necessarily be infinite and, by Proposition 6, self-caused and, by Proposition 5, will perforce consist of a different attribute so that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one substance which, by Proposition 6, is absurd. Moreover, the parts, by Proposition 2, would have nothing in common with their whole and the whole, by Definition 4 and Proposition 10 could both exist and be conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be absurd. If we adopt the second alternative, namely, that the parts will not retain the nature of substance, then, if the whole substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance and would cease to exist, which, by Proposition 7, is absurd. Proposition 13 Substance, absolutely infinite, is indivisible. Proof If it could be divided, the parts into which it was divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite substance or they would not. If the former, we should have several substances of the same nature, which, by Proposition 5, is absurd. If the latter, then, by Proposition 7, substance, absolutely infinite, could cease to exist, which, by Proposition 11, is also absurd. Corollary It follows that no substance and consequently no extended substance, insofar as it is substance, is divisible. Note, the indivisibility of substance may be more easily understood as follows. The nature of substance can only be conceived as infinite and, by a part of substance, nothing else can be understood than finite substance, which, by Proposition 8, involves a manifest contradiction. Proposition 14 Besides God, no substance can be granted or conceived. Proof As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied, by Definition 6, and he necessarily exists, by Proposition 11, if any substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same attribute would exist, which, by Proposition 5, is absurd. Therefore, besides God, no substance can be granted or consequently be conceived. If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as existent, but this, by the first part of this proof, is absurd. Therefore, besides God, no substance can be granted or conceived. Quad erat demonstrandum. Corollary 1 Clearly therefore, 1 God is one, that is, by Definition 6, only one substance can be granted in the universe, and that substance is absolutely infinite, which we have already indicated in the note to Proposition 10. Corollary 2 It follows, 2, that extension and thought are either attributes of God, or, by Axiom 1, accidents, afexionis, of the attributes of God. Proposition 15 Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be or be conceived. Proof Besides God, no substance is granted or can be conceived by Proposition 14, that is, by Definition 3, nothing which is in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes, by Definition 5, can neither be nor be conceived without substance, wherefor they can only be in the Divine Nature and can only through it be conceived. But substances and modes from the sum total of existence, by Axiom 1, therefore, without God nothing can be or be conceived. Quad erat demonstrandum. Note Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and mind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been said. But these I pass over. For all who have in any wise reflected on the Divine Nature deny that God has a body. Of this they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body a definite quantity so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhile, by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart from the Divine Nature and say it was created by God. Wherefrom the Divine Nature can have been created? They are wholly ignorant. Thus they clearly show that they do not know the meaning of their own words. I myself have proved sufficiently clearly at any rate in my own judgment, corollary. Proposition 6 and Note 2 Proposition 8 that no substance can be produced or created by anything other than itself. Further, I showed in Proposition 14 that besides God, no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God. However, in order to explain more fully I will refute the arguments of my adversaries which all start from the following points. Extended substance insofar as it is substance consists as they think in parts wherefore they deny that it can be infinite or consequently that it can appertain to God. This they illustrate with many examples of which I will take one or two. If extended substance they say is infinite, let it be conceived to be divided into two parts. Each part will then be either finite or infinite. If the former, then infinite substance is composed of two finite parts which is absurd. If the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another infinite which is also absurd. Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths it will consist of an infinite number of such parts. It would equally consist of an infinite number of parts if each part measured only an inch. Therefore, one infinity would be twelve times as great as the other. Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn two diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance apart but are produced to infinity it is certain that the distance between the two lines will be continually increased until at length it changes from definite to indefinable as these absurdities follow it is said from considering quantity as infinite. The conclusion is drawn that extended substance must necessarily be finite and consequently cannot appertain to the nature of God. The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme perfection. God it is said in as much as he is a supremely perfect being cannot be passive but extended substance in so far as it is divisible is passive. It follows therefore that extended substance does not appertain to the essence of God. Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers who by them tried to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature and cannot possibly appertain there too. However, I think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered their propositions for all their arguments are founded on the hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts and such a hypothesis I have shown Proposition 12 and Corollary Proposition 13 to be absurd. Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all these absurdities if absurdities they be which I am not now discussing from which it is sought to extract the conclusion that extended substance is finite do not at all follow from the notion of an infinite quantity but merely from the notion that an infinite quantity is measurable and composed of finite parts. Therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that infinite quantity is not measurable and cannot be composed of finite parts. This is exactly what we have already proved in Proposition 12. Wherefore, the weapon which they aimed at us has in reality recoiled upon themselves. If from this absurdity of theirs they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares and finding himself thereby landed in absurdities proceeds to deny that circles have any center from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. For taking extended substance which can only be conceived as infinite one and indivisible, Propositions 8, 5, 12 they assert in order to prove that it is finite, that it is composed of finite parts and that it can be multiplied and divided. So also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be infinitely divided. Assuredly, it is not less absurd to assert that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts than it would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface of lines, and a line of points. This must be admitted by all who know clear reason to be infallible and most of all by those who deny the possibility of a vacuum. For if extended substance could be so divided that its parts were really separate, why should not one part admit of being destroyed the others remaining joined together as before? And why should all be so fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum? Surely, in the case of things which are really distinct one from the other one can exist without the other and can remain in its original condition as then there does not exist a vacuum in nature of which and on, but all parts are bound to come together to prevent it. It follows from this that the parts cannot really be distinguished and that extended substance in so far as it is substance cannot be divided. If anyone asks me the further question why are we naturally so prone to divide quantity? I answer that quantity is conceived by us in two ways, in the abstract and superficially as we imagine it as substance as we conceive it solely by the intellect. If then we regard quantity as it is represented in our imagination which we often and more easily do we shall find that it is finite, divisible and compounded of parts but if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect and conceive it as substance which it is very difficult to do as I have sufficiently proved find that it is infinite, one and indivisible. This will be plain enough to all who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination especially if it be remembered that matter is everywhere the same that its parts are not distinguishable except in so far as we conceive matter as diversely modified when its parts are distinguished not really but modally. For instance, water in so far as it is water we conceive to be divided and its parts to be separated one from the other but not in so far as it is extended substance from this point of view it is neither separated nor divisible further, water in so far as it is water is produced and corrupted but in so far as it is substance is neither produced nor corrupted. I think I have now answered the second argument it is in fact founded on the same assumption as the first, namely that matter in so far as it is substance is divisible and composed of parts even if it were so I do not know why it should be considered unworthy of the divine nature in as much as besides God by Proposition 14 no substance can be granted wherefrom it could receive its modifications. All things I repeat are in God and all things which come to pass come to pass solely through the laws of the infinite nature of God and follow, as I will shortly show from the necessity of His essence wherefore it can in no wise be said that God is passive in respect to anything other than Himself or that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature even if it be supposed divisible so long as it is granted to be infinite and eternal but enough of this for the present. End of Part 1 Propositions 11-15 Recording by Dr. Wu Part 1 Proposition 16-20 of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Dr. Wu The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. L. Ways Part 1 Proposition 16-20 Proposition 16 From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect. Proof Proposition will be clear to everyone who remembers that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers several properties which rarely necessarily follow therefrom that is, from the actual essence of the thing defined and it infers more properties in proportion as the definition of the thing expresses more reality that is, in proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more reality. Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes by definition 6 of which each expresses infinite essence after its kind it follows that from the necessity of its nature an infinite number of things that is, everything which can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect must necessarily follow Quad Erat Demonstrandum Corollary 1 Hence it follows that God is the efficient cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect Corollary 2 it also follows that God is a cause in himself and not through an accident of his nature Corollary 3 it follows thirdly that God is the absolutely first cause Proposition 17 God acts solely by the laws of his own nature and is not constrained by any one Proof we have just sown in Proposition 16 that solely from the necessity of the divine nature or what is the same thing solely from the laws of his nature an infinite number of things absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways and we proved in Proposition 15 that without God nothing can be nor be conceived but that all things are in God wherefore nothing can exist outside himself whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to act wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature and is not constrained by any one Quad Erat Demonstrandum Corollary 1 it follows 1 that there can be no cause which either extrinsically or intrinsically besides the perfection of his own nature moves God to act Corollary 2 it follows 2 that God is the sole free cause for God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature by Proposition 11 and Proposition 14 Corollary 1 and acts by the sole necessity of his own nature wherefore God is by definition 7 the sole free cause that God Erat Demonstrandum Note Others think that God is a free cause because he can, as they think bring it about that those things which we have said follow from his nature that is, which are in his power should not come to pass or should not be produced by him but this is the same as if they said that God could bring it about that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles or that from a given cause no effect should follow which is absurd Moreover I will show below without the aid of this Proposition that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's nature I know that there are many who think that they can show that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature for they say they know of nothing more perfect than that tribute to God than that which is the highest perfection in ourselves Further although they conceive God as actually supremely intelligent they yet do not believe that he can bring into existence everything which he actually understands for they think that they would thus destroy God's power if they contend God has created everything which is in his intellect he would not be able to create anything more and this they think that he is attached with God's omnipotence therefore they prefer to a set that God is indifferent to all things and that he creates nothing except that which he has decided by some absolute exercise of will to create However I think I have shown sufficiently clearly by Proposition 16 that from God's supreme power or infinite nature an infinite number of things flowed forth in an infinite number of ways or always flow from the same necessity in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for eternity that is its three interior angles are equal to two right angles where for the omnipotence of God has been displayed from all eternity and will for all eternity remain in the same state of activity this manner of treating the question attributes to God and omnipotence in my opinion far more perfect for otherwise we are compelled to confess that God understands an infinite number of createable things which he will never be able to create for if he created all that he understands he would according to this showing exhaust his omnipotence and render himself imperfect where for in order to establish that God is perfect we should be reduced to establishing that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power extends this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd and most repugnant to God's omnipotence further to say a word here concerning the intellect and the will which we attribute to God if intellect and will appertain to the eternal essence of God we must take these words in some significance quite different from those they usually bear for intellect and will which should constitute the essence of God would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human intellect and will in fact would have nothing in common with them but the name there would be about as much correspondence between the two as there is between the dog the heavenly constellation and a dog an animal that barks this I will prove as follows if intellect belongs to the divine nature a cannot be in nature as ours is generally thought to be posterior to or simultaneous with the things understood in as much as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality proposition 16 corollary 1 on the contrary the truth and formal essence of things is as it is because it exists by representation as such in the intellect of God where for the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to constitute God's essence is in reality the cause of things both of their essence and of their existence this seems to have been recognized by those who have asserted that God's intellect, God's will and God's power are one and the same as therefore God's intellect is the sole cause of things namely both of their essence and existence it must necessarily differ from them in respect to its essence and in respect to its existence for a cause differs from a thing it causes precisely in the quality which the latter gains from the former for example a man is the cause of another man's existence but not of his essence for the latter is an eternal truth and therefore the two men may be entirely similar in essence but must be different in existence and hence if the existence of one of them cease the existence of the other will not necessarily cease also but if the essence of one could be destroyed and be made false the essence of the other would be destroyed also where for a thing which is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of a given effect must differ from such effect both in respect to its essence and also in respect to its existence now the intellect of God is the cause both of the essence and the existence of our intellect therefore the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence differs from our intellect both in respect to essence and in respect to existence nor can it in any wise agree therewith save in name as we said before the reasoning would be identical in the case of the will as anyone can easily see Proposition 18 God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things proof all things which are are in God and must be conceived through God by Proposition 15 therefore by Proposition 16 Corollary 1 God is the cause of those things which are in Him is our first point further besides God there can be no substance by Proposition 14 that is nothing in itself external to God this is our second point God therefore is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things Proposition 19 God and all the attributes of God are eternal proof God by definition 6 is substance which by Proposition 11 necessarily exists that is by Proposition 7 existence that pertains to its nature or what is the same thing follows from its definition therefore God is eternal by definition 8 further by the attributes of God we must understand that which by definition 4 expresses the essence of the divine substance in other words that which appertains to the substance that I say should be involved in the attributes of substance now eternity appertains to the nature of substance as I have already shown in Proposition 7 therefore eternity must appertain to each of the attributes and thus all are eternal Quad Erat Demonstrandum Note this proposition is also evident from the manner in which in Proposition 11 I demonstrated the existence of God it is evident I repeat from that proof that the existence of God like his essence is an eternal truth further in Proposition 19 of my principles of the Cartesian philosophy I have proved the eternity of God in another manner which I need not hear repeat Proposition 20 the existence of God and his essence are one in the same proof God by the last proposition and all his attributes are eternal that is by definition 8 each of his attributes expresses existence therefore the same attributes of God which explain his eternal essence explain at the same time his eternal existence in other words that which constitutes God's essence constitutes at the same time his existence wherefore God's existence and God's essence are one in the same Quad Erat Demonstrandum Corollary 1 hence it follows that God's existence like his essence is an eternal truth Corollary 2 secondly it follows that God and all the attributes of God are unchangeable for if they could be changed in respect to existence they must also be able to be changed in respect to essence that is obviously be changed from true to false which is absurd End of Part 1 Propositions 16 to 20 Recording by Dr. Wu Part 1 Propositions 21 to 25 The Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Bill Mosley The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Elwys Part 1 Propositions 21 to 25 Proposition 21 All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite or in other words are eternal and infinite through the said attribute Proof Conceive if it be possible supposing the proposition to be denied that something in some attribute of God can follow from the absolute nature of the said attribute and that at the same time it is finite and has a conditioned existence or duration For instance the idea of God expressed in the attribute Thought Now Thought insofar as it is supposed to be an attribute of God is necessarily by Proposition 11 in its nature infinite but insofar as it possesses the idea of God it is supposed to be finite it cannot however be conceived as finite unless it be limited by Thought by Definition 2 but it is not limited by Thought itself insofar as it has constituted the idea of God for so far it is supposed to be finite therefore it is limited by Thought insofar as it has not constituted the idea of God which nevertheless by Proposition 11 must necessarily exist We have now granted therefore Thought not constituting the idea of God and accordingly the idea of God does not naturally follow from its nature insofar as it is absolute Thought for it is conceived as constituting and also as not constituting the idea of God which is against our Hypothesis wherefore if the idea of God expressed in the attribute Thought or indeed anything else in any attribute of God for we may take any example as the proof is of universal application follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute the said thing must necessarily be infinite which was our first point furthermore a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration for if it can suppose a thing which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute to exist in some attribute of God for instance the idea of God expressed in the attribute Thought and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed or to be about not to exist now Thought being an attribute of God must necessarily exist unchanged by Proposition 11 and Proposition 20 Corollary 2 and beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of God supposing the latter at some time not to have existed or not to be going to exist Thought would perforce have existed without the idea of God which is contrary to our hypothesis for we suppose that Thought being given the idea of God necessarily flowed therefrom therefore the idea of God expressed in Thought or anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of God cannot have a limited duration but through the said attribute is eternal which is our second point Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of anything which in any attribute necessarily follows from God's absolute nature Proposition 22 whatsoever follows from any attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification which exists necessarily and as infinite through the said attribute must also exist necessarily and as infinite Proof The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the preceding one Proposition 23 Every mode which exists both necessarily and as infinite must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God or from an attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily and as infinite Proof A mode exists in something else through which it must be conceived Definition 5 That is Proposition 15 It exists solely in God and solely through God can be conceived If therefore a mode is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite it must necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of God insofar as such attribute is conceived as expressing the infinity and necessity of existence In other words Definition 8 Eternity That is insofar as it is considered absolutely A mode therefore necessarily exists as infinite must follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God Either immediately Proposition 21 or through the means of some modification which follows from the absolute nature of the said attribute That is by Proposition 22 which exists necessarily and as infinite Proposition 24 The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence Proof This proposition is evident from Definition 1 For that of which the nature considered in itself involves existence is self-caused and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature Corollary Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of things coming into existence but also of their continuing in existence That is in Scholastic Phraseology God is cause of the being of things Ascendi Rerum For whether things exist or do not exist whenever we contemplate their essence we see that it involves neither existence nor duration Consequently it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other God must be the sole cause in as much as to him alone does existence appertain Proposition 14 Corollary 1 Erat Demonstrandum Proposition 25 God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things but also of their essence Proof If this be denied then God is not the cause of the essence of things and therefore the essence of things can by axiom 4 be conceived without God This by proposition 15 is observed Therefore God is the cause of the essence of things Corollary Note this proposition follows more clearly from Proposition 16 For it is evident thereby that given the divine nature the essence of things must be inferred from it no less than their existence In a word God must be called the cause of all things in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself This will be made still clearer by the following corollary Corollary Individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner The proof appears from Proposition 15 and Definition 5 End of Part 1 Proposition is 21 to 25 Recording by Bill Mosley Frelsberg, Texas USA Part 1 Propositions 26 to 30 of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer LibriVox.org Recording by I.M. Clifford, the Ethics by Benedict A. Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Elvis Part 1 Propositions 26 to 30 Proposition 26 A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular manner has necessarily been thus conditioned by God, and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to act as proof, that by which things are said to be conditioned to act in a particular manner is necessarily something positive. This is obvious Therefore, both of its essence and of its existence, God by the necessity of His nature is the efficient cause Proposition 25 and 16 This is our first point Our second point is plainly to be inferred therefrom. For if a thing which is not being conditioned by God could condition itself the first part of our proof would be false and this, as we have shown is absurd. Proposition 27 A thing which has been conditioned by God to act in a particular way cannot render itself unconditioned. This proposition is evident from the third axiom. Proposition 28 Every individual thing or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence to act unless a be conditioned for existence acting by a cause other than itself which also is finite and has a conditioned existence and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist or be conditioned to act unless a be conditioned for existence and action by another cause which also is finite and has a conditioned existence and so on to infinity. Proof Whatsoever is conditioned to exist been thus conditioned by God, by Proposition 26 and Proposition 24 corollary. But that which is finite and has a conditioned existence cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God, for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal, by Proposition 21. It must therefore follow from some attribute of God insofar as the set attribute is considered as in some way modified, for substance and modes make up the sum total of existence by axiom 1 and definitions 3 and 5, while modes are merely modifications of the attributes of God, but from God or from any of His attributes insofar as the latter is modified by a modification infinite and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow. Or it must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence inaction by God or one of His attributes, insofar as the latter are modified by some modification which is finite and has a conditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, this cause or this modification, for the reason by which we establish the first part of this proof, must in its turn be conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and again, this last by another, for the same reason, and so on, for the same reason, to infinity. Quadaret Demonstrantum Note, as certain things must be produced immediately by God, namely those things which necessarily follow from His absolute nature, through the means of these primary attributes which nevertheless can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it follows. One, that God is absolutely the proximate cause of those things immediately produced by Him. I say absolutely, not after His kind, as is usually stated, for the effects of God cannot either exist or be conceived without a cause. Proposition 15 and Proposition 24, corollary. Two, that God cannot properly be styled the remote cause of individual things except for the sake of distinguishing these from what He immediately produces, or rather from what follows from His absolute nature. Four, by a remote cause we understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect, but all things which are in God, and so depend on God, that without Him they can neither be nor be conceived. Proposition 29, nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature. Proof whatsoever is in God. Proposition 15, but God cannot be called a thing contingent. For by Proposition 11, He exists necessarily and not contingently. Further, the modes of the divine nature follow therefrom necessarily and not contingently. Proposition 16, and they thus follow whether we consider the divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way conditioned to act. Proposition 27, further, God is not only the cause of these modes insofar as they simply exist by Proposition 24, corollary, but also insofar as they are considered as conditioned for operating in a particular manner. Proposition 26, if they be not conditioned by God, Proposition 26, it is impossible and not contingent that they should condition themselves. If they be conditioned by God, it is impossible and not contingent that they should render themselves unconditioned. Therefore, all things are conditioned by the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing that is contingent. Quadaret, Demonstrando. Note, before going any further, I wish here to explain what we should understand by nature viewed as active, natura, naturans, and nature viewed as passive, natura, naturata. I say to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that, from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear that by nature viewed as active, we should understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance which express eternal and infinite essence. In other words, Proposition 14, Corollary 1, and Proposition 17, Corollary 2, God, insofar as He is considered as a free cause. By nature viewed as passive, I understand all that which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, insofar as they are considered as things which are in God and which without God cannot exist or be conceived. Proposition 30, Intellect, Infunction, Actu, Finite, or Infunction Infinite must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God and nothing else. Proof, a true idea must agree with its object, axiom 6. In other words, obviously, that which is contained in the intellect in representation must necessarily be granted in nature. But in nature, by Proposition 14, Corollary 1, there is no substance saved God, nor any modifications saved those, Proposition 15, which are in God and cannot without God either be or be conceived. Therefore, the intellect in function finite or in function infinite must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God and nothing else. But ere it demonstrando. Part 1, Propositions 31 to 36 of the Ethics by Spinoza. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Bill Mosley. The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza. Translated by R. H. M. L. Wies. Part 1, Propositions 31 to 36. The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, etc., should be referred to passive nature and not to active nature. Proof By the intellect we do not, obviously, mean absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from other modes, such as love, desire, etc., and, therefore, Definition 5, requiring to be conceived through absolute thought. It must, by Proposition 15 and Definition 6, through some attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite Essence of Thought, be so conceived that without such attribute it could neither be nor be conceived. It must, therefore, be referred to nature passive rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of thinking. Quote Erot Demonstrandum. Note I do not hear, by speaking of intellect in function, admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality, but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of understanding than which nothing is more clearly perceived, for we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of the act of understanding. Proposition 32 Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause. Proof Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like intellect. Therefore, by Proposition 28, no volition can exist nor be conditioned to act unless it be conditioned by some cause other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause and so on to infinity. But if will be supposed infinite, it must also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his being substance, absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought, by Proposition 23. Thus, however it be conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by which it should be conditioned to exist and act. Thus, Definition 7, it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or constrained cause. Quad irat demonstrandum. Corollary 1. Hence it follows, first, that God does not act according to freedom of the will. Corollary 2. It follows secondly that will and intellect stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion and rest, an absolutely all-natural phenomena which must be conditioned by God. Proposition 29. To exist and act in a particular manner. For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause by which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner. And although when will or intellect be granted, an infinite number of results may follow, yet God cannot, on that account, be said to act from freedom of the will. Any more than the infinite number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying that motion and rest act by free will. Wherefore will no more appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands in the same relation to Him as motion, rest, and the like, which we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular manner. Proposition 33. Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has, in fact, obtained. Proof. All things necessarily follow from the nature of God. Proposition 16. And by the nature of God are conditioned to exist and act in a particular way. Proposition 29. If things, therefore, could have been of a different nature or have been conditioned to act in a different way so that the order of nature would have been different, God's nature would also have been able to be different from what it now is. And therefore, by Proposition 11, that different nature also would have perforced existed and consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods. This, by Proposition 14, Corollary 1, is absurd. Therefore, things could not have been brought into being by God in any other manner, etc. Vod Iraq demonstrandum. Note 1. As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at noon day, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things contingents, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall attach to the word contingent, but I will first explain the words necessary and impossible. A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or in respect to its cause, for the existence of a thing necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition or from a given efficient cause. For similar reasons, a thing is said to be impossible, namely in as much as its essence or definition involves a contradiction or because no external cause is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect, but a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge. A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or does not involve a contradiction, or of which knowing that it does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes us. Such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or impossible, wherefore we call it contingent or possible. 2. It clearly follows from what we have said that things have been brought into being by God in the highest perfection in as much as they have necessarily followed from a most perfect nature. Nor does this prove any imperfection in God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection. From its contrary proposition, we should clearly gather, as I have just shown, that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to God a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being. I do not doubt that many will scout this idea as absurd and will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very different from that which we, definition 7, have deduced. They assign to him, in short, absolute free will. However I am also convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and do the way in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nougatory, but also as a great impediment to organize knowledge. There is no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Proposition 17, but for the sake of my opponents I will show further that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection that things could not have been by him created other than they are or in a different order. This is easily proved if we reflect on what our opponents themselves concede, namely that it depends solely on the decree and will of God that each thing is what it is. If it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things, further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all eternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would be convicted of imperfection or change. But in eternity there is no such thing as when, before, or after. Hence it follows solely from the perfection of God that God never can decree or never could have decreed anything but what is, that God did not exist before his decrees and would not exist without them. Yet it is said, supposing that God had made a different universe or had ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in God. But persons who say this must admit that God can change his decrees. Or if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature and her order, different from those which he has ordained, in other words, if he had willed and conceived something different concerning nature, he would, perforce, have had a different intellect from that which he has, and also a different will. But if it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a different will without any change in his essence or his perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the decrees which he has made concerning created things, and nevertheless remaining perfect? For his intellect and will concerning things created and their order are the same in respect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived. Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that God's intellect is entirely actual and not at all potential, as they also admit that God's intellect and God's will and God's essence are identical. It follows that if God had had a different actual intellect and a different will, his essence would also have been different, and thus, as I concluded at first, if things had been brought into being by God in a different way from that which has obtained God's intellect and will, that is, as he has admitted, his essence would, perforce, have been different, which is absurd. As these things could not have been brought into being by God in any but the actual way and order which has obtained, and as the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection of God, we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he had understood them. But it will be said there is in things no perfection or imperfection, that which is in them, and which causes them to be called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the will of God. If God had so willed, he might have brought it about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection and vice versa. It is such an assertion, but an open declaration that God, who necessarily understands that which he wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he should understand things differently from the way in which he does understand them. This, as we have just shown, is the height of absurdity. Wherefore I may turn the argument against its employers as follows. All things depend on the power of God. In order that things should be different from what they are, God's will would necessarily have to be different, but God's will cannot be different, as we have just most clearly demonstrated, from God's perfection. Therefore neither can things be different. I confess that the theory which subjects all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth than the theory of those who maintain that God acts in all things with a view of promoting what is good. For these latter persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar, or which he aims at as a definite goal. This is only another name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny. An outer absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of all things, and also of their existence. I need therefore spend no time in refuting such wild theories. PROPOSITION 34 God's power is identical with his essence. PROPHE From the sole necessity of the essence of God it follows that God is the cause of himself, Proposition 11, and of all things, Proposition 16 and Corollaries. Wherefore, the power of God, by which he and all things are and act, is identical with his essence, quad erot demonstrandum. PROPOSITION 35 Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God necessarily exists. PROPHE Whatsoever is in God's power must, by the last proposition, be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists, quad erot demonstrandum. PROPHE There is no cause from whose nature some effect does not follow. PROPHE Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essence in a given conditioned manner, by Proposition 25 and Corollaries. That is, by Proposition 34, Whatsoever exists expresses in a given conditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of all things, and therefore an effect must, by Proposition 16, necessarily follow, quad erot demonstrandum. PROPHE End of Part 1, Propositions 31 to 36. Recording by Bill Mosley, Frelsburg, Texas, U.S.A. Part 1, Appendix of the Ethics by Spinoza. This is LibriVox Recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Ernst Patinama. The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza. Translated by R. H. M. Elvis. Part 1, Appendix. In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of God. I have shown that He necessarily exists, that He is one, that He is and acts solely by the necessity of His own nature, that He is the free cause of all things and how He is so, that all things are in God and so depend on Him, that without Him they could neither exist nor be conceived. Lastly, that all things are predetermined by God, not through His free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. I have further, or occasion afforded, taken care to remove the prejudices which might impede the comprehension of my demonstrations. Yet there still remain misconceptions, not a few, which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worthwhile to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason. All such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act, namely with an end to view. It is accepted as certain that God Himself directs all things to a definite goal, for it is said that God made all things for man, and man that He might worship Him. I will therefore consider this opinion, asking first why it obtains general credence and why all men are naturally so prone to adopt it. Secondly, I will point out its falsity, and lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and confusion, due to an ugliness and the like. However, this is not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of the human mind. It will be sufficient here, if I assume as a starting point, would ought to be universally admitted, namely, that all men are born ignorant of the courses of things, that all have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they are conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows, first, that men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and never even dream in their ignorance of the courses which have disposed them so to wish and desire. Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely for that which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final courses of events, and when these are learned, they are content as having no course for further doubt. If they cannot learn such courses from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them personally to bring about to give an event, and thus they necessarily judge other natures by their own. Further, as they find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist them, not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, etc., they come to look on the whole of nature as means for obtaining such conveniences. Now as they are aware that they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think they have course for believing that some other being has made them for their use. As they look upon things as means, they cannot believe them to be self-created. But judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe and out with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted everything for human use. They are bound to estimate the nature of such rulers, having no information on the subject, in accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that the gods ordain everything for the use of man, in order to bind man to themselves and obtain for him the highest honor. And also it follows that everyone thought out for himself, according to his abilities, a different way of worshiping God, so that God might love him more than his fellows and direct the whole course of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. Thus the prejudice developed into superstition and took deep root in the human mind. And for this reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain the final causes of things. But in their endeavor to show that nature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods and men, are all mad together. Consider, I pray you, the result. Among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, etc. So they declared that such things happen because the gods are angry at some wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in their worship. Experience, day by day protested and showed by infinite examples that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious and impious alike. Still they would not abandon their inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of the reasoning and start afresh. They therefore lay down as an axiom that gods judgements far transcend human understanding. Such a doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished another standard of verity, in considering soly the essence and properties of figures without regard to the final courses. There are other reasons which I need not mention here, besides mathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directed to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge of the truth. I have now sufficiently explained my first point. There is no need to show at length that nature has no particular goal in view, and that final courses are mere human figments. This I think is already evident enough, both from the courses and foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and also from Proposition 16 and the corollary of Proposition 32, and in fact all those propositions in which I have shown that everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with the utmost perfection. However, I will add a few remarks in order to overthrow this doctrine of a final course utterly. That which is really a course it considers as an effect, and vice versa. It makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect. Passing over the questions of course and priority as self-evident, I explain from Propositions 21, 22, 23, that the effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by God. The effect which requires for its production several intermediate courses is, in that respect, more imperfect. But if those things which were made immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his end, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all. Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God. For if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something which he lacks. Certainly theologians and metaphysicians draw a distinction between the object of want and the object of assimilation. Still they confess that God made all things for the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation. They are unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God himself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore driven to admit, as they clearly must, that God lacked those things for whose attainment he created means, and further, that he desired them. We must not omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine, anxious to display the talent in assigning final courses, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their theory, namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to ignorance, thus showing that they have no other method of exhibiting their doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from a roof onto someone's head and kills him, they will demonstrate by the new method that the stone fell in order to kill the man. For if it had not by God's will fallen with that object, how could so many circumstances, and there are often many concurrent circumstances, have all happened together by chance? Perhaps you will answer that the event is due to the fact that the wind was blowing and the man was walking that way. But why, they will insist, was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very time walking that way? If you again answer, that the wind had then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had been invited by a friend, they will again insist. But why was the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time? So they will pursue the questions from cause to cause, till at last you take refuge in the will of God, in other words, the sanctuary of ignorance. So again, when they survey the frame of the human body, they are amazed. And being ignorant of the courses of so great a work of art, conclude that it has been fashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural skill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt another. Hence, anyone who seeks for the true courses of miracles and strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being, and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as an impious heretic by those who the masses adore as the interpreters of nature and the gods. Such persons know that with the removal of ignorance to wonder which forms their only available means for proving and preserving their authority would vanish also. But I now quit the subject and pass on to my third point. After men persuaded themselves that everything which is created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as a chief quality in everything that which is most useful to themselves, and to account those things the best of all which have the most beneficial effect on mankind. Further, they were bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth, cold, beauty, deformity, and so on. And from the belief that they are free agents arose the further notions of praise and blame, sin, and merit. I will speak of these latter hereafter when I treat of human nature. The former I will briefly explain here. Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God, they have called good. Everything which hinders these objects, they have starved bad. And inasmuch as those who do not understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any way but merely imagine them after fashion and mistake their imagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that there is an order in things, being really ignorant both of things and their own nature. When phenomena are of such a kind that the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of imagination and can consequently be easily remembered, we say that they are well ordered. If the contrary, that they are ill ordered or confused. Further, as things which are easily imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to confusion as though there were any order in nature except in relation to our imagination and say that God has created all things in order. Thus, without knowing it, attributing imagination to God unless indeed they would have it that God foresaw human imagination and arranged everything so that it should be most easily imagined. If this be their theory, they would not perhaps be daunted by the fact that we find an infinite number of phenomena far surpassing our imagination and very many others which confound its weakness. But enough has been said on this subject. The other abstract notions are nothing but modes of imagining in which the imagination is differently affected. Though they are concerted by the ignorant has achieved attributes of things in as much as they believed everything was created for the sake of themselves and, according as they are affected by it, started good or bad, healthy or rotten and corrupt. For instance, if the motion which objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health, the objects causing it are styled beautiful. If a contrary motion be excited, they are styled ugly. Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled fragrant or fetid, is through our taste sweet or bitter, full-flavored or insipid, if through our touch hard or soft, rough or smooth, et cetera. Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise, sound or harmony. In this last case, there are men lunatic enough to believe that even God himself takes pleasure in harmony and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded themselves that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to harmony, all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather, mistakes for things to forms of his imagination. We need no longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we have witnessed and, finally, skepticism. For although human bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they differ, so that what seems good to one seems bad to another, what seems well-ordered to one seems confused to another, or displeasing to one displeases another, and so on. I need not further enumerate because this is not the place to treat the subject at length and also because the fact is sufficiently well known. It is commonly said, so many men, so many minds. Everyone is wise in his own way. Brains differ as completely as pallets, all of which proverbs show that men judge of things according to their mental disposition and, rather, imagine than understand. For if they understood phenomena, they would, as mathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I have urged. We have now perceived as all the explanations commonly given of nature are mere modes of imagining and do not indicate the true nature of anything but only the constitution of the imagination. And although they have names, as though they were entities existing externally to the imagination, I call them entities imaginary rather than real. And therefore, all arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily rebutted. Many argue in this way. If all things follow from a necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there so many imperfections in nature? Such, for instance, as things corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil, sin, et cetera. But these reasoners are, as I have said, easily confuted for the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and power. Things are not more or less perfect according as they delight or offend human senses or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to mankind. The those who ask why God did not so create all men that they should be governed only by reason, I gave no answer but this, because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest or most strictly because the laws of his nature are so vast as to suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Proposition 16. Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note. If there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection. End of Part One, Appendix. End of Part One, Recording by Ernst Patinama.