 Good afternoon everybody. You're most welcome to this webinar from the IIA this afternoon. I have to say that we have had many hundreds of webinars and meetings in the IIA, particularly webinars over the past two years. But I don't think any of us could have imagined that we would be having a webinar on the war in Ukraine. And it's the end of the long piece in Europe, which is the title of today's talk. Even as latest two or three months ago, this would have been unthinkable. But we are here today and we're very grateful to be joined by three speakers who will talk to us and inform us from the basis of their considerable knowledge on the topic. The speakers are Judy Dempsey, Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe, Ben Toner, Professor of International Relations at the UCD School of Politics and International Relations, and Professor Donico Biakon, Professor of Politics at the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is the largest combined arms operation to take place in Europe since the Second World War, and a watershed moment in modern European history. It prompts questions which we will look at today, whether Europe is exiting the long piece and entering a more turbulent epoch. The conflict has led EU member states such as Germany to review national positions on defence, and also member states who traditionally non-aligned states are evaluating their own starters in the new geopolitical landscape. All of this we will investigate in the next hour or so. Just some of the administrative details for the talk. You'll be able to join the discussion of Q&A function on Zoom, which you should see on your screen, and please feel free to put your questions in the course of the session as they occur to you. And we will come to them once our speakers have finished our presentation. I'm sure that both the Q&A and the presentations are on the record, and also of course as usual, please feel free to join the discussion on Twitter using the handle at IEA. Let me now formally introduce our speakers in the order of which they will deliver their address, which is going from the wider scope of the Russia and the former Soviet Union, to the EU in Germany in particular with Judy, and then we'll talk about Europe, EU and Ireland. I have seen these here that if I were to go into them properly, it would take a good 20 minutes. So I will have to have to give a shorter version, but believe me, there is a lot more. Professor Donico Biakon is Professor of Politics as I mentioned in the School of Law and Government, and where he lectures on post-Soviet politics, unrecognised states, Irish studies and foreign policy. And he's conducted research in all 15 former Soviet republics and lectured as a visiting professor, including Georgia, Russia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. And he has also been principal investigator of two EU funded projects focusing on post-Soviet space, collectively valued at 7.5 million, and he has been awarded many accolades champion of European research and a number of other accolades. And his books relate to the colour revolutions in the post-Soviet region, and a number of other publications. Judy Dempsey, who is no stranger to the IIEA, and we're always so pleased to see you back, Judy, has a huge experience in this area. She's a non-resident fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor-in-chief of the Strategic Europe blog, which has a huge number of followers, I know. She's author of the book of The Merkel Phenomenon, and she worked for the International Herald Tribune from 2014-11 as its Germany and East Europe correspondent, and as columnist later. She was diplomatic correspondent of the Financial Times in Brussels from 2001, onward covering NATO and European Union enlargement. And she served as Jerusalem bureau chief and European correspondent in London, East European correspondent in London for the Financial Times. She has contributed to several books on Eastern Europe, including developments in Central and Eastern Europe. And Ben, of course, is also very well known to the Institute and a great contributor to the work of the Institute through security and defence discussions in the Institute. The Institute is a full professor of international relations at the UCD School of Politics and International Relations. And at UCD, he teaches, researches and published in European foreign security and defence policy, Irish foreign security and defence policy and international relations theory. He is a member of the Royal Irish Academy and has served at the Chair of the Academy Standing Committee on International Relations. He's a distinguished fellow at the Asia Forum, a Dublin based think tank on security, defence and cyber defence, where it has really come to the fore. He previously worked in the Department of International Politics in the University of Wales, the University of Dublin, and the Centre for Strategic and International Relations in Studies in Washington. We are very welcome, again, as are all our speakers. We will start off then without further ado, so if I could introduce Professor Danika Bjakon to give us the benefit of your considerable experience of the area which is under such undergoing such violence at the moment. Danika, the floor is yours. Thank you very and thank you to the organisers for putting together this event. It's very hard to talk about Ukraine at this time. It's a very fluid situation and it's to be frank, emotionally exhausting to think about it, to talk about it. Like many of you, I'm still in a state of shock trying to digest the enormity and brutality of what has happened during these last few weeks in Ukraine. I first started living in the former Soviet Union more than two decades ago now and have been researching and visiting Ukraine during that time and never in my darkest nightmares did I suspect the calamity that awaited people there. In fact, actually, Ben Tanra and I only six weeks ago both jointly addressed the Iraqis Committee on European Union Affairs and we went through many different scenarios, but again, we didn't anticipate such barbarity being inflicted upon the people of Ukraine in such a short space of time. Given that I'm the first speaker, I thought I'd use my seven minutes or so to outline the basics and hopefully set the context for what will hopefully be a very fruitful discussion. And that is essentially to focus on what this war is about and what it's not about and to give you I guess a spoiler alert most of what it's not about is what the Kremlin says it is. To start with what it's not about. It's not about liberation. Ukraine is a sovereign democracy. This is about occupation. It's about subordination. It's not about genocide of Russians in Ukraine. We are now witnessing as you know the mass murder of Ukrainians by the Kremlin. It's not about protecting Russian speakers, the vast majority of whom are hostile to the Kremlin's intervention. It's not about Nazism and denazification. As you know, Vladimir Zelensky, the president of Ukraine is Jewish. In fact, when he was elected in 2019, the Prime Minister of Ukraine was also Jewish. It was in fact the only country outside of Israel that had a Jewish Prime Minister and a Jewish president. There was a 450 seat parliament and not a single member was elected under the party list system for a far right party. Whereas Vladimir Putin, of course, by contrast, has been supporting within the European Union far right movements for many years. It's not about ensuring that Ukraine is neutral or demilitarized. As many of your listeners will be aware, in 1994, Ukraine had nuclear weapons, which it voluntarily gave up as part of this Budapest memorandum. It had the third largest arsenal actually in the world, which it inherited from the Soviet stockpile, and it gave those nuclear weapons up in return for security guarantees from the Russian Federation, from the United States and the United Kingdom. And indeed, it was militarily nonaligned and demilitarized more or less when in 2014 its territory was invaded and occupied. So being neutral, being militarily nonaligned, being demilitarized, has not saved Ukraine from invasion and occupation. And it's a complete canard to suggest that this is what is behind the current Russian invasion of Ukraine. It's not about NATO moving eastwards, which is, of course, a large again part of the Kremlin narrative. This is about countries in the region and central and eastern Europe moving westwards. Countries which are sovereign democratic governments making a choice. The EU and NATO acquires new members by invitation, whereas we know the Kremlin expands by invasion, as is happening now. It's not about a Western puppet government as it's portrayed in Moscow, you know, trying to force a reluctant population to join NATO or the EU. In fact, because of Kremlin aggression, Ukrainians have become ever more convinced of the necessity of joining these organizations. And that's something that I myself noticed over many years, the shift towards joining NATO and EU as a result of Kremlin aggression in Ukraine. And this is not about Ukraine being a threat to Russia, but it is about Russia being a threat to Ukraine. So what is this war about? It's about destroying a country, Ukraine, and dominating what remains of it. It's about destroying a people. Putin, of course, is on record in his writings and in his public pronouncements as saying that Ukrainians essentially don't exist, that they're the same people as Russians. That Ukraine is somehow populated by some kind of political Frankenstein, which is stitched together during Soviet times and sustained by its adversaries. This conflict is about empire. It's about making Russia great again. And that greatness is depending upon the subordination of Russia's neighbors. In that sense, the Kremlin doesn't recognize international borders. It has blurred margins. This war is about regime change. It's about replacing a democratically elected government with a pliant puppet. It's essentially the Kremlin trying to make the neighborhood in its own image. Through supporting Kin states, we saw, for example, how Russia rushed to the aid of the dictatorship in Kazakhstan only two months ago when it was under threat from its own people, establishing rival institutions based largely on dictatorships to rival the EU and NATO, such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. In fact, I only saw yesterday that there was presidential elections in Turkmenistan, which is a hereditary dictatorship, where power is now being passed from a dictator to his son. And the Russian media reported that there were no violations in that election, whereas we're supposed to believe that Turkmenistan is a democracy, Ukraine is not. And this is again about creating a world which is made up of the Kremlin and Kindred state. So this is fundamentally about dictatorship versus democracy, which is why it's not just Ukraine's war. It's our struggle as well as members of the European Union, as Democrats, as anti-imperialists. Dictatorships, when they go to war, it's somewhat different than when democracies go to war. Democracies have gone to war and lost. The regimes usually survive because they have a degree of democratic legitimacy domestically. Dictatorships, because they rely on the monopoly of coercive force, they risk everything when they go to war. And this is one of the reasons why, when we look at what's happening now in Ukraine, we risk seeing ever greater depths of deep property, as Putin has wagered everything on a military victory in Ukraine. And he knows that his regime and indeed perhaps his life depends on winning. Now, while NATO is in the spotlight, it's obvious that Vladimir Putin is equally obsessed with Ukraine's prospective EU membership. Indeed, EU membership is arguably a bigger threat as it brings the prospect of a prosperous and peaceful Ukraine that would be a beacon for Russians. And in fact, it shouldn't be forgotten that it was Ukraine's efforts to get closer to the European Union, not NATO, which in 2013 triggered part one of this two-part tragedy, which we're seeing playing out at the moment. And I might conclude by saying that this is the latest chapter in what is a rather long story. As a historian, I tend to take the long view of things. And the Kremlin, as you know, quashed the Hungarians in 1956, the Czechs and the Slovaks in 1968 when they tried to reform. The Poles, of course, were suppressed throughout the 1980s. All these nations are now in the European Union and NATO. 14 of NATO's 30 members have joined since the end of the Cold War. 16 of the European Union's 27 members have joined during the same period. And this is because it was their choice as sovereign democracies to escape the abuse of cycle of history imposed upon them by the Kremlin. And this is Ukraine's choice today as well. This is why we have this murderous war against the Ukrainian people. And this is why we must try to do as much as we can to help the people of Ukraine in their hour of need. So I'll conclude on that note and thank you again, the organizers for putting together this event. I look forward to hearing the other contributions and receiving questions from the audience. Thank you very much indeed, Donika. That's a very comprehensive and full of insight view on the reasoning behind the Russian attack and a very good background. So thank you now. May I turn to Judy? Judy, you're very welcome. You are in Berlin, which of course is hugely affected both from a foreign policy, military policy and refugee situation with regard to this conflict. So the floor is yours, Judy. Put on my timer. Thank you very much, Marie, for your kind words. Thank you, everybody from the IEA and especially the technical staff and all the people who put this program together. And I have to congratulate Donika for a super, a super lecture in such a short space of time. Thank you. So I'm going to really look at Germany and the huge implications for Europe for the transatlantic relationship for Eastern Europe and Russia. And one brief introduction, which I think has to be said about German foreign policy. All of foreign policy over the years has been reactive. German foreign policy over the years has tend to be sitting on the fence, not quite taking a very clear view with Eastern European neighbors, meaning the countries that Donika was talking about about Georgia, about Ukraine, about Belarus, about Armenia, about Azerbaijan, about Kazakhstan. In many ways, the German political elite and the establishment, for many reasons, looked at this region to the prism of Russia. And any policies by any long term strategy towards the region was actually how would Russia react or, well, our priority in any cases Russia. And this very special relationship with Russia, partly it's because the Second World War, partly because it's very, very long historic relationship, but essentially it goes down to the deep seated belief started in the late 1960s and 1970s in that if we reach out to Russia, this is the West Germany, if we reach out to the former Soviet Union, we will slowly, slowly and make it closer to Europe, but above all what the German establishment wanted was predictability and stability. This is when they built a huge gas pipeline. The first one between West Germany and the Soviet Union. The Americans were not happy about this. This was with Germany going as alone on its energy policy on its political policy on its economic and trade policy with Russia. We now of course are paying the price because of the Nord Stream pipeline. And this, this idea of, of change to trade or change through coming together and persisted even during the Merkel era. And although Merkel was very skeptical about Putin and his promises and he broke up his, his promises to Merkel in 2014 when she asked him directly are you going to invade Ukraine, Crimea, Ukraine. So that was the end of it but nevertheless, Merkel stuck to this view of not wanting to absolutely antagonize Russia even though she did leave the EU to impose the sanctions after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Eastern Ukraine, but she never broke up off Nord Stream too. And in some ways, Merkel did see Eastern Europe also to that traditional view to the Prism of Russia. And so, after a long time in power, Merkel gave up and she was succeeded by the Social Democrat, Olaf Scholz. And he took over in early December, and he really didn't say anything. We didn't know where he stood on so many things. Some say, oh, well, you know, a government takes a while. He's been in the Ministry, the Finance Ministry for years anyway, he's no, he's no, he's no novice. And then he went off to Moscow after Macron, and he was subjected to this long, long table. The reason is that, like Macron, he refused to get tested by a Russian doctor for COVID, he didn't want his DNA to be locked away in the Kremlin. Anyway, he got the long table treatment. And I think that visit changed him. He went to Berlin. And a few days later, from the 30th to the Sunday, he held nonstop meetings with the various Ministers, with the Finance Minister, with the Foreign Minister, with the three-part coalition. And that Sunday, he's the special meeting of the Bundestag called because of the Russian attack on Ukraine. He came up, gave a 35-minute speech, and threw away the German rulebook, threw away the old German belief in diplomacy, threw away the old belief that we can do business with Russia. And he actually created a new German policy, a zeitwende, a change of the time. And basically, he just threw 200 billion euros at the army to get, you know, basically like German underwear now that are up in Baltic states because they are so underfunded and so badly managed. He actually increased the defense spending to meet the NATO targets, 2% of GDP, that's about 100 billion euros. Three, he reinforced the transatlantic relationship big time. And therefore, he actually did marginalize, radically, the anti-American, the pacifist, and the pro, never underestimated the deep pro-Russian lobby inside the Social Democratic Party. And above all, he ended this special relationship with Russia. If he sticks to this, and it's very difficult to see him going back since he, since he committed to this financially and politically, the implications are huge. First of all, after already stopping Nord Stream 2 under pressure from the US administration, this is going to be a sea change in European and East European politics. The war changes everything. And the war, because of the war and Russia's war against Ukraine, is just fundamentally changed Germany's relationship with Russia. Putin has actually destroyed his closest European friend and country inside the European Union. It's an astonishing, astonishing strategic long-term mistake and there will be no going back to it. This is the first thing. Secondly, because of this, Germany will take its Eastern European neighbors much more seriously. They will be heavily involved when all this terrible tragedies over in rebuilding Ukraine and taking a very different view of how to deal politically with the civil society, with the whole idea of economic recovery in these countries. It's, it's a debate which we can have later in Germany for the moment is on board that a lot of these countries, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, they have put their hats in the ring for joining for joining the EU. And we'll have to see how this debate goes. The other point is that in Germany's position is going to rapidly improve its relations within the EU, especially with the central European countries. They were highly skeptical, even angry that Germany held onto Nord Stream because they believe that the old suspicions, the old belief that Germany was doing a deal behind their backs and it wasn't any idea about solidarity or European diversification of energy. And so we have now a new Germany, a chancellor that is has broken away the old links and the chancellor that actually wants to use this change to try to redefine the transatlantic relationship, because America is not going to stay in Europe. And also redefine what role Germany can now play as a series committed partner inside the European Union. And we have, it's going to be an astonishing period. It already is, but so much now will will will depend on how this awful war will end. Thank you. Thank you very much indeed Judy that's that's tremendously important for us to get an insight into what was I think for all of us and an astonishing vendor or turn about in German policy, particularly from a chancellor that one hadn't expected such a huge foreign policy change and and as you said the implications are huge for for Germany obviously for Europe, and including for Ireland. I'll turn now to Ben. Ben, how do you assess what's happening for Europe for Ireland and your views as a foreign policy expert in this incredible these incredible events that have hit us so suddenly. Thanks, Marian. Thanks to the team at the WIA. First, I've got two reflections and three substantive points. First two reflections on the title of today's seminar. Is this the end of the long piece in Europe. My obvious reflection is what long piece, Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Georgia, Crimea, Libya, Syria, Baldova, Chechnya, Caucasus. Europe has been engaged in wars for some time now. I believe the long piece has been long foretold Europe didn't listen, didn't hear it, or perhaps chose to dilute itself. In particular we owe sincere and abject apologies to colleagues in the Baltics, and in Poland, and elsewhere in Central East Europe who warned us of this who told us that this was dominant thinking in Russia. In any event, this is the largest scale and most egregious signal that that long piece whatever it was is no more. The second reflection is that this goes well beyond Europe. This is a full frontal assault from a nuclear armed state on the post war settlement, not the Cold War settlement, which Putin is on record as regretting for the settlement after the Second World War. This is an assault on the UN system, international law, and the norms that we have drawn unto ourselves to shield us from the worst successes of international anarchy. I believe that China and the rest of the world draw from this conflict, and its ultimate resolution will define the coming era. My three substantive points relate to narrative on Europe's response and Ireland's choices. In terms of narrative, I think we're at a very very dangerous inflection point. Thus far, thus far Russia has been unsuccessful in framing this as a West versus the rest conflict. This is not about the West with its obvious colonial ideological and cultural baggage. This is about defending deep principles and practice of international law governance and norms that restrain the tides of rampant violence and the logic of war. At the same time, those defending that rule of law must first be careful in their framing of a conflict, because many outside Europe do see double standards at play here. This is one of the most effective responses in terms of Europe's response to this conflict. Bobby McDonough, who I think is is is somewhere on the on the on the on the call here wrote a wonderful book talking about EU summit and EU treaty change, in which he said some of the sounds that you never hear coming out of Brussels are Rubicon's being crossed decisive steps and knocking heads together. This truly has changed. Europe has turned on a dime. What Judy says in respect of Germany's response and vote fast applies to this European Union of ours. Everything appears to be now on the table. There is tremendous momentum here. And this may be, and others are writing on this already this may be the third of our Hamiltonian moments in the European Union, alongside the financial crisis, the pandemic, and now war. I think, in terms of this response. Another thing I would say is is we are extraordinarily lucky that we have the US president that we have where Europe to be facing this crisis in the hands of Donald Trump, or any of his many doppelgangers on the US right Europe would be tragically dangerously and critically exposed. There are several elections in about 30 months time in the United States. So therefore whatever Europe's response is must be reflective of the fact that Europe may have to stand alone at that point. My final substitute point is in terms of the outcome. There are multiple scenarios we face occupation and a bitter counterinsurgency war ceasefire and standoff. Potentially even the implosion of the Russian Federation. And predicting that is way above my pay grade. All I can say all I will say is that Ireland has choices to make here. The old sureties, the old assumptions no longer apply anymore in Ukraine, then in Germany, then in the Baltic States, then they do here. We have to seriously sit down and revisit the chivalrous and the myth that we have told ourselves to address our place in Europe and make fundamental decisions and I am. I am entirely agnostic on which way those decisions go, but there are costs and consequences for each. And we need to talk about them. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ben. That's a very good outline of of the choices and and and the possibilities and what we need to do, as well as the European Union, and your comments on the EU, the Hamiltonian moment are very relevant. I have needless to say several questions I have one first, I think probably for Donica, and then another one for both Judy and Ben. I have a question from Francis Jacobs, what is the, what is the situation in Belarus at the moment. Lukashenko is backing Putin in his invasion and providing a base for attack. Is he completely on side with with Russia, and also what is the situation with regard to the other former former Soviet republics. They've been quiet Kazakhstan as you say, oh, Putin for the his help in the presidential election, but just a short overview of the other the stands and the other post Soviet republics at the moment and particularly Belarus which of course is such a close neighbor. Thank you Francis for for those questions. I was in touch with friends of mine from Belarus during the last couple of days. So I have a rather accurate picture I think from from the ground. Many are leaving Belarus, particularly those working in companies that do trade with the European Union and the United States because of the sanctions which affect Belarus as much as they affect Russia. In particular, actually there's quite an exodus to Georgia. And there's a lot of fear. I remember during my own interviews in Belarus over many years one thing that struck me when I was talking to students was the fear of what would happen if they were engaged in a protest and because all the presidents of the universities are usually nominated. Actually they're not called president in Belarus because the president of Belarus doesn't like the term president being used by anybody else. So they tend to be called different things, but they're appointed by the presidential administration and they it's their job to make sure that students stay in line. And what happens is if somebody is arrested, they, they then are expelled from the university and then of course they're sent into the army as conscripts. So it's a very rapid transition from studying for your, for your, you know, modules and and ending up being on the front line in Ukraine. That instills a lot of fear in young people. So this is to paraphrase one, one known person. This is not really the will of the people we're seeing in Belarus. It's the fear of the people. There's been an absolute crackdown on dissent in Belarus. And as I said, people are, are leaving and, and Lukashenko is no longer able to now navigate as he tried to do over the years between the EU and and Putin. Of course, he already had a special relationship with Putin, the so-called gas for kisses. But now he's his fate is completely tied with Putin. He, he, he, you know, stands or falls with Putin. He's now wagered everything along with Putin on this working out. And therefore I think his position is quite vulnerable and, and is uncertain. And there's no obvious exit strategy for him. In terms of Kazakhstan and, and the stands generally, I mean, I lived in, in Central Asia for half a dozen years. So it's, it's definitely an old bailiwick of mine. And they are having a huge, I mean, the fact that the ruble has collapsed is having a huge impact in Central Asia, where of course so many migrants have have are working in Russia into Kazakhstan, for example, about one in seven of the population are migrant workers in Russia. So that has a huge impact on remittances. It, it's, it means, of course, that trade between the two countries is really diminished. But in terms of what happened in Kazakhstan two months ago, as you know, the Russian, the Kremlin sent troops to shore up the dictatorship in Kazakhstan. And during this war, it has been looking for, you know, that favor to be repaid. And what's interesting is the Kazakhstan government has not been eager to repay it in any, in any way at all, either by, you know, recognizing the, the so-called politics of Lohansk and Donetsk or by military support. And it demonstrates that, you know, they're keeping a very open mind about how this will pan out. Russia is isolated in an unprecedented way. And as I said, it's having a negative impact on Central Asia. And also they're not eager to align themselves. And that was also evident, by the way, during the General Assembly vote in the United Nations, where Russia could only get the support of Syria, Belarus and Eritrea, the rest of the world didn't vote with Russia. And that included all the Central Asian republics and indeed places like Armenia, which is also in recent times very dependent on Russia because of its role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Thank you very much, Danika. That's extremely interesting because we haven't had much information about the other former Soviet republics, so the UN assembly, General Assembly resolution was very revealing, which followed on from the unsuccessful and unsatisfactory Security Council resolution on the same. Judy, I have a question that's specifically addressed to you with greetings from the British Ambassador in Ireland, Paul, UK Ambassador in Ireland Paul Johnston. It's nice to see you again, and indeed we all say that. How do you see the spectrum of EU member state views on strategic autonomy evolving in the wake of the invasion, particularly perhaps in terms of Berlin's shift and implications for the Franco-German dynamic. And I also have another question on France, but we'll see if we can get to that. I'd be very brief. Nice to see you, Paul. I remember your days in NATO. Okay, I think we have to call a spade and spade and at the moment the idea of strategic autonomy is over. As Ben said, if he had Trump in the White House, it would have been a complete disaster. And actually, Trump was the reason for all this talk about Europe having strategic autonomy. It was a very woolly concept. It was pushed by France in the beginning. Essentially, it was about eventually Europe going its own main defense security and intelligence. Well, it's not going to happen. It's not going to happen because more than ever now, the West and this will include Canada, perhaps Australia as well, Japan, South Korea. I mean, they're all on on board for the sanctions, but essentially the transatlantic relationship in NATO has actually become much stronger. And I dare, I dare to use the word nimble, but it's been quick to relocate to move forces to deploy to the Baltic States into Romania. France is on board. And this is this is actually very important. The second point about strategic autonomy is never welcomed by Poland. It was never welcomed by the Baltic States or some of the Central Europeans, because the idea of strategic autonomy was a fear by these countries that it would weaken NATO that would become a competition to NATO that would actually slowly weaken the role that that America played in Europe. And above all, the idea of strategic autonomy boils down, not just to defense capabilities and interoperability, it boils down to the fact of trust. And frankly, the 27 member states when it comes to security, foreign policy and defense do not trust each other. And this, this war has actually created a European trust in the United States for how long this will last. I'm not quite sure, but it's certainly put strategic autonomy on the back on the back burner. However, Germany will certainly take the lead in actually shaping the future defense capabilities and leadership and command structures to actually depend on the United States. Thank you, Judy. I was going to move on to Ben to see if how you would reach the European movements and the Versailles Declaration and the attempt to be must more muscular in terms of European defense within the European Union and allied with NATO Ben. Right, just just really quickly, Judy, I don't disagree with the thing you said in terms of where strategic autonomy sets. The only thing I'd say in response is strategic autonomy reminds me a lot of what partnership for peace was designed to do. Partnership for peace was designed as a two for one deal. It would provide for people coming closer and joining NATO, but it also provided for Russia to come in, aligned with NATO and to solve a security problem. In terms of strategic autonomy in my mind has that same ambivalence. And I do think that it's relevance. It could potentially be huge in 30 months time, because Europe does need to strengthen the alliance it does need to work, but we do have those elections to face. And if it goes in particular direction United States Europe could again stand alone in which case strategic autonomy comes racing back from center in terms of Europe's capacity. Mary, your question on on European security architecture. I mean, for me, that boat sailed six months ago. I mean, I think Putin and his and his regime have given up on that they make demands now in terms of a change European security architecture which is utterly, utterly untenable, and isn't an architecture of collective securities architecture of empire and dominance as Donica was was talking about. So I think we can talk about a new European security architecture but only after Putin there's there's no conversation to be had with Putin about security architectures. Thanks very much Ben. I have a question from somebody who has a very deep interest in the conflict it's from to raise Healy who is the Irish ambassador to Ukraine. And she said how did the speakers assess the evolving policies of countries such as Turkey and China towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine. If I could have a quick comment from each of you. From your perspective, Russia, the Turkey and China. How did you like to start off. So the influence of Russia, Turkey and China. Sorry, how do, how do the speakers assess the evolving policies of countries such as Turkey and China towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Aha, okay. Well, Turkey is a very interesting one because Turkey and Russia, I think you could describe as frenemies in a way they have in various times when it comes to for example resisting the European Union and indeed the United States at times are more or less they have a convenience of interest and then at other times Turkey is resentful of Russia's role in what it sees as its its own near abroad. So for example, it was very resentful of Russia's intervention in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, where it more or less came to the rescue of Armenian forces. It was very resentful of the way Russia intervened in Kazakhstan, which again, Central Asia would be seen as a sphere of influence for Turkey. And it quite, it's been quite open in its support for Ukraine in this conflict in supplying humanitarian measures, not only humanitarian assistance, but also drones for the Ukrainian armed forces. It's actually been, you might say, ahead of the curve in supporting Ukraine. And that is noteworthy, certainly, because as I said, they have at times also had a cooperative relationship, even if it's one based on sometimes mutual suspicion, Erdogan and Putin. And of course, China is of course also very interesting. I think many of us would have said that China was looking at this with interest and not, it was not dispassionate about the outcome because of course it has its own historical territories, or at least how it perceives Taiwan, which is also a democracy, which China believes should be returned to the fold. So I think that how Russia, how the responses, the collective response to Russia has a bearing on China's own ambitions in the region. But China, as you know, didn't vote, it abstained rather in the UN Security Council on the issue, didn't vote with Russia. So I think it's been trying to sit on the fence on this one to neither antagonize Russia and Jordan, but not to antagonize the West. In that sense, it's a little bit different, of course, from Turkey, as I said, who have come out rather strongly in favor of Ukraine. Thank you very much. Thanks, Donica. Two interesting countries and in particular, of course, China has a huge role and we watch where events will take there, particularly with the suggestion that Russia has, in fact, I suppose one could say shown weakness by asking China for for assistance. I don't know if either Judy or Ben would like to comment on that we have quite a few other questions but I'd be very brief. I'd be very brief on China. China has done Putin an enormous favor by actually saying no to further to further NATO enlargement. This is was an enormous signal and present for Putin. And in return, China got long guarantees of energy, which it really needs. This is the first point. China is so anti NATO at the moment, and I was speaking with a very top intelligence person over the weekend, Chinese who's unbelievably well connected and he didn't mince his words about China's role, how it sees the West, how Putin is right, mocked Ukraine, although they did abstain at the UN Security Council General Assembly, but China is bidding its time. And it may mediate. But then what does this say about the role of the United States and Europe. Can you mediate and deal with European future security architecture with China mediating itself. So it's, it's, it's a very complicated question. China's real long term strategy, but one thing is sure that the closer Russia gets to China, the less influence Russia will actually have. Thank you, Judy. Ben, I don't know if you have any comment on that. But could I just follow up with you Ben with the question from no door who's the former ambassador to the UK and to the United Nations. Because Noel was on the Security Council when Ireland was on the United Nations previously. And he is looking forward five years from the dreadful situation, where by then Putin may have gone either in large part through failure in Ukraine, or, and he is looking towards a new comprehensive security settlement for Europe updating Helsinki 1975 and Istanbul 1999. Could I, could we envisage that, and how soon might that happen. And I have a question also from Derek Fitzgerald is, what would solution look like at this stage, what would some kind of end solution for this war look like, or are we looking at a very long drawn out conflict. And bless us all I think I think both both questions aimed on what happens in Moscow, how this war plays out house received by the by the Russian population Russian elites, whether moves are made to disempower or get rid of Putin entirely in which all options, you know, are on the table in terms of a resolution and new kinds of security structures. Okay, in terms of the immediate resolution. I mean my, my own pessimism leads me to suggest that we're looking at an effective crippling of the Ukrainian state and attempted subdivision in the Caribbean state the occupation of a large portion of the Ukrainian state, and based on the evidence we've seen today, a long drawn out bitter and brutal counterinsurgency conflict in Europe in the heart of Europe and involving 10s and hundreds of thousands. That's a very sobering and negative assessment. I have a question about French foreign policy it's from Marie loose. Professor of law at UCD. What about France, Marie Lou Lou says, she's very surprised foreign policy of the country with the First Army in the EU and nuclear dissuasion is barely mentioned. The country and its president are not really taken seriously, or his moves towards discussion and dialogue with with Putin. We had mentioned that the war changed the relationship with Russia but it also changes and should change the relationship of each EU country with their security and defense policy, and with their army. Come first for a comment down a French foreign policy and put and President Macron's relationship. There's a feeling that they are not been given the weight of their efforts at the moment. Is that a commonly held view. They're not been given the weight. For the, the Macron efforts of dialogue with and as would be home a nuclear part state a member of the Security Council. There's a lot talked about with Germany and I last duty to. Certainly this is the view of a French citizen, Marie Louise Professor of law that Francis not really been given much attention in terms of its efforts to try to work out, at least to maintain a dialogue. Well, I mean, yeah, I mean, France has been at the forefront of attempts. And not only during this war, of course, France was an integral part of the Minsk talks to the Normandy format and whatnot. And of course, in 2008, even with the war in Georgia, Nicholas Sarkozy was the leader who negotiated an agreement between Moscow and Tbilisi at that time. No, the French have been definitely active. With that, of course, comes, I guess, responsibilities and indeed criticisms that perhaps Macron was and indeed various European powers, not just France were perhaps too indulgent of Russia in trying to understand its insecurities and not being perhaps listening as much to the securities of Russia's neighbors. It's an ongoing debate and I don't want to come down on one side or the other, but simply to say that certainly those who now that we know what we know and what has happened has happened. Certainly there are more critics who argue that more could have been done or should have been done. It goes back to the point that Ben Turner made that essentially, you know, since 2014 and Judy, of course, mentioned about Nord Stream to being completed after 2014. So there's a lot of things that we have to, I think, reflect on about the mistakes that were made. And that's not to say, though, because this question comes up all the time that this could necessarily have been avoided, you know, because the attempts that talks in Macron going to Moscow, they were well intentioned. And, you know, the request and this is happening now and this is why I'm not particularly optimistic about negotiations right now that the request that Vladimir Putin was making in advance of this war were so impossible to meet. I mean, the question was making sure that it seems that they were just simply a pretext to say, Well, I tried diplomacy, and now I'm going to try Plan B, which is war. And I think that anybody who therefore tries diplomacy with Vladimir Putin leaves themselves open as Macron has had to that accusation that he was naive. But again, that's that's a matter of opinion and perhaps is unfair. Thank you very much. Judy, have you a comment because I'll be extremely brief. It's interesting, Donica's answer. And Macron with his team worked incredibly hard and long over the past two years, three years to understand the Kremlin, particularly Putin. And there were mistakes made by French foreign policy that they didn't liaise with the Baltic States or Poland, United States, UK, Germany did a little frankly Angela Merkel wasn't particularly interested in strengthening the Franco German, the Franco German relationship. But Macron's visits to Putin and the telephone calls over the past two months have been absolutely fundamental in changing Francis view of Putin. And it's, it's an appalling realization because look, look at the backdrop of the treble war on Ukraine. But it's very, very interesting reading the French press and speaking to French diplomats that a Macron tried somebody had to try. Somebody shows was to an experience somebody who knew a Putin personally had to see what's going on in Putin's mind. And after his last phone call and last visit. Macron came back to France saying, he's not interested in a, in a, in a dialogue or solution. So the kind of I use the word very carefully, the kind of innocence that belief that you could talk to Putin is over. And at the last point, Macron didn't put a foot wrong over the past four or five months. He liaise with all the Baltic States with war is also with Berlin with Brussels with the United States with the UK with everybody possible that this was no freelancer going off to Putin and he has come back deeply disappointed and deeply worried that this is going to be a long drawn out awful war. Yeah, I was, yeah, I was going to come to you anyway, Ben, sorry, but go ahead now. Excessive enthusiasm on my part, I apologize. No, it's just to extend my elucid point in terms of in terms of the strategy of all this. I mean, obviously, you know, Macron has been has been pushing strategic astronomy has been pushing a common defense has been pushing a common defense policy. What we saw in Versailles, you know, again, six weeks ago would have blown anybody's mind. But it does raise the fascinating question and a very difficult question for Ireland. Where does a European common defense relate to nuclear deterrence. Now the French have said in the past, this is a conversation to be had never taken seriously, but I'm sorry it becomes front and center. Well, Ben, the questions I had two questions I was going to put to you and you've already mentioned both of them. The first one was from Ian Hughes, who's senior policy analyst of science and technology but nuclear weapons have primarily been framed as a deterrent against war. Putin is using them as a shield on the which to commit unlimited atrocity. What are the implications going forward for nuclear policies. And the other one was from John Baker. Is this going to push Europe towards a European defense policy. Ben, could you comment on both of them. I think to John's question the answer is probably yes. No question in my mind. The answer to to Ian's question is, God knows, I mean, genuinely, I mean it throws on our head on understanding of what what mutual assured destruction was meant to provide. It throws on its head all of the reality politic that we dealt with all of the traditional understandings of what nuclear deterrence meant in a cold war context. It reverses it and throws it on its head it's almost as if the possession of nuclear weapons give you gives you license for anarchy. And I think some very smart people have got to sit down I think some very profound thoughts as to what this means and its implications and I, again, above my pay grade. Okay. Another question then it's related to India, which is an interesting is from so long a major in new CD. And she said what role can we know what it should do, can India possibly play in this current geographic geopolitical configuration. It's an interesting one because India has been looked at very carefully they abstained in the Security Council debate, the role of India in this situation. Donica have you. I'm, I know it's a bit beyond your absolute main area but obviously you, we are all have a consciousness of what India should do in the situation and the Indian role. I have to say a strong opinion on India's role. So it's better that I don't elaborate upon that only to say that I understand in Ukraine that there's a disappointment that India isn't doing more. But considering its size, but it's, but other than that I wouldn't, I wouldn't feel confident enough to comment on it. I would say I have been, I've been really, really disappointed in India on this point. I mean I know people have been talking about for some time about the rise of Hindu nationalism the link between Hindu nationalism and right wing populism and some of the similar phenomena we've seen in India as another major democracies, but India's role really does bemuse me because if India has any long term strategic interest. It's the stable democracies and the stable of national sovereign and the stability of national sovereignty. And if India won't stand up on this occasion, and deal with these questions frankly I think I think that's not a good sign. I don't know the duty. I don't know if you have thought I mean the German India. I've been following India on and off actually, and two very quick points. India has done itself enormous damage vis-a-vis France. France is such a very close strategic security defence relationship with India in terms of exercise in terms of dealing with the Indo-Pacific region. It's crucial for Indian stability and the stability of this part of the world and the fact that India did abstain because it didn't want to antagonise Russia's military agreements also with Russia. It's an enormous disappointment to the idea of the West and the principles of non interference of course Italy and India has its own territory problems. One other thing which I think we should really just say one very important thing. The war in Ukraine is is also about the appalling vacuum in arms control arms control was completely neglected in the late 1990s and then Trump and the Bush administration walked away from arms control agreements. So did so did Trump, Obama tried to revive arms control. And if we are going to talk about nuclear weapons or what happens to the INF Treaty, we have to go back to some kind of arms control that will create some kind of stable security environment. I don't know when this is going to start, but the sooner the better, because this is this is the crux after during and after this war. Thank you very much, Judy. I think that's a hugely important point and of course Ireland who has been so involved in arms control almost since we joined the UN. This is an area where I think we feel we can contribute and even now as a member of the Security Council, where we will wish to contribute. I have a question. Hey, McDonald's former ambassador to the UK of course saying recent events have led to a dramatic change in thinking in Germany the EU Ireland etc. To the panelists think that there could be any substantive change of thinking in the UK, where Putin intervened in support of Brexit and now benefits and from it and celebrates it. I'm not sure about the latter bit. It's quite controversial, but then do you think how are the British coming out of this, this looking at the situation in Ukraine. There's a lot of activity, a lot of weapons donated. I think there's been a lot of rhetoric on the UK side. I think there's some very serious and substantial military support to Ukraine. I think the UK is playing and will continue to play a very strong and a powerful role within within within a NATO context. But I have to admit that politically geo strategically I think Britain has been somewhat on the margins and on the sidelines. There's a lot of support as I say really important support within NATO really important. And I think that as a function of the existing political dynamics within the UK and the UK's departure from from the EU but again coming back to Judy's point you know it NATO centrality becomes much more to before. There is a really important role there for the UK to play and as I say, there are clearly ambitions resources and will on the UK part to play that role but I would, I would warn UK interlockers against overweening rhetoric and under delivery. Yeah, thanks. Just on a last point. Ben, you mentioned that and Judy indeed did as well and donica that it will require a change perspective in all of the EU Member States. Then a final word on on the Irish situation there's been a lot written about Irish neutrality. I think there's been great clarity from government and from opposition parties that were not neutral on this. And I think we all understand why we could not possibly be neutral on this. I think the question that arises is, is where we go from here. I think that I think there are some tough choices going to be presented. I mean, if, as I said in response to, to john's question, you know, there is, there is swift and solid movement towards a European common defense, as opposed to just a common defense policy that requires constitutional change and referendum in this state. And that will be a tough and difficult conversation and it will inevitably be wrapped up in the nature of that common defense and the role of new governments within that common defense and those are really difficult existential questions for the Irish state, and very tough choices to be presented to us and so, you know, for having spent 60 70 years nobody talking about defense. Suddenly we're having a crash course in what defense actually means and we may be forced to make some very hard and fast decisions very soon. Unfortunately, we have come to the end of our a lot of time. I'm really regretful, and I have to apologize to all the members who are on this call because we have had dozens of questions and there is huge interest in in this and in the situation, and it's a reflection of the, of the attention that everybody is giving to Ukraine. We have a particular interest in feeling bitterly upset and disappointed as a former ambassador to Ukraine. And we can just sincerely hope that there might be as fast as the invasion happened that there might be just as quickly a solution in sight from whatever talks are going on. But I want to thank the members of the panel Judy and Ben and Donica most sincerely you've given us all of your information from from the depth of your considerable knowledge, and we're greatly enriched and, as I say, thank you once more and thank you to all the members who joined us today.