 Thank you very much, Professor Heralt, and good afternoon. I'm very honored to be here, the eve of the Irish presidency. And I think it's a topical subject, even though, formally speaking, there is no particular role for the presidencies in the area of foreign relations. But indeed, we always interact with the presidency on quite a number of issues when it comes to foreign relations. Now, let me say a few words about our experience of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. The UN member states have become a diplomatic force in their own right, at least for policy issues that require patient diplomacy. As seen from the outside, the EU is an aspiring superpower, albeit a soft, slow-moving one with fuzzy edges. The EU foreign policy representative has emerged as a substantial figure in international relations. Now she's a commission vice president, so the EU is better able to deliver on its foreign policy promises. So does it sound like a nice account of the last three years to you? But it's not. Because that's a quote from a paper called EU 2010, An Optimistic Vision of the Future by Charles Grant, written and published in 2000. So there we are, 12 years later. And now we can look back at the three years into the Lisbon Treaty and two years into the effective functioning of the European election service. It's quite interesting to see that, I mean to realize, in fact, that the Lisbon Treaty was supposed to be the foreign policy treaty. That was at least what Mark Leonhard has said about it when it was still being negotiated. And yet now in the current context, the foreign policy is no way slipping off the agenda. We can see it definitely at the level of heads of state and government. They have some other matters to deal with, and they are doing now that as we speak. They were doing that in Brussels. So the treaty has raised certain expectations, and now we are struggling to satisfy them. On top of that, given the context of the financial crisis, I think it's the worst thinkable moment to create a new diplomatic service. And we all know why. The crisis is quite profound. And it felt hard here in Ireland. And President van Rompuy, the President of European Council, has said that in fact, it's a variety of crises in plural, a banking, fiscal, and competitiveness crisis. And the issue of financial crisis and continues to dominate the agenda. So we are faced with a little bit of a paradox here. Then a foreign policy treaty giving us new tools enters into force. And yet we seem to develop rather less attention to foreign policy, being preoccupied with domestic and economic issues. At the same time, there is a lot of foreign policy challenges around us. We should also look at ourselves. This is a very European attitude. We tend to be a bit introvert and very self-critical. And traditionally, the EU has always spent a lot of time dealing with itself. We look at the whole period of the European Convention and the negotiations on the future, the Constitution First and the Lisbon Treaty. We spend almost 10 years dealing with ourselves. And in the meantime, the world has changed. And we only realize that when the new treaty entered into force. And then we woke up in the new world with what the tectonic policy shifts have already occurred. But of course, the world has changed. It is more complex, less stable. And there was a lot of security challenges around us. So let's try to walk through them very, very briefly. First of all, the evolving developments in our southern neighborhood, whether we call it Arab Spring or something else, it doesn't really matter. But it's true. I mean, it's not a fairy tale. It's a book of history. And the events in Libya, in Syria, now in Gaza have not gone in fact on the whole regions. There are all those linkages to other hotspots in Iran or the whole Sahel region, which has been heavily affected by the knock-on effect of the Libyan crisis. Well, the Iranian nuclear file dominates the security agenda. And it's the top priority of the high representative, Cathy Eshin, who's been leading the international legal sessions to so-called three-plus-three format for the last two years. And there were talks on that earlier this week in Brussels. There is still some unfinished business in the Balkans. I mean, NATO is still there in First of All. So are we with the police mission, the largest ever European civilian mission. We are still present in Bosnia. The wounds of the war have not healed yet. And one tweet can have a major impact on the situation in the Balkans. There is a European perspective on the countries, but it requires more than that to maintain stability. Another priority there for the high representative is the Serbia-Kosovo talks. And I think it's only us, the EU, who can really act as the honest broker between the two parties. And this is very high on our policy agenda. Going to the east, we're still faced with a number of frozen conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Transnistria, and Georgia. We could go all around the world, but I will only make one more remark about the north. The north seems stable. But if you look at the Arctic and the potential geostrategic importance of the Arctic region, you can see that the situation is heating up. And this is only partly linked to the climate change, making competition for resources in this area more plausible than ever before. I mentioned that the world around us has changed. And the BRIC countries have become a foreign policy factor to be reckoned with. Also in the multilateral context, if we just think about the role in the UN, G20, or the international financial institutions, in particular the World Bank and the IMF, engaging with the partner is a must. And this is the second foreign policy priority of the high representative. First is the engagement with the neighborhood, south and east, and the Balkans. And second, building up relations with the partners, with the new strategic partners. Threats are coming also from other than geographic directions. We are faced with a lot of new threats, only to mention the cyber security. We are all living in network-centric societies. And these make us all very much vulnerable. There are climate change-related conflicts. I mentioned the Arctic, but let's take the Darfur-Sudan conflict, which was probably the first ever war in history, fought over access to water caused by side effects of climate change. We could say that the Middle East and Central Asia may come next. And this is all pretty close to home. But of course, there is some tension building up in the east, in particular in the south and east China Sea. We also faced with the effects of the so-called American pivot to Asia and the Pacific. The Americans really expect the EU to become a security provider, rather than a security consumer alone. And this is the exact wording of the US strategic guidance that was released in January this year. In other words, they just expect us to take care of our own neighborhood and to be able to deliver on this role of a security provider. So giving the complex environment, security environment, what are we going to do? That's the famous Lenin question, what to do? Let's just go home and close the door. And that cannot be the answer. First of all, we should be serious about our assets and comparative advantages that we do have as Europeans. The European foreign policy is value-based. It may be a restraining factor in some situations. But of course, compromising on our values would be an act of self-denial. I know for Ireland, it's an important consideration. And Ireland is rightly proud of its ethical approach to foreign policy with regard to human rights, with regard to disarmament or development. There is a lot of demand for Europe out there. We sometimes tend to underestimate it. The third states reach out to us. They want to work with us. They want to partner with us. So there is a positive perception, albeit a bit more nuanced now because of the euro crisis. And it counterweights this usual self-flagalation of the Europeans. In a way, it reminds me maybe Ireland is a good place to use the parallel of a garage rock band. You have to send them out, let them break through internationally, and only then they are being recognized at home. We are not at that stage yet. But it's sometimes good to ask the others what they think about us. We are still, in terms of absolute numbers, we are also at defence power, the sense that collectively the European Union member states spend roughly 200 billion euros on defence. I know it's a defensive issue here, but nevertheless I would like to say a few words about it, and it's also an area I'm in particular responsible for in the EAS. We are outspending Russia, China and Japan combined, but it doesn't really give us the right bank for our, not a buck, but a euro in this case. We are hopelessly fragmented. And of course, at the same time, the defence spending in countries like Russia and China has been rising for the last years and will continue to do so in the future. So we should not spend more, but we should spend better and should spend better together. And address the fragmentation of demand, and it's true because the demand is purely national, because the national decision-making on defence is on purchasing, is with member states, and supply is fragmented as well. The defence industries operate within national boundaries and they are not really integrated with the single market. I mean, there have been attempts to do so. We have two defence directives, but this is only a very modest beginning. In that context, we really should realise that the missions and operations conducted by the European Union and the framework of the common security and defence policy are making a real contribution to the global peace and security. And we have a global outreach. I mean, we've been, over the last nine years, we've conducted 25 different missions and operations. We usually run eight or nine of them concurrently. Some of them are really role-profile or rather technical capacity-building missions, but nevertheless making an impact. In that regard, I would like to pay tribute to the Irish contribution, because Ireland has participated successfully to many EU operations and has shown excellent leadership. I'd like to pay tribute to General Patrick Nash, who was leading the operation in Chad three years ago, and to Colin Michael Berry, who's still leading the EUTM, which is a training mission, training Somali soldiers in Uganda. So this is an important contribution we make to the world out there. But Europe, as such, it's still a point of reference. I think not only in terms of market access. I mean, European market is still attractive, but also, I think, for many, the Europe is the most liveable place on the planet, and in particular for the rising global middle class. So it's a source of inspiration for many, even though we tend to forget it. We are collectively the largest donor of development and humanitarian aid. Again, the budget, the figures are quite impressive. We are spending €53 billion a year, which is more than a half of the overall, the global budget on development assistance. So there is a real commitment of the Europeans to development. We simply need to be more effective, in particular in times of scarcity, in a way, respect policy choices of our partner countries, but expect them to respect ours. And that's what I call the mutual accountability between partners. Now, what's the essence of the European external action relations, external action as defined by the Lisbon treaty? We call it comprehensive approach, which is one of those typically Brussels buzzwords has become a second religion in Brussels. But if I try to put it simple, in simple terms, as Einstein has said, for every problem there is a solution that is clear and simple and wrong. So there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the foreign policy challenges. But we are quite uniquely placed to make the right combination, to define the right policy mix using different instruments that are at our disposal. So that's the unique selling proposition of the EU. Just to give you an example, what we mean by comprehensive approach. In the OECD context, sometimes they call it the 3D, which is diplomacy, defense, and development. Let's look at the Horn of Africa, a huge vast area, a lot of challenges, piracy, failed states, challenges of development, and lack of governance. There, we're really using all those different instruments in our toolbox in quite an effective manner. First of all, we are there as a political actor. We have a EU special representative, Alex Ronders, who's coordinating our efforts. We're engaging in particular with the new Somali government trying to help them develop the governance of the country. We are still the largest donor of development funding. So our funding for Somalia until 2013 is roughly 400 million euros. We've been supporting financially the largest African, genuinely African peacekeeping operation called AMISM, which is active in Somalia, and they've been engaging quite effectively fighting the extremists of al-Shabaab and freeing different areas of the country. So we've been funding them from our budget. And we are there with the maritime anti-piracy operation, which is also showing results. I just visited the headquarters of this operation, which is in Northwood, just outside London, a few days ago, and I've been there for three years, four years now, it's quite impressive just to give you some numbers. Last year in 2011, there were 151 pirate attacks in the Indian Ocean. And it's a critical maritime route for everybody. It's not only a European problem, it's a Chinese, American, Indian, and Australian problem. So we really need, we are in this together. So we had this more than 150 attacks. And as we really moved up and stepped up our engagement in the Indian Ocean, and last year we managed to really disrupt the infrastructure of the pirates on land. Since May this year, there was only one attempt to pirate a ship, so it's quite a difference. But of course, this is fighting pirates at sea, it's not enough, we have to address the root causes of piracy on land, which is lack of governance, lack of government control, and also lack of other job opportunities as piracy is simply a very lucrative business model. So there we need all this very European mix of policy instruments to address these issues, and that's what we call comprehensive approach. That's exactly where the Europeans are in action. The European exchange service fits into the picture. We are an asset. We want to add value to what the member states do bilaterally. The creation of the European exchange service has brought more continuity and consistency in the European foreign policy, not only because we took away something from the rotating presidency, but also because of the genuine setup of the service and the possibility to draw on those different instruments, defense, diplomacy, and development, we can make a difference. We have a global network of 140 delegation, our eyes and ears on the ground, and there we can really build on our competitive edge. We need to be realistic, of course, compared to a diplomatic service of a mid-sized member states, we are relatively small and not very expensive. I mean, there are those myths about the Brussels bureaucracy, but our budget is less than half of the budget of the foreign ministry in France or the UK, and one-twelfth of the State Department budget. Of course, we are not looking for excuses. We also have our weaknesses. We are the new kid on the block. We are still struggling with quite complex procedures. We need to develop a new corporate culture. We're not there yet, but we're making progress. And of course, we're only three years old. The first year of the EAS was very much about its survival rather than anything else. So we are going to look at different structural deficiencies of ourselves next year when we are going to conduct a review, a mandatory review of the European External Action Service, and we should try to refine our mission statement, put more emphasis on the delivery mechanism of the comprehensive approach, as I described it, and more than that. And otherwise, we only need to do three things, consolidate, consolidate, and consolidate, so that we are really an effective foreign policy service. And to conclude, we are, of course, facing the greatest financial crisis in recent history, and we face a more complex and less stable world than ever, and power has shifted, new actors appear, but it's just one more reason to engage more. We need to engage now if you don't want to catch up, spend, want to spend more, most of our time catching up with the others. And I think the greatest risk is not out there. The greatest risk is our own lack of confidence. We are stronger and more effective if we work together, and we should not be, we shouldn't be too shy to look at our own achievements also in the perspective. So it may sound a bit too revolutionary for the current climate, but I can quote Danton, who said, audacity, more audacity, always audacity. And that's what we need in Europe. We need to rethink ourselves, we need to rethink our policies and institutions, and of course, this whole debate in about the European governance, the future, the future model of European integration has already began, but it's now focusing on financial management on economic governance. We shouldn't lose sight of the foreign policy dimension of the way we project Europe abroad. I hope it will not take another 10 years, like the Lisbon Treaty did, but it's certainly worthwhile thinking about the role of Europe in the world. Building on our own clouds, we tend to underestimate. So I'm looking forward to working on these and other subjects with the incoming Irish presidency, and thank you very much for your attention. Thank you very much.