 Question 27 of Summa Theologica, Pars Prima, Trinity and Creation. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica, Pars Prima, Trinity and Creation by Saint Thomas Aquinas, translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province. Question 27, the procession of the divine persons. Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of the persons in God. And because the divine persons are distinguished from each other according to the relations of origin, the order of the doctrine leads us to consider, firstly, the question of origin or procession. Secondly, the relations of origin. Thirdly, the persons. Concerning procession, there are five points of inquiry, whether there is procession in God, whether any procession in God can be called generation, whether there can be any other procession in God besides generation, whether that other procession can be called generation, and whether there are more than two processions in God. First article, whether there is procession in God. Objection 1, it would seem that there cannot be any procession in God, for procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is nothing mobile nor anything extraneous, therefore neither is there procession in God. Objection 2, further everything which proceeds differs from that once it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity, but supreme simplicity, therefore in God there is no procession. Objection 3, further to proceed from another seems to be against the nature of the first principle, but God is the first principle as shown above, therefore in God there is no procession. On the contrary our Lord says, from God I proceeded. I answer that divine scripture uses, in relation to God, names which signify procession. This procession has been differently understood. Some have understood it in the sense of an effect proceeding from its cause. So Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as the creature of both. In this sense neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true God, and this is contrary to what is said of the Son, that we may be in His true Son. This is true God. Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, no you not, that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost. Now to have a temple is God's prerogative. Others take this procession to mean the cause proceeding to the effect as moving it or impressing its own likeness on it. In which sense it was understood by Sebelius, who said that God the Father is called Son in assuming flesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is called Holy Ghost in sanctifying the rational creature and moving it to life. The words of the Lord contradict such a meaning when he speaks of himself. The Son cannot of himself do anything. While many other passages show the same, whereby we know that the Father is not the Son. Careful examination shows that both of these opinions take procession as meaning an outward act. Hence neither of them affirms procession as existing in God himself. Whereas since procession always supposes action and as there is an outward procession corresponding to the act tending to external matter. So there must be an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining within the agent. This applies most conspicuously to the intellect, the action of which remains in the intelligent agent. For whenever we understand by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us which is a conception of the object understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object. This conception is signified by the spoken word and it is called the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice. As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God, not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual substances. While even the similitudes derived from these fall short in the representation of divine objects, procession therefore is not to be understood from what it is embodied, either according to local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as for instance like heat from the agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for example of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker yet remains in him. In that sense the Catholic faith understands procession as existing in God. Reply to Objection 1, this objection comes from the idea of procession in the sense of local motion or of an action tending to external matter or to an exterior effect which kind of procession does not exist in God as we have explained. Reply to Objection 2, whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct. Indeed the more perfectly it proceeds the more closely is it won with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood the more closely is the intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent. Since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood. Thus as the divine intelligence is the very supreme perfection of God the divine word is of necessity perfectly one with the source whence he proceeds without any kind of diversity. Reply to Objection 3, to proceed from a principle so as to be something outside and distinct from that principle is irreconcilable with the idea of a first principle whereas an intimate and uniform procession by way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of a first principle. For when we call the builder the principle of the house in the idea of such a principle is included that of his art and it would be included in the idea of the first principle were the builder the first principle of the house. God who is the first principle of all things may be compared to things created as the architect is two things designed. Second article whether any procession in God can be called generation. Objection 1 it would seem that no procession in God can be called generation for generation is changed from non-existence to existence and is opposed to corruption while matter is the subject of both. Nothing of all this belongs to God therefore generation cannot exist in God. Objection 2 further procession exists in God according to an intelligible mode as explained above but such a process is not called generation in us therefore neither is it to be so called in God. Objection 3 further anything that is generated derives existence from its generator therefore such existence is a derived existence but no derived existence can be a self subsistence therefore since the divine existence is self subsisting it follows that no generated existence can be the divine existence therefore there is no generation in God. On the contrary it is said this day have I begotten thee. I answer that the procession of the word in God is called generation in proof whereof we must observe that generation has a twofold meaning one common to everything subject to generation and corruption in which sense generation is nothing but change from non-existence to existence in another sense it is proper and belongs to living things in which sense it signifies the origin of a living being from a conjoined living principle and this is properly called birth. Not everything of that kind however is called begotten but strictly speaking only what proceeds by way of similitude hence a hair has not the aspect of generation and sonship but only that has which proceeds by way of a similitude nor will any likeness suffice for a worm which is generated from animals has not the aspect of generation and sonship although it has a generic similitude for this kind of generation requires that there should be a procession by way of similitude in the same specific nature as a man proceeds from a man and a horse from a horse so in living things which proceed from potential to actual life such as men and animals generation includes both these kinds of generation but if there is a being whose life does not proceed from potentiality to act procession if found in such a being excludes entirely the first kind of generation whereas it may have that kind of generation which belongs to living things so in this manner the procession of the word in God is generation for he proceeds by way of intelligible action which is a vital operation from a conjoint principle as above described by way of similitude in as much as the concept of the intellect is a likeness of the object conceived and exists in the same nature because in God the act of understanding and his existence are the same as shown above hence the procession of the word in God is called generation and the word himself proceeding is called the son reply to objection one the subjection is based on the idea of generation in the first sense importing the issuing forth from potentiality to act in which sense it is not found in God reply to objection two the act of human understanding in ourselves is not the substance itself of the intellect hence the word which proceeds within us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature as the source once it proceeds so the idea of generation cannot be properly and fully applied to it but the divine act of intelligence is the very substance itself of the one who understands the word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same nature and so is properly called begotten and son and scripture employs terms which denote generation of living things in order to signify the procession of the divine wisdom namely conception and birth as is declared in the person of the divine wisdom the depths were not as yet and I was already conceived before the hills I was brought forth in our way of understanding we use the word conception in order to signify that in the word of our intellect is found the likeness of the thing understood although there be no identity of nature reply to objection three not everything derived from another has existence in another subject otherwise we could not say that the whole substance of created being comes from God since there is no subject that could receive the whole substance so then what is generated in God receives its existence from the generator not as though that existence were received into matter or into a subject which would conflict with the divine self subsistence but when we speak of his existence as received we mean that he who proceeds receives divine existence from another not however as if he were other from the divine nature for in the perfection itself of the divine existence are contained both the word intelligibly proceeding and the principle of the word with whatever belongs to his perfection third article whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the word objection one it would seem that no other procession exists in God beside the generation of the word because for whatever reason we admit another procession we should be led to admit yet another and so on to infinitude which cannot be therefore we must stop at the first and hold that there exists only one procession in God objection two further every nature possesses but one mode of self communication because operations derive unity and diversity from their terms but procession in God is only by way of communication of the divine nature therefore as there is only one divine nature it follows that only one procession exists in God objection three further if any other procession but the intelligible procession of the word existed in God it could only be the procession of love which is by the operation of the will but such a procession is identified with the intelligible procession of the intellect in as much as the will in God is the same as his intellect therefore in God there is no other procession but the procession of the word on the contrary the holy ghost proceeds from the father and he is distinct from the son according to the words I will ask my father and he will give you another pericleate therefore in God another procession exists besides the procession of the word I answer that there are two processions in God the procession of the word and another in evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in God only according to an action which does not tend to anything external but remains in the agent itself such an action in an intellectual nature is that of the intellect and of the will the procession of the word is by way of an intelligible operation the operation of the will within ourselves involves also another procession that of love whereby the object loved is in the lover as by the conception of the word the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent hence besides the procession of the word in God there exists in him another procession called the procession of love reply to objection one there is no need to go on to infinitude in the divine processions for the procession which is accomplished within the agent in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the will reply to objection two all that exists in God is God whereas the same does not apply to others therefore the divine nature is communicated by every procession which is not outward and this does not apply to other natures reply to objection three though will and intellect are not diverse in God nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the processions belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order for the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the procession of the word since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in the intellect so as there exists a certain order of the word to the principle whence he proceeds although in God the substance of the intellect and its concept are the same so although in God the will and the intellect are the same still in as much as love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect there is a distinction of order between the procession of love and the procession of the word in God fourth article whether the procession of love in God is generation objection one it would seem that the procession of love in God is generation for what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among living things is said to be generated and born but what proceeds in God by way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature otherwise it would be extraneous to the divine nature and would be an external procession therefore what proceeds in God by way of love proceeds as generated and born objection two further as similitude is of the nature of the word so does it belong to love hence it is said that every beast loves its like therefore if the word is begotten and born by way of likeness it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of generation objection three further what is not in any species is not in the genus so if there is a procession of love in God there ought to be some special name beside this common name of procession but no other name is applicable but generation therefore the procession of love in God is generation on the contrary were this true it would follow that the Holy Ghost who proceeds as love would proceed as begotten which is against the statement of Athanasius the Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son not made nor begotten but proceeding I answer that the procession of love in God ought not to be called generation in evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect and the will differ in this respect that the intellect is made actual by the object understood reciting according to its own likeness in the intellect whereas the will is made actual not by any similitude of the object willed within it but by its having a certain inclination to the thing will thus the procession of the intellect is by way of similitude and is called generation because every generator begets its own like whereas the procession of the will is not by way of similitude but rather by way of impulse and movement toward an object so what proceeds in God by way of love does not proceed as begotten or as son but proceeds rather as spirits which name expresses a certain vital movement and impulse accordingly as anyone is described as moved or impelled by love to perform an action to reply to objection one all that exists in God is one with the divine nature hence the proper notion of this or that procession by which one procession is distinguished from another cannot be on the part of this unity but the proper notion of this or that procession must be taken from the order of one procession to another which order is derived from the nature of the will and intellect hence each procession in God takes its name from the proper notion of will and intellect the name being imposed to signify what its nature really is and so it is that the person proceeding as love receives the divine nature but is not said to be born reply to objection to likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to love it belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object understood as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator but it belongs to love not as though love itself were a likeness but because likeness is the principle of loving thus it does not follow that love is begotten but that the one begotten is the principle of love reply to objection three we can name God only from creatures as in creatures generation is the only principle of communication of nature procession in God has no proper or special name except that of generation hence the procession which is not generation has remained without a special name but it can be called spiration as it is the procession of the spirit fifth article whether there are more than two processions in God objection one it would seem that there are more than two processions in God as knowledge and will are attributed to God so is power therefore if two processions exist in God of intellect and will it seems that there must also be a third procession of power objection two further goodness seems to be the greatest principle of procession since goodness is diffusive of itself therefore there must be a procession of goodness in God and objection three further in God there is greater power of fecundity than in us but in us there is not only one procession of the word but there are many for in us from one word proceeds another and also from one love proceeds another therefore in God there are more than two processions on the contrary in God there are not more than two who proceed the son and the holy ghost therefore there are in him but two processions I answer that the divine processions can be derived only from the actions which remain within the agent in a nature which is intellectual and in the divine nature these actions are to the acts of intelligence and of will the act of sensation which also appears to be an operation within the agent takes place outside the intellectual nature nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the sphere of external actions for the act of sensation is perfected by the action of the sensible object upon sense it follows that no other procession is possible in God but the procession of the word and of love reply to objection one power is the principle whereby one thing acts on another hence it is that external action points to power thus the divine power does not imply the procession of a divine person but is indicated by the procession there from of creatures reply to objection two as Boethius says goodness belongs to the essence and not to the operation unless considered as the object of the will thus as the divine processions must be denominated from certain actions no other processions can be understood in God according to goodness and the like attributes except those of the word and of love according as God understands and loves his own essence truth and goodness reply to objection three as explained above God understands all things by one simple act and by one act also he wills all things hence there cannot exist in him a procession of word from word nor of love from love for there is in him only one perfect word and one perfect love thereby being manifested his perfect fecundity the end of question twenty seven question twenty eight of summa theologica par's prima trinity and creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica par's prima trinity and creation by saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question twenty eight the divine relations the divine relations are next to be considered in four points of inquiry whether there are real relations in God whether those relations are the divine essence itself or are extrinsic to it whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each other and the number of these relations first article whether there are real relations in God objection one it would seem that there are no real relations in God for Boethius says all possible predicaments used as regards the Godhead refer to the substance for nothing can be predicated relatively but whatever really exists in God can be predicated of him therefore no real relation exists in God objection two further Boethius says relation in the trinity of the father to the son and of both to the Holy Ghost is the relation of the same to the same but a relation of this kind is only a logical one for every real relation requires and implies in reality two terms therefore the divine relations are not real relations but are formed only by the mind objection three further the relation of paternity is the relation of a principle but to say that God is the principle of creatures does not import any real relation but only a logical one therefore paternity in God is not a real relation while the same applies for the same reason to the other relations in God objection four further the divine generation proceeds by way of an intelligible word but the relations following upon the operation of the intellect are logical relations therefore paternity and filiation in God consequent upon generation are only logical relations on the contrary the father is denominated only from paternity and the son only from filiation therefore if no real paternity or filiation existed in God it would follow that God is not really father or son but only in our manner of understanding and this is the Sibelian heresy I answer that relations exist in God really in proof whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in the apprehension and not in reality this is not found in any other genus for as much as other genus as quantity and quality in their strict and proper meaning signify something inherent in a subject but relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of things as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered to each other and have a mutual inclination and such relations are necessarily real relations as in a heavy body is found an inclination and order to the center and hence there exists in the heavy body a certain respect in regard to the center and the same applies to other things sometimes however this regard to another signified by relation is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to another and this is a logical relation only as for instance when reason compares man to animal as species to the genus but when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature then both the one proceeding and the source of the procession agree in the same order and then they have real relations to each other therefore as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature as explained above these relations according to the divine processions are necessarily real relations reply to objection one relationship is not predicated of God according to its proper and formal meaning that is to say insofar as its proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent but only as denoting regard to another nevertheless Boethius did not wish to exclude relation in God but he wished to show that it was not to be predicated of him as regards the mode of adherence in himself in the strict meaning of relation but rather by way of relation to another reply to objection two the relation signified by the term the same is a logical relation only if in regard to absolutely the same thing because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards the order of anything to itself according to some two aspects thereof the cases otherwise however when things are called the same not numerically but generically or specifically thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity not in every respect but only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these relations as neither is it by relation of identity reply to objection three as the creature proceeds from God in diversity of nature God is outside the order of the whole creation or does any relation to the creature arise from his nature for he does not produce the creature by necessity of his nature but by his intellect and will as is explained above therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature whereas in creatures there is a real relation to God because creatures are contained under the divine order and their very nature entails dependence on God on the other hand the divine processions are in one and the same nature hence no parallel exists reply to objection four relations which result from the mental operation alone in the objects understood are logical relations only in as much as reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the mind those relations however which follow the operation of the intellect and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding and the source when it proceeds are not logical relations only but are real relations in as much as the intellect and the reason are real things and are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds from it corporeally thus paternity and filiation are real relations in God second article whether relation in God is the same as his essence objection one it would seem that the divine relation is not the same as the divine essence for Augustine says that not all that is said of God is said of his substance for we say some things relatively as father and respect of the son but such things do not refer to the substance therefore the relation is not the divine essence objection two further Augustine says every relative expression is something besides the relation expressed as master is a man and slave is a man therefore if relations exist in God there must be something else besides relations in God this can only be his essence therefore essence differs from relation objection three further the essence of relation is the being referred to another as the philosopher says so if relation is the divine essence it follows that the divine essence is essentially itself a relation to something else whereas this is repugnant to the perfection of the divine essence which is supremely absolute and self-subsisting therefore relation is not the divine essence on the contrary everything which is not the divine essence is a creature but relation really belongs to God and if it is not the divine essence it is a creature and it cannot claim the adoration of Latria contrary to what is sung in the preface let us adore the distinction of the persons and the equality of their majesty I answer that it is reported that Gilbert de la paure erred on this point but revoked his error later at the council of reams for he said that the divine relations are assistant or externally affixed to perceive the error here expressed we must consider that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark one is the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject for the essence of an accident is to in here the other point of remark is the proper nature of each one of these genera in the genera apart from that of relation as in quantity and quality even the true idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject for quantity is called the measure of substance and quality is the disposition of substance but the true idea of relation is not taken from its respect to that in which it is but from its respect to something outside so if we consider even in creatures relations formally as such in that aspect they are said to be assistants and not intrinsically affixed for in this way they signify a respect which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something else whereas if relation is considered as an accident it inheres in a subject and has an accidental existence in it Gilbert de la Porre considered relation in the former mode only now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures when considered as transferred to God has a substantial existence for there is no accident in God since all in him is his essence so in so far as relation has an accidental existence in creatures relation really existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way distinct there from but in so far as relation implies respect to something else no respect to the essence is signified but rather to its opposite term thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as his essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence thus it is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other but are one in the same reply to objection one these words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same as the divine essence but that it is not predicated under the mode of substance as existing in him to whom it is applied but as a relation so there are said to be two predicaments only in God since other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are spoken both in their generic and in their specific nature but nothing that exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is spoken except the relation of identity and this by reason of God's supreme simplicity reply to objection two as the relation which exists in creatures involves not only a regard to another but also something absolute so the same applies to God yet not in the same way what is contained in the creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning of relation is something else besides that relation whereas in God there is no distinction but both are one in the same and this is not perfectly expressed by the word relation as if it were comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that term for it was above explained in treating of the divine names that more is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified by any name hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything besides relation in reality but only in the various names imposed by us reply to objection three if the divine perfection contained only what is signified by relative names it would follow that it is imperfect being thus related to something else as in the same way if nothing more were contained in it than what is signified by the word wisdom it would not in that case be a subsistence but as the perfection of the divine essence is greater than can be included in any name it does not follow if a relative term or any other name applied to God signify something imperfect that the divine essence is in any way imperfect for the divine essence comprehends within itself the perfection of every genus third article whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other objection one it would seem that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other or things which are identified with the same are identified with each other but every relation in God is really the same as the divine essence therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other objection two further as paternity and filiation are by name distinguished from the divine essence so likewise are goodness and power but this kind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine goodness and power therefore neither does it make any real distinction of paternity and filiation and objection three further in God there is no real distinction but that of origin for one relation does not seem to arise from another therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other on the contrary Boethius says that in God the substance contains the unity and relation multiplies the trinity therefore if the relations were not really distinguished from each other there would be no real trinity in God but only an ideal trinity which is the error of Sebelius I answer that the attributing of anything to another involves the attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it so when man is attributed to anyone irrational nature is likewise attributed to him the idea of relation however necessarily means regard of one to another according as one is relatively opposed to another so as in God there is a real relation there must also be a real opposition the very nature of relative opposition includes distinction hence there must be real distinction in God not indeed according to that which is absolute namely essence wherein there is supreme unity and simplicity but according to that which is relative replied to objection one according to the philosopher this argument holds that whatever things are identified with the same thing are identified with each other if the identity be real and logical as for instance a tunic and a garment but not if they differ logically hence in the same place he says although action is the same as motion and likewise passion still it does not follow that action and passion are the same because action implies reference as of something from which there is motion in the thing moved whereas passion implies reference as of something which is from another likewise although paternity just as affiliation is really the same as the divine essence as these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects hence they are distinguished from each other replied to objection two power and goodness do not import any opposition in their respective natures and hence there is no parallel argument and replied to objection three although relations properly speaking do not arise or proceed from each other nevertheless they are considered as opposed according to the procession of one from another fourth article whether in God there are only four real relations paternity affiliation spiration and procession objection one it would seem that in God there are not only four real relations paternity affiliation spiration and procession for it must be observed that in God there exists the relations of the intelligent agent to the object understood and of the one willing to the object willed which are real relations not comprised under those above specified therefore there are not only four real relations in God objection two further real relations in God are understood as coming from the intelligible procession of the word but intelligible relations are infinitely multiplied as avicenesis therefore in God there exists an infinite series of real relations objection three further ideas in God are eternal and are only distinguished from each other by reason of their regard to things as above stated therefore in God there are many more eternal relations objection four further equality and likeness and identity are relations and they are in God from eternity therefore several more relations are eternal in God than the above named objection five further it may also contrary wise be said that there are fewer relations in God than those above named for according to the philosopher it is the same way from Athens to Thebes as from Thebes to Athens by the same way of reasoning there is the same relation from the father to the son that of paternity and from the son to the father that affiliation and thus there are not four relations in God I answer that according to the philosopher every relation is based either on quantity as double and half or on action and passion as the doer and the deed the father and the son the master and the servant and the like now as there is no quantity in God for he is great without quantity as Augustine says it follows that a real relation in God can be based only on action such relations are not based on the actions of God according to any extrinsic procession for as much as the relations of God to creatures are not real in him and so follows that real relations in God can be understood only in regard to those actions according to which there are internal and not external processions in God these processions are too only as above explained one derived from the action of the intellect the procession of the word and the other from the action of the will the procession of love in respect of each of these processions to opposite relations arise one of which is the relation of the person proceeding from the principle the other is the relation of the principle himself the procession of the word is called generation in the sense of the term whereby it is applied to living things now the relation of the principle of generation in perfect living beings is called paternity and the relation of the one proceeding from the principle is called filiation but the procession of love has no proper name of its own and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper name of their own the relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves and not to the relations reply to objection one in those things in which there is a difference between the intellect and its object and the will and its object there can be a real relation both of science to its object and of the willer to the object willed in God however the intellect and its object are one and the same because by understanding himself God understands all other things and the same applies to his will and the object that he wills hence it follows that in God these kinds of relations are not real as neither is the relation of a thing to itself nevertheless the relation to the word is a real relation because the word is understood as proceeding by an intelligible action and not as a thing understood for when we understand a stone that which the intellect conceives from the thing understood is called the word reply to objection two intelligible relations in ourselves are infinitely multiplied because a man understands a stone by one act and by another understands that he understands the stone and again by another understands that he understands this thus the acts of understanding are infinitely multiplied and consequently also the relations understood this does not apply to God in as much as he understands all things by one act alone reply to objection three ideal relations exist as understood by God hence it does not follow from their plurality that there are many relations in God but that God knows these many relations reply to objection four equality and similitude in God are not real relations but are only logical relations and reply to objection five the way from one term to another and conversely is the same nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same hence we cannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the same as that of the son to the father but we could conclude this of something absolute if there were such between them the end of question 28 question 29 of Summa Theologica Pars Prima Trinity and Creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy Summa Theologica Pars Prima Trinity and Creation by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 29 the Divine Persons having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the processions and the relations we must now approach the subject of the persons first we shall consider the persons absolutely and then comparatively as regards each other we must consider the persons absolutely first in common and then singly the general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four points the signification of this word person the number of the persons what is involved in the number of persons or is opposed there too as diversity and similitude and the like and what belongs to our knowledge of the persons four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point the definition of person the comparison of person to essence subsistence and apostasis whether the name of person is becoming to God and what does it signify in him first article the definition of person objection one it would seem that the definition of person given by Boethius is insufficient that is a person is an individual substance of a rational nature for nothing singular can be subject to definition but person signifies something singular therefore person is improperly defined objection two further substance as placed above in the definition of person is either first substance or second substance if it is the former the word individual is superfluous because first substance is individual substance if it stands for second substance the word individual is false for there is contradiction of terms since second substances are the genera or species therefore this definition is incorrect objection three further an intentional term must not be included in the definition for to define a man as a species of animal would not be a correct definition since man is the name of a thing and species is the name of an intention therefore since person is the name of a thing for signifies a substance of a rational nature the word individual which is an intentional name comes improperly into the definition objection four further nature is the principle of motion and rest and those things in which it is essentially and not accidentally as Aristotle says but person exists in things immovable as in God and in the angels therefore the word nature ought not to enter into the definition of person but the word should rather be essence and objection five further the separated soul is an individual substance of the rational nature therefore person is not properly defined as above I answer that although the universal and particular exist in every genus nevertheless in a certain special way the individual belongs to the genus of substance for substances individualized by itself whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject which is the substance since this particular whiteness is called this because it exists in this particular subject and so it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their own for they are called hypothesis or first substances further still in a more special and perfect way the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions and which are not only made to act like others but which can act of themselves for actions belong to singulars therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances and this name is person thus the term individual substance is placed in the definition of person as signifying the singular genus of substance and the term rational nature is added as signifying the singular in rational substances reply to objection one although this or that singular may not be definable yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be defined and so the philosopher gives a definition of first substance and in this way Boethius defines person reply to objection two in the opinion of some the term substance in the definition of person stands for first substance which is the hypothesis nor is the term individual superfluously added for as much as by the name of hypothesis or first substance the idea of universality and of part is excluded for we do not say that man in general is an hypothesis nor that the hand is since it is only a part but where individual is added the idea of assumptions is excluded from person for the human nature in Christ is not a person since it is assumed by a greater that is by the word of God it is however better to say that substance is here taken in a general sense as divided into first and second and when individual is added it is restricted to first substance reply to objection three substantial differences being unknown to us or at least unnamed by us it is sometimes necessary to use accidental differences in the place of substantial as for example we may say that fire is a simple hot and dry body for proper accidents are the effects of substantial forms and make them known likewise terms express above intention can be used in defining realities if used to signify things which are unnamed and so the term individual is placed in the definition of person to signify the mode of subsistence which belongs to particular substances reply to objection four according to the philosopher the word nature was first used to signify the generation of living things which is called nativity and because this kind of generation comes from an intrinsic principle this term is extended to signify the intrinsic principle of any kind of movement in this sense he defines nature and since this kind of principle is either formal or material both matter and form are commonly called nature and as the essence of anything is completed by the form so the essence of anything signified by the definition is commonly called nature and here nature is taken in that sense hence Boethius says that nature is the specific difference giving its form to each thing for the specific difference completes the definition and is derived from the special form of a thing so in the definition of person which means the singular in a determined genus it is more correct to use the term nature than essence because the latter is taken from being which is most common reply to objection 5 the soul is a part of the human species and so although it may exist in a separate state yet since it ever retains its nature of unibility it cannot be called an individual substance which is the hypothesis or first substance as neither came a hand nor any other part of man thus neither the definition nor the name of person belongs to it second article whether person is the same as hypothesis, subsistence and essence objection 1 it would seem that person is the same as hypothesis, subsistence and essence for Boethius says that the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by the name hypothesis but this with us signifies person therefore person is all together the same as hypothesis objection 2 further as we say there are three persons in God so we say there are three substances in God which implies that person and subsistence have the same meaning therefore person and subsistence mean the same objection 3 further Boethius says that the Greek usia which means essence signifies a being composed of matter and form now that which is composed of matter and form is the individual substance called hypothesis and person therefore all the aforesaid names seem to have the same meaning objection 4 on the contrary Boethius says that genera and species only subsist whereas individuals are not only subsistent but also substand but subsistence are so called from subsisting as substance or hypothesis is so called from substanding therefore since genera and species are not hypothesis or persons these are not the same as subsistence and objection 5 further Boethius says that matter is called hypothesis and form is called usiosis that is subsistence but neither form nor matter can be called person therefore person differs from the others I answer that according to the philosopher substance is two fold in one sense it means the quiddity of a thing that's definition and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing in which sense substance is called by the Greeks what we may call essence in another sense substance means a subject or suppositum which subsists in the genus of substance to this taken in a general sense can be applied a name expressive of an intention and thus it is called suppositum it is also called by three names signifying a reality that is a thing of nature subsistence and hypothesis according to a three fold consideration of the substance thus named for as it exists in itself and not in another it is called subsistence as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves and not in another as it underlies some common nature it is called a thing of nature as for instance this particular man is called a human natural thing as it underlies the accidents it is called hypothesis or substance what these three names signify in common to the whole genus of substances this name person signifies in the genus of rational substances reply to objection one among the Greeks the term hypothesis taken in the strict interpretation of the word signifies any individual of the genus substance but in the usual way of speaking it means the individual of the rational nature by reason of the excellence of that nature reply to objection two as we say three persons poorly in God and three substances so the Greeks say three hypotheses but because the word substance which properly speaking corresponds in meaning to hypothesis is used among us in an equivocal sense since it sometimes means essence and sometimes means hypothesis in order to avoid any occasion of error it was thought preferable to use subsistence for hypothesis rather than substance reply to objection three strictly speaking the essence is what is expressed by the definition now the definition comprises the principles of the species but not the individual principles hence in things composed of matter and form the essence signifies not only the form nor only the matter but what is composed of matter and the common form as the principles of the species but what is composed of this matter and this form has the nature of hypothesis in person for soul flesh and bone belong to the nature of man whereas this soul this flesh and this bone belong to the nature of this man therefore hypothesis and person add the individual principles to the idea of essence nor are these identified with the essence in things composed of matter and form as we said above when treating of divine simplicity reply to objection four Boethius says that genera and species subsist in as much as it belongs to some individual things to subsist from the fact that they belong to genera and species comprised in the predicament of substance but not because the species and genera themselves subsist except in the opinion of Plato who asserted that the species of one subsisted separately from singular things to substand however belongs to the same individual things in relation to the accidents which are outside the essence of genera and species reply to objection five the individual composed of matter and form substands in relation to accident from the very nature of matter hence Boethius says a simple form cannot be a subject its self subsistence is derived from the nature of its form which does not supervene to the things subsisting but gives actual existence to the matter and makes it subsist as an individual on this account therefore he ascribes hypothesis to matter and usiosis or subsistence to the form because the matter is the principle of substanding and form is the principle of subsisting third article whether the word person should be said of god objection one it would seem that the name person should not be said of god for Dionysius says no one should ever dare to say or think anything of the super substantial and hidden divinity beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles but the name person is not expressed to us in the old or new testament therefore person is not to be applied to god objection two further Boethius says the word person seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies and tragedies for person comes from sounding through since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the mask these persons or masks the greeks called prosopa as they were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes this however can apply to god only in a metaphorical sense therefore the word person is only applied to god metaphorically objection three further every person is a hypostasis but the word hypostasis does not apply to god since as Boethius says it signifies what is the subject of accidents which do not exist in god Jerome also says that in this word hypostasis poison lurks in honey therefore the word person should not be said of god objection four further if a definition is denied of anything the thing defined is also denied of it but the definition of person as given above does not apply to god both because reason implies a discursive knowledge which does not apply to god as we proved above and thus god cannot be said of nature and also because god cannot be called an individual substance since the principle of individuation is matter while god is immaterial nor is he the subject of accidents so as to be called a substance therefore the word person not to be attributed to god on the contrary in the creed of Athanasius we say one is the person of the father another of the son another of the holy ghost I answer that person signifies what is most perfect in all nature that is a subsistent individual of a rational nature hence since everything that is perfect must be attributed to god for as much as his essence contains every perfection this name person is fittingly applied to god not however as it is applied to creatures but in a more excellent way as other names also which while giving them to creatures we attribute to god as we showed above when treating of the names of god reply to objection one although the word person is not found applied to god in scripture either in the old or new testament nevertheless what the word signifies is found to be affirmed of god in many places of scripture as that he is the supreme self subsisting being and the most perfectly intelligent being if we could speak of god only in the very terms themselves of scripture it would follow that no one could speak about god in any but the original language of the old or new testament the urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find new words to express the ancient faith about god nor is such a kind of novelty to be shunned since it is by no means profane for it does not lead us astray from the sense of scripture the apostle warns us to avoid profane novelties of words reply to objection too although this name person may not belong to god as regards the origin of the term nevertheless it excellently belongs to god in its objective meaning for as famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies the name person was given to signify those who held high dignity hence those who held high rank in the church came to be called persons then by some the definition of person is given as hypothesis distinct by reason of dignity and because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity therefore every individual of the rational nature is called a person now this dignity of divine nature excels every other dignity and thus the name person preeminently belongs to god reply to objection 3 the word hypothesis does not apply to god as regards its source of origin since he does not underlie accidents but it applies to him in its objective sense for it is imposed to signify the subsistence Jerome said that poison lurks in this word for as much as before it was fully understood by the latins the heretics use this term to deceive the simple to make people profess many essences as they profess several hypothesis in as much as the word substance which corresponds to hypothesis in greek is commonly taken amongst us to mean essence reply to objection 4 it may be said that god has a rational nature if reason be taken to mean not discursive thought but in a general sense an intelligent nature but god cannot be called an individual in the sense that his individuality comes from matter but only in the sense which implies incommunicability substance can be applied to god in the sense of signifying self subsistence there are some however who say that the definition of Boethius quoted above is not a definition of person in the sense we use when speaking of persons in god therefore Richard of saint victor amends this definition by adding that person in god is the incommunicable existence of the divine nature fourth article whether this word person signifies relation objection 1 it would seem that this word person as applied to god does not signify relation but substance for Augustine says when we speak of the person of the father we mean nothing else but the substance of the father for person is said in regard to himself and not in regard to the son objection 2 further the interrogation what refers to essence but as Augustine says when we say there are three who bear witness in heaven the father the word and the holy ghost and it is asked three what the answer is three persons therefore person signifies essence objection 3 according to the philosopher the meaning of a word is its definition but the definition of person is thus the individual substance of the rational nature as above stated therefore person signifies substance objection 4 further person in men and angels does not signify relation but something absolute therefore if in god it signified relation it would bear an equivocal meaning in god in man and in angels on the contrary Boethius says that every word that refers to the persons signifies relation but no word belongs to person more strictly than the very word person itself therefore this word person signifies relation I answer that a difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this word person in god from the fact that it is predicated poorly of the three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the essence nor does it in itself refer to another as do the words which express relation hence some have thought that this word person of itself expresses absolutely the divine essence as this name god and this word wise but that to meet heretical attack it was ordained by conciliar decree that it was to be taken in a relative sense and especially in the plural or with the addition of a distinguishing adjective as when we say three persons or one is the person of the father another of the son and so forth used however in the singular it may be either absolute or relative but this does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation for if this word person by force of its own signification expresses the divine essence only it follows that for as much as we speak of three persons so far from the heretics being silence they had still more reason to argue seeing this others maintained that this word person in god signifies both the essence and the relation some of those said that it signifies directly the essence and relation indirectly for as much as person means as it were by itself one and unity belongs to the essence and what is by itself implies relation indirectly for the father is understood to exist by himself as relatively distinct from the son others however said on the contrary that it signifies relation directly and essence indirectly for as much as in the definition of person the term nature is mentioned indirectly and these came nearer to the truth to determine the question we must consider that something may be included in the meaning of a less common term which is not included in the more common term as rational is included in the meaning of man and not in the meaning of animal so that it is one thing to ask the meaning of the word animal and another to ask its meaning when the animal in question is man also it is one thing to ask the meaning of this word person in general and another to ask the meaning of person as applied to God for person in general signifies the individual substance of a rational figure the individual in itself is undivided but is distinct from others and for person in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones and this soul which are the individuating principles of a man and which though not belonging to person in general nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular human person now distinction in God is only by relation of origin as stated above while relation in God is not as an accident in a subject but is the divine essence itself and so it is subsistent for the divine essence subsists therefore as the God is God so the divine paternity is God the Father who is a divine person therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting and this is to signify relation by way of substance and such a relation is a hypothesis subsisting in the divine nature although in truth that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself thus it is true to say that the name person signifies relation directly and the essence indirectly not however the relation as such but as expressed by way of a hypothesis so likewise it signifies directly the essence and indirectly the relation in as much as the essence is the same as the hypothesis while in God the hypothesis is expressed as distinct by the relation and thus relation as such enters into the notion of the person indirectly thus we can say that this signification of the word person was not clearly perceived before it was attacked by heretics hence this word person was used just as was any other absolute term but afterwards it was applied to express relation as it lent itself to that signification so that this word person means relation not only by use and custom according to the first opinion but also by force of its own proper signification reply to objection one this word person is said in respect to itself not to another for as much as it signifies relation not as such but by way of a substance which is a hypothesis in that sense Augustine says that it signifies the essence in as much as in God essence is the same as the hypothesis because in God what he is and whereby he is are the same reply to objection two the term what refers sometimes to the nature expressed by the definition as when we ask what is man and we answer a mortal rational animal sometimes it refers to the suppositum as when we ask what swims in the sea and answer a fish so to those who ask three what we answer three persons reply to objection three in God the individual that is distinct and incommunicable substance includes the idea of relation as above explained reply to objection four the different sense of the less common term does not produce equivocation in the more common although a horse and an ass have their own proper definitions nevertheless they agree univically in animal because the common definition of animal applies to both so it does not follow that although relation is contained in the signification of divine person but not in that of an angelic or of a human person the word person is used in an equivocal sense though neither is it applied univically since nothing can be said univically of God and creatures the end of question 29 question 30 of Summa Theologica Pars Prima Trinity and Creation this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy Summa Theologica Pars Prima Trinity and Creation by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 30 the plurality of persons in God we are now led to consider the plurality of the persons about which there are four points of inquiry whether there are several persons in God how many are they what the numerical term signify in God and the community of the term person first article whether there are several persons in God Objection 1 it would seem that there are not several persons in God for person is the individual substance of a rational nature if then there are several persons in God there must be several substances which appears to be heretical Objection 2 further plurality of absolute properties does not make a distinction of persons either in God or in ourselves much less therefore is this affected by a plurality of relations but in God there is no plurality but of relations therefore there cannot be several persons in God Objection 3 further Boethius says of God that this is truly one which has no number but plurality implies number therefore there are not several persons in God and Objection 4 further where number is there is whole and part thus if in God there is just a number of persons there must be whole and part in God which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity on the contrary Athanasius says one is the person of the Father another of the Son another of the Holy Ghost therefore the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost are several persons I answer that it follows from what precedes are several persons in God for it was shown above that this word person signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine nature it was also established that there are several real relations in God and hence it follows that there are also several realities subsistent in the divine nature which means that there are several persons in God Reply to Objection 1 The definition of person includes substance not as meaning the essence but the suppositum which is made clear by the addition of the term individual to signify the substance thus understood the Greeks use the name hypothesis so as we say three persons they say three hypostases we are not however accustomed to say three substances lest we be understood to mean three essences or natures by reason of the equivocal signification of the term Reply to Objection 2 the absolute properties in God such as goodness and wisdom are not mutually opposed and hence neither are they really distinguished from each other therefore although they subsist the less they are not several subsistent realities that is several persons but the absolute properties in creatures do not subsist although they are really distinguished from each other as whiteness and sweetness on the other hand the relative properties in God subsist and are really distinguished from each other hence the plurality of persons in God Reply to Objection 3 the supreme unity and simplicity of God exclude every kind of plurality of absolute things but not plurality of relations because relations are predicated relatively and thus the relations do not import composition in that of which they are predicated as Boethius teaches in the same book Reply to Objection 4 number is twofold simple or absolute as two and three and four and number as existing in things numbered as two men and two horses so if number in God is taken absolutely or abstractedly there is nothing to prevent whole and part from being in Him and thus number in Him is only in our way of understanding for as much as number and part from things numbered exists only in the intellect but if number be taken as it is in the things numbered in that sense as existing in creatures one is part of two and two of three as one man is part of two men and two of three but this does not apply to God because the Father is of the same magnitude as the whole Trinity as we shall show further on second article there are more than three persons in God Objection 1 it would seem that there are more than three persons in God for the plurality of persons in God arises from the plurality of the relative properties as stated above but there are four revelations in God as stated above paternity, affiliation commonspiration and procession therefore there are four persons in God Objection 2 God does not differ from his will more than from his intellect but in God one person proceeds from the will as love and another proceeds from his nature as son therefore another proceeds from his intellect as word besides the one who proceeds from his nature as son thus again it follows that there are not only three persons in God Objection 3 further the more perfect a creature is the more interior operations it has as a man has understanding and will beyond other animals but God infinitely excels every creature therefore in God not only is there a person proceeding from the will and another from the intellect but also in an infinite number of ways therefore there are an infinite number of persons in God Objection 4 further it is from the infinite goodness of the Father that he communicates himself infinitely in the production of a divine person but also in the Holy Ghost is infinite goodness therefore the Holy Ghost produces a divine person and that person another and so to infinity Objection 5 further everything within a determinant number is measured for number is a measure but the divine persons are immense as we say in the Creed of Athanasius the Father is immense the Son is immense the Holy Ghost is immense therefore the persons are not contained within the number 3 on the contrary it is said there are 3 who bear witness in heaven the Father the Word and the Holy Ghost to those who ask 3 what we answer with Augustine 3 persons therefore there are but 3 persons in God we answer that as was explained above there can be only 3 persons in God for it was shown above that the several persons are the several subsisting relations really distinct from each other but a real distinction between the divine relations can come only from relative opposition therefore two opposite relations must needs refer to two persons and if any relations are not opposite they must needs belong to the same person since then paternity and filiation are opposite relations they belong necessarily to two persons therefore the subsisting paternity is the person of the Father and the subsisting filiation is the person of the Son the other two relations are not opposed to each other therefore these two cannot belong to one person hence either one of them must belong to both of the aforesaid persons or one must belong to one person and the other to the other now procession cannot belong to the Father and the Son or to either of them follow that the procession of the intellect which in God is generation where from paternity and filiation are derived would issue from the procession of love when spiration and procession are derived if the person generating and the person generated proceeded from the person spyrating and this is against what was laid down above we must consequently admit that procession belongs to the person of the Father and to the person of the Son for as much as it has no relative opposition either to paternity or to filiation and consequently that procession belongs to the other person who is called the person of the Holy Ghost who proceeds by way of love as above explained therefore only three persons exist the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost reply to objection one although there are four relations in God one of them, spiration, is not separated from the person of the Father and of the Son but belongs to both thus although it is a relation it is not called a property because it does not belong to only one person nor is it a personal relation that is constituting a person the three relations paternity, filiation and procession are called personal properties constituting as it were the persons for paternity is the person of the Father filiation is the person of the Son procession is the person of the Holy Ghost proceeding reply to objection two that which proceeds by way of of intelligence as word proceeds according to similitude as also that which proceeds by way of nature thus as above explained the procession of the divine word is the very same as generation by way of nature but love as such does not proceed as the similitude of that whence it proceeds although in God love is as coessential as being divine and therefore the procession of love is not called generation in God reply to objection three as man is more perfect than other animals he has more intrinsic operations than other animals because his perfection is something composite hence the angels who are more perfect and more simple have fewer intrinsic operations than man for they have no imagination or feeling or the like in God there exists only one real operation that is his essence how there are in him two processions was above explained reply to objection four this argument would prove if the Holy Ghost possessed another goodness apart from the goodness of the Father for then if the Father produced a divine person by his goodness the Holy Ghost also would do so but the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and the same goodness nor is there any distinction between them except by the personal relations so goodness belongs to the Holy Ghost as derived from another and it belongs to the Father as a principle of its communication to another the opposition of relation does not allow the relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the relation of principle of another divine person because he himself proceeds from the other persons who are in God reply to objection five a determinate number if taken as a simple number existing in the mind only by one but when we speak of a number of things as applied to the persons in God the notion of measure has no place because the magnitude of the three persons is the same and the same is not measured by the same third article whether the numerical terms denote anything real in God objection one it would seem that the numerical terms denote something real in God for the divine unity is the divine essence but every number is unity repeated therefore every numerical term in God signifies the essence and therefore it denotes something real in God objection two further whatever is set of God and of creatures belongs to God in a more imminent manner than to creatures but the numerical terms denote something real in creatures therefore much more so in God objection three further if the numerical terms do not denote anything real in God and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense as plurality is employed to remove unity and unity to remove plurality it follows that a vicious circle results confusing the mind and obscuring the truth and this ought not to be therefore it must be said that the numerical terms denote something real in God contrary Hilary says if we admit companionship that is plurality we exclude the idea of oneness and of solitude and Ambrose says when we say one God unity excludes plurality of gods and does not imply quantity in God hence we see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove something and not to denote anything positive in the answer that the master considers that the numerical terms do not denote anything positive in God but have only a negative meaning others however assert the contrary in order to resolve this point we may observe that all plurality is a consequence of division now division is two fold one is material and is division of the continuous from this results number which is a species of quantity number in this sense is found only in material things which have quantity the other kind of division is called formal and is affected by opposite or diverse forms and this kind of division results in a multitude which does not belong to a genus but is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by many this kind of multitude is found only in immaterial things some considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete quantity and seeing that such kind of quantity has no place in God asserted that the numerical terms do not denote anything real in God but remove something from him others considering this kind of multitude said that as knowledge exists in God according to the strict sense of the word but not in the sense of its genus as in God there is no such thing as equality so number exists in God in the proper sense of number but not in the sense of its genus which is quantity but we say that numerical terms predicated of God are not derived from number a species of quantity for in that sense they could bear only a metaphorical sense in God like other corporeal properties such as length, breadth and the like but that they are taken from multitude in a transcendent sense now multitude so understood has relation to the many of which it is predicated as one convertible with being which kind of oneness does not add anything to being except a negation of division as we saw when treating of the divine unity for one signifies undivided being so of whatever we say one we imply its undivided reality thus for instance one applied to man signifies the undivided nature or substance of a man in the same way when we speak of many things multitude in this latter sense points to those things as being each undivided in itself but number if taken as a species of quantity denotes an accident added to being as also does one which is the principle of that number therefore the numerical terms in God signify the things of which they are said and beyond this they add relation only as stated in which respect the master was right so when we say the essence is one the term one signifies the essence undivided and when we say the person is one it signifies the person undivided and when we say the persons are many we signify those persons and their individual undividedness for it is of the very nature of multitude that it should be composed of units reply to objection one one as it is a transcendental is wider and more general than substance and relation and so likewise is multitude hence in God it may mean both substance and relation according to the context still the very signification of such names adds a negation of division beyond substance and relation as was explained above reply to objection two multitude which denotes something real in creatures is a species of quantity and cannot be used when speaking of God unlike transcendental multitude which adds only indivision to those of which it is predicated such a kind of multitude is applicable to God reply to objection three one does not exclude multitude but division which logically proceeds one or multitude multitude does not remove unity but division from each of the individuals which compose the multitude this was explained when we treated of the divine unity it must be observed nevertheless that the opposite arguments do not sufficiently prove the point advanced although the idea of solitude is excluded by plurality and the plurality of God's by unity it does not follow that these terms express this signification alone for blackness is excluded by whiteness nevertheless the term whiteness does not signify the mere exclusion of blackness fourth article whether this term person can be common to the three persons objection one it would seem that this term person cannot be common to the three persons for nothing is common to the three persons but the essence but this term person does not signify the essence directly therefore it is not common to all three objection two further the common is the opposite to the incommunicable but the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable as appears from the definition given by Richard of Saint Victor therefore this term person is not common to all the three persons and objection three further if the name person is common to the three it is common either really or logically but it is not so really otherwise the three persons one person nor again is it so logically otherwise person would be a universal but in God there is neither universal nor particular neither genus nor species as we have proved above therefore this term person is not common to the three on the contrary Augustine says that when we ask three what we say three persons because what a person is is common to them I answer that the very mode of expression itself shows that this term person is common to the three when we say three persons for when we say three men we show that man is common to the three now it is clear that this is not community of a real thing as if one essence were common to the three otherwise there would be only one person of the three as also one essence what is meant by such a community has been variously determined by those who have examined the subject some have called it a community of exclusion for as much as the definition of person contains the word incommunicable others thought it to be a community of intention as the definition of person contains the word individual as we say that to be a species is common to horse and ox both of these explanations however are excluded by the fact that person is not a name of exclusion nor of intention but the name of a reality we must therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name person is common by a community of idea not as genus or species but as a vague individual thing the names of genura and species as man and animal are given to signify the common natures themselves but not the intentions of those common natures signified by the terms genus or species the vague individual thing as some man signifies the common nature with the determinate mode of existence of singular things that is something self-subsisting as distinct from others but the name of a designated singular thing signifies that which distinguishes the determinate thing as the name Socrates signifies this flesh and this bone but there is this difference that the term some man signifies the nature or the individual on the part of this nature with the mode of existence of singular things while this name person is not given to signify the individual on the part of the nature there is this persistent reality in that nature now this is common in idea to the divine persons that each of them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature thus this name person is common in idea to the three divine persons reply to objection one this argument is founded on a real community reply to objection two although person is incommunicable self of incommunicable existence can be common to many and reply to objection three although this community is logical and not real yet it does not follow that in God there is universal or particular or genus or species both because neither in human affairs is the community of person the same as community of genus or species and because the divine persons have one being whereas genus and species and every other universal are predicated of many which differ in being the end of question 30