 Welcome everyone it's great to see the room full and once again the Crawford School every time I come here hints to me that we need a larger set of rooms in this complex. Before I begin I would like to acknowledge and celebrate the first Australians on whose lands we meet the none of all people and pay my respects to their elders past and present. Your Excellencies Ambassador of Japan High Commissioner of Canada High Commissioner of South Africa and other members of the diplomatic corps distinguished international visitors ladies and gentlemen. I'm delighted this afternoon to join this international conference on Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Challenges and cooperation hosted by the ANU's National Security College and it is my privilege to introduce to you in the next few moments our keynote speaker Admiral Scott Swift commander of the US Pacific Fleet and I've had a very interesting conversation with him over the last 20 minutes and you are in for really getting a deep insight into the topic of this meeting. As the National University of Australia ANU has a mission to foster policy debate, policy insight and provide policy ideas on the issues critical to Australia's future. This goes hand-in-hand with excellence in research and teaching and this event is part of our mission the very core of our mission. In the area of national security and related fields of statecraft that is very much the philosophy of the National Security College our own NSC. Recently for instance the college has convened a week-long international conference on cyber security I got to be part of that as well this involved academia, government and industry and it was intended and did generate new concepts and partnerships to protect Australia's interest in that critical and emerging domain. Along with the Crawford School and Indian partner institutions the NSC is recently held a bilateral dialogue in New Delhi the Australian India Policy Forum and this will help inform an important and growing bilateral relationship across the full policy spectrum between our two countries and later this year the NSC has plans for a conference with Chinese academics on counterterrorism and related issues. You see we're covering the whole area and that is one of the remits of the Crawford School and the NSC. This week's conference however is decidedly marathon. It is focused on security challenges and partnerships in a region becoming known as the Indo-Pacific. No doubt that concept will be debated here but it could be described as a fresh way of looking at what has been we've been accustomed of calling the Asia Pacific with an emphasis on the economic and strategic importance of the oceans and the sea lanes. These discussions are not solely about any one country and we have imminent expert speakers from Indonesia, China and India as well as many leading Australian academics and not all of them from the ANU. That is part of what the National University is is not just to be us but bringing together the entire nation. For the reasons that Professor Medcap has noted in an earlier session there is also an emphasis on the perspectives of Japan. As the recent Australian Defense White Paper has affirmed, Australia needs to develop new regional partnerships to ensure its prosperity and security in the coming century. The Defense White Paper also states however that a strong and deep alliance is at the core of Australia's security and defense planning. Our keynote speaker today knows full well the meaning behind those words. Admiral Scott Swift is one of the most distinguished and senior officers in the U.S. Navy and carries great responsibilities for regional security as commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet with its headquarters in sunny Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Admiral Swift attended San Diego State University and received his commission in 1979 through the Aviation Reserve Officer Candidate Program. He received his master's degree from the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. His senior operational assignments include Deputy Commander, Naval Forces, U.S. Central Command Commander, Carrier Strike Group 9, and Commander U.S. Seventh Fleet. During those tours he participated in combat operations, Praying Mantis, Southern Watch, during Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. His shore tour assignments include Commander of Strike Fighter Weapon School, Pacific, Officer of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Staff, and Director of Operations, U.S. Pacific Command. Prior to assuming command at U.S. Pacific Fleet he was assigned to the Pentagon as Director of Navy Staff. Admiral Swift is entitled to wear the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, and Meritorious Service Medal along with various other awards which I think I could probably go on based on what's here all day. Our speaker is no stranger to Australia and this region I think he said it's his fifth trip to Canberra and he appreciated that the weather was very nice today and maybe not always like this. And this is particularly from his time as Commander of the Seventh Fleet based in Japan. It gives me great pleasure to invite Admiral Swift to share his insights on the regional security challenges and cooperation. Admiral Swift. It's great to be here this morning. I see many familiar faces in the crowd. I have a few comments that I'd like to make up front but I'm most interested in getting to the questions and comments that you all may have and turn this into a two way educational experience. I'm traveling with Lieutenant General Tulan, my naval partner in the Pacific. He wears two hats. He's the Commander of Marine Forces in the Pacific but he's also the Commander of Fleet Marine Forces in the Pacific and in that hat he's actually subordinate to me when Marines are embarked and then of course he takes a leadership role of those Marines when they disembark and are ashore. So it's great to be traveling with John and his team. I'd like to offer a special thanks to the National Security College here at the Australian National University and the Embassy of Japan in Australia for co-hosting this event. I'm particularly heartened by the diversity of opinion and perspective represented by those attending this important forum. As I've said many times before, these opportunities for inclusive dialogue helped to push us beyond admiring the problem of the day and toward developing more predictive long term responses to shared concerns. This conference falls at an important moment both in my tenure as the Commander of the US Pacific Fleet and for the broader Indo-Asia Pacific region that I serve in. Over the past 10 months I've traveled throughout this region from the West Coast of the United States to Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia, South Asia and most recently to the large ocean nations of Oceania. All of these sub regions are vital parts of the vast Indo-Asia Pacific through which not only our economies flow but the global economy as well. Some have described the Indo-Asia Pacific as the economic engine that drives the global economy. Whether your views are as grand as that, I have not found anyone who disagrees with the notion that the regional economy drove the rising tide of prosperity that has lifted so many from poverty. All of our nations large and small have major equities in the international rules based system established in the wake of World War II that it has been foundational as an enabler to this rising tide. Over the past 70 years this principled system has fostered a highly interconnected neighborhood in which exclusivity and hierarchy have no place. We are all locals here. There are no outsiders or subordinate states among the Indo-Asia Pacific nations. We are all given voice after World War II regardless of economic stature, heritage, culture, form of government or military strength. Some nations do not see it this way and seeking to write perceived imbalances or wrongs of the past are abandoning the international rules based system in the process. As a consequence, portions of the sea are besieged by word or deed to serve unilateral interests alone. Manifest by unprecedented examples of aggressive construction and militarization on disputed land features as well as legal appeals to historic paths that are inconsistent with international law. There is a palatable sense that an arc of right makes right is returning to the region after more than 70 years of security and stability. Attempts to justify these activities at sea are often based on channeling nationalistic history outward, the sort of thing that may stoke patriotism at home but has no place among responsible nations in international waters. It's becoming increasingly clear that a contest is underway in the most vulnerable waters of the Indo-Asia Pacific. As mentioned earlier, on one side is a potential return of might makes right after more than 70 years of stability. On the other is a continuum of international rules based system that has served us so well with limitless potential to continuing to do so. Though larger nations are certainly affected by these new challenges to the freedoms we enjoy and to the rules based system in particular, smaller nations that border disputed waters are most vulnerable and increasingly alarmed by these disruptive trends. Charmless offenses which have offered dubious reassurances in the past are clearly no longer charming and no longer adequate to buy silence or distract regional countries from aggressive activities occurring just beyond their shores. Regional rhetoric is catching up to this reality. Late last month the chairman of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and separately Singapore's Minister of Foreign Affairs raised the region's concerns about growing maritime instability at a summit in Laos. The chairman noted that colleagues from all 10 ASEAN nations and I quote remained seriously concerned over the recent and ongoing developments end quote and as such quote land reclamations and escalation of activities in the area. End quote. Reminding us that maritime disputes involve many more nations than just the direct claimants foreign minister Dr. Balakrishnan said and I quote again Singapore is not a claimant state nevertheless because we are a small country we have to firmly adhere with the concept of a rules based world order in other words we cannot have a world where might makes right end quote. I also hear clear and direct expressions of this anxiety from every regional leader and geopolitical expert I meet with during my many travels throughout the region. There are two primary elements driving this anxiety first is the disproportionate scope scale and acceleration of the disruptive activities I have mentioned before especially in contested areas and surrounding waters second is a lack of transparency about the intentions of some regional navies coast guards and paramilitary forces under their command. The resulting climate of uncertainty not only threatens freedom of the seas and chips away at the rules based system it encourages nations to transfer ever largest share of national wealth to purchase naval weapons beyond what is needed merely for self-defense. More and more media reports reflect broad concern for rising military budgets as well as calls for greater transparency and a clear explanation of intentions. Relatedly and most troubling are the undeniable signs of militarization in select parts of the region unprecedented in terms of scope and scale. The seeds of this militarization were sown by garrisons established decades ago in barely habitable outposts. Now many of their original blockhouses are dwarfed by thousands of acres of reclaimed land with newly constructed barracks, deep water ports, extended runways, high power radars, surface to air missiles and squadrons of naval aircraft. Recent restrictions on internet and press freedoms by some nations may very well reflect their true intentions toward all forms of international exchange. Freedom across cyberspace may be less tangible than freedom of navigation for ships at sea but it is no less consequential in today's interconnected world. Successful imposition of restricted national laws in international waters would likely require militarization. For these reasons I remain concerned that the freedoms of the seas and some Indo-Asia Pacific waters is not only at risk by long-standing challenges like piracy, smuggling and other illicit activities, it is increasingly vulnerable to a state-led resurgence of the principle of Mike Mank's right. I believe there is a clear choice of a best practice to emulate and replicate among the competing visions I have outlined, one that can be illustrated within the vast Indo-Asia Pacific region. Just after the new year I visited India and Bangladesh. In Bangladesh I attended the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium where I remarked that if I stood in the Straits of Malacca looking east into the South China Sea and East China Sea I saw protracted maritime disputes and a lack of transparency in contested waters. Looking west into the Indian Ocean I saw neighboring nations large and powerful such as India as well as smaller and more vulnerable such as Bangladesh and Myanmar Burma working together in international fora to resolve similar types of disputes peacefully and promote an inclusive climate of cooperation at sea. By submitting long-standing disputes to international institutions and agreeing to honor the outcomes these nations demonstrated the responsible application of a 70-year-old model forged in war tested by time modified by consensus decisions and adjudicated in accordance with international law. If I now here today re-center my orientation from the Straits of Malacca to the center of the Indian Ocean I am struck by what I see looking west. There the situation deteriorates rapidly in parts of Eastern Europe the Levant and the Maghreb. Ongoing turmoil in Syria, Libya and Ukraine reflects the resurgent challenges of international terrorism failed states and large states invading their much smaller neighbors. These challenges extend to the vital waters of the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea which enabled the prosperity that region has enjoyed for so long. Here in the Indo-Asia Pacific we would do well to notice that these seas are now vectors of instability plaguing the region. Put simply Mike makes right is taking root in these places in ways that continue to challenge existing regional governance structures and are spreading to the international community in large part from the sea. So I end with a message of hope concern and reality hope that the international rules-based system that has served us so well regionally as well as globally for the last 70 years will remain the gold standard for issue resolution. We have only to look as far as the nations that border the Indian Ocean for an example and an affirmation that nations great and small and are valued by what up to now has been an enduring model of issue resolution and stability. Concern, concern that my example of standing in the middle of the Indian Ocean what I view as a relative sea of tranquility and looking west into the increasing chaos of the Mediterranean and the Black Seas may be analogous to looking through a window at a potential future for the Indo-Asia Pacific region. And last that the reality is demonstrated from the days of sale the great British, French and Spanish armadas as true today as then that the canary in the cold mine of regional and global stability and prosperity isn't found in a cave but on international waters. We have assumed so long these international seas are the domain of all free men. Perhaps now we too easily dismiss these freedom enablers these guarantors of stability and prosperity as simply freedom of navigation. In closing on the theme of this conference challenges opportunities and cooperation I suggest while we could admire the example set for us by our Indian Ocean friends we have an obligation to ensure that the opportunity the Indian Ocean example presents is leveraged to ensure that all rise to the challenge of ensuring the sea of tranquility does not become an oasis more defined by the chaos that surrounds it than by the stability within. The key to ensuring the longevity and application of this Indian Ocean model throughout the rest of the Indo-Asia Pacific region is cooperation cooperation in the form of applying the same international rules based system of accepted norms standards rules and laws that have served us so well so long and well into the future. Thank you I look forward to the opportunity of expanding my knowledge through your informative questions and comments. Thank you Admiral please don't go away that's I think been a very very valuable and quite compelling exposition of the issues and I particularly valued the way in which you looked at the comparisons and the analogies with different regions and different sub regions including interestingly the Mediterranean as well as the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean we have time for some questions and I certainly want to offer an opportunity to as many of you as possible to ask questions of Admiral Swift so the way we'll proceed I'll ask you to raise your hands and your first sir I ask you to raise your hands and when the microphone comes to you please identify yourself as we are on the public record I'll probably take about three questions at a time and then give the Admiral opportunity to address them so we'll start with this gentleman and then the young woman for the back. Thank you very much Admiral Teng Jianqin from China Institute of International Studies. I used to be a naval officer in the South China Sea Fleet headquarters of the PLA Navy as I should say to you and in recent years we have witnessed the competition between China and the United States has been intensified especially in the South China Sea and you know we are puzzled a little bit about the attitude by the US Navy and US Air Force toward this region some said this is a competition between and traditional maritime power and new uprising maritime power it's not only a issue of freedom of navigation so what is your comment and the second is a technical question you know in recent days I think last week or a week ago the US aircraft carrier battle group stand is in the just in the South China Sea and there were some PLA Navy vessels came very close to the battle group do you think is a professional response from the Chinese side according to the MOU you know between the two sides thank you. Two questions I think you should take. Yeah thank you thank you for the questions and thank you for being here today and if you would pass my congratulations to Admiral Su to his recent appointment to his new position as the PLA is going through a restructuring I think his responsibilities have expanded greatly. I had the pleasure of visiting Shanghai recently and and I had deep and extensive discussions with Admiral Su and and I was privileged to go to Beijing after that and enjoyed a extended evening with Admiral Wu as well so to the to the first question on activities in the South China Sea with the PLAN units and Pacific fleet units I don't see the situation there on the water as as being changed both Admiral Su and Admiral Wu and I talked about the difference of opinion at the national level between the Chinese government and the US government and we we all three agreed that it was very important for us as naval leaders to ensure that those disagreements did not manifest themselves on on the waters at sea as our navies interact together and in fact the code for unalerted encounters at sea has been a very positive development and the engagements the dialogue that occurs at sea between the captains of PLAN ships and and the Pacific fleet ships is is very positive. I think the core to that first question is best answered by comments that Secretary Defense Carter made that the US would continue to sail and fly in accordance with international law which is what we have continued to do as a force. The Stennis Strike Group was recently in the in the South China Sea there was interaction as there always is in the seas between US naval units and PLA and units as well. All I would characterize all these interactions as as being very positive bridge to bridge exchanges as you would expect would occur between any sailors at sea is the norm that that marked the interaction of of these vessels. Thank you I think the young woman here and then Hi I'm Darshan from the Observer Research Foundation in Delhi and I'm also currently with the Crawford School here at ANU. I have two quick questions when we talk about the Indo-Pacific we mostly end up talking about the countries of ranging from India, Australia, Indonesia, Japan. I want to know your viewpoints on what about these smaller island nations in the region like more of these Mauritius seashells and even South Pacific and what kind of role do you see them playing in the emerging and security discourse that's shaping in the region especially in light of Chinese investments in these islands. Second question in relation to the South China Sea disputes in recent few past weeks there has been a lot in the media about US leadership encouraging India to play a larger role in the South China Sea. This US really believed that India is ready or prepared to carry out joint patrols in the South China Sea because India doesn't seem to be ready itself and if that is leading to concerns somewhere about slowing down the process of new pace in the US maritime relationship about US pushing India too hard at public forums on issues such as the South China Sea. Thank you. I'll restrict others to one question at a time. I appreciate it. Thank you. Well it's great to see you again a little bit different than the last time we saw each other in Delhi which I think is reflective of the common interest broadly across the region. To the issues size in my mind is not a significant factor. International laws are not based on the size of anyone's country's economy or what its claims may be. It is the equalizer of all nations. So as I say as I made the comments in Delhi I wrote an op-ed for the paper and then follow on engagements in Bangladesh that I do think that there's a model to follow that the resolution of some of the disputes between India a very large powerful nation by every measure population military economy chose to go to international arbitration and to accept the outcome of that arbitration with a much smaller more vulnerable country like Bangladesh. And I think the result is you see the continued prosperity and growth within the Indian Ocean region. The ions I think was also reflective of the broad engagement and embracing of these international norms standards and rules and laws by all the nations in the Indian Ocean certainly Sri Lanka and India Bangladesh Burma the Maldives Seychelles others as well. I note that Spain had representatives there as did Germany many many the European countries and of course many of the the Pacific as well. So I think this is a model to be held up as an example. I'm aware of the comments that have been made about India's role in the region. I continue to be an advocate and a supporter of the Indian nation and Amal Dohan's view and the Indian's navy Amal Dohan's view of the future of that navy and the Indian government but I think it's very important that that they're the dialogue is focused on the interest of the individual countries and where those interests intersect that those are are the basis of where we can collaborate and cooperate. But these are serious issues there in play I think rightfully so my operations that may be directed to establish and affirm a US government's position. Those decisions are held at the US government level back in Washington DC not my level and I would suggest that this this dialogue in the background about joint patrols or collaborative patrols or collaborative exercises those discussions are best at the national level and then once the countries decide on the way forward then it is turned to us as naval leaders to determine how best to implement that guidance from from the government level. Thanks Warrie. I'm Ewan Graham from the Lowy Institute. Nice to see you again Admiral. Last time I saw you you were cutting a cake on Blue Ridge when you were still with the Seventh Fleet. Welcome to Australia. Two quick questions. One given that you transitioned from the Seventh Fleet to Commander Pack Fleet does the region look any different to you from those two vantage point? Does it matter where you where you sit? It's a lot bigger. And the second point to bring you again I'm afraid back to the South China Sea with your from a naval perspective what it's a hypothetical but if you were to lose your access internationally in Shrine to the South China Sea what practical impact would it have on you as a commander? How important is it and could you live without that? Yeah so in to address your first question certainly my responsibilities from a geographic perspective are much smaller as the Seventh Fleet commander although the tyranny of distance certainly affects the Seventh Fleet commander's perspective every day. But it is it is much different as the Pacific Fleet commander. I have to be attentive to the policy issues and the other issues that are play in the entire region. I also have a much larger responsibility for the sustainment of the force that I'm responsible for. So there's over 200 ships over a thousand aircraft. I have over 140,000 sailors that are assigned to Pacific Fleet. So there's a there's a business element of my responsibilities as the Pacific Fleet commander that consumes a significant piece of my time that was not the case when I was the when I was a Seventh Fleet commander. Look I think the question that you ask is not an uncommon question and I hear it many times for from those that I speak to in the region but it's not this isn't a naval issue. One of my frustration is and I commented in my comments today is this unpacking of the freedom of navigation. The issue is not the impact on me as a as a military sailor. The issue is the impact from an economic perspective and from a rules-based perspective. The dialogue that's occurring across the region about the impact of national laws being applied in international space to NGOs, to commercial interests, to internet access, to privacy requirements. That that is what I hear in the region as I speak to business leaders, government leaders, military leaders. That's what the core issue. I think it is important that that your question is a hypothetical. That's not an expectation of something that is going to occur but if it were to occur the implications are far beyond the scope of anything that's military in nature. It's much broader than that. Dr. Malcolm Davis, Australian Strategic Policy Institute. At the moment the Chinese are focused very much on the near and middle seas and developing capabilities for offshore active defense there but they're moving obviously in regards to the 21st century maritime silk road. They're gradually starting to build the sort of capabilities to project power into the Indian Ocean. So do you think that one possible response to China's moves in that regard would be to resuscitate the quadrilateral security arrangements, the Quad comprising India, Japan, Australia and the United States? Yeah, so the question is a little bit beyond the scope of my responsibility so let me approach it this way. I'm not a policymaker and I'm not here to give policy advice to people that aren't interested in getting it from me. But I will say there needs to be a separation of what's happening economically in the region. The economic growth is stunning and it continues and to correlate economic growth with something that's more sinister I think we need to be very careful about that. The challenge is the lack of transparency of many nations about what their intent is but every time we see an economic investment I am reluctant to correlate a military significance to that. I haven't found anybody that would disagree with me that everyone wants a strong and emerging China. Everyone is lifted by that. The question that I get from the region is by what rule set will govern that emergence? I would defer to others on the value of the one belt, one road from the economic perspectives. I see that there's value there but I'm certainly not an economist and I do think it would be premature to think in terms of the current security structures do we need to rethink those based on what is I think something that's welcomed by the region as a vibrant and growing Chinese economy? We're getting short of time. There are no more questions from the room for the moment I might just pose a question to the admiral myself turning to the alliance context of some of the conversations that we're having in this conference and elsewhere and of course a number of US alliances in the region but of course in this in this town the alliance of Australia matters perhaps a little more than the others. The alliance, US alliance with Japan is also of enormous significance. It would be interesting to hear some of your reflections on how do you see mutual expectations in those alliances moving forward and in particular any reflections you have on the Australian Defence White Paper that was released recently. A couple of points I would make. I guess I would start to say that the United States has seven formal alliances across the world. Five of them are here in the Pacific. So those that sometimes take exception to what the President has characterized the United States as being a Pacific nation I would point to that. In fact one of the oldest alliances treaty alliances that we have is with Thailand which is one of the first alliances that we signed as a new nation and certainly Japan and Australia are a part of that sphere. Those alliances are interesting because it gives us a structure on which to build relationships and from that perspective it's useful. But the other term I talk about our allies our partners and friends and I include in my definition of what friends are I include China. As I said the exchanges that we have at sea captain to captain are by and large are very formal and positive and where they get directive from policy issues they're by script. It's clearly a script that is describing the nation the national perspective of the flag that flies from that from that vessel. I have a strong relationship with Admiral Su and Admiral Wu as I mentioned as well. So I think the term friends is broadly inclusive in my perspective. It's also important to note that there's many countries in the region that we don't have formal alliances with that we have long and lasting relationships with certainly from a maritime perspective there's a series of exercises that that we refer to as carrot that we interact broadly in a multilateral and bilateral way with countries throughout the region and have for many years. So I think there is a strong relationship of understanding across the region in which to continue this effort of focusing on those mechanisms that have ensured the stability that we all have enjoyed over the last 70 years. I was I'm you know all my comments are my own I'm not speaking for the U.S. government and I wouldn't presuppose others that might be assessing the recent white paper but I was struck in reading it I was the words that come to my mind are consistency as it it wasn't there weren't major changes in there that I saw the specificity of it quite frankly I was quite envious of the stunning of direct clear guidance from the government of where they were going internally and then the physical commitment to it that there was actually a commitment from a budget perspective of putting reality behind the measures that were discussed I thought it was a broadly joint in nature I'm very pleased as a naval officer to see the commitment to Admiral Barrett's naval forces I'm going to enjoy lunch with him here shortly but the other services of the Australian Defense Forces as well I it it makes me very comfortable to see that white paper as a continued affirmation of the relationship that I join that I enjoy with the the Australian Air Force the Australian Navy and the Australian Army the ground forces so thank you Admiral thank you very much look it just remains it just remains for me to say a few last words to close this session and I know we'll be going straight into another session so most of you will probably want to remain remain in place but look it's very I think pleasing from the perspective of the university and the national security college and indeed I think colleagues in the room here from other Australian institutions that you've given a very a very thoughtful a very considered a very substantial set of remarks was today and I I appreciate the the grace and the professionalism of which you've taken the questions as well the Alliance of the United States as the Vice-Chancellor pointed out in his remarks and as the white paper emphasises remains critically important to Australia's security Australia's future we are as a nation deepening other relationships in the very context that you've you've described in this conference as a chance to really explore all of that so it just remains for me to really to thank you and to ask the rest of the audience to join me in expressing their their appreciation