 I'm Susan Collins, the Joan and Sanford Wildean here at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy and I'm really delighted to see all of you here with us this afternoon. I'd like to welcome you to what is our final policy talks of the 2016 academic year. We're ending on a really high note, which we're very pleased about. Today's event is part of the Ford School's annual City Foundation lecture series. This is a series that, as many of you know, enables the Ford School to bring some of the world's most prominent policy leaders and thinkers here to campus. And so it really is my great honor today to welcome all of you here to hear from one of the nation's most distinguished military leaders, General George Casey Jr. We're delighted to have you with us. General Casey will share his experience and insight on how the rise of non-state actors with global reach like Al Qaeda and ISIS has really significantly complicated and already very complex international security environment. General Casey served as the 36th Chief of Staff for the U.S. Army, and in this capacity he was the most senior uniformed officer in the Army, serving on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and advising the National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, and the President of the United States. From 2004 to 2007, he commanded a coalition of over 30 countries, peace, and security forces in Iraq, living in a combat zone, leading forces through Iraq's transition to a sovereign government, three elections, and the growth of the Iraqi Army and police. General Casey has had a global perspective his entire life. He was born in Sendai during the Allied Occupation of Japan. He graduated from Georgetown's Wall School of Foreign Service, and he earned his Master's in International Relations from what is now the Joseph Corbell School of International Studies at the University of Denver. Over 41 years of military service, his assignments have taken him to Europe, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia. He currently serves as the National Security, on the National Security Advisory Council of the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, and he also teaches courses on civil military relations in war at the Corbell School. One of General Casey's major legacies has been improving the Army's long-term support for wounded soldiers and their families, as well as for survivors of the fallen. He created the Army Survivor Outreach Services. He pledged resources to improving soldiers' psychological health and recovery from the emotional traumas of war. He pushed the military to reduce the stigma associated with combat stress, implemented alcohol treatment and suicide prevention programs at Army installations around the country. At his retirement ceremony in 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that General Casey has served as a stalwart advocate and guide for thousands of brave young men and women and their loved ones, and he was awarded a Defense Distinguished Medal of Service. Following General Casey's remarks, we'll open to questions from the audience. Starting around 4.30 p.m., we'll have staff who will start collecting the question cards. Professor Joy Rody, together with Ford School students Brian Garcia and Sonia Swanbeck, will facilitate the question and answer session. And if you're watching us virtually, please tweet your questions to us using the hashtag policy talks. And now it is truly a great honor for me to welcome to the podium General Casey. Hi. Good afternoon. I'm going to stand out here a little bit. I'm too short to stand behind the podium. I heard when I got here that Michigan time was 10 minutes late. I kind of came out at the other direction because I used to work for Vince Lombardi one year when I was in college, when he coached the Redskins. And Lombardi time was 15 minutes early. And boy, was that a shock when he implemented that. It's great to be with you this afternoon. One of the things people always ask me is what was it like transitioning from running an organization of a million people spread all around the world and with a staff of hundreds at your beck and call, taking care of your every need to retire from the military and go to really being an army of one, my iPhone and me. And I tell you, I wrestled with that for a long time and to describe to people what the challenge and what that transition was. And then one day, right before Christmas last year, I was doing a crossword puzzle as I do every morning. And I'm going along and the clue was army head seven letters. Easy, general, boom, move on. So I go on and you know how when you're doing a crossword puzzle, you start to realize that something's not quite working. And I kept going back to this one and I realized that's not it. And then I finally realized that the clue was an army head. It was army head and the answer was latrine. So from general to latrine is a pretty good way of describing what that transition was like. What I'd like to do for about 30 minutes this afternoon is to give you a soldier's view of the international security environment. And it's a view that's been framed over 41 years from the waning days of Vietnam until the early days of the Arab Spring. And it's a view that's been shaped by transforming a very good 20th century army that was designed to prevail in combat over other states armies to an army that was able to deal with the very different security challenges of the 21st century. I'll make three points with you today. And the first point being that the threat has changed and changed significantly and we all, no surprise to you, we live in a far more difficult and complex world than we did. Certainly when I came in the army in 1970. Second, it may not seem like it to you as you go about your daily lives, but this later this year in September, the country will have been at war for 15 years. And I believe we've yet to appreciate as a society the fact that we're involved in a long-term ideological struggle against Islamic extremism. And the duration of that struggle is going to be more akin to that of the Cold War than it is of like the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And then the third point I'll make with you is that the trends as I see them in the international environment seem to me to be more likely to ameliorate that long-term struggle, I'm sorry, to exacerbate that long-term struggle rather than ameliorate them. And then I'll finish up with a couple of thoughts about what we as a country can do and should do to be successful in that environment. All right, all in favor? All right. Here we go. The threat. So for centuries, if you could control the conduct of states, you had some modicum of a chance of maintaining global order. And we didn't do too well in that during the 19th, I'm sorry, the 20th century where we just we wound up destroying Europe twice. However, today, we're faced with what I think is a significantly more complex challenge and that's non-state actors. And if you think back to September 11th, you have a non-state actor, Al Qaeda, was able to inflict significant damage, I would say catastrophic damage on a country, on a state, us. I mean, think about it, 19 terrorists in an hour and 17 minutes killed 2,000, murdered 2,977 people from 90 different countries inflicted about $40 billion of economic damage on New York. And when the stock market opened six days later, it lost $1.4 trillion in value in the first week. That's, to me, is catastrophic damage. And that's the challenge that we need to be prepared to deal with. So in the future, not only are we going to have to deal with states behaving badly as we have for centuries, we're going to have to deal with non-state actors with global reach who have access to the instruments of catastrophic destruction that, up until fairly recently, have been the exclusive purview of states. And I think that's a challenge. Now, let me just take a quick walk around the world here and to talk about states and non-state actors and give you a broad sense of what I'm talking about. I start with you. It's been about six years since Russia invaded Georgia and recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A couple of weeks ago, it was two years since Russia annexed the Crimea. It's 18 months since they occupied eastern Ukraine and it's six months since they went into Syria to help the Assad regime fight their civil war. That's a resurgent Russia that presents significant challenges to the global environment. The Middle East. I think that's foremost on everybody's mind. The Middle East seems to be coming unglued from Pakistan to Morocco. And if you think about the Syrian civil war, it's in its fifth year. 250,000 people or more likely have been killed and 11 million people have fled Syria. De-stabilizing the region and destabilizing Europe. I don't know if some of you probably will remember the pictures of Hungary where they're loading the migrants onto trains. The image that that brought back to me of the Holocaust was frightening. But they're able, non-state actors now are able to destabilize significantly. The Far East. China's continued to work and to expand its military. They're expanding their defense budget by about 12% a year. North Korea claims to have tested a hydrogen bomb and they've lost a satellite recently that looks to be able, at least to have the propulsion capability eventually to prepare a rocket. They would hit the United States. They continued to lob missiles into the sea of Japan. They're a significant challenge. And then Pakistan, a nuclear power, has significant internal stability problems. And finally, Afghanistan continues to struggle with a resurgent problem. With a resurgent Taliban. ISIL. I mean, if you told me while I was still in Iraq that we would wake up one morning and find that a terrorist organization has occupied an area the size of Jordan in Eastern Syria and Western Iraq, I would have said, but that's just not possible. But they did that about 18 months ago. And they continue to hold that territory and that ground. And as they do that, they continue to export terror around the world. Recall back into late October, early November of 2015, where in a period of 20 days ISIL murdered 400 people in four countries. Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, and France. That may not be an existential threat, but it is a significant threat to the developed world. And they continue to push and exploit vacuums and they've established a significant presence in Saudi Libya, which is only a few hundred miles from Europe. And that's just a more significant problem for them. And lastly, they continue to use the Internet to radicalize people all over the world. There's a recent book by Peter Bergen, who's an American journalist. It's called The United States of Jihad. And he looks at the ability of ISIL to mobilize and radicalize folks, to inspire folks to go out and commit crimes in other countries without having to train them or pay them. Just in the United States, over 300 people have been indicted or convicted of terrorism or supported terrorism since September 11th. And they're going to continue to reach out and touch us and generate terrorist attacks over the course of the next several decades. Now, that might seem pretty depressing to everybody. And it is, but it's not all bad. And as I look back over the 40 years, probably the most significant thing I see is the existential threat from nuclear weapons that I grew up with. And I see a lot of folks in the audience with hair of my color and who will remember the duck and cover exercises that we did in grade school to protect ourselves when the nuclear attack came. Significantly, if not infinitesimally reduced. The other thing I'd say is the likelihood of large-scale conventional war between states is also very remote at any place other than really the Korean Peninsula. And Kim Jong-un, as I said, is a wild card. He maintains a large army and armed forces at the ready. And that could possibly happen. But the other thing, even if people are concerned with the resurgent Russia in Europe, even if Russia was to attack Europe today, they would do so at a very significantly reduced capability. And I did some math and I went back and I looked at the number of motorized rifle and armored divisions that the Warsaw Pact had at the height of the Cold War. It was about 225. And those forces would be at the spearhead of the vanguard if there was an attack. Today Russia can field 22 divisions, one-tenth of that capability. Even if there was a state-on-state conflict in Europe, it would be significantly at a significantly reduced scale than we've seen in the past. And then the last little bit of good news, and this might seem counterintuitive to you, is that war-related deaths in the first decade of the 21st century are the lowest of any decade for the past 100 years. They are about one-third of what they were during the Cold War, about one-half of what they were in the 90s, and they're about one-one-hundredth of what they were during World War II. And that seems hard to reconcile with all the images you see on television all the time, but it's a reality. Unfortunately, the deaths from the Syrian Civil War are likely to drive that up again, and it'll be higher this year. So my point that I'm trying to stress here is that non-state actors, global reach, access to instruments of catastrophic destruction. And I'm sure you've heard the term weapons of mass destruction, WMD. And by that I mean nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological, or I include cyber in that group, because I believe there is a potential for a significant cyber attack. And it's these weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorist organizations that I personally believe is the greatest long-term threat to us as a country. And that's something that we need to deal with. And I must admit to you, I've been saying since 2007 that I expected a developed country to be attacked by a terrorist group with a weapon of mass destruction in the next five years. Now I'm more than pleased to report that I've been wrong for nine years, but it's coming. It's only a matter of time. I was reading an article the other day that says there's 1,300 metric tons of heavy-enriched uranium in the world today. Three times in the last 15 years, authorities have confiscated bits of that from different people around the world, Bulgaria, Moldova and France. The stuff is out there, and it's only a matter of time when it falls into the wrong hands. So very different world, very different threat that we have to deal with today. And the threats from state actors have not entirely gone away. Second point, we're involved in a long-term ideological struggle against global extremism. And when I say long-term, I mean that maybe I can put it in perspective for you a little bit. Last September was the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. The previous November was the 25th anniversary of the wall coming down. The Cold War, our last ideological struggle against communism, was 45 years. Next September will be 15 years since September 11th. We're closer to the beginning of what we're dealing with here than we are to the end. And we need to come to grips with that. The second very interesting thing to me is this is not a struggle like the Cold War that we can win by ourselves. It's a struggle that can only be won within Islam. And we see that struggle starting to take place between moderate and extremist Islam. But by virtue of the fact that it is an ideological struggle, it's going to take a long time to resolve. I believe it's only going to be complicated by the Sunni Shia struggles. But I do believe that this struggle with extremism is going to be the defining security struggle of the rest of my lifetime and probably for most of the lifetime of some of the younger folks that are out here. And then the third point I'd leave with you is the trends that I see out there again are more likely to exacerbate what's going on right now than to ameliorate it. And let me just run through a couple of the trends. First, domestically. The fact that we're entering this difficult period with burgeoning deficits, a war weary US population and a military that's been stretched and exposed over the last 14 years only makes our jobs harder. And I think fiscal pressures, the fact that we're actually doing high fives because the deficit last year was lower than it has been in many, many years, it finally moved below 500 billion. But our debt is still $18 trillion and as you get ready next month to fill out your taxes and mail them in, know that you're part of that $18 trillion debt is about $158,000 per person. That's going to create pressures for sequestration-like tools that are going to complicate what our military is doing. And we have to be very careful with that. Second significant trend is the Internet. The UN telecom organizations estimate about 3 billion people online today. That's about six times as many people who were online on September 11th. 3 billion people, about 40% of the world's population are online today. The really scary thing to me is there's 60% of the world's population that aren't online. What's going to happen as they come online? There's about 7 billion cell phone subscribers in the world today. That's more cell phone subscribers than there are people. And when you combine who's online with the cell phones, what you have is a global population that has access to information 24-7. And that access to information has created a global awakening and expectations as people look across the Internet and see what other people have. And what they see doesn't make them happy. What they see is that there's a significant disparity in the distribution of wealth around the world. 20% of the world's population controls 75% of the world's wealth. And at the same time, you have 3 billion people subsisting on less than $2.50 a day. That's a challenge and a significant problem for folks. Social media, binding us closer and closer together. Facebook just turned 12. They've got a billion and a half users. 75% of them are outside the United States. And in honor of his birthday, Mark Zuckerberg said that he expected to be reaching 5 billion people by 2035. And he's going to do this using UAVs to bring the Internet to remote places. 5 billion people. Twitter. They'll turn 10 in July. They've got about a billion users. Those users send half a billion tweets a day. 75% of them are outside the United States. This presents significant problems and challenges. Another trend, demographics. What we've seen and especially in the developing world, a rapid growth in populations that's created a youth bulge. And you have situations like 60% of the population of the Middle East is under 25. And there are lots of academic studies out there that say when you have large populations of unemployed, disaffected males, it's a breeding ground for instability and especially in the Middle East. The other challenge is the other part of that demographic surge is it presents huge problems for these governments to feed them, to educate them, to care for them and to employ them. And I was on a group that went to Egypt in 2014 or 2012 to meet with people from across the political spectrum in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. And it was clear to us, the whole delegation, as we, when we finished our trip there, was there was no way that any Egyptian government was going to meet the expectations for prosperity of the people. There was no way that was going to happen on the timelines that the people expected. So without an increase in prosperity, we were going to face an increase in instability. So as I look back across that then, what does that tell you? We're involved in a long-term ideological struggle. The threats have become far more complicated and the trends especially in the Middle East are more likely to exacerbate what's going on today. So as I look out there, what I see is an environment where the implements of catastrophic destruction are no longer the exclusive purview of states and we have non-state actors that have access to those capabilities and have global reach. And that does not make me feel good and it makes me believe that we are therefore in for several decades of what I call persistent conflict. A protracted confrontation among states, non-states and individual actors who are increasingly willing to use violence to accomplish their political and ideological objectives. I think that's where we are and I think that's what we should expect to see going forward here. Now, what in the heck do we do about that? I'd say three things. One, we have to stay engaged. We, the United States of America, have to stay engaged. We always seem to take the wrong lessons from the last war. The lessons that we should take from Iraq is not no boots on the ground. Somewhere between occupying another country and no boots on the ground is the right answer. But we, the United States, must be engaged. But we need to do that understanding that we're not the global cop. We can't be the global cop. We can't even be the global hall monitor. But we can pull together groups of people to act and act productively together. The other thing we need to do, and this is a lesson I think from Iraq and Afghanistan, is we need to understand the limits of our own power, particularly our military power. There are problems like Iraq and Afghanistan that the military just can't resolve. So the military is not necessarily the tool of choice. It's part of a U.S. solution where all of the elements of national power are brought to bear. The last part of this is that's going to take a lot of patience. Because as I've suggested to you here, the causes, the long-term causes of some of the instability that we're seeing are going to take a long time to resolve. Economic prosperity, I believe, is ultimately the key. Second, we need to lead, but we need to lead collaboratively. And some of you will recall the expression, lead from behind. The President started talking about that, and everybody kind of got, ugh, it just didn't feel American. And what people didn't realize was it's a term that we developed and used in Iraq as we were trying to get our soldiers to work with the Iraqis. And the idea was get them to do what you want them to do without telling them to do it. We, the United States of America, are the indispensable catalysts. We bring unmatched economic, military, and moral power to bear. And we can create coalitions much as you see the President doing now to deal with a lot of these challenges. Now, some people will be, will get impatient with coalitions, but as I think this quote is attributed to Napoleon, the only thing worse than going to war with a coalition is going to war without one. We have to take the time to form these coalitions and to lead collaboratively and to help other people solve their problems and not solve their problems for them. And lastly, the problems are so complex there's not one root cause that we need to employ multifaceted integrated approaches. And this might seem strange coming from a military guy, but it's the 3Ds. Defense for sure, but diplomacy and development. People, if I ask you today how much the United States of America spends on foreign aid, we probably get a lot of different answers, but it's less than 1% of our budget. 1%. As I suggested earlier, economic development and prosperity are a key element in dealing with some of the instability that we have across the world today. I'm not saying if you're poor, you're a terrorist. I'm saying it can be a contributing factor, but we need to employ all of those assets. I do some work, as Susan suggested, for the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition. And one of the things that I, one of the statistics that they throw around is that 10 of our top 15 trading partners were once aid recipients. And some of them are now net donors. So in addition to reducing instability, it creates opportunities for U.S. business. So we could probably do a heck of a lot better than $50 billion a year to economic development abroad, particularly in some of these developing countries that are threatened with significant instability. FDR, long, long time ago, was wise enough to see, and he said, America's well-being depends upon the well-being of nations far away. And I think that's something we can all, we should all remember, especially today. Now, I got a couple of minutes left. Let me just say a few words about the men and women who have served this country so well, especially since September 11. As I said, we've been at war for almost 15 years. If you had asked me in the days and weeks after September 11, if it would be over a decade before we would have been attacked at home again, I would have said, you're crazy because we knew so little about what had hit us and what our enemy was. That stability and security at home came at a cost. Almost 7,000 men and women have given their lives. They've left over 25,000 surviving family members. Over 50,000 have been wounded. Some 10,000 of them seriously enough to require long-term care. Another over 400,000 have been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress or traumatic brain injury, the signature injuries of this war. Two and a half million men and women have served during that period. 1.9 million have left the service. 150,000 of them are unemployed. We can do better than that as a country. I would tell you that we cannot and should not expect the government to do everything themselves. I worked for the government for 41 years. It is a huge, inefficient bureaucracy, and it will never be able to deal with the individual challenges facing our veterans and their families as private efforts can do. I met with some folks this afternoon as a great example of that private effort, MSPAN, doing some work with peer training and in ways of improving mental health for our veterans. Those are the kind of projects that make a huge difference. There's over 400,000 organizations around the United States that support veterans. The vast majority are small things that take soldiers hunting, take soldiers skiing, things like that. But they all make a huge difference because they send a signal to the men and women of our all volunteer force that America cares. And that's hugely important if we're to sustain this high quality volunteer force for the decades to come when we'll need them. So with that, thank you very much for your attention and I'm happy to take questions about anything you'd like to talk about. Good afternoon, sir. My name is Brian Garcia. I'm a former Army captain and Afghan war veteran. These days I'm a dual MBA and Master of Public Policy student here at Ford School and at the Ross School of Business next door. So you'll know how to run a policy consulting firm. One day, sir. One day. Before we get into questions, I just want to thank you. One for your service as one veteran to another and thank you for donating your time today to come on and speak with us. Thank you for yours. So our first question. I'm a simple businessman and taxpayer. Please explain after outspending our nearest competitors by nearly 14 to 1 and the next eight competitors combined for the last 20 years. How the U.S. military can still be unprepared in the eyes of the majority of major party presidential candidates? Well, I certainly cannot speak for major party presidential candidates. I will tell you. First of all, it is true. It is true. The United States of America outspends our next eight countries in defense combined. I mean a half a trillion dollars a year goes to defense. I saw some data the other day that says that's significantly, proportionally it's significantly higher than it was during the middle of the Cold War. Could we run the Department of Defense more efficiently? You bet. Absolutely we could. I wrestled with this as the Army Chief of Staff and it absolutely drove me crazy. But there is absolutely no incentive in the government to be efficient. The big fight within the government is to get the resources. And so it's not just in the Department of Defense. It's every agency in the government. You go in and you fight the other silos in your department for a share of the budget. And one of the companies whose board I'm on is actually a reverse auction company that over the years has saved the government about $200 million by basically conducting a reverse auction. So if you want 100,000 rolls of toilet paper, your name goes out on the site and the bidders compete against each other to get the lowest price to get the bid. You can't get people to use it because they're more concerned with spending the money than they are with using it efficiently. And that's as a taxpayer that bothers me. It bothered me as the Army Chief of Staff as we tried to work ourselves to get more efficient in doing that. Now that said, it's a blunt force instrument and we're fighting a war. We have soldiers all over the world, some in combat. You have to be very careful how you do this. I alluded to that early in my remarks when I talked about the financial pressures can cause frictions with the military as you're doing this. Sequestration in 2013. Congress basically the government closed. No one outside the Beltway noticed for a couple of weeks. It came back in. And what the sequestration required the military to do was to cut programs arbitrarily by 10% across the government. Well, when you have arbitrary cuts, you never know the outcomes of those things till years later. So I know we did some things to ourselves back then that are going to cause us problems down the road. We can't do things like that. And there's got to be constant pressure from Congress for the military to be more efficient. And that'll take time. We have to work ourselves down. But I fully appreciate your concerns. But we're at war and we need to be very careful how we get more efficient and how fast we get more efficient. Good evening. My name is Sonia Swanbeck. I'm a second year MPP here studying international security and emerging technologies. And I want to also thank you for coming in talking tonight. Definitely have a lot of really interesting perspectives on a lot of these issues. The first question I have for you is how do we retain the focus and presence that the international threat environment requires of us given the war-weary national mood and our constrained budgets? Yeah. I mean, that's really hard. And it's especially hard because the threat of the non-state actors, it's not existential. I mean, the president says that and people criticize him for it, but it's true. I mean, they're not going to wipe us off the face of the earth, but they can radicalize people that can strike us any place in the country. That's scary, but it's not existential. And so keeping, it's a great question. How do you keep people focused on that? I think one of the things you do is you acknowledge up front, hey, this is a long-term struggle. We're going to be at this for a long time. It's not, we're going to be out of Afghanistan by Christmas or out of Iraq by Christmas. This is a long-term proposition. I think that's a start. The other part of it is, I mean, you can't go around scaring people. I spoke up at Cornell a month ago and I had a group of undergraduates. There's about 30 of them. And I said, I asked them the question. I said, what do you think about the threat of terrorism every day? And they said, no, they don't. And I said, well, that's probably good. So we need to pay attention. But at the same time, we can't be wringing our hands every day and we have to get on with it. Because one of the things that terrorists want is for us to collapse and change our way of life. And we can't allow that to happen. So that's about as clear as I can get as an answer to that question. It's a challenge. Sir, what is your opinion on the impact of individual individuals acting like Edward Snowden and Julian Assange? Including security? If so, how, if not, why not? So I was invited to a program called Summit at Sea. And I was told what I should expect was an Aspen Institute for Millennials, which it was. And so we went on this cruise and the first night they had Edward Snowden piped in from Russia. And he was on a huge screen. The screen was probably bigger than this whole area here. And he was in a black turtleneck against a black background with the lights shining on his face. So it looked like the Wizard of Oz. And what I saw was that he's had two years to get a pretty good spiel together. And to come across as a thoughtful patriot. And I must say that his comments resonated with a lot of folks there in the audience who believe the government is spying on everybody. I didn't feel the same way. The fact that he gave away that amount of classified information is a crime. And I think at some point he needs to return and be prosecuted for that crime. What I feel badly about is it took him to cause us to have the debate about security versus individual liberties that we should have been having a decade before. Because what happened after September 11, the pendulum swung way over here. That can never happen again. But the further we get away from September 11, the more the pendulum goes back this way. But as soon as there's another terrorist attack, significant terrorists go back that way. It's our country coming to grips with the new reality in a new environment. So actually following up from that question, this one is another one about domestic surveillance. In the face of threats from lone wolf non-state actors, what do you personally believe is the proper balance between domestic surveillance, privacy, and free speech? I mean this is a huge tension here right now. And we need to have the debate as a country. This question kind of came up at lunch with the students. And a lot of it is personal. If you're really afraid and you want to feel secure, you lean more towards security having a priority. But if you feel fairly secure and you don't want anybody infringing on the liberties that the men and women of armed forces have fought for 200 plus years to retain for us, then you feel differently. And it's almost personal. But it's a debate that we need to have at the right levels in the country. And I'm sure it will be legislated and it will be litigated in the courts. But it's a hugely important debate for us to have because I believe the worst thing we could do is to revert to security ahead of the values and ideals that the country stands for. That would be the real crime and frankly that would give a nod to the terrorists. And I don't think we should be pushed in that direction. Sir, switching gears a little bit. In 2010, Sunni Arabs participated in Iraqi national elections in one by two MP seats. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki promptly issued arrest warrants for two of the candidates the Sunnis voted into office. Thereby ensuring his own pro-Iranian Shia party retained power. Sunnis predictably became disillusioned with the political process and reverted to violence. How important do you think this event from 2010 is to the rise of ISIS in Sunni Iraq? I think it was hugely important. I mean, if you watch the elections in Iraq, the over time multi-sectarian parties got an increasing share of the vote till 2010 where they actually got a majority. And the fact that they were not able to form a government, it's like you're so close. You're just about there. Everything we've been fighting for there since 2003. And then you see it go away because the Iraqis couldn't come to grips with what was going on. My sense is having participated in two elections and a constitutional referendum during the time I was in Iraq. And the Sunnis boycott of the first election. And this is as a result of the boycott, they didn't have enough people to be represented in the drafting of the constitution. So guess what? They didn't like the outcome of the constitution. And they voted primarily against it. That was kind of the first step in the unraveling of things in Iraq. Because the document that we hoped to be the national compact that would bind the country together became a divisive element. The Sunnis came out with some help and pressure from us in the end of 2000 and December of 2005 elections and voted. But they were disappointed with what came after that, with Maliki. And so I wasn't there after that, but I can see it happening. They all worked together, worked very hard to come in on those 2010 elections and get a multi-sectarian party in place. And when they, that government couldn't be formed, the government that everybody worked so hard to get elected, that was probably the last nail in the coffin for the Sunnis. Now they're not innocent in this thing to begin with, but I think that they said the heck with this. Another question on Iraq. Of the 30 plus countries in the multinational force you were commander of for over two and a half years, which were most supportive of our efforts and who could have been more helpful in Iraq? Well, the Brits, the Aussies, interestingly enough, the Baltic countries, small contingents, but very supportive. The vast majority of the countries had very significant limits on their rules of engagement. And that was a challenge. And really it was the United States forces and the Brits down in the south, the Brits in Australia down in the south that did most of the heavy left in there. In 2004 there was a nationwide uprising right after I got there in August of 2004. And as we looked across, I lost my train of thought on this one. I'll come back to it. Hit me the question one more time. So who was most supportive of our efforts and who at least? So the Poles, the insurrection had gone to a province in the south and they had surrounded the governor's house. And they called and said we need some help from the multinational force to get the governor out of it. So I called the Polish commander and I said, hey, you need to go get the governor out. He said, I'm sorry. My rules are I can't leave the barracks. I said, what? I've been there about 30 days. I said, you're kidding, right? He couldn't do it. I had to bring an American unit down from Mosul to get the governor out. That was not helpful. But all of those restrictions are put on them by their governments. It's not a military thing. It's the governments that put those restrictions on there. Today the news reports Putin is withdrawing military forces from Syria. For about two weeks there's been a ceasefire. There will be some transgressions, but apparently still holding. What do you think would be realistic way towards achieving stability in Syria? Well, I think the first point is that Russia's got to be part of the solution and not part of the problem. And this ceasefire and the work that's been done together is a step in that direction. Interestingly, for me, as I look at Putin's suggestion that you've got to get the Assad regime to stabilize the country. That's not all bad. And what I worry about is you take out the Assad regime and then you have a sectarian bloodbath there, the likes of which would make what happened in Iraq seem calm and tame. And so there is something to that. But there's a lot of things that have to come together for that to happen. As I looked at this and I look at what's going on, what I worry about is I think the strategy of building a coalition and working with the Russians to stabilize the country is the right way to go. But what I worry about is it's going to take too long to unfold and to implement. And I worry that a major terrorist attack will emanate out of the area controlled by ISIS against the developed country. He was withdrawing totally. I didn't hear that. Again, I haven't seen the reports, but it would tell me that he thinks that what he's done there has had some effect in accomplishing what he wanted to accomplish, otherwise he wouldn't be pulling back. I told the students today there's not many things in international relations that you can say will always happen. But the one thing that I have found that always happens is nations will act always in their own interest or what they think is in their interest. And whatever Russia is doing, I'm sure is in their interest. So turning to Iran, would improving relationships with Iran assist to stabilize the region? And if so, how? I think over the long haul, yes. I mean Iran is a significant regional player and the more that they can be brought in as a productive player in the international community, I think the more stable that everybody will be. But it's a big if about when and how long it'll take to do something like that. When I got to the Pentagon, it was 1997. I got the Pentagon in the policy business. And ever since 1997, I've heard the Iranian people really have a democratic tendency and they're going to overthrow the regime and move it forward since 1997. And you saw some hopeful results come out of the last election with some moderates being elected. But that's a long way off. We'll see. The biggest problem I have with Iran is they're a state sponsor of terror. And they're using terror as an instrument of policy throughout the Middle East. I don't see how we can, you know, we have to come to grips with that. And they have to stop at some point if they're going to re-enter the international community. And until then, the more we can keep them on site, I think the better off we're going to be. Sir, going off of that, what leverage does the U.S. have over China and North Korea to deter or manage their military assertions? Their military assertions? Assertions. Well, I would not link China and North Korea in the same boat. As I've talked about North Korea already, they're kind of in a class by themselves. China, I personally don't view as a military competitor. I view them as a competitor. I see what they're doing in the South China Sea as something that they see is in their interest. I don't agree with it. It's something that we need to keep constant pressure on them about. But I think it is very much in China's interest to remain a productive player in the international community. They've got so many economic ties, I don't know how they can take a chance at destabilizing that. Now, what leverage do they have over North Korea? Probably not as much as we think they do. I visited China in 2009 and went up to Xinjiang Province, which is up in Manchuria. It's the closest province to North Korea. The generals up there didn't talk to me like they had great leverage and influence over anybody in North Korea. I think they can provide some level of pressure and support. But I think the most difficult thing for me is what is in Kim Jong-un's head? What is he trying to accomplish? We try to think of it in our own minds as rational actors. I'm not sure that applies. Bottom line, I don't put China and North Korea in the same boat. I think North Korea is a wild card, as I said. I think China is a competitor, but not necessarily a foe. In many states in which we are currently seeking to fight non-state actors, there is much fragmentation and little stability. What military approach should be used in fighting non-state actors when all groups seem to be fighting each other? When all groups seem to be fighting each other. That's basically what I had in Iraq in 2006. I had the Sunni extremists. I had the insurgents who weren't radicalized, but just were insurgents. Then I had the Shia militias and I had the Shia extremists. There were militia groups that were going around and were supported by Iran. It was hugely difficult for our folks to figure out who was who. You didn't really care whether you were a Shia extremist or a Sunni extremist. If you were shooting at us, you were a problem, but it was a really complex environment. The two units, the multinational division that was in Baghdad, where most of the sectarian violence was going on, and the Allah province, which is just north of Baghdad, where there were significant sectarian violence, it took a toll on the troops and the leaders because they said we're over here to help them. We're over here to help protect them and they're killing each other. Our guys and gals just couldn't comprehend that. It was very difficult and it took a real toll, particularly on those two units. It's very hard and I guess the short answer is there's not a lot the military can do unless you put an awful lot of them in and just kind of freeze the situation. I don't know if we want to do that. Thank you. Next question. It seems this country has continuously been weathering an era of persistent conflict ever since World War II. This person has two parts to this question. One, can this country afford the same pattern going forward? Two, what's caused this historic pattern since World War II? That's a great question. I probably talk like this just happened since September 11th, but as the questioner points out, there's been a lot going on in the world since the end of World War II. Part of it was the ideological struggle against communism. Now we have a different kind of ideological struggle going on here. What caused it? I think you got competing ideological theories. You got communism versus capitalism, world domination through communism. Not going to happen. Got into Korea to stop the spread of communism, got into Vietnam to stop the spread of communism. You know, it's interesting to me, my dad fought in Vietnam. And everyone has kind of discounted the idea that we succeeded in stopping the spread of communism by what we did in Vietnam. But you talk to people in the region, they say, hey, communism didn't get any further in the Far East. And I'm not trying to get into revisionist history here, but it's a reality. And now you have this different ideology in a different world. And for a lot of the things I talked about, I mean, you've always had poverty, but you haven't always had a situation where the poor people could see what everybody else had. And they could see the disparities in the wealth. And now more people are pissed off than before. And now they're getting the capability to do something about it. It's a different environment. So yeah, we've always had some level of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. But that's the way I think the state structure worked. And now we have a state structure that has non-state actors with global reach. And it's just a more complicated environment. With recent reductions in troop levels, what do you believe is the ideal force strength the U.S. should maintain at home in Iraq and in Afghanistan? And how should the military ensure that they retain the best and brightest of our soldiers? Okay. Second first, we have an all-volunteer force. Our first president, George Washington, said that the willingness of men and women to continue to serve in war, no matter how just, depends on their perception of how the veterans of previous wars were treated and appreciated by their country. So one of the first things we can do is what we're doing is taking care of the veterans, the 1.9 million men and women who've already left the military. For me, that's the best thing that we can do to ensure that we continue to draw from the best and brightest of America for the country. The first part, I always hate these double questions late in the afternoon. The first one was the numbers. The numbers of troops. How big should the U.S. military be? I'll tell you. This goes back to what I said about the inefficiencies of budgeting in the Pentagon. What happens is you start off with the national military strategy, and then people use that strategy to justify their current size, and they fight. And the only way that the Defense Department can get the services to draw down is by cutting their budgets. And the Army, 60% of the Army budget has to do with people. And so the smaller the Army, the more the Air Force and the Navy can spend on ships and planes. And so there's this constant tension going back and forth among the services. How big should it be? What do you want it to do? And the big change from the conventional war that I grew up, I mean, I spent 30 years of a 40-year career training to fight a war I never fought. Conventional war against the Warsaw Pact in Europe. And the last 10 learning to fight a different form of war while I was fighting it. And that's kind of the bane of the Army's existence. But in a conventional war, you went over to Europe, you fought several months, and then you finished your job and you came home. That's how we thought. So the force was sized against your ability to fight the Russians in Europe and do something simultaneously on the Korean Peninsula. So you can imagine, you go back and add all that up. You need this many ships, this many planes, and this many divisions. That's how they do it. Now, the big change for us as we went into Iraq and Afghanistan, and we had to sustain a deployment of about 200,000 men and women for an extended period of time, that was a huge shift for the Army. And when I got to the job as Army Chief of Staff, we were sending soldiers over to Iraq, bringing them home for 12 months and sending them back right away. And that was unsustainable, but it was driven by the fact that the Army at that time was too small to sustain that protracted rotation. Now we've built the Army up to the size where it could do it, but guess what? Now we're not supporting 200,000 folks deployed around the world. It's probably closer to 50. So you can imagine all the budget hawks there have their knives out to cut the size of the Army down. And it'll probably go down to about 450,000. To put that in perspective for you, at the end of the Cold War, the Army was 780,000 active. After the Cold War, we went down to 480,000. In 2007, we expanded it to 560,000. And now we're down by 90,000. So the Army is smaller. Should it be smaller than that? Probably not right now. Air Force and the Navy, they probably take some reductions at the margin. But I couldn't begin to give you a number of how big it should be. You've got to take it back to what you want it to do. And the likelihood that we will have to sustain extended rotations for long periods of time. Sir, going off of that. As you know, the VA estimates that upwards of 22 veterans a day commit suicide. Almost every serviceman and woman has been affected in some way by suicide among our active duty and reserve soldiers as well as our veteran population. Given this era of persistent conflict, this issue isn't likely to go away anytime soon. What more can the military and VA do to combat this threat to our troops and our veterans and better assist our returning soldiers? Yeah. First of all, I think there could be a misperception that these 22 veterans a day are all post-911 vets. That's not the case. They're across the board. Second. Second. So when I came back from Iraq in 2007, I was reviewing the truckloads of briefing books they give you to prepare you for your new job. And I read a report that was feedback from our annual personnel survey across the Army. And the finding was 90% of the men and women in the Army would not get treatment for a behavioral health issue because they felt it would impact their career. 90%, 900,000 people. And then a couple of days later, I'm reading a report from the docs that says we should expect 12 to 15% of the men and women who deploy to have post-traumatic stress when they return. If they deploy twice, we should expect 15 to 17% to come back with it. And if they deploy three times, it's 19 to 21%. So I put the two of those together and I say, hey, wait a minute. If we don't do something to reduce the stigma of getting behavioral health care, we're going to run out of troops. And so we began working at it. And we began, we put in place programs like comprehensive soldier fitness program to give to train soldiers and family members to give them the skills they needed to be more resilient to deal with the challenges we were confronting them with. And we had a huge stigma reduction program. And every place I went, I talked about it and drove it home with the chain of command. After banging away at it hard for four years, I looked at the annual personnel survey again, just as I was leaving. We had reduced the number that would not get help from 90% to 50%. Now, good news, bad news. The bad news, the good news, 40% reduction. The bad news is still 500,000 people. That's still a big problem. They kept chipping away at it and the last survey I saw said it was down to about 35%. But we have to continue our efforts to reduce the stigma. I will say I think we're making headway on that. And I think the headway the military is making will ultimately benefit society as that trickles down into society. We still are not where we need to be in the transitioning, the medical transition from the Department of Defense to the VA. We still don't have common transferable medical records. There's a lot more work that could be done that. But the biggest thing that I think we can do is to continue our efforts to reduce the stigma so people are not afraid to come forward and get help. Because all our research says you get help, we get better. So this is another about combating religious extremism. We see that many regimes have methods for combating extremism that we might not agree with from a human rights standpoint such as suppressing freedom of religion. How should the U.S. work with countries to fight extremism in a humane and effective manner? I had a similar question at lunch. What's the one thing you can always count on in international relations? Countries will always act in their own interests. We should act in our own interests. But at the same time, we cannot turn a blind eye to human rights violations. And a good example is what's going on in Egypt. It's in our interest that that government makes a transition and ultimately moves into a stable democratic society. There's a very internal Egyptian debate about whether security is more important than human rights. They're wrestling with that. I think we have to continue to insist that the regime adhere to internationally recognized human rights standards. Understanding that they probably won't all the time, but we can never let up on that. And we can never be put in a position where we can don't. Someone asked me at lunch if I was ever in a position with my three Iraqi prime ministers that I worked with to turn a blind eye to something that they did. And I was able to say no. They didn't always take the results to do the things that we asked them to do, but we never let them off the hook for doing things that didn't line up with our values and our ideals. So we need to act at our interests, but at the same time, we never can let them off the hook to live up to the values and ideals that we all aspire to. There's a great dynamic going on here. You asked a question. No, you asked a question. Sexual assault in the military. As a private citizen unfamiliar with the discipline and deference to authority in the armed forces, who can instill real change to protect those who protect us? Who? Military leadership can do a much better job on that. One of the things I regret is that I wasn't able to devote the time and attention I needed to advance the ball in that area. I worry that we in the military haven't gone far enough in addressing the sexual assault issue. And one of the things I see is we have what we call uniform put of military justice and we push the responsibility for adjudicating things down as low as a captain. So the late 20s, someone in the late 20s. And in some cases, we're asking these young men and women who are company commanders to adjudicate a he said C-shirts, she said sexual assault. Well, they're not trained to do that. They don't have the skills to do that. And there have been suggestions that we have some type of group that does nothing else but investigate allegations of sexual assault and take it away, take it outside of that young commander's hands. Some of those things seem pretty useful to me. And what I hear a lot is you don't trust the chain of command. That's not necessarily so. Ever since I've been in the military, if an officer was caught drunk driving, his boss didn't punish him. It went straight to the commanding general. The two-star dealt with it. And I'm saying that's the same thing here. Let's ratchet it up. Give the responsibility to adjudicate sexual assault allegations to someone with a team that's trained to do the job so that we actually can prosecute people intelligently. There's a couple of very good movies out that I know the producers of, and I've seen them both, one on sexual assault in the military, one on sexual assault on campuses. And as I talk to those folks, what they say is the vast majority of the sexual assaulters are repeat offenders. And they're not getting prosecuted sufficiently in the system, so they keep on doing it. We can do better than that in the military and in society. Thank you again for coming to talk with us. We have time for just one more question. This is where you always get nervous, you know this. They wear you down and they save the big one over here. Oh, this is going to get him. No, no. Under Goldwater Nichols, our services were to work jointly, and the system of regional commanders was developed. How do you think we're doing? So, easy question. Yeah, it's fairly easy. I think we're doing great. It took us a long time to get started, but I think we're doing really, really well in that regard. You know, I'm teaching a class at the National Defense University on Ethics and the Profession of Arms. And I go over there and they all are all different services, all sitting around the table doing their thing. So I think that had a huge impact on the military. And it wasn't until the provision that to become a general officer, you had to have a joint assignment prior to being promoted. That didn't come into effect until I think the year I was leaving the job as Chief of Staff of the Army. But it made everybody that thought they were going to be a general get out and get a joint job. And they got much more experience. And then the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused us to really come together. Now, this is the bonus answer you get. So one of the other questions I get is, okay, what about the interagency? What about a Goldwater Nichols for the interagency? If you're going to employ integrated multifaceted approaches that use all the elements of national power, don't you need the Treasury guys and the State Department guys and the Intelligence guys and the DOD guys and gals and everybody work together? So where's that? And we've got to start somewhere. It's a multi-decade process. 1987 was Goldwater Nichols. 2000, let's just call it 2007. Okay? So that's a long time. Before it was embraced by the military. Because this is interagency, it'll probably take even longer, but we've got to start someplace. There's a whole story about Bob Gates when he left the CIA to be the Deputy National Security Advisor. He was having his fair relevance. He was walking out. Everybody was saying, see you later, man. You're never going to come back here again. You're dead, your career's over. You're going out of another branch of the government. See, Bob, take care. It was nice knowing you. And then he comes back as the director of the CIA. So there's a lot of institutional pressures and things that work against you there, but I think we've got to get started on it. That's to you, Mel. That was Mel's question earlier today. Okay, are we done? Thank you very much. Thanks a lot. Thank you. So I just wanted to thank the general for such a rich conversation. I also wanted to thank all of you for joining us and for your questions. I hope to see you again on Friday. We will have our annual Gramlich Showcase of student work. It's an opportunity for us to really celebrate some of the best student work at the Ford School. And so I hope to see you on Friday afternoon. Please join us to continue the conversation with the reception just outside in the Great Hall. And a final round of thanks to General George Casey. Thank you so much. Thank you.