 Just want to wait for some more time? No, no, we have more in life. Just a minute. Yes. Directive principles, origin, need, and relationship with fundamental rights is one of the concepts which not only touches the heart of every Indian, but as a lawyer and as a judge, one definitely wants to have deeper insights into it as to what was the intent of the directive principles to be incorporated into the constitution here as to what could be the vis-a-vis director of principles with fundamental rights, what is the relationship. This all we will be understanding in this short video for around one hour, wherein Mr. Amit Pai, who has already done a session with us, who is a Supreme Court lawyer, would make us things better to understand. We are also proud that this session is in tie up with the recruitment associates from Karnataka. And tomorrow we all know that tomorrow is a big day. Before that, we thought tomorrow we will all shift our focus towards that. And let's understand the things in the better perspective of directive principles as to how it originated, what was the need of it, what the constitutional makers actually deliberated upon, and what is the nice balancement between the two of the directive principles and fundamental rights. I will not take much time and I will request Mr. Amit to take over and make us understand the things in a better perspective. Thank you very much, sir. How I intend to have the session is I intend to divide how the directive principles came into being briefly discuss what happened in the Constituent Assembly, what really is the philosophy behind the directive principles, and how the courts interpreted it, how governments used it, and how directive principles, the sentiments behind the directive principles of state policy are probably found in our chapter on fundamental rights. So let me just understand, at any point of time, if anybody has any queries, if they want to make a comment, it's most welcome because it's always better to have more people talk than have one-way traffic. Let's understand what is the philosophy behind the directive principles of state policy that we have in our Constitution. Directive principles of state policy, really, are based on what we think of or what we understand to be a welfare state, where the economic opportunity of the citizenry is equal, where the citizens are given a fillip in terms of how their lives are to be governed. As the name suggests, directive principles of state policy, these are principles on which the state was expected to make laws, was expected to have its policies, was expected to have the manner in which the state is supposed to function. And at the very beginning of the directive principle, the state policy, you have Article 38, which lays down categorically that this is really to secure a social order and for the promotion of the welfare of the people at large. This is Article 38. Let's understand, where do we get the directive principles of state policy? We've all learned in political science class that Jeremy Bentham had proposed the theory of utilitarianism, which is the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. Perhaps that is what is the basis for these directive principles of state policy. As we go along, I will go through the different directive principles to understand what they are. Greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. Now, the initial part of the directive principles are very utopian. However, the very beginning of the directive principles is where they started Article 36 and Article 37 say, look, these directive principles are not enforceable by law. This is opposed to Part 3 of the Constitution. As you know, Part 3 of the Constitution deals with the basic human rights, fundamental rights, civil liberties, et cetera, which are enforceable by courts of law. But Part 4, Article 37 says, are principles that the government will take into account while making the laws. But one cannot go to the court and say, look, directive principles, articles, so and so, is not being enforced. In other words, they are not enforceable, right? So let us understand how directive principle, as we go along, we'll see the relationship between Part 3 and Part 4, because that's a substantive part of the constitutional litigation that India has seen, particularly in the 70s. But at this point, suffice it to say that the basic difference between Part 3 and Part 4 is that Part 3 are rights, which you can go to the court for enforcement. And Part 4 are principles on the basis of which state is supposed to legislate. They are not enforceable. However, Sirvai suggests that one of the greatest architects of our Constitution, Sir B. N. Rao, who was not just a special advisor to the Constituent Assembly, but was also the draftsman of the 1935 Act. The 1935 Act really provided the skeletal framework for our Constitution, as it is seen today, which was drafted by the drafting committee really headed by the great Babasai Bombayatkar. Now, he had proposed certain amendments to Article 37 and other articles to make Part 4 also enforceable. That was what he had proposed. However, he was turned down. He was turned down. And one of the biggest criticisms of Part 4 of the Constitution, is the Directive Principles, is that they are toothless. In response to this criticism, in the Constituent Assembly, Babasai Bombayatkar said as follows. He said, and I quote, if it is said that the Directive Principles have no legal force behind them, I am prepared to admit it. But I am not prepared to admit that they have no sort of binding force at all. Nor am I prepared to concede that they are useless because they have no binding force. So the point Babasai Bombayatkar further elucidates is that these principles are, in a sense, a instruction manual or an instrument of instructions for the government of the day, for the executive, for parliament, in terms of how they must legislate. What is it they must take into account while they are legislating? And he said that wherever there is a grant of power in general terms of peace, order, and good government, it is necessary that it should be accompanied by instruments regulating its exercise. Equating this to the Directive Principles, he would say, whoever came into power would be held accountable. He was not free to do what he wanted once you got power. He would be held accountable by the electorate as to whether these particular principles, which are elucidated in the Directive Principles, had been followed or not followed. Now what are the Directive Principles of straight policy? Let's just look at the Directive Principles as they are. Article 39 talks of equal economic opportunity. Saying that everybody must get equal economic opportunity, adequate means of livelihood. Men and women must be paid equal work for equal pay. The economic system must not operate in a manner in which the wealth is concentrated in some hands. It also said that it further went to equal justice and legal aid. Article 39A subsequently amended article. But it's important because you need free legal aid for those people who cannot go to court. Because going to court is not a very cheap affair. It is an expensive affair. 40, I think somebody has a question. OK, somebody there. All right. I thought there was a comment. Anyway, article 40 talks of strengthening of the Panchayat system. 41 talks of the right to work to education and public assistance, to make sure that there is no unemployment, to make sure that the old and the sickly people, the disabled people, are taken care of by the state. 42 talks of humane conditions for workers, as well as maternity benefits. 43 talks of a living wage for workers. 44, 44, I mean, it's much in the debate nowadays. The talks of the government wanting to have or the parliament or the state will endeavor to have a uniform civil code. 46 talks of educational and economic interests of the scheduled caste and the scheduled tribes and other weaker sections of the society, which would be OPCs, religious minorities, et cetera. So as to ensure that they are not to protect them from social injustice in all forms and exploitation. 47, again, is very interesting. It talks of raising the levels of nutrition and health. And it ends with saying that the state shall endeavor to make sure that there is a prohibition of consumption of liquor, intoxicating drinks, and drugs which are injurious to health. 48 talks of animal husbandry and agriculture. Mind you, when we got freedom, when independence was obtained by the struggle, and when the Constitution came into being, a principal part of the country was in agrarian. It was agrarian. And 48 has a very interesting thing. It also says that the state shall endeavor to take steps to prevent cow slaughter. 48, 49 talks of how the state will make sure that the monuments, et cetera, are protected, monuments, historical monuments, and places of national importance. And 50, where the state will ensure that the judiciary and the executive are separated from each other. 51, international peace and security will be ensured. What is interesting, if you see part 3, every single article, right from 39 to 51, says the state shall endeavor. It's quite different from saying the state shall. Now, just suppose this to say part 3, where it says article 12, 13, particularly, 13 says that the state shall not act in a manner in which your fundamental rights are taken away. So please understand the difference in approach in these two parts of the Constitution. The first part, the part 3, puts an obligation on the state to ensure that there is no legislative or executive action which will take away the fundamental rights between article 14 and then 31. We'll come to 31, because that's very relevant at this point of time. The first time the question of whether directive principles of state policy versus fundamental rights, which one was to prevail, came up in the case of Champagam Durai Rajan, where then Justice Esar Das subsequently became Chief Justice. Categorically held that fundamental rights were obviously sacrosanct and at an elevated position in the Constitution of the country. And they could not be equated. They could not be equated with part 4 of the Constitution. And obviously, part 4 could not be interpreted in a way to give them predominance over part 3. Now this holds relevance as we come along in our history. What is interesting is if you see the directive principles of state policy which we discussed, article 39 and 40 and 44 uniform civil code, 47 which talks of prohibition, 48 which revisions of council order, some of them are extremely Gandhian in their way. Please remember, this is a time when Madhava Gandhi had just been killed. Today is the 21st of January. 20th of January was the failed attempt on Gandhi's life. 30th of January was the successful in 1948. So some and most of the people in the Constituent Assembly were had political allegiance to Bapu as they called him. And these principles being made a part of the Constitution have only one reason, because Gandhi was a very vehement sort of proposer of ban against council order, prohibition. Gujarat still sees prohibition because of Gandhi. The Panchayat system, because he always talked of devolution of power and non-centralization, these basic principles. Now let's just look at how part 3 of the Constitution and part 4 of the Constitution are related. How their relation, their conflict, et cetera, came along. The first, according to me, was the very first amendment to the Constitution, mind you, to the government of India in 1950, 51, 52, headed by Pandit Nehru. One of the chief projects was land reforms. This can directly be linked to economic redistribution of wealth. The socialist mindset, land reforms. And we all know that when land reforms were struck down by the Patna High Court in Kameshwar, the government of the day came up with a very unique sort of savings clause, which was Article 31A and 31B. 31B said that anything that is put in the ninth schedule of the Constitution, anything that was put in the ninth schedule of the Constitution cannot be challenged on the grounds of Articles 14, 19, and 31. The ninth schedule, I mean, this is very unique because fundamental rights are supposed to be protected and laws cannot violate fundamental rights. However, if a law violates a fundamental right and is put in the ninth schedule, it is saved from that fundamental right. So this is something that is actually strange and unique. But perhaps it was the political, constitutional, and social need of the day. Today, 75 years hence for me, it's very easy to make a comment. Now, why I bring about, bring to your notice land reforms is why they are directly not connected to Part 3, Part 4 of the Constitution. They are definitely related to Article 39 of the Constitution, which we just read a while ago. Article 39 primarily wanted a situation by which there was an economic redistribution of wealth. I'm just going to read for your benefit one part of Article 39 where the state will endeavor in directing its policy to secure that men and women have ownership and control of material resources of the community so as to be distributed to best serve the common good. Mind you, when we started, we discussed the utilitarian theory of Bentham, which had greatest happiness of the greatest number. You can directly relate this to that. And the second thing, which the directive principle, this is 39B and 39C. Along our discussion, this will assume relevance and therefore I'm reading it right now. 39C said, again, the state shall endeavor to direct its policy to secure operation of an economic system that does not result in concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. Now, how is this related to land reforms? How is this related to evolution of zamindari? At that point of time, it was the zamindars who held large tracts of land and the tiller would till and then pay the zamindar and would be impoverished. So land, the ownership of land by imposing ceilings, redistribution, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. There was also a great social movement headed by Vinoba Bhave and actively participated by Jatrakash Narayan, who was called Bhutan, where people donated their lands for redistribution, not taken over forcefully by the state. These two principles, 39B and C, sought to ensure that the land which was held by a few was redistributed to the many. And the tiller was the owner of the land now. Not that the tiller was somebody else and the owner was the zamindar. That was what the object of land reforms was. We all know that land reforms came under challenge. And it was upheld. The 9th schedule came under challenge in Shankari Prasad and was upheld. And it went on like that. What is interesting here is that, which we've already discussed, the enforcement mechanism. You had no way of asking a writ to the government to enforce a certain directive principle of state policy. However, if a law was passed, which in furtherance of a directive principle of state policy would take away a fundamental right, that law could be challenged on the ground that such a law is taking away the fundamental right. 25th amendment, this now the 25th amendment comes immediately after the landmark judgment of Golaknath. As you people all know, Golaknath was the first time the Supreme Court said, 11 judges headed by Chief Justice Subba Rao, the Supreme Court said that fundamental rights could not be taken away by a constitutional amendment. Of course, the source there, they sourced the power to amend the constitution as being a legislative power which is found in the residuary entry of the first list, which of course was corrected later on. In reaction to this, in the 24th amendment was passed by which the power to amend the constitution being a constituent power was specifically given in Article 368. And it was categorically said that whatever is done under Article 368 could not be amiable to a challenge under Article 3 of the constitution. Now, this is where the founding sort of steps to Keshan and Bharti are laid. But remember that 25th amendment in 1971, which is very, very important. And we must understand it from the political scenario in which certain things happen. So I'm just going to take a step back from the directive principles of state policy for a couple of minutes so that we understand what was the political scenario in which the 25th amendment was passed. In 1964, Pandit Nehru died. Lal Bahadur Shastriji became the prime minister of India. He gave a big trust to agrarian reforms. Jai Javan, Jai Kisan was the Nara at that point of time as we all know. I'm telling you all this because it is my firm belief that constitutional law and the contemporary politics have to go hand in hand and have to be read together to understand each other. Otherwise, constitutional law cannot be understood in a vacuum because the constitution, according to me, is a political document. So 1965, we had the war in 1966, January 11. Sadly, Lal Bahadur Shastri passed away. There was a struggle for who was to be prime minister. Murarji Desai contested against Indira Gandhi. And Indira Gandhi was supported by the old guard and Mrs. Gandhi won. In 1966, she became the prime minister of India. Murarji Bhai became her deputy. Of course, there was a tussle between Murarji Desai and Mrs. Gandhi through and through. The old guard in the Congress made Mrs. Gandhi prime minister because they thought that she would be under their control. But as we see later on, that was not to be. By 1967, 67, 68, Mrs. Gandhi started coming into her own being. In 1968, 69, in 1967, Zakir Hussain, the president was elected in 1969. He passed away. The Congress party wanted the party, that's the party the heads wanted, the Sri Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy to be president. Mrs. Gandhi wanted the incumbent vice president who was V.Giri to be president. He, however, relented to what the party elders said. The party's decision, which was to propose, which was to officially sponsor Sanjeeva Reddy's candidate. Giri, on the other hand, contested as an independent. And this gave rise to what was interestingly known as the conscience vote. When Mrs. Gandhi says, my conscience asked me to vote for Giri and there was no whip at that point of time, which could be enforced. Remember because now the whip comes with the tent schedule, et cetera. Sorry. At that point of time, V.Giri won by a small margin because those who supported Mrs. Gandhi all voted for V.Giri. And the Congress old guard was left with egg on its face. As a consequence, they expelled Mrs. Gandhi in 1969. And in 1969, she went ahead with, in 1969, she went ahead with the support of the communists to proceed and have to continue her government. Came 1970, between 1969 and 1970, in number of policies, pro-poor policies were projected by the government, which were, one of them was bank nationalization. 14 banks were overnight nationalized. Princes were devolved off their privy purses. And in 1970, when Mrs. Gandhi went for elections, when the opposition jointly had Indira Hatao as their Nara, Mrs. Gandhi went with the Nara of Garibi Hatao. And from that comes, again, Garibi Hatao is really found in part four of the Constitution. So therefore, in 1971, with the 25th Amendment, came Article 31 C. Article 31 C, the reason why I've given you this background is because this was the fundamental political push for the 25th Amendment. The 25th Amendment principally said that a law which declares that it is in furtherance of articles 39B and 39C, we read 39B and 39C a while back, could not be challenged for falling foul off articles 14, 19, and 31, 31 at that point of time, right to property, right? To borrow what Palkiwala said in a lecture in Madras in 1971, 72, all that parliament had to do, and parliament at that point of time made a clear-cut majority like we had today. Not much of a check. There's a clear-cut majority. There's not much of a check and balance on parliament's power. All that parliament had to do was say that this law is in furtherance of Article 39B and C. And then Part 3 could not be, 14, 19, 31, could not be used as a ground to invalidate such a law. Now, that's very strange, and I'll tell you why. Suppose there is an act which takes away, these are obviously for economic purposes. I mean, the basic fundamental principle, Article 39B and C, are for economic purposes, right? For economic opportunity and to bring people on an equal scale and equal distribution of wealth, et cetera. Now, I'll tell you the problem which Palkiwala, he doesn't specify it, but let's explore it. Suppose there is an act which takes away your fundamental right to free speech or your fundamental right to assemble or move from place to place in the country. These are all protected by Article 19. And such an act starts with that this is in furtherance of the directive principles specified in the Articles 39A and 39B and C. You could not challenge them saying that my free speech is taken away or my right to assemble is taken away. Please remember, no fundamental right in India is absolute. Every fundamental right is restricted by reasonable restrictions. Article 191, which is your right to free freedom of speech and expression, is restricted by Article 192. And there are eight heads. For example, peace, public order is one of them. Friendly relations with neighboring states, sovereignty, defamation, contempt of court, these are restrictions of your free speech, which can be there. Article 31C, now, by this device, made Article 39B and C as a restriction on your Article 14, 19, and 31. How could that be? This is more so in the background when Part 3 at this point of time was at an elevated status where you could go to court for the enforcement of your Part 3. You cannot go for an enforcement of Part 4. This article made Part 4, at least two articles of Part 4, 39B and C. They made Article 39B and C a super restriction on the right in Articles 14, 19, and 31. And another article which came into being by the 26th Amendment, which was added, Kerala Act was added in the 9th Schedule. Collectively, the 24th, 25th, and the 26th Amendment came to be challenged in the great case of Keswananda Bharati. Keswananda Bharati completed 50 years last year. And a great number of people these days, amongst them the vice president, a former chief justice, keep raising questions on the correctness of Keswananda Bharati. I will go chronologically as to why Keswananda Bharati was correct and why the dangers of Keswananda Bharati not being there. We'll just go to that as we discuss. At this stage, let's understand that Keswananda Bharati saw the challenge of 24, 25th, and 26th Amendment. And one of the principal questions was what is the relationship between the directive principles and the fundamental rights? Could government restrict your fundamental rights for furtherance of directive principles of state policy? Could that be done? Because remember, Golaknath said fundamental rights cannot be taken away at all. The 24th Amendment undies Golaknath. And now we are in Keswananda Bharati where they say Golaknath is not correct perhaps. All judges say except for two, three. But what is of significance? But what is of significance now is what is it that the judges? Because remember, Keswananda Bharati was on a wafer-thin majority. Six judges said that there were implied limitations. Six judges, six other judges said that there were no implied limitations. And one judge said there were no implied limitations. But there was a basic structure, Justice Khanna. So seven is to six. The basic structure came into being. The majority headed by Chief Justice Sikri simply said that 31C had a very, very sweeping wide connotation and language. And as a consequence, it granted immunity to laws and restricted judicial review, where the court could not examine whether these rights, because mind you, Baya Sahib Ambedkar had said at the time of the Constitution that judicial review is one of the most important parts of the Constitution. The most important article he said was Article 32. Of course, it is 32 and 226 for the reason that I'm sorry, somebody is saying something. No. The reason why he said Article 32 and 226 are so important is because that was the way you would be able to realize your fundamental rights. So Chief Justice, coming back to what Chief Justice Sikri said, Chief Justice Sikri said that the wide sweeping language of Article 31C, which restricted judicial review from being exercised in respect of Articles 14, 19, and 31, was so wild that any article under 19, 14, 19, and 31, merely by saying that these were in furtherance of 39B and C could not be exercised. This was concurred to by Khanna. This was said in the similar way by others. Ray, on the other hand, said that look, the power that was conferred on parliament was subject to safeguards. And these are not my words. These are words of Chief Justice Ray. He said that it was the good sense of the legislature. These are the safeguards. And the innate good sense of the people, comma, the community, sorry, the ascent of the president, and the room for judicial review to determine the relevant mixes. Friends with great respect to Justice Ray, this would be obligating Article 37 of the Constitution as opposed to Article 13 of the Constitution, obligating both those articles, giving Part 4 a status higher than Part 3, would be directly in contravention with what the text of the Constitution and what the Constitution makers envisaged. I read to you what Babasaheb Ambedkar said. Abbedkar categorically said that they have no legal force. But they are instruments of instructions for governments. Obviously, Babasaheb Ambedkar did not mean that these instruments of instructions are to be exercised in such a manner that that very soul of the Constitution, Article 32 or 226, judicial review, was to be taken away. And that mechanism by which Part 3 of the Constitution was to see enforcement be reduced to a nullity. If what the minority view in Keshan and Bharati is to be said is to be correct, then, well, every government could come. The dark clouds that Palki Wala had said in his Madras speech in 1971, 72. It's a speech which is available on YouTube. Everybody could look it up. It is a speech where Palki Wala speaks with the great see Rajagopalachari, where he said this. And he talks of privy purses, et cetera. Those dark clouds of rights being taken away merely by stating that these are in furtherance of directive principles would actually come true. What came out of Keshan and Bharati is well known. It is the great, basic structure doctrine. Today, as I mentioned, some people in very high places keep questioning the basic structure doctrine. But taking you straight away to the reason why the basic structure doctrine is important is the 39th Amendment, which was enacted immediately upon the imposition of the emergency. It was enacted in a matter of four days because in five days, I'm sorry, because on the sixth day, the matter was listed before the Supreme Court. The matter being the prime minister's appeal, where her disqualification by the Ilabad High Court was being heard. As we all know, the Ilabad High Court set aside the election of the prime minister on some grounds of the prime minister, Indira Gandhi's elections at that point of time. On the grounds of corrupt practices because she had used some government servant, Yashwal Kapoor, and some government machinery for her election. That was challenged before the Supreme Court. That order was passed on the 12th of June. It was then challenged before the Supreme Court. And then the single judge, vacation judge, Krishna Ayer, heard it on the 24th, did not grant a stay. He granted only a conditional stay to the prime minister, which severely undermined her authority. So on that very day, on the night of that very day, on the 25th of June, the country saw, perhaps the most abused constitutional action, which was the imposition of the internal emergency. And with emergency came the entire opposition being picked up and put in jail or being debarred from parliament, and therefore being debarred from parliament. And when no opposition in parliament, barely one or two few people here and there, the 39th amendment was passed in four days. On the 6th of August, 7th of August, 8th of August, and 9th of August, the matter was listed on 11th of August. So on the 6th of August, the Lok Sabha passed the 39th amendment, 7th the Rajya Sabha, 8th, one-half of the states rectified it, and 9th the president signed it, 10th it was gestated, 11th when the matter was called out to the attorney general, waived a paper saying that the prime minister's election is saved, because what did the 39th amendment do? The 39th amendment said, you cannot challenge the prime minister's election, khatam. Prime minister and speaker, but that was only to add somebody else other than the prime minister. Such an amendment was applied retrospectively. Obviously, a matter that an election that was challenged and set aside by the court would, if the 39th amendment stood, be revived in terms of the 39th amendment. By God's good grace, we had the basic structure doctrine which became the fundamental basis for striking down the parts of the 39th amendment. That's why the basic structure of the constitution is very important. There were some draconian amendments in the infamous 42nd. Of course, we all know that there was an attempt during the, on the fourth day, three days after this judgment of where the prime minister's election case was decided. Of course, the prime minister's election was upheld. The Galawad High Court was set aside, but the 39th amendment fell, or at least a part of the 39th amendment fell. Three days thereafter, an attempt was made to review Kishan Bharti, which was aborted in the middle. And then what happened was, in 1976, the infamous 42nd amendment came into being. The 42nd amendment came from the then, I'm not sure whether he was defense minister at the point of time, but he was earlier a defense minister. On the basis of a report by a gentleman known as Swarant Singh, Swarant Singh committee report, which gave huge, huge, made huge changes to the constitution. I'm not going to go into all the changes that the constitution made, but they make a very worthy reading because you will realize with almost every amendment that the 42nd amendment made, you will realize a substantive amendment that, thank God, we had a basic structure, basic structure doctrine. So that article 31c, which we remember from the Kudol Kishan Bharti days, the 21, the 25th amendment in 1971, was now further amended in the 42nd amendment. Now what 31c said was that instead of only 39 b and c, all articles in part four, the entire part four, would enable a law to be immune from a part three challenge, a 1419, 1931 challenge, took away judicial review, made article 32 and 226 in a sense, in a sense, took away the teeth. It made it a paper parchment guarantee. Now what was the need to do this? Obviously it was a political agenda at that point of time to say that the directive principles of state policy would be the policies which we will proceed with and you could not challenge them for violation of part three rights. Of course, a year thereafter, fortunately for us, the emergency got over after the emergency. Much of what article 42nd amendment had done was undone by the 44th amendment. Some part of it was left. One of the things that the 44th amendment did was it deleted in entirety the right to property as a fundamental right and moved it to a constitutional right in now which exists as 300a. Why this is important? I mean, I've always found it to be a mystery because a government headed by Muradji Bhai and with other free market entities, I found it a mystery why the right to property was demoted to a constitutional right from a part three right. But be that as it may. This part 42nd amendment made another amendment in section 55 of the 42nd amendment. These two amendments came to be challenged in the case of Minerva Mills, which is one of the most important cases in the series of cases on constitutional amendments right from Sankari Prasad to the NJSE case. In Minerva Mills, the question again was can you take away judicial review on 14, 19, and 31? The age-old question, remember, the age-old question of which is more, which is above the other, which is more relevant. Chief Justice Chandrachud, who wrote for the majority, said, and I'm quoting here and then I will just summarize the remaining part of what he said. I'm just quoting. He said, to destroy the guarantees given by part three in order to purportedly achieve the goals in part four is plainly to subvert the Constitution by destroying its basic structure. Remember now, this is Chandrachud was just Chief Justice Chandrachud was one of the dissenting judges in Keswanand Bharti, followed basic structure in Indira Gandhi, sat on the bench in that aborted review. And this Minerva Mills comes in 1980 or 1979, 1980 when he is now Chief Justice of India and the country has seen seven years of political developments. So therefore, even Chief Justice Chandrachud now understands what is the importance of the basic structure doctrine. And Chief Justice Chandrachud, this is Yashwan Chandrachud, I must say, Chief Justice Yashwan Chandrachud says that the guarantees in part three cannot be subjugated to the principles that the state is supposed to follow in part four of the Constitution. He said further that particle 31C undoubtedly had an effect of abrogating articles 14 and 19. Mind you, by now 31 is deleted when it comes to those laws which parliament would enact in furtherance of part four of the Constitution. Justice Bhagwati took a slightly different view. Overall, Justice Bhagwati is in agreement. But on this aspect, and I'm going to read out what Justice Bhagwati says for the reason that perhaps it's interesting, he said that it was not correct to say that the fundamental rights alone are based on human rights. He said that the directive principles fell into some or the other category of human rights. Because now I'm coming to the end of my discussion, I am quoting Bhagwati because then I'll show you how fundamental rights also get us to what Bhagwati says. He says further that socioeconomic rights embodied in the directive principles are as much a part of human rights as the fundamental rights. The only distinguishing feature between fundamental rights and directive principles is that the former are enforceable in the court of law, and the latter are not. Remember the words of Bawa Saheb Ambedkar, who had at that point of said, yes, they don't have a legal force behind them. But they are instruments of instructions. Taking what Bawa Saheb Ambedkar had said and taking what Justice Bhagwati had said in his differentiating opinion, where he further said, but merely because directive principles are non-justiciable, he does not follow that they are subservient or inferior to fundamental rights. I respectfully disagree with what Justice Bhagwati has said. Of course, they are subservient to fundamental rights. But what Justice Bhagwati says that look, part four also takes care of basic human rights of the many in terms of economic policies. This is something that has actually been catered to in part three of the Constitution and is the running theme of the Constitution. I say this because even prior to the amendment, the even prior to the amendment, the preamble itself spoke of justice, social, economic, and political. Liberty of expression, belief, faith, and opportunity, liberty of worship, sorry. Equality of status and of opportunity. Please remember, socioeconomic justice, political justice, equality of opportunity and status are all there in that very document which was finalized at the end, which is really the identity of the Constitution, the preamble. Further, these socioeconomic rights, et cetera, are embodied in Article 14, for example, where all persons where the state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territory. The state prohibited discrimination on grounds of race, caste, religion, economics, et cetera. The state made sure that equal opportunity was available in terms of public employment and touchability, which was a great gain of our country, perhaps in unfortunately it is still exercised in some parts of the country, was abolished. Titles were abolished. These are all enforceable rights and obviously the basic philosophy behind these particular fundamental rights, which I just sort of read out, and the preamble are reflected in Part 4 of the Constitution. Therefore Justice Bhavati was not wrong in saying that Part 4 takes care of a larger human, larger section of society, human rights, and of course they are, but they are also reflected in Part 3 of the Constitution. With that, I would like to conclude my discussion. If anybody has any questions, comments, it would be, I would be more than happy to engage. At least we don't have on the chat, I'm just checking it out on the YouTube. Yes. One Ravi Pandey probably knows you, he says that it's great to catch up. He's writing from Bihar that it's great to catch up with you Amit. And one Subed says it's a very informative lecture. One has come. Does nevertheless in article 37 equal to not-withstanding clause? I don't think it can be equated to a not-withstanding clause. A not-withstanding clause would be then it would override, not-withstanding what is said somewhere, this was override. Nevertheless in 37 says that governance, this nevertheless is suffixed by that the governance of the state must be in furtherance of the policies between articles 39 onwards in 51. Mr. V. Sudarshan has written, can I get this video on the WhatsApp? Mr. Sudarshan, not only you, but for others, we are already live on the YouTube. You can subscribe to the channel of Beyond Law CLC. You will get all the sessions, even the previous session done by Mr. Amit. So thank you everyone, stay safe. And thank you.