 Then the last class I have explained about phenomenal consciousness koal nith kaila and kid nh din koal Some of the important points I will explain again in these lectures because koala is one of the important aspect of philosophy of mind and without proper explanation on koala it's very difficult to explain what is consciousness and how conscious experience neurological quality qualities. Ad snaput is a debate about whether source quality really in here, in object or whether they are simply subjective effect in the mind of the observer. According to reductionist quallia theory d xtspace täftt xt pur n ho ß 11 52 11 12 12 23 24 25 28 26 29 T landing ca , Ind though no which causes they arise, mental states have no causal powers of their wonderful powers, which are causally derived from the brain processes. However for non deductionism hourly physical causes are rejected. Because for dualism if you see according for it are independent of physics and autonomous నామాసా లిలిలాలా తూవాలింపి ఈన౎డిలిన నిలిం సితూ పికినా క౪తిక్కి ఆభరడ వ్పవనాకనా గాలి ​పశొలికావంది పినాందా పిరికోమౌ ఇంచిని � that can be acquired only by undergoing the relevant experience oneself. For example someone has knowledge about what the character of phenomenal red colour is, nay being a red colour, experience he or she will get the red colour experience. Physical knowledge is not sufficient to know the experience of red colour, but according We have been it if you see a donate is one of the reductionist and he has been arguing that we can coin koalyaa. Koalyaa can be coined on physical object and it can explainable in terms of scientific way and for him there are no such thing as koalyaa or the qualitative subject of the experiences. He does not accept the reality of the koalyaa because he believes that, koalyaa is the private experience how things look like, and there is nothing in the mind which can be correspond to these qualities, features of the mental states. Dennis writes that qualia is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us, the ways things seem to us and look at a glass of milk at sunset, the way it looks to you, the particular personal and subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the qualia of your visual experience at the moment, the way the milk taste to you then is another and how it sounds to you as you shallow is an auditory qualia, these various properties of conscious experience are prime example of qualia. For him, qualia are supposed to be properties of a subject's mental states that are by definition ineffable, increasing, private and immediately appreciable in consciousness, but such properties have absolutely no use in our understanding of consciousness, they are as good as nonexistence. As he puts it, that I do not deny the reality of conscious experience, because conscious experience has some properties and these properties are the properties of a subject's mental states. These consciousness have properties in virtue of which those states have the experimental content and that qualias are supposed to be a special properties. But his claim was that conscious experience has no properties that are special in any of the way a qualia have been supposed to be a special. The qualitative experience according to Dennett is that are the functional state of the brain. These are not different from what happens in the brain when the brain is simulating by the external environment. Thus, Dennett concludes that qualia do not exist. Dennett's third-person perspective relates qualia with the neuro-physiological function of the brain to say that our subjective experience of color, beauty, et cetera, embody, qualia is extrising rather than intrinsic. The brain states explains what senses when we have first-person experience, whether qualia are private sense experiences can be publicly judged by attaching a perfect neuro-scientific machine into human head. In addition, that will certainly provide the causal explanation of the visual experience, which are called qualia. Thus, this functionality approach of Dennett proves that qualia are non-existence. It is because the mechanism is sufficient to explain how qualitative experience occur according to inverted qualia. If you have a visual experience, then you have a visual experience, which is called qualia. Thus, this functionality approach of Dennett proves that qualia are non-existence. It is because the mechanism is sufficient to explain how qualitative experience occur according to inverted qualia. If qualia are defined broadly as the properties characterizing what it is like to have conscious experiences, then their existence is hard to deny. Qualitative experiences are only the first-person conscious experiences or the subjective attitude of experiencing things. Therefore, qualia belongs to the first-person point of view and the first-person ontology. Here, according to Prof. Pradhan, he points out the mental life of man cannot be fully represented in a mechanistic system. And that are subjective mental states, which need a first-person perspective of their proper understanding. Therefore, it is very important to understand that qualia are non-existence. According to Prof. Pradhan, he points out the mental life of man cannot be fully represented in a mechanistic system. And that are subjective mental states, which need a first-person perspective of their proper understanding. Therefore, it is very difficult to explain qualia in the mechanistic way. Now, we have to see the inverted qualia and other issues which are related to inverted qualia. According to this qualia, our conscious mental states have distinctive qualitative features. For example, a man has a visual experience of red color, which differs qualitatively from the kind of experience he has when he looks at a green thing. Here, his experience of red and green things involves different color qualia. But let us invert his color experience. Now, he sees something different from what he used to see earlier. According to the inverted spectrum or inverted qualia argument, if our functional organizations were realized in a different physical substrate, a system may still have experience, but it would have a different kind of experience. A person who sees something as red today and may see yellow tomorrow, here the thing remains constant, but his color experience can vary from red to yellow. In this case, the person's color experience is inverted in the experience that he sees something different from what he used to see earlier. He only described his previous experience of red as that of yellow. Now, we cannot deny the logical possibility of our qualia being inverted in the case of oneself and of others. A person's color experience can vary from seeing red to green. His experience is inverted in the sense that he sees something different from what he had seen earlier. Qualia inversions would not be possible if the conscious states would have been functionally state of the brain. In the case of consciousness, qualia inversion is possible because qualia are the properties of the mental states which cannot be ascribed to the physical and machine states. The machine functionalist view about consciousness that it must be rejected because conscious states are not physical states and because conscious states have qualia, according to Flanagan, inverted qualia are a problem primarily because they are alleged to the unacceptable, but the very possibility of inverted qualia challenges computational functionalism because the computational states cannot have any qualia. For example, two people with red-green inversion have different inner lives. Soft persons may be input-output equivalent, but they are not mentally equivalent. It is because even if the two systems are mechanically equivalent they do not have the same mental properties. Thus, inverted qualia are an epistemic problem even if they are non-metaphysically problematic. According to the functionalist, state of a mind are functional states. There can be complete explanation of qualia without any reference to consciousness or conscious thought experiences. Functionalism is able to explain the qualia in terms of functional states of the brain, but not the inner or qualitative nature of our mental states. The problem for functionalism is that even if my spectrum is inverted related with yours, we remain functionally isomorphic with each other. My visual sensation is functionally identical with your visual sensation. Therefore, they are the same type of states and it does not make sense to suppose that my sensation is really a sensation of green. If it meets the functional condition for being a sensation of red, then by definition it is a sensation of red. According to functionalism, a spectrum inversion of the object described is ruled out by definition. According to Schumacher, in the case of inverted spectrum, there should be a systematic difference between the character of someone's color experience at a certain time and the characteristic that same person's color experience at another time. Here, there is a distinction between intrasubjective and intersubjective. In both the cases, qualia inversions are possible. For Schumacher, the qualitative similarity and differences is well defined only for the intrasubjective case. It is conceivable that two people have similar functional visual systems, but only the things that look red to one person look green to the others. If this spectrum inversion, the way things look is possible, but that cannot be given a functional description. The way things look to a person is an aspect of that person's mental life that cannot be explicated in purely functional terms. If somebody finds yellow things more similar to orange things and lesser similar to blue things, other person finds just the opposite. For Schumacher, in this intrasubjective inversion case, the color quality spaces of the two people should have the same structure. That requires the same conditions. They make the same subjective of relative color similarity about the same visual objects. However, if one claims to have undergone spectrum inversions, then it is different to know about the change in his color experiences and his memory of how things appear to him in the past. Therefore, there is no answer to the questions how is intrasubjective inversions possible. We cannot comprehend the inverted experience of others according to Schumacher. The possibility of spectrum inversions leads to skepticism about our ability to acquire knowledge about the qualitative character of experience of other persons. He writes that the behavioral evidence that establishes intentional similarities and differences between experience of different persons is not by itself sufficient to establish qualitative similarities and differences between such experiences. In the inverted spectrum case, we have two persons whose experiences are functionally and intentionally same, but qualitatively inverted. There are two kinds of content of experiences. One is intentional or representational content and the other is qualitative or sensational content. If my spectrum is inverted with respect to John's, then in the qualitative sense, rare things look the same to me as green looks to John. According to Ned Block, if an inverted spectrum is possible, then experimental contents that can be expressed in public language, for example, looking red, are not qualitative content. For Ned Block, the intentional content of experience is functional and experience has the intentional content of looking red if it functions in the right way. If it is caused by rare things in the right circumstances and used in thought about rare things and actions with respect to rare things rightly. The functionalists argue that in the case of interpersonal spectrum inversion, it is most implausible to suppose that the subjects concerned would really be functionally equivalent in respect of their color experiences. That means there are causal relations between our color experiences and our emotional responses. There is no reason to think that the different physiological realization of the experience of rare things involves any experimental differences. For example, the mental states like the experience of red has alternative physiological realization and this is held to be just a case of alternative realization of the very same experiences. Thus, if quality inversion is possible, functionalism is false. Therefore, Ned Block discusses a cases of two persons whose experiences are qualitatively the same but intentionally and functionally inverted in his inverted earth case. Inverted earth is just like earth except that the colors around us change. When one uses inverted spectrum spectacles, appearances changes, grass becomes red, sky becomes yellow and etcetera. In addition, on this inverted earth, the color vocabulary is also inverted. They call their yellow sky blue, their bright red grass green and so forth. Suppose, mad scientist make John's unconscious, inserted color inverting lenses in his eyes changes his body, page meant to show that it will look normal to him upon awakening and then move him to inverted earth. When he wakes on inverted earth, he notices no differences. Again, Ned Block says that what it is like for you to interact with the world and with other people does not change at all. So, one has to see the things which are different from each other. But in the case of color experience or inverted color experience, if you see, either earth, those color experiences are kind of functional and intentional inversions together with the same qualitative contents and the converse of the inverted spectrum cases. This is enough to refute the functionality theory of qualitative content and at the same time to establish intentional and qualitative distinction according to Ned Block. Our new linguistic and physical environment will eventually produce changes in the intentional content of our mental states. In time, our blue experience will be about yellow things, our red experience will be about green things and so on, just like the other inhabitants of the inverted earth. According to Block's view, we will be intentionally and functionally interact with the world. We will be inverted with respect to our former self, but our qualia will remain inverted. Inverted earth also changes representationalism, the view that qualia are just representational or intentional properties. On that view, blue experience are equated with perceptual state that represented blue things. But David Chalmers, he argues that the absent qualia, hypothesis, challenges not only functionalism, but also versions of physicalism. Just as a qualia, free functional duplicates of a conscious human being seems possible. A qualia, free physical duplicate seems possible. Such creatures are known as Phenomenal Zumbaes. We cannot see any conscious experience in such a system. In this case, a Zumbae may have minds just like us, beliefs, desires, even pains functionally equivalent to us. But it would never enjoy mental state with the qualitative character. Here, the qualia are absent and there is a Zumbae extremely identical to ourselves, but lacking an inner life. Chalmers discusses that a fading qualia may have minds just like us, beliefs, desires, even pains functionally equivalent to us, but it would never enjoy mental state with the qualitative character. Here, the qualia are absent and there is a Zumbae extremely identical to ourselves, but lacking an inner life. Chalmers discusses that a fading qualia has a positive argument against the possibility of absent qualia. A thought experiment is involved with the replacement of part of brain by silicon chips. Here, a system isomorphic, that is robot, is a functional same with a conscious system like a man, which lacks consciousness. Experience entirely and is made of silicon chips instead of neurons. Every neuron in the system lacks consciousness. A thought experiment is involved with the replacement of part of brain by silicon chips. Here, a system isomorphic, that is robot, is a functional same with a conscious system like a man, which lacks consciousness. Experience entirely and is made of silicon chips instead of neurons. Every neuron in the system has been replaced by a chip and there are no biochemical mechanisms playing an essential role. The system robot is processing the same inputs and behavior like human beings by hypothesis. This is experiencing nothing at all. According to Chalmers, that fading qualia are logically possible because there is no contradiction in the description of a system that is so wrong about its experiences, but logically possibility and naturally possibility are different things. Chalmers dancing qualia is also an argument against the possibility of inverted qualia. In this case, the structural features of these systems experiences are preserved throughout. There can be two functional isomorphic systems in the same functional state, but having different experiences. This thought argument takes a silicon circuit and install it in human beings head as a backup circuit. After the install, the switch can operate directly between the neural and silicon circuits. When upon flipping the switch, the neural circuits becomes irrelevant and silicon circuit takes over. Suppose, somebody is having a problem with the silicon circuit and the silicon circuit takes over. Suppose, somebody is having a problem with the silicon circuit and the silicon circuit takes over. Having a red experience and his or her silicon isomorph is having a blue experience. When we flip the switch that time, his or her experience was red. After the switch, he or she has a blue experience. Chalmers describe the situation as what will happen then is that my experience will change before my eyes where I was once experiencing red. I will now experience blue all of a sudden. I will have a blue experience of the apple on my desk. We can even imagine flipping the switch back and forth a number of times so that the red and blue experiences dance before my eyes. According to Chalmers, qualia are different. It may well be that our qualia are in fact dancing before our eyes all the times. Therefore, in dancing qualia, a functional isomorphic silicon system may experience blue where human beings experience red. Chalmers argues that though it is logically possible to have dancing qualia and fading qualia, it is not practically possible to have them. It follows that we have good reason to believe that the principle of organizational invariance is true. And that functional organization fully determines conscious experience. Functionalist and physicalist sometimes respond by challenging the coherence of the absent qualia hypothesis. For example, Schumacher argues that a true functional duplicate of a conscious human must have introspective beliefs about its own sensory states, which in his view entails that some of its states have qualia. Another reply is to consider that the absent qualia hypothesis is coherent but deny that it is undermined functionalism or physicalism. Here we can discuss script case view on necessity according to whom water is H2O is metaphysically necessary, truth which is found even if the laws of nature are different. Yet we know that the truth is only a pasteurized conceptual reflection alone cannot reveal the metaphysical impossibility of water existing. The argument shows that conceptual reflection alone cannot reveal whether absent qualia cases are metaphysically possible. This argument depends on the clear court distinction between the ordinary concept of water which is given by its superficial features. And water itself, the essence of which consists in its molecular structure. We have some subjective character of experience or raw feelings which involves something increasing, not reducible to behavior. For example, the red things which look red and our feelings of red are the way the red things appear to us. These appearances are the phenomenal properties of the things. These are also in our subjective consciousness and as such they make our color experience. The phenomenal properties of color red are given only in the subjective consciousness. The raw feelings are increasing in a certain sense in which the character of an individual's raw feeling is logically independent of its relationship. In other words, raw feelings are subjectivity. These are involved in all varieties of sensation and conscious perceptual experience. Dreaming, after imagining, etc., the friends of qualia argue that there are qualitative features of consciousness that are facts of an intersubjective understanding. The conscious states which constitute our mind have some features like being experienced. This type of aspect of our consciousness cannot be studied by the brain sciences. This concept is not only the concept of consciousness, but also of the consciousness. These are some features like being experienced. This type of aspect of our consciousness cannot be studied by the brain sciences. This subjective aspect can be studied only by the phenomenology of the psychological states which is known as the qualitative features of consciousness. The first person point of view only takes the mental state as belonging to a person from his or her subjective point of view. The raw feelings of our consciousness are ontological real because they are the ultimate features of our consciousness. Which make up the phenomenal mind. The qualia constitute the essence of consciousness and are intrinsic to the conscious subjects. Functionalism fails to explain our consciousness to the conscious subject. The first person point of view is the mental state of our consciousness. And are intrinsic to the conscious subjects. Functionalism fails to explain our color experience. In case of spectrum inversions there is no differences in functional terms between my color experience and that of others. In respect of color experience we are functionally equivalent. Thus it means that my color experience and the other experience would exhibit exactly the same pattern of causal relation to environmental states and other mental states or behavior. After all they would have exactly the same causal role. However our color experiences have the most striking feature of qualitative characters. Firstly we cannot doubt the fact that other human beings can see color differently. Even in our case we may see colors differently in different situations. Therefore both the interest objective and interest objective qualia inversions are possible and we can always imagine what could happen to our present color experience in a different situations. This inversion is possible because we have all the relevant conceptual resources to think of the inverted qualia. A theory of subjective consciousness gains its motivation from the need to explain the heterogeneous qualitative character of our mental life. Thus our knowledge or awareness of our qualia could not constitute by any of the physical processes occurring in us. The similar processes would occur in beings that are physical just like us yet completely lack consciousness. Now we have to see coining qualia. Can qualia coined on the physical object? As we know that qualia are the increasing quality of conscious experiences. For example the experience of testing a suit is very different from that of watching a movie because both of these have a different qualitative character of experience. This shows that there are different qualitative features of conscious experience. That is why we cannot derive the pleasure of eating sweets by watching movies and vice versa. As Schalmers writes that mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in the mental states. To put it in another way we can say that a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative field that is an associated quality of experience. These qualitative fields are also known as phenomenal qualities or qualia for short. But functionists like Danette have argued for eliminating qualia from the discourse of mind. The basic reason for them is that mind is a machine. It cannot entertain the so-called qualitative subjective experience called qualia. According to Danette qualia are supposed to be a properties of subject that are ineffable, intrinsic, private, directly or indirectly apprehensible in consciousness. Qualia are ineffable because one cannot say exactly what ways one is currently seeing, testing, smelling and so forth. Why qualia are ineffable is that they are increasing properties which seems to imply internally that they are somehow atomic and unanalysable. Since they are simple there is nothing to get hold of when trying to escape such properties. Since qualia are ineffable and intrinsic qualia are private because all interpersonal comparisons of these of appearing are systematically impossible. Lastly, since their properties of experiences qualia are directly accessible to the consciousness because qualia are properties of one's experience which one is immediately apprehensible in consciousness. Thus qualia constitute the phenomenal structure of the mind in that they enrich our understanding of the mind and also provides close to the ontology of the mental. What the mental ultimately is as distinguished from the physical is to be known from what the qualia reveals about mind. Therefore, the qualia play a very important role in the understanding of mind. The important question is here is that is Denet right in calling qualia the private and ineffable experience of queer assault? Obviously not. As Pradhan argued that the notion of private as we know from Wittgenstein's private language argument does not apply to the qualia. In the sense that the qualia are intersubjectively intelligibly and that they are available for interpersonal communications. The qualia of color experience are such that any two persons belonging to the same linguistic community can easily communicate their color experience and can understand each other well. This shows that the qualia in spite of being subjective are not private at all. As to their ineffability or otherwise it goes without saying that they are expressible in an interpersonal language. That is the reason why they are accessible to all speakers if they are suitable placed. Thus Denet's main argument that the qualia are inaccessible to all except to the subject of the qualia does not hold good. Because if you see Denet's argument that qualia are atomistic and non-relation is equally weak for the reason that the subjective experience need not be atomistic at all. Because they can be taken as constituting the stream of consciousness in that they constitute a single unbroken series of conscious experiences. In this sense the qualia are holistic rather than atomistic. The fact of the matter is that the qualia never exist in isolation and they are always in constellations. For example the color experience of a red rose is not only that of the color red is that of color red but also of the rose plant of certain shape and size. Here the two experiences do not stand apart but constitute one whole. But Denet is skeptical about reality of the qualia because he believes qualia to be the private experiences and there is nothing in the mind that can correspond to these qualitative features of the mental states. According to him the qualitative features are the appearances of the brain states which in reality are the functional states of the brain. Denet argues against qualia because for him there are brain functions as a machines. The brain performs multiple functions that is to say that all varieties of thought or all mental activities are accomplished in the brain by a parallel multi-track processes of interpretations and elaboration of sensory inputs. That is why this model of mind is called the multiple draft model which I have already explained. In Denet's language according to the multiple draft model all varieties of perceptions indeed all varieties of thought or mental activities are accomplished in the brain by parallel multi-track processes of interpretations and elaboration of sensory inputs. The nature of the mind under this model is unfolded in the cognitive processes which the mind undertakes. For Denet the mind turns out to be computing machines programmed to scope with the cognitive representations of the world. For machine functionalist like him the structure of the mind is the structure of the machine representations. Therefore in this respect there is no place for the subjective qualia among the mechanical state of the mind. Now the question is that can the qualia be made part of third person perspective. Denet's reductionist program is fully committed to the reducibility of the qualia to the brain state. However this can be opposed on the ground that the qualia are ascribed to a conscious subject and not to the brain because the brain is a physical system though with infinite physical capacity. The subject is not reducible to the brain in the sense that brain itself belongs to the subject. Our conscious mental states have different conscious experiences. For example a man can see something as red today but tomorrow he may see the same as green. That is the thing remaining the same a man's scholar experience can vary from seeing red to seeing green. In this case the person's scholar experience undergoes an inversion in the sense that he sees something different from what he used to see earlier. Here that man is not only misidentifying the same object rather the systematically goes on describe his previous experience of red as that of green now. Therefore we cannot deny the logical possibility of our qualia being inverted in the case of oneself and of others. The qualia inversions does not entail the physicalistic and the machine functionalist notion of consciousness because qualia inversion would not be possible if the conscious state would have been functionally state of the brain. The qualia inversion cannot be ascribed to the physical and the machine states. Therefore the functionalist approach to consciousness must be rejected on the ground that consciousness or conscious states are not physical states because conscious states have qualia. As we have mentioned earlier there is a first person dimension of the conscious states in that only from the first person point of view point of view can we understand the conscious states. The first person point of view is such that it takes the mental state as belonging to a person from his or her subjective point of view. In this connection we can mention Sol's view that the first person perspective provides an ontological state to the subjective mental states. John Sol says that ontological objectivity is not an essential trait of science. If science is supposed to give an account of how the world works and if subjective state of consciousness are part of the world then we should seek an epistemically or objective account of an ontological subjective reality. The reality of the subjective states of consciousness. What Sol's argue here is that we can have an epistemological objective science of domain that is ontological subjectivity. And therefore mental subjects are subjective not in the epistemological sense of being known exclusively by the subject. But in the ontological sense that they are essential riveted only to the subject. Functionalism is incompatible with our semantic externalism because functional organization is not only a matter of sensory inputs, transition from one state to the another and motor outputs. Semantic externalism refers to the content of our words and thoughts which is partly determined by our relation with things in environment. A robot which has a program encoded into its system does not have any relation to the external environment. Putnam in its later writing has rejected the computational view of mind on the ground that the literal tuning machine like the robot would not give a representation of the psychology of human being and animals. For him functionalism is wrong in holding the thesis that propositional attitudes is just like computational state of the brain. For example to believe that there is a cat on the mat is not the same thing as that there is one physical state or a computational state believing that there is a cat on the mat. Then the question is whether these semantic and propositional attitudes properties and relations are reducible to physical computational properties and relations. This is impossible because the propositional attitudes refer to the intentional state that is to say that it refers to various state of affairs in the world. For example if I say that John will go to New Delhi from Hyderabad this statement refers to many attitudes and it cannot be realized computationally. Thus according to Putnam the functionalist is wrong in saying that semantic and propositional attitudes predicates are semantically reducible to computational properties. There is no reason why the study of human cognition requires that we try to reduce cognition either to computation or to brain processes. We may well succeed to discovering theoretically models of the brain which vastly increase our understanding of how the brain works. But if we will reduce the human mind into brain it is no way helpful in understanding the mind. Therefore functionalism fails to account for the real nature of the mental state because of its unsuccessful attempts to reduce mental state to the machine state. It fails as a theory of mind because of its reductionistic dogma and it makes mind meaningless in the universe. It also fails to explain how consciousness is possible. Therefore the mechanistic theory of mind does not have any positive or possible answer to the question how qualia are necessary feature of consciousness. There are mechanistic model of mind like artificial intelligence that offers largely functionalistic view of mind fails to explain how consciousness is possible. We conclude that in this lectures mechanistic explanation of qualia is not sufficient in explaining consciousness. This thesis follows from the conviction that we cannot convince of consciousness unless we view it as having raw feelings. Therefore there are two aspects of this thesis, epistemological and the metaphysical. Epistemological the subject of consciousness intimately knows the raw feelings metaphysically speaking. However the raw feelings are real in the sense that they are part of the function of the mental world. Therefore it is very difficult to explain qualia in the mechanistic way. Therefore qualia are conscious experience. Thank you.