 Thank you so much, Peter and thank you, General Raymond. Our next panel is entitled What is the Future of Intelligence? It will be moderated by Dr. Carol Evans, who's the director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, as well as the USAWC Press. Thank you so much. Thank you for that introduction, Daniel. I'm really excited for today's panel. We've been planning this for some time in many months, and it's just interesting just in the short time that we've had, you know, so much has happened within the intelligence community and many of the challenges that we're facing and looking forward into the future. We have three outstanding panels today speaking on the top of an intelligence. Also from the US Army War College is my dear colleague, Dr. Genevieve Lester, who holds the Deserio Chair of Strategic Intelligence. Gene is also currently on secondment to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, or ODNI, as we know it in the business. Joining us from the United Kingdom is Sir David Oman, visiting Professor at King's College London. And Sir David has served as UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the Cabinet Office, but I think very well-renowned as former Director of UK Government Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ for short. Rounding out our panel is Mr. Neil Wiley. Neil recently retired from Government Service in 2021, where he served in ODNI as Principal Executive. And among those duties and responsibilities were those in his capacity as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. Neil also served as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, so I can't think of a more renowned and a more capable panel to talk about the future of intelligence than our three members today. The format for our panel on what is the future of intelligence is going to be 30 minutes of me moderating discussion and then followed by about 15 minutes of questions and answers from the participants. And so for you that are coming in as participants, you may leave your questions via Slido, which you'll see on your Zoom.gov screen. And as you're thinking about the question, and if you have a question for a particular panelist, please indicate that as well and I can then direct the question accordingly. So again, welcome and thank you to our three distinguished panels and for you participants joining us this afternoon. So my questions to the three of you will center on strategic level issues facing the intelligence community post 9-1-1. And I know a lot of our participants joining us this afternoon are going to be very much thinking about the headline news, particularly today's recently redacted FBI report that the Biden administration has released. Obviously a huge amount of soul searching looking at Afghanistan, but I'm going to really keep to that strategic level. And I'm going to guess that many of the participants will for their sort of aspect in the 15 minutes look at some of those more recent and topical issues. So if I may start then my first question is in two parts. And Neil, I'm going to ask you to sort of take the lead on this one. And then perhaps I'm going to then come to David to you and then to Jen. So the question is 20 years after 9-1-1, what should intelligence priorities be? And how have these priorities perhaps changed over time? So that's part A to the question. Part B is can you provide insight as to what has been sort of driving the change in priorities? And even in thinking about change, are there barriers to change? What are those different impacts as you think about prioritization? So again, if we could start with you, Neil, please. Over. Oh, thank you. I appreciate it. So I'm going to depart from the best practices of trade craft. And I'm going to answer your question backwards. So what's changed over 20 years and what drives it? So there are three, I think in this case, main drivers of anything the intelligence community does. One, we are actually a demand driven creature. We serve customers, whether that customer is a national policymaker, a military commander, or any acquisition professionals. There is a consumer for the product and the consumer actually gets a say in what we do. Secondly, the demand for intelligence always outstrips the capacity of whatever intelligence system you have to satisfy that demand. So existentially, the intelligence community is always risk managed. So we always shift capacity. We shift focus back and forth in order to try to best satisfy that demand as well as keep whatever watching brief we need to keep on other things. And third, ongoing military operations are voracious consumers of intelligence. So as soon as you have an ongoing military operation or multiple ongoing military operations, you know where a substantial amount of your intelligence effort, and it's not solely on the defense side, will go. So those three factors really came together post 9-11. We had a substantially different demand than we had the day before. Terrorism, which had been part of the priority portfolio, all of a sudden became almost exclusively the priority portfolio. That drove over time that change in demand and therefore the change in the ability to satisfy it. Risk management then assumed risk on other portfolios. And then we had persistent military operations ongoing for 20 years. And so what had here before been fairly rare applications of military force that required an intelligence surge to support it became really just part of the environment. And that was something we had never faced before. So the intelligence community is like an organism. Organisms evolve to the demands of their environment. And over time that led to some very profound changes in how the intelligence community was structured and postured. We became very good at doing a few things that were high demand. That's understandable and logical. We also took substantial risk on bits of the portfolio, which were in less demand, but still very important. And in fact, the risk we took in those parts of the portfolios are now becoming topics of discussion as the threat landscape changes yet again. The barriers to change really are the ability that the community has or any bureaucracy has to programmatically shift to a persistent problem. You can surge on a problem like a noncombatant evacuation or a humanitarian relief operation, or God throws you another curveball. We can surge pretty well. But if you actually want to change the way you persistently collect and analyze in the collection systems really are the long pulls in the tent, that just takes time. Now, we had time over 20 years to do that, so which is why we ended up with a substantial structural change. What should the priorities be? I mean, the priorities will be whatever the decision makers and policy makers wish them to be, go back to where demand driven. The priorities will also be whatever the uncertainty inherent in the human condition puts in our way, because a lot of times we spend time dealing with things that nobody wanted to deal with. They just happened because that's life. But I think if you could step back and plan without chaos intruding on to it, the difference today between today and post 9-11 or is post 9-11, whether it was an accurate and a right thing to do or not, we could define a threat that looked a certain way. The principal threat to the United States was defined as non-state terrorist action or just terrorist action in general. So we could focus and occupy ourselves with that as the predominant threat. Today, it's not possible to identify some part of the conflict spectrum that is the predominant threat and you can sort of ignore or reduce your effort on some other part of the conflict spectrum. The entire conflict spectrum today is in play. So I think if it were me, I would try to find a way to rebalance the intelligence community in such a way that it had better coverage across the full conflict spectrum portfolio. You can't just say terrorism's gone. Certainly Afghanistan will tell you that's not. And it wouldn't have been anyway. But high-end adversaries are in play as well. So I think a question of balance across the portfolio is where you have to go. Great. I'm going to quickly then shift gears to Sir David for his thoughts over. I think David, you might be muted. There we go. Thank you very much, Carol, and thank you for having a British voice in your conversation. I want to build on what Neil was saying and I agree with everything he said. You can explain a lot of what has gone on in the last 20 years in the intelligence world by thinking of a triangle of forces. There's the dynamic interaction between the forces of demand that Neil has talked about, but also the forces of supply and the third force is law and ethics and how much of the particularly more modern intelligence activities the public prepared to accept as being done on their behalf. So if you think about the demand side, one of the biggest changes is the emphasis on intelligence about people as individuals. The terrorists, the serious criminals, the hackers, the dictators. And that's on top of all the traditional intelligence on weapons systems, proliferation, hostile states and all the rest of it. None of that went away. But if you want to know about individuals, where do you look? And that takes you straight into the supply side because in those 20 years we had a digital revolution. We had the internet. We had mobile devices continuously broadcasting their location. And so the supply side has actually created demand. It was simply infeasible to have the real time geolocation of suspects in the way we can today or bulk coverage of fiber optic cables or global visual surveillance. But the supply side changes artificial intelligence and so on has enabled that kind of information to be produced. And once the customers that Neil talked about see it, they say, well, we want that and we want actionable real time intelligence, particularly military customers, and we want it now. And so you've had this dynamic interaction between demand and supply. And the modulating force that I mentioned, the third force, is about ethics and law. And we ran into this, of course, with the war on terror, with the controversies over rendition and coercive interrogation methods and so on. We ran into it with the Snowden material that he stole from NSA and GCHQ, which triggered this global paranoia about privacy. And for the future, when you think of some of the things which are becoming really possible, the pervasive AI driven visual surveillance and identification of individual suspects, say by drone, on a global basis, but is that going to be acceptable? We've already had major arguments about encryption, end-to-end encryption, law enforcement access and so on. So these three forces are in tension. And if I were running my agency today, I'd be looking for a safe, stable space where those three forces were in balance. Just a word on the barriers. I think they're mostly cultural. The technology is there, and the technology is moving very fast. The human skills that of the agent recruiter and runner are there. Do we have the culture which will enable a mission-centric approach? And we've seen the armed services go through this with individual services, recruiting and training and with very high ethos, but competent commands actually delivering the punch. And can we kind of do the same in the intelligence community? And any barrier that may be there is, I think, cultural. Well, I'm going to then shift gears to Jen on that very note. Over to you, Jen. I just want to follow up on what both of my colleagues have stated, because I think that they covered the terrain extremely well. Pulling from what Neil said, I think it's important to think, so I'm going to address this as the going forward aspect of the current threats, because I think that the full spectrum issue is one that I find quite important. We threw a lot of resources at the counterterrorism problem, and we left other things aside. And I think the focus was important. The need was important. There was a definite demand, and it was very immediate. And there was also a big public piece of this, that 9-11 happened. It was very public, and there was a piece of assuaging public opinion about these things. So we saw several actions taken that may have led us slightly astray from some of the principles that David lined out in terms of ethical and moral principles. So what I think about now is how do we rebalance these issues? And I don't mean just rebalancing, for example, civil liberties versus security, which I think is a false dichotomy, but how do we rebalance all aspects of this whole mission? Because we are needing to think about the relationship between military and intelligence support and domestic and foreign law enforcement intelligence. And I think we're looking at how do we consider this range of threats, recalibrate this to realign for the next post 9-11 era. So I really feel that we're just bringing this together for the future going forward, and that is a realignment and rebalancing. That comes right straight to question number two that I had in mind, which is, and you really touched on this well, but I'd like to maybe hear a little bit more clearly from each of you. And that is 9-11, as we know, led to the realignment, to use your term gen in terms of how foreign and domestic intelligence interplay and also intelligence and law enforcement interact with each other. So again, from each of your unique perspectives, could you talk perhaps about the implication of these interactions and their evolution going forward? And Jen, I would just press you, if you wouldn't mind continuing on with that thought, and then over to you, David, and then to you, Neil, sort of in reverse orders we did before. Over. Thanks, Carol. Thank you for this great topic. I think the domestic, I worked quite a bit on domestic intelligence within the realm of thinking of how to reframe it for the U.S. experience. So I was part of a study that talked about how do we redesign domestic intelligence for the U.S. democracy because domestic intelligence is culturally, traditionally, historically not considered very acceptable within open discourse on intelligence activities. We do what we do over there is not what we do over here. And I think we saw some reframing in this. We saw some new language appear post 9-11, the word homeland that we're so used to. We didn't use that before. George Packer, the journalist, made a great point that he said that 9-11 and the reaction to it caused a militarization of the homeland. And that may be taking it a step too far. But I think we saw some trends. We saw local law enforcement getting weaponry from the Department of Defense. We saw the barrier that had traditionally been very present between law enforcement intelligence dropped somewhat. Legislations such as the Patriot Act passed that facilitated operations in these areas. So I think we saw some of the barriers between these different spheres that I spoke of before started to drop since the 1970s. There had been a clear delineation, relatively speaking. And suddenly it seemed that the threat was pushing us in a very new direction, new legislation. And I would argue new norms of behavior, new norms of acceptability when it comes to how far law enforcement can penetrate the civil environment. So on the operational level, we saw this wall as it is termed drop. We saw a greater acceptability, I would argue, among the public to deal with greater incursions, searches, taking your shoes off. All of those aspects of the very public aspects and demonstrations of security that became very well accepted. And then we saw the whole mantra of information sharing really spread. So many of us were part of that whole world at that time, which is how do we include both vertically, so down to the local level, and how do we include horizontally? Information sharing among the agencies, the range of federal agencies. And those barriers were helpful, but it also introduced floods of information that sometimes at the local level pushed out more relevant topics. Sorry about that. And I think, and also it was a slight distraction, but also pushed out other issues. So for example, in Los Angeles County, there's a lot of gang issues, that type of law enforcement issue, some of that was pushed out to deal with terrorism. So there were floods of information that was good, the mantra of information sharing, some of it was too much. And I would argue now, 20 years later, that we see how this interaction is played out, the fusion centers, which were a great very distinct unit, yes, for the United States. And I'm just going to shift a little bit to move over to David, because we're talking from a very US centric perspective. And I'm curious, Sir David, your thoughts on this topic as well from a UK perspective. I think in the UK, we have now accepted that cyberspace doesn't respect borders. The perpetrators are overseas, the victims are here. And this is common to all of us. And I think it does mean the rethinking, the traditional domestic and overseas balance. It means the human terms and the digital intelligence people forming new partnerships between themselves and the technical intelligence in a way that probably wouldn't have been thought to be necessary before the internet age. It's a bit of a challenge for domestic law, because the law, as in the UK, the laws domestically are different from intelligence gathering overseas. And there there's a deal to be done between the public, the legislators, and the executive and the intelligence community about if you're going to give powerful intelligence gathering tools to be used in the domestic space. And I believe that is really necessary. You can't just have ordinary law enforcement these days. If you're going to give them those powerful tools, you've got to satisfy the public that there won't be scandals, that they won't be misused for political purposes and so on. And that deal, it took the UK 18 months of really vigorous parliamentary argument to settle a deal, which is now, I think, pretty stable that allows that to happen. But domestic and overseas and not the only sort of dichotomy you've got to manage. You've got to manage the tensions between individual agencies, functionally specialized and an intelligence community, talked earlier about the mission. You've got to look at the tension between evidence and intelligence. If you're going to, again, try and bring to justice people who you actually have under your hand domestically. And the tension, I say between technical sources and human sources, when actually you need a partnership, one enabling the other. And there are plenty of historical precedents for that being done. But it's ever more important in the digital age. Thank you for that. And over to you, Neil, if I may. I see that you're on mute. Just you've got it. So I might be a little bit contrarian on this one. Oh, excellent. We like contrarians. Yes. Well, so I completely understand and accept why we did what we did post 9 11 as a result of the 9 11 Commission. And most of those actions were taken to try to shore up what was an information gap between the domestic law enforcement agencies and the foreign intelligence service, particularly about the information that the foreign intelligence services had on foreign activity, which had the which was going to manifest itself in the domestic space as Sir David and Dr. Lester said. So we put a number of things in place. That's fine. I understand it. But I think we have to be perilously careful going forward to ensure that we retain a distinction not geographically between foreign and domestic, because I agree with Sir David entirely that that distinction, if it ever was real, it's not real now, but between foreign activity and domestic and activity by U. S. Persons. Because there is a distinction in U. S. Law between what U. S. Persons do and how they are treated and what legal status they enjoy. And others elsewhere. The the foreign intelligence community deals with others elsewhere. The law enforcement community deals with U. S. Persons by and large. And there is some there's a there's crossover and in cyberspace and a number of those things with the foreign intelligence community, I think has to really continue to focus on foreign activity because it has substantial reputational risk in what is today something I could only describe as a deeply politicized domestic environment. Any time we dip our toe in the domestic world, we the intelligence community risk being perceived as tools of one or another political viewpoint. And the one thing the intelligence community cannot afford to lose is the trust on behalf of both the decision makers and the and the public in the integrity and probity of what we do. And the closer we are in the domestic space, the more we will be dragged into whatever political debate there is. And then the more corrosive effect that will have on the overall perception of the integrity of us as a community. And that will also permeate the foreign intelligence mission. We went through that with the church pike and Rockefeller commissions back in the 70s. So we have to be painfully careful to look at our reputational stability while we go and while we navigate whatever this new path is in this kind of uncomfortable nexus in the foreign domestic. Can I actually agree with what Neil was saying there, but of course you wouldn't have this problem if you had a security service, if you had an MI5, which doesn't have powers of arrest. So they have to team up with the police. So that actually balances out quite neatly. The US Constitution makes this distinction with US persons and that's not going to change in the foreseeable future. But of course we don't have that distinction in the UK, interestingly enough, in our or in European countries where the distinction is geographical. So if you're inside the United Kingdom under as it were majesty's realm, then everyone gets treated the same, whether you're a matter of what nationality you are or if you're British. If you're outside the domain and you're in Neil's overseas space, then we're all again, everyone is the same, but the rules are different and more aggressive. These used to lead to the occasional problem when in GCHQ we done cover some Colombian drugs racket and discover there's an American citizen involved. We couldn't just share the information with NSA. We had to ring up and say, we've got a case that looks rather like this, but we can't tell you the name. They then have to go to the court, get a warrant, and then we could pass the intelligence over. So you make it work, but it's a little adds a little bit of bureaucracy to what otherwise is very smooth arrangement. We already have some fantastic questions coming in from the participants. So I'm going to start fielding these if I may. There's quite a number of questions coming in about the role of, well, first, what is the health of the Five Eyes community? And one of our online participants says, what do you believe is appropriate if any role for Five Eyes countries on addressing right wing or white supremacist terrorism? So maybe we could start, what is the health of the Five Eyes and appropriate role when we look at these extremist organizations? And let me start then back to you, David. Well, I think the Five Eyes arrangement, which of course dates back, indeed it takes parts of it date back to the First World War, let alone the Second World War. So cryptographers across the Atlantic have worked together, as I say, since 1916 and the US expeditionary force under General Pershing. And the Second World War accelerated that then the Korean War, then the long Cold War. So the habits of cooperation run very deep. And certainly in the signals intelligence world, they, it's a common sort of information base that is then being analyzed on both sides of the Atlantic. And the opportunity for peer review. So you have somebody who's not in your system, but who has access to exactly the same information, and who can then look at the assessments you make and argue about it. All of that is hugely important. And in the cyber era, it's going to be even more important to have that kind of cooperation. After 9-11, if anything, it intensified. There were some hitches with the war on terror because of the some of the measures that were taken, which the UK could not participate in, such as extreme coercive interrogation. But those are product minor. So I think it's in very good shape. So one of the questions was, or part of that question was, what do you believe is an appropriate role for five eyes countries in addressing right wing or white supremacist terrorism? And maybe Neil, you might like to tackle that part. I think you're on mute. So first off, I just want to associate myself entirely with Sir David's view of the five eyes community. It is extremely healthy. And it is based, I mean, I go back to the trust word, but it is based based on trust as much as it is based on common interest. And in the intelligence world, trust is everything. And it takes a long time for countries to have that degree of trust in each other. And it serves each of them well when they need it. And certainly after 9-11, we needed it. And each of us needed again. So in terms of the second question, so it's a good example of why I think the intelligence community needs to be extremely careful about dealing with domestic issues. Now, I mean, you can argue that right wing terrorism, white supremacy, or you pick your favorite type of extremist activity. If there is a global nexus to it, if there's an association or a group something like that, then the intelligence communities have a role in trying to expose drivers and connections like it would any other type of terrorist organization. But as soon as you go back into the domestic space, I mean, to me, that is fundamentally a law enforcement activity because if you're dealing with American citizens, you're dealing with law enforcement. And you do not want to give the American public the impression that somehow it has turned the strength of the foreign intelligence community on Americans inside the United States or US persons anywhere. And again, the current political environment basically defines an extremist as anyone with whom you do not agree. So you can pick your favorite part of extremism and ask why the intelligence community isn't hunting it down. But fundamentally, again, if there's a foreign connection to it, we do it. If it's solely a domestic thing, then it is a law enforcement issue. And that applies to any law-breaking extremist, any law-breaking organization, whatever its flavor. I would put it even more bluntly that it turns out it's the Russians or the Chinese who are actually fomenting this trouble. And it's the intelligence community who's going to find that out and indeed deal with it, originate your turn. I'm going to pose the next question to Dr. Lester if I may. We talk about the role of non-traditional areas of intelligence. This particular individual says, is the IC well situated to address recent taskings on assessments of issues that do not primarily revolve around state or organizational rivals or feature significant natural variables, for example, COVID-19 origins and impact, climate change, etc. So as we look to the future, Jen, they're asking, you know, how well situated is the IC to look at, say, feel like that non-traditional areas of intelligence collection and analysis. Over. No, thank you. I think the shift is happening, but it is a slow one. And as we know that this administration has focused on issues such as climate change, pandemic, public health, those types of issues, they come to the forefront. But I would argue that the shift to address those has been rather slow. It's a transition that is happening. But as I said, slow. And I would argue, I would suggest that this may be an opportunity for us, for the intelligence community to partner, to engage with partners who can focus more specifically on these issues. And this is something I've argued for, for some time, that partnership, engagement, talking to the private sector more closely, talking to academics, there's a long history of intelligence community, engaging with academics for very specific types of expertise. This would be an opportunity to engage with those individuals, medical specialists, public health specialists, talk to climate scientists. I know that those individuals exist within the intelligence community, but I think partnerships can help the intelligence community at this point maintain its comparative advantage where it needs to be while engaging with other areas of expertise that pertain to these emergent non-traditional issues. Fantastic. Thank you for that. And another, again, I want to get as many participant questions as I may. Neil, perhaps you could address this one. What changes does the intelligence community need to keep pace with the pace of warfare as it becomes increasingly networked, complex, and fast-moving? Yeah. So that's an excellent question. I think... Because you hinted at this at the beginning of some of your remarks. Yeah. So there's two general answers to this, and they sit on either end of the spectrum, I think. One is that the intelligence community actually needs to be able to provide intelligence, and we say this all the time, at the speed of relevance. And in an increasingly networked, centric, automated environment, that speed of relevance is frequently machine to machine. We increasingly write all-source intelligence assessments for machines. And in terms of things like intelligence mission data for fifth and sixth generation platforms, you have an autonomous weapons system, it actually has to function based on an appreciation of the environment that we give it. So as the warfighter becomes more net centric, I don't have no idea what I just said. So the intelligence community has to become similarly net centric. So that's the do it fast and do it relevantly in an operational way. The other side of that on the other end of the spectrum is I think the intelligence community needs to revitalize its effort on foundational military intelligence. In other words, understanding the basic characteristics, performance, signatures of weapons systems, capabilities, operational intent, doctrine, command and control of foreign militaries and militarily capable entities, and all of that is done ahead of time. If you haven't done your foundational military intelligence work, you can't do it on the day. And one of the things that we kind of let slip over the last 20 years because our focus was it and resources were aimed elsewhere was that foundational basis. So we need to be more net centric in our delivery and we need to get much more focus on foundational intelligence. Excellent. And that sort of prompts me here at the War College, particularly at SSI, where we're partnering with the intelligence agency to do some of those deep dyes with regard to the PLA. Whereas, you know, we have the resident PLA, if you like expertise, but, you know, bringing the two together in a more deliberative manner to see where our gaps are, and that's some of the focus of what I'll be actively engaged with over the next few months. A question for David, I think. Let's see. They're still typing. Hang on. Hang on. Okay, with increasing powerful surveillance capabilities, how should the intelligence community think about protecting the rights and privacy of people who are not protected by the rights granted to citizens? Because you also mentioned privacy ethics. David is being important to actors moving forward. One approach would be whilst protecting and preserving and upholding your constitutional provision on American persons is to say that those who are in the United States should benefit from the same level of protection that can be an executive decision that doesn't require a new law. It's the way you interpret what is going on. And there's some advantage in having that recognition because it helps to get over the idea that there is only one absolute human right and that's the right not to be tortured. All the others are relative. And there's a balance within the canon of human rights that has to be strapped, depending on the circumstances. If you were at war, you strike that balance somewhere differently than if you're in conditions of, let's say, peaceful competition. It seems to me very important that we don't allow people to think about trading off the privacy and other rights for so-called security. It's a trade-off between rights. I have the right to life. I have the right not to be blown up by some crazed terrorist or have my information subverted by a foreign power. So these are rights that I have. I respect the, and we have to respect the rights, the privacy rights of those who, for example, are using communications that law enforcement and intelligence will want to look at. In the UK, we've reached, I think, a reasonable compromise, if you like, balance between those rights. If we run into bigger threats, then that will have to be revisited. I don't see us going very far the other way because we're clearly in a world of quite significant competition. And the activity of serious criminal groups has got to be tackled using some of the modern techniques that the intelligence community has because the criminal groups are just as well-organized as states. And some of them have really enormous resources that they can put to bear. And we have, I think, probably a final question. I'd like to really have time for each of the panelists to address. And the question is this, one of the five scenarios projected by Global Trends 2040 is a renaissance of democracies in which the United States and its allies are leaders. Do you see the January 6th insurrection in the US and in conjunction with the West's ongoing struggles with the diversity, equity, and inclusion as warning signs that this scenario is in jeopardy? I'd like Jen, please, through you to kick off with that one. Small question. I know. And we only have four minutes, so I'm going to keep you to the elevator. Very short response. I have to say that at this point in time, I'm a pessimist on this question. And I feel that if the United States is to be a leader, and I'm just going to focus on the United States in my response to this question, it must reinforce its own democratic institutions internally. That means election integrity. It means dealing with disinformation, those types of issues domestically. I know I've harped on domestic, but I think that it's underserved area when we talk about intelligence with large. So I do think that democracy in this country and in democracy in terms of being a leader in the democratic sphere is in danger. I don't think it's a lost cause by any stretch of the imagination, but I do think that some more bolstering, some more rethinking of what democracy means and what our institutions mean and how we support them in our society through our various branches of government and also political actors is crucial to making that a possibility going forward. Great. And how about you, Neil? Real quick here. Real quick. So is it in danger? Is that scenario in danger? No. Yes. Yeah, I don't think so. First off, that scenario in global trends was not suggested to be a likely outcome. It was just one of the five. But I would suggest that given the factors that the question or cited, all of those are fairly near term issues. They're being in our heart today. But over the 20, 30, 20, 40 global trends, the strength of the democracies will or will not rest on their performance in the long term against the options. So I don't think that that scenario is any more or less likely after January the 6th. And how about you, David, looking from a broader perspective? From a broader perspective, we put January the 6th to one side. The rise of global populism, the rise of China with an alternative ideology to that of freedom and democracy, these are, I think, extremely serious threats to the maintenance of our democratic values. So I think it's worth taking it very seriously. The answer is not in the intelligence community or the intelligence community is going to have to work on this agenda and stop states interfering with us. The answer is with us. And we should be starting in schools, redoubling the efforts to teach both citizenship and how to stay safe online, how to recognize fake news when you see it. Do all that, then like Neil, we will prevail in the end. Well, on that note, we are just coming to the very end of our session and time. So if I may just say again to our three panels, thank you so very much for your participation today and obviously for everyone that has joined us online. We are going to be taking a very short break from the Future Security Forum. We will be reconvening at quarter to three, 2.45 p.m., so a 15-minute break and we'll be back with the next panel. And again, thank you everyone today. I appreciate everyone's great input and thought-provoking discussion. Over.