 15 The decisive feature governing firefighting in all countries and under all conditions may in every case be summed up in two words, water supply. Personnel may be of the finest, an apparatus of the most complete, but both are helpless if the wherewithal to quench the fires is lacking. Many disastrous conflagrations have owed their magnitude to this circumstance, and it is a curious commentary upon municipal intelligence that many large cities the world over, surrounded as they are with an abundance of water, absolutely lack the means for concentrating it at the scene of a serious outbreak. Small means, intended for supply under normal circumstances, become practically useless when great fires are in question. Further, fire departments are often criticized by the inexperienced in newspapers and elsewhere for their inability to check a blaze, when the fault really lies with indifferent city fathers who in their omnipotence disregard the advice of those who, after all, are paid to know and absolutely fail to benefit by past bitter experience. During the year 1903 several large fires occurred in New York, and several disastrous ones of great magnitude throughout the United States. The city had been growing steadily, and it was recognized that the water mains were too small to meet an emergency, and the authorities thereupon decided to investigate this most important subject. After careful discussion and consultation with eminent engineers, it was resolved to install the most up-to-date system of water supply known to science, popularly known as the High Pressure Service. In its essentials there is nothing really very remarkable about the idea, and in fact its designation as above is something of a misnomer. As a matter of fact the actual pressure off a high pressure main can be equaled by the modern steam fire pump. But whereas the latter is dependent upon the human element in the shape of the fireman who is responsible for the stoking of the engine, and for the quality of the coal and the organization of the fuel supply, and finally for climatic conditions which in extreme circumstances must affect in some degree an unprotected boiler exposed to the fury of the elements, this alternative system is practically independent of all these considerations. Undoubtedly the ideal situation for such an installation is in a town which draws its water from surrounding mountains, such as in many Swiss cities, it stands to reason that if a reservoir or lake lies some thousands of feet above the point to be supplied, the laws of gravity will ensure a steady and continuous stream of water at any position in the area connected with it at a pressure according to the altitude of the source of supply. The fire departments of Switzerland have shown themselves keenly alive to these natural advantages, and the mechanical fire pump is practically unknown in their fire departments. But however the world has not been formed for the convenience of its occupants, and hence it is that science has been compelled to step in, and by artificial means to find a solution of the problem. A brief description of the high pressure system written from the standpoint of the firefighter will explain the scheme of operations, and what applies to one city applies to all intents and purposes to others. The service in the borough of Manhattan, the island of Manhattan in the city of New York, protects approximately two thousand six hundred acres, that in the borough of Brooklyn about one thousand four hundred acres, and that at Coney Island about one hundred forty six acres. There are two pumping stations in Manhattan, with two thousand sixty six hydrants, and some three hundred thousand feet of mains, chiefly located in the business section of the city. Brooklyn has one thousand one hundred twelve hydrants, including twenty four for fireboat connections, while Coney Island possesses three hundred forty five, including three monitor nozzles. In deciding upon the location of pumping stations, prudence naturally directed that they should be placed so as to be practically outside the reach of any possible conflagration, and yet in a position to avail themselves of an unlimited supply of water drawn from either fresh or saltwater sources. Thus the Manhattan stations were located at the northwestern and southern ends of the protected area, the main features of their construction, one story and basement, fireproof buildings, being almost identical in both cases. These structures are of sufficient size to carry eight pumping units each, though the present equipment consists of but six. The contract calls for a delivery from each pump of three thousand gallons of seawater per minute against a discharge pressure of three hundred pounds per square inch, and a suction lift not exceeding twenty feet. At the acceptance tests the fire pumps in each station totaled a delivery of about eighteen thousand gallons per minute at the aforesaid pressure, some of the individual pumps discharging as much as three thousand eight hundred gallons. This total can of course be increased proportionately without change in the buildings or mains by the addition of the two pumping units for which space has been provided. Fresh water for each station is supplied through two twenty-four inch mains connected with a third of thirty-six inches diameter. The saltwater supply is drawn from the north and east rivers through two thirty-inch pipes. These lead into suction chambers directly in front of each station, and are so constructed that they are at all times below mean low water. This ensures a steady flow and prevents the possibility of interruption caused by air being admitted to the suction lines. Protection is afforded to the river ends of these mains by heavy bulkhead screens, and to the suction chambers by weighty bronze shields which are readily accessible for cleaning. The pumping units consist of centrifugal pumps driven by electric motors, both supported on a common bed. Special care as to strength and ability to resist corrosion was expended upon the pumps, which run at a speed of seven hundred forty revolutions a minute. They are of the five stage type, each stage being designed to give a pressure of sixty pounds to the square inch, or the combined pressure of the five stages three hundred pounds to the square inch, which is the maximum working pressure of each unit. It may sound a scientific anomaly, but the fact remains that increase of pressure does not correspond to increase in volume. To frame a crude analogy, an ocean greyhound can steam eighteen knots at an economical coal consumption. Increase her speed two knots, and the consumption of fuel at once increases out of all proportion to the additional speed. Subsequently each additional knot, or even half knot, will demand an enormous increase in coal consumption, till eventually a certain maximum of speed will have been reached beyond which it is impossible for the engines to develop sufficient driving energy no matter how much coal be expended. In other words, thereafter surplus energy becomes waste. Now, somewhat similarly, each installation of pumps can deliver about eighteen thousand gallons per minute at a pressure of three hundred pounds, but a much greater volume of water can be secured by running them at a lower pressure. Thus the average pressure required for fire duty is from one hundred twenty-five to two hundred pounds at the hydrant, and each station working under these conditions will deliver with its present complement of pumping units thirty thousand gallons of water per minute. Were this volume of water concentrated within a radius of five hundred feet, no imaginable conflagration could survive its attack. The pumping units are set in operation by throwing a switch on the main switchboard, which is directly connected with the motors. By this means the machines are brought into instant use, and in less than one minute the maximum pressure can be developed. Current for these motors is furnished locally at six thousand six hundred volts, and each station has four separate electrical feeders, two from the waterside station and two from the nearest substation. Of these four feeders two will operate the six pumps, but provision is made for connection with the Brooklyn stations of the electric company in that burrow, this in cases of emergency. Two twenty-four inch mains lead out of each station and traverse practically the entire protected area. These are intersected by lateral branch pipes of twelve and sixteen inch diameter, which in turn are cross-connected by twenty inch mains at frequent intervals. The water, thus traveling only a short distance through a main smaller than twenty inches before reaching the hydrants. These latter are connected to the mains by eight inch branch pipes, gates being provided at intervals of about two hundred fifty feet, to enable the carrying out of necessary repairs without affecting any hydrants except those directly adjacent to the gate in question. The pipe system is so planned, that without excessive drop in pressure due to friction loss in the mains, it is possible to concentrate twenty thousand gallons of water a minute upon the average block of buildings, or the full capacity of both stations upon an area of approximately one quarter of a square mile. Since the work of the fire department commences at the hydrant, no part of a high-pressure system is more important in determining its efficiency than the type of hydrant employed, which must be ever ready for instant service. Hence the following points may be tabulated as governing the selection of this most essential feature. Firstly, suitability of design. This includes workmanship and material in order to obtain the maximum of reliable service. Secondly, facility of operation. Thirdly, freedom from frictional resistance to ensure maximum delivery. And fourthly, and of supreme importance, perfect drainage to obviate all possibility of freezing. Without going into a lengthy dissertation upon the specifications prepared and the tests carried out, it is sufficient to say that the hydrants eventually installed are furnished with four three-inch outlets, which provide a capacity of four two-inch streams with seventy-five pounds nozzle pressure and roughly four thousand gallons of water per minute. It was deemed advisable that the main valve in these hydrants, which is six inches in diameter, should open downwards against the pressure to be encountered, in order therefore that the operation of opening this valve against the heavy pressures liable to be met with in the service mains should be an easy and rapid one. It was so designed that the first three turns of the hydrant wrench should open a pilot valve, thereby admitting water to the barrel of the hydrant, thus equalizing the pressures on both sides of the main valve, after which it can be opened without difficulty or resistance. A few seconds is sufficient to accomplish this adjustment of pressures after the application of the wrench. The operation above described sets in action a drip valve which closes as the main valve is opened and opens as the latter closes. There is a connection between the drip valve and the sewer, thus ensuring the drainage of the hydrant barrel after use. Valves controlling the hose outlets are provided with a device which balances the pressures, permitting the former to be opened easily with a five-inch wrench under a pressure of two hundred fifty pounds. Needless to say, before this system was finally handed over for practical service in the New York Fire Department, extensive tests were made, two of which are particularly worthy of notice. The first took place along the North River Front. Twenty-one three-inch lines were stretched from seven hydrants, and twelve two-inch and nine one-and-a-half inch nozzles were used. Within two minutes after the order to start water had been given, a nozzle pressure of eighty pounds was registered, and so great was the volume of water delivered that the street speedily became a lake and overflowed towards the docks. The second test was even more exhaustive. Twelve three-inch lines with one-and-a-half-inch nozzles, six Siamese lines with two-inch nozzles, a water tower with a two-inch nozzle, and a deck pipe with a one-and-three-quarter-inch nozzle were all brought instantaneously into action. One minute after giving the order to start, a nozzle pressure of one-hundred fifty pounds was obtained, and in two minutes one-hundred ninety-five pounds was registered on the one-and-a-half-inch nozzles and one-hundred seventy pounds on the two-inch. With the nozzles elevated to an arc of eighty degrees this pressure carried a solid stream of water one-hundred feet above the roof of a fourteen-story building. The gauge on the water tower at this time registered two-hundred seventy pounds. To the layman even these simple figures may seem perplexing, so it may be well to translate hard facts into picturesque simile. A stream of water propelled by a pressure of two-hundred pounds to the square inch, striking an ordinary office partition at right angles at a distance of about one-hundred feet, would smash it up, as though it were so much matchwood, and play with its contents like a whirlwind. Similarly, the same stream, elevated to eighty degrees, could easily clear the cornice of the tallest apartment house in Manhattan, or could wash the dome of St. Paul's Cathedral in London. In nineteen-oh-eight this system was formally turned over to the department, but at the outset the greatest caution was observed over its operation. Thus companies responding to an alarm in the high-pressure district, as a precautionary measure, always coupled up to the low-pressure hydrants with engines, thus making security doubly sure. As the absolute reliability of the new installation became increasingly apparent these precautions were gradually withdrawn, till to-day no engines respond to any fires in the high-pressure district unless specially requisitioned. Many outbreaks nowadays are fought and conquered with a second alarm assignment, which, before the advent of the high-pressure system, would have required a fourth alarm, a fact which, trivial perhaps to the lay mind, will be appreciated by chiefs of fire departments in its full significance. No doubt the latter have often realized the danger of having to draw almost every piece of apparatus at their command to a big fire, leaving nothing in reserve with which to tackle another outbreak should one then occur. Simultaneous calls of this nature tax the wit of man to meet, and the days of miracles are passed. The first fire can be fought and quelled, but the second, coming when the force is already engaged, forms a very serious menace. In the high-pressure area of New York, four fires of some magnitude have been attacked and suppressed at the same time, not to mention several smaller blazes. That fact speaks for itself. Prior to the installation, also, there was always the fear of a sweeping conflagration after the style of Baltimore, but that has passed away forever. New York, today, is the best fire-protected city on the American continent, but even the knowledge that this is so, has not prevented further efforts to meet the demands of the situation. Another pumping station is even now in course of construction, and within two years it is confidently expected that the area protected by duplicated high-pressure mains will amount to over ten thousand acres, this in the most congested and most valuable portion of the city, but to return to the detailed description of the apparatus employed in rendering the installation additionally effective. The use of centralized energy for delivering water at a high pressure throughout an entire system naturally entails upon all the mains and hydrants involved the maximum pressure required at any one point. It is therefore quite likely to happen that whereas a pressure of one hundred twenty-five pounds will be ample for one fire, another outbreak may occur in the protected area necessitating a pressure of two hundred fifty pounds. This would mean that the pressure would have to be raised suddenly to meet the fresh call, and coming unexpectedly and unheralded it might seriously endanger the men operating at the smaller outbreak. Or further to illustrate this point, it is sometimes desirable to take water from a hydrant for a hand line at seventy-five pounds and from another outlet to supply a water tower at two hundred twenty-five pounds. To permit of this arrangement a regulating valve weighing only twenty-five pounds has been invented which is attached to the hydrant outlet. A pressure gauge is inserted on the hose side, the regulating valve is opened until the gauge needle points to the pressure required, and no matter to what extent the pressure on the receiving side is increased on the discharging side it remains at the figure selected. If a shut-off nozzle is used on the line automatically the pressure remains at the figure indicated on the gauge. Even the laymen will appreciate the enormous importance of a valve of this nature without which the system as a whole could not be properly controlled or operated to the best advantage. In order to guard against the somewhat remote possibility of a breakdown of all pumping units in both stations provision is made for connecting the fire-boats of the department to the high-pressure hydrants. By this means these boats can deliver sixty thousand gallons of water per minute at a pressure of two hundred fifty pounds. In addition, by this method, fire-boats may be made to constitute a valuable auxiliary in the case of any great emergency. But as science is never idle and one discovery leads to another, so it is with the business of fire-control, and day by day fresh ideas are brought into being tested and utilized for the common wheel. Thus in the later portions of the city protected by the high-pressure system it has been found advantageous to duplicate the mains and hydrants, so that if one set of mains becomes blocked the other may be brought into service without delay. The system is operated as a unit, but in case of a break in the mains it can be divided by closing of the motor valves at the selected points. These valves are controlled by switches on the pumping station switchboard, a row of red and a row of green lights indicating the two lines of mains. In the event of a break pumps are shut down and the motor valves are immediately closed. When the pumps are started again the pressure building up on the line that is intact will be shown by the colored lights mentioned. The serviceable main will be kept in use at the fire, but the officer in charge must wait about one minute in order to see whether the pressure is from the red or the green line. As soon as the pressure shows on either those lines connected to that disabled will be shifted over to the hydrants on the main intact and the fight can be continued with ample water supply. During the continuance of a fire the chief operating can control the pressure of the pumping station, increasing or decreasing the same or stopping it all together by means of a special telephone service run into boxes conveniently situated and specially designed for the purpose which are plentifully installed throughout the protected area. This system has been found to answer well, though it is open to the possibility that orders may be misunderstood from one cause or another. Probably some improvement thereon may be framed in time as the science of firefighting becomes increasingly popular and it is better realized what an important part is played by fire control in the daily life of the people. For instance one of the most gratifying effects of the introduction of the high pressure system in New York was the immediate drop in insurance rates. In December 1908, about six months after this system had been put into regular use, the New York Fire Insurance Exchange made a general reduction of rates throughout the high pressure zone in Manhattan, a reduction amounting to the respectable sum of five hundred thousand dollars annually. In Brooklyn likewise a reduction of two hundred fifty thousand dollars followed so that the improvement has already saved the taxpayer in the community about seven hundred fifty thousand dollars a year. Hence this method is not one of fire control alone but becomes positively a good investment. Of course it may be urged that in the United States the profession of firefighting has developed into such a highly specialized service and has demanded so many drastic changes in equipment and maintenance because the risks incurred are proportionately greater than are met with elsewhere. There is a measure of truth in this, but it is on a par with the individual who living in a small island considers motor-cars an unnecessary means of transportation and railways a wasteful expense because he has always found a horse and trap convenient and sufficient for his needs. That is, of course, a somewhat exaggerated simile, but it is an incontrovertible fact that there are many otherwise normal citizens in all the countries of the world who view innovation with suspicion and shield themselves behind the comfortable assurance that our fathers did very well without all these newfangled notions and what was good enough for them is good enough for us. This especially as regards municipal outlay on fire protection, though in this respect the writer must lay it on record that New York has always risen to the occasion in the most open-handed manner. For some obscure reason the average man objects to putting his hand in his pocket for anything in connection with the fire risks of the community, just as much as though he were being held up by a highway robber and willy-nilly had to surrender his purse. There is no advantage in laboring an obvious point, and the writer has in his mind not Europe alone but some American cities where the fire department is apparently regarded as a costly and unnecessary adjunct to other municipal offices. Yet in all fairness to those whose responsibility it is to protect the lives and property of those given into their charge there should be no hesitation in providing them with the most modern and up-to-date apparatus for the discharge of their duties. The mathematical aspect of the whole question as regards the high-pressure system as a whole is not a difficult one for fire committees to understand. Since one high-pressure hydrant is the equivalent of six engines of the first size, how many hydrants would be equal to the entire pumping outfit of the brigade, using an English term, and would not the initial expense of the installation be more than met by the decrease in personnel, the decrease in insurance rates, and the increase in safety of citizens committed to their charge? The answer to this conundrum should not unduly tax the mental equipment, even of one of those corporations addicted to the traditions of the Medes and Persians. CHAPTER XV FIRE CONTROL IN SCHOOLS, FACTORIES, AND HOSPITALS Since it is no exaggeration to define panic as one of the most effective allies of fire, it is obvious that in dealing with buildings occupied by large numbers of either young or infirm people, or with places where passing crowds are apt to congregate, such as department stores, peculiar precautions are necessary. The genesis of many a conflagration attended afterwards with terrible loss of life is often trivial. Taken in time and dealt with coolly, it would never have developed into a serious outbreak. And equally the magnitude of the blaze, as regards actual fire damage, can never be accurately gauged by the death role. Experience has shown that in such disasters as many die from suffocation consequent upon crushing, or from injuries received in seeking safety through some desperate and ill-judged action such as jumping into the streets, as perish in the flames. Of course this is natural, a curl of smoke, a few sparks, and a cry of fire, and unless beforehand prepared for this kind of emergency, the primal impulse of any one is to reach safety, or what appears safety, as quickly as possible. No thought is given as to the best mode of exit, misguided instinct suggests the way by which one has entered, and instantly corridors, stairways, and passages become jammed with a frightened hustling crowd, beyond control, and following each other like sheep to the shambles. It is this incontrovertible fact which has caused the architect to labour towards the design of panic-proof structures, and has led those interested in fire control to devise means which shall render such occurrences rare to the point of non-existence. And it must be remembered that, unfortunately, responsible authorities are called upon to frame regulations, often times not for application in modern fire-resisting buildings, but for structures composed largely of lath and stucco, and which, given the opportunity, would burn like tinder-boxes. Hence it seems scarcely necessary to emphasise the point, that with the latter the danger is more acute, and above all else there is need for speed and sang-frois. Now the only method by which this state of affairs can be assured is by a process of accustoming the human unit to the conditions likely to arise in a fire-emergency. And this can best be done by means of drill. Whether it be employees in a factory, children in a school, or the staff of a hospital or a department store, exit drills should always be enforced. And where circumstances allow, provision should be made for some sort of house firefighting force. It must be understood, of course, that the latter in no way takes the place of the regular fire department, which should be communicated with at once in all cases, but rather is intended to act as an auxiliary pending their arrival. It will be convenient to deal seriatim with the four types mentioned. In factory buildings particular danger attaches to the stairways connecting stories. They can only accommodate a limited number of people, and form dangerous exits for crowds. Congestion at their corners means death, and since employees may be expected to vary in nationality, misunderstanding of orders becomes more probable, and the problem of preventing a panic assumes a thorny aspect. In the first place, exit drills should be held as often as possible and should include everyone in the building. When two or three firms occupy the same premises there should be cooperation, and the alarms announcing these drills should be given from different floors in order that practice may be afforded in changing the order of precedence for possession of stairways and fire escapes. The line of march may be so arranged as to take advantage of the additional time required in the descent of those from the upper floors by dismissing such of the lower floors as would not delay their egress. An exception to this rule should be made where buildings are divided by firewalls with protected openings, which permit the transfer of occupants in the fire section to the corresponding fire-free section on the same floor in the building, or where provision is made for a safe retreat by means of gangways leading to adjoining buildings. Incidentally, an excellent scheme where feasible is to dismiss the employees nightly by a fire signal. In assigning stations the first consideration is the selection of aisle guards whose business it is to effect line formation, prevent pushing and overcrowding, and to see that the time-honored precept women and children first is observed. All subsequent movements should be regulated by a gong or whistle. Thus the first alarm indicating the floor of the outbreak should consist of a number of taps indicating the floor. As soon as the first stroke sounds, work should cease, and if possible all power be shut off the machines. Then all stock, chairs, or benches blocking the aisles, should be removed by the employee's nearest, and placed either above or below the work-tables. The next movement is to march to the exit passage in single or double file. If in the latter, couples should link arms for mutual support, the women using their free hand to raise their skirts to prevent themselves and those behind them from tripping. Then each file should move forward observing a uniform distance between the couples. The signal to start should be given by the room captain, and under no circumstances should any employee be permitted to attempt to secure clothing from a locker or cloakroom. Upon reaching the street the line should be led away to a safe distance from the building, and for this duty one of the supervisors should be selected and drilled as a guide. Elevator attendants should take their cars upon the first sound of a building alarm to the floor indicated, and hold themselves subject to the orders of the floor chief. In high buildings of the fire-resistive type the operator should run his elevator into the fire-zone, receive passengers, and, if conditions favour, discharge them a few floors below. The usual difficulty, however, is that floors and stairways are so crowded that he has no option but to run to the ground floor. The assignment of exits necessarily depends upon their number, capacity, and location, but it is important that all means of egress should be based on approximate estimates of their relative discharging capacities which can be readily arrived at by actual tests. When possible provision should be made for the unhampered entrance of firemen, and in the planning of such fire drills combinations of exits should be studied. Employees having the welfare of their work-people at heart can always obtain advice, if in any doubt on this subject, from officials of the fire department. All that is intended here is to suggest certain simple rules of conduct which will tend to prevent confusion and make for safety. The location of stairways, fire escapes, and other exits should be indicated by illuminated signs, and for the information of employees leaflets should be printed in several languages, giving the details of the fire drill. It goes without saying that all modern buildings of this type should be equipped with an electrically operated alarm system, the mechanical gong of which could be better heard above the noise of any machinery than one struck by the room captain, and would possess the additional advantage of automatically operating on all floors from any position. The box stations governing these alarms should be accessible only to responsible persons. It may be urged that such precautions presuppose certain members of the staff being possessed of intelligence and a considerable amount of organizing ability. But as a rule, either four men or four women in sectional charge of fifty employees will be found to fill admirably such executive positions as room captains, they in their turn are naturally subordinate to the manager, who should accept supreme control and the responsibility attaching thereto. Ile guards may be compared to lieutenants, they should be strong and alert, and owing to the fact that they may be required to use some physical force should, when possible, be men. They should be especially watchful for persons stumbling, fainting, or becoming hysterical. Where stair exits have sharp bends they should be stationed there to prevent congestion, and above all they should be made to realize their obligations and to feel that their duties are no mere sinecure. Finally there should be at least one male and one female searcher on each floor to visit the toilet rooms and other such places where perhaps the fire signal could not be heard. In buildings of an antiquated type these precautions make no pretense of securing absolute safety to the individual, but if the drills be arranged with the advice of a skilled fire official it is probable that panic will not unreasonably seize all inmates and that the fire department will at least be given an opportunity of effecting such rescues as human ingenuity and providence will allow. At any rate they will not be met with the appalling conditions, which alas have been only too common hitherto, when persons have found death needlessly while safety awaited them with the advent of the professional firefighters. The fire risk is real enough, without the additional factors of fright and bad management, and it is to guard against these that the above has been suggested. One of the most terrible conflagrations of this nature in recent years was that which occurred on Saturday, March 25, 1911, in the Ash Building, a ten-story structure situated at the corner of Washington Place and Green Street, New York City. The following account, vivid in its simple realism, is taken from the report of the New York Board of Fire Underwriters. Occupancy 8th, 9th, and 10th floors. Workrooms, showroom, and factory, stockroom, pressing and shipping department, of the Triangle Waste Company. On the ninth floor there were two wooden partitions, one forming the cloakroom, the other being at the north side enclosing the entrance to the freight elevators and stair shaft. On the tenth floor there were partitions of wood and glass forming offices and showrooms. On the rear of the building in the court was an iron fire escape, the steps being seventeen-and-a-half inches wide. The fire escape did not extend to the bottom of the court, and the court had no exit to the street. On the eighth floor were five unbroken rows of four-foot tables, each containing a double row of sewing machines and shirt wastes in process of manufacture. These tables extended from the Washington Place front south wall to within eighteen feet of the north side of the building. This latter space was partially filled with stock, principally on tables. An aisle space was also left running east and west along the north side. The space along the east wall contained the cutting tables. Approximately two hundred seventy-five operators were on this floor. On the ninth floor there were eight unbroken rows of four-foot tables with three hundred operators. There were no aisles running east and west at the south side of these floors, the sewing machine tables extending close up to the wall. The space between the tables was approximately four feet wide and contained two rows of chairs back to back. It also contained baskets and other receptacles for the goods in process of manufacture. The only convenient way for the operators next to the south wall to reach the stairs and elevators at the southwest corner was to walk the entire length of the crowded space between the tables to the north side and then use the aisles which extended along the north and west sides of the building. The fire started at four-forty-two p.m. on the eighth floor in the vicinity of the northeast corner of the building, almost simultaneously with the signal to stop work for the day. It is generally believed to have originated from a match or cigarette igniting scrap material on the floor in the vicinity of the cutting tables. It spread rapidly, however, due to a large quantity of inflammable material, consisting chiefly of thin cotton, lace, and other trimmings. In a very short time the fire had spread over the entire floor and communicated principally out and in the windows to the floors above. In addition to the windows the fire may have communicated from floor to floor by way of the stairs and elevator shafts, as the doors were undoubtedly open, in part at least. The plant was working overtime when the fire occurred. According to the information obtainable, the operators crowded in among the machines, chairs, and goods on the eighth and ninth floors were badly panic-stricken immediately after the start of the fire, and in consequence made slow progress towards the exits. Considerable delays said to have been experienced in opening the doors leading to the stairs at the southwest corner of the building, as they opened inwards and the women became jammed against them. Obviously the entire loss of life was confined to those employed on the ninth floor. More than half of the number said to have been on this floor escaped. It seems apparent, however, that by the time this number had got out the elevators had stopped running and the flames around the two inside stairways and the outside fire escape, both on this floor and those adjoining, would not permit any further egress in these directions. The result was that all who remained on the floor until this condition prevailed were overcome by the smoke and fire or jumped from the windows. It is said that a few, probably twenty, from the upper floors descended by way of the outside fire escape. These re-entered one of the lower stories and passed down the stairways. Approximately twenty-five bodies were found closely jammed in the cloakroom next to the stair shaft at the west end of the building. About fifty were found near the northeast corner behind the partition and clothes-locker, located thirty inches from the north end of the two tables nearest the east wall. Twenty bodies were found near the machines where they worked, apparently having been overcome before they could extricate themselves. About ten are said to have been taken from the bottom of the court on the north. The balance of those killed, approximately forty, jumped from the windows to the street. There seems to be no doubt that had a fire drill been organized amongst these women, so great a panic would have been avoided. But in the opinion of the writer, automatic sprinklers would in all probability have averted the disaster, as their operation would have turned in an immediate alarm, and the delay in sending in an alarm contributed greatly to the appalling loss of life. It must however be remarked that the fire escape in the rear of this building was quite inadequate for the needs of the situation, as in order to gain the street it will be noticed those using it were obliged to re-enter one of the lower stories and pass thence down the main stairway to the front door. In addition, doors should never be constructed to open inwards. Turning now to the problem of schools. In its essentials this is in many ways akin to that of factories, with the outstanding difference that in dealing with children even greater care must be exercised by the supervisors or room captains. These should be chosen from amongst the teachers, and their duties with regard to their charges should be along precisely similar lines to those already laid down, though it should be borne in mind that personal influence here plays a greater part. Where pianos or other instruments are available, an excellent plan is the use of marching music to assist in steadying the lines of scholars after the fire alarm. Incidentally, schools should always be dismissed once a day in accordance with the practices of fire drill. In the matter of exits, preference should be given to the classes with smaller children, and it is particularly urged that exits for infants should be smoke-proof and of sufficient width to accommodate double lines of two children each. Further, as far as the construction of the building will allow, the convergence of two columns in narrow halls or stairways should be particularly avoided. This is only too liable to cause confusion, which in the event of the building being a quick burner may result in terrible loss of life. In schools of advanced grades, where there are boys of a certain age, it is a good system to organize a small firefighting force, to use the chemical extinguishers common to all public institutions, and from the nature of the duty youngsters are likely to become enthusiastic over and expert in their management. Since example is proverbially better than precept, the following accounts of two school fires, widely differing in ultimate results, but having many points in common, may not be without interest to the general reader. In Collinwood, a suburb of Cleveland, Ohio, there stood on the fourth of March 1908, a large school accommodating over eight hundred children. The day was a warm one, and there was but a small fire in the furnace, which was situated under the front stairs. Before the noon recess, the janitor in charge noticed a thin stream of smoke coming from the basement, and at once gave the alarm. On the ground floor the children were marched out quietly, calm in the belief that the signal was for a drill. But before the anxious teachers on the next two floors could marshal their charges, the fire had gained such ground that all escape by the front door was impossible. As the children neared this exit, they were driven back by the smoke which confronted them, and fought to re-ascend the stairs, only to be pushed down into the flames by the excited and frightened little mob still descending. In the drills used, both teachers and children had been accustomed to employ only the front door as a means of egress, and the fact that this means was debarred to them seems to have had a paralyzing effect upon all intelligence and action. By the time the second stairway leading to a door in the rear was thought of, the children were entirely out of hand, and when this door was found to be locked the situation became uncontrollable. Parents brought to the scene by the sight of the smoke and the shrieks of the children in distress stood helpless as did the firemen. In this suburb the only force available was that of volunteers, whose apparatus was inadequate, having no ladders long enough to reach the third floor, and who were unable to obtain sufficient water pressure to extinguish the fire in the second story. One desperate mother, aided by an unknown man, tried vainly to open the rear door, behind which muffled sobs and groans told of the extremity of the little ones within. But her efforts were fruitless, and with her bare hands she succeeded in breaking some panes of glass in adjacent windows, and managed by this means to drag to safety a few semi-conscious tots. None of the children fighting and struggling for life behind this pitiless barrier was more than fourteen years of age, and many were only six or seven. At the front door the weight of human bodies became so great that it collapsed and showed to the agonized spectators, many of them parents, a heap of little forms caressed by the flames and half hidden by the smoke. Amongst this pile was one small girl of ten, whose father arrived in time to make a futile attempt to pull her from the death awaiting her. Still alive, but crushed and horribly burnt, she was able to hold out her feeble arms to him, and he, heedless of the peril of his own position and intent only on the saving of his daughter, worked frantically until his own injuries prevented further effort. Another child was recognized by her mother, their hands met, when a piece of broken glass fell on the mother's wrist practically severing it from the arm. As the grip of the two hands relaxed the daughter fell back into the blazing pyre to be seen no more. In thirty minutes from the time of the first alarm nothing remained of the building but four blackened and uncovered walls and a smoldering heap of wreckage, some of which had once been human beings. It was only then that the firemen were able to enter the ruins, and there was virtually nothing for them to do. Of the eight hundred ten children who had taken in their books that morning, about one hundred seventy had perished, and with them died two teachers in the vain attempt to lead their charges to safety. The rear door also was broken down by the number of little ones who had been packed so closely against it that their combined weight caused the lock to give when it was too late. Practically all of the bodies were unrecognizable, and frenzied relatives were unconvinced of the losses in their homes until the roll had been called. The origin of this fire still remains unknown. It may have been due to defective flues or to carelessness, but be that as it may the results of this catastrophe carried mourning into hundreds of homes, and once again emphasized the pressing need of every known structural precaution in such buildings, plus better considered planning of drills. It is a relief to turn from the recitation of such horrors to the narration of a brighter and happier story. In Raleigh, a small town in North Carolina, on Friday morning, February 14th of the present year, a fire broke out in an old wooden school building, which from its construction was a veritable fire-trap. In spite of the fact that the halls and rooms were filled with smoke before the three hundred fifty children could be got into line, their order was unbroken and their courage unshaken, as they marched through the suffocating atmosphere to the doors and down the wet fire escapes. The principal of the school was notified of the danger by one of her subordinates. Quickly closing the doors in the upper hall, she gave the signal for the drill, which her pupils had often practiced. At the tap of the gong every child fell into line, those downstairs going out of the front and main entrances, while those on the upper stories descended to the streets by the two fire escapes, which were wet and sticky from the snow that had fallen during the morning. All was as orderly as a stage rehearsal. Even the smallest tots followed the elder ones without the slightest confusion. There was no attempt to get hats or raps or books. The whole operation occupied only three quarters of a minute, which was better time than had ever before been made in practice. Parents who had rushed to the scene, dreading the terrible sights which might meet their eyes, saw an orderly procession of youngsters march out of the building, filled though it was with smoke and flames. Owing to the snow and the slippery condition of the streets, the fire department had been appreciably delayed in responding to the alarm, and had it not been that the fire chief had insisted on and enforced the precautions of a daily drill amongst the pupils, the loss of life might have been appalling. In the opinion of the writer, all concerned deserved the maximum of praise. The head of the fire department, Sherwood Brockwell, a graduate of the New York Fire College, for his insistence, the superintendent, for the intelligent way in which the children had evidently been trained, and the latter for their coolness and their evident trust in their teachers, it is no exaggeration to say that the fire peril could be practically eliminated in schools were the example of Raleigh followed. At the same time it is absolutely incomprehensible how sane persons, ignorant though they might be of the elementary principles of fire control, could allow so glaringly foolish an arrangement to be made as that which permitted the placing of a furnace immediately under the front stairs of a school building, apart from these having been constructed of wood. Under any circumstances, heating apparatus of that nature should be located in a separate structure adjacent to but isolated from the school itself. Should a fire occur during school hours, the officer in command of the fire force can ascertain quickly from either the principal or the teachers the location of the fire which will govern his subsequent actions. Should it be in the upper floors, the entrance must not be attempted by doors or stairways by which the children are leaving, though use may of course be made of any unused stairway. By means of a ladder raised to an upper window a line of hose can be brought quickly to bear on the blaze, care being exercised to drive it back from the exits. Other lines as necessary will be placed similarly, and the fire may thus be held in check until all the scholars are out of the danger zone. Then should the fire assume dangerous proportions it may be fought as in other buildings, that is, by stairways both front and rear, and if necessary from both sides. Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the necessity of preventing excited parents and others from rushing to the entrances by which the children are leaving the building, breaking the line, causing confusion and retarding the exit of those still within. However good their intent, their interference must work mischief. It is imperative that the children be kept marching until all are safely out of danger. Officers in command should see that an adequate force of police and firemen are told off for this important duty. The safety of the shopping public in the enormous department stores which have laterally sprung up in all American cities, and for that matter in Europe as well, is in itself one of the most difficult problems which those interested can possibly face. Here there is no question of drilling regular habituaries, for the population is a floating one, that is to say the attendants and employees may be trained until they are expert in the duties assigned to them, but dealing with dispersal of great hordes of strangers is one that requires almost superhuman management and foresight. In fact, in the opinion of many it is impracticable. Drills are rendered difficult by the constant presence of strangers. A test alarm may produce a panic when even those gifted with the maximum of human magnetism would find the control of strange crowds beyond their powers. But at least precautions can be and are taken. Abroad, as well as in the United States, efforts have been made by private fire departments, which should always be captained by retired officers of regular fire brigades, and by the organization of all employees into a homogeneous unit of action, in the event of crisis to grapple with the events likely to occur so far as circumstances will allow. No human agency can do more. The study of scientific fire control is of recent growth, and many of the great Emporia which dot the cities of the world are the result of evolution. But as a rule, when additions are made to such structures they are subjected to the most searching of fire tests, and the writer can avert from personal experience in New York, that neither time nor money has been spared to render the same as secure as is feasibly possible. In addition, it must be understood that under no circumstances can effective drills be carried out, that is, as though under emergency conditions, unless the temper of the public changes in an amazing degree. However, it is always practicable to construct some sort of edifice even upon the most insecure of foundations, and certain primary precautions, though in no way adequate properly to control the situation, may go a long way towards the prevention of a disastrous panic. In brief, all that has been written may be taken as supplying in embryonic form the basis of department store exit drill. That is to say there should be capable floor masters, capable guards, and by private instruction the actions of all concerned should be regulated. Owing to the fact that many of the employees are women and girls, men should be chosen to fill executive posts, that some chance be given to their weaker colleagues to make their escape whatever occurs. Upon the first signal of the alarm, each member of the staff should, as in a factory drill, clear all gangways of rubbish, stock, or obstructions. They should then form in double lines along the aisles leading to the exits. Those not actively employed in the emergency organization should then form squads and in pairs women holding up their skirts, march to the exit they have been previously instructed to use. The elder women in all departments should be trained to lead these lines, and incidentally their example is sure to have a steadying effect upon both their subordinates and their customers. But the real problem is concentrated in how effectually to deal with the casual public, who throng these buildings daily to so great an extent that it is estimated not less than ten thousand persons are sometimes on the premises at the same moment. Apart altogether from the private fire brigades maintained by these establishments, apart altogether from fire escapes and the most modern fire precautions, this constitutes the real peril which must be initially overcome. It can only be accomplished by constant and painstaking training of every individual employee, and by their example coupled with the exertions of aisle guards, who will indicate to the flurried and hysterical how safety may be most easily reached. At such a moment one cool floor-walker, with his wits about him, will potentially save more lives than the best-equipped fire department which ever travelled the streets. Conquering a fire is one thing, conquering a panic is another, and whereas even after its inception prompt action may quell the former, the latter belongs to the elemental side of human nature, and as such is beyond the reach of science or apparatus. As for structural safeguards, the disposal of rubbish and other means towards fire control, they have been dealt with elsewhere, though the cardinal factor of human temperament can never be altered or modified by such external measures, the knowledge of their presence tends to a certain degree to alleviate fear. If the employees of a department store are faced with an enigma in dealing with their customers, then most assuredly the staff of any hospital have every reason to fear fire and its accompanying risks. Here the problem is complicated by the absolute helplessness of the patients, and the possibility that severe shock in some instances may result in death. But on the other hand nurses, attendants, and doctors are all persons of superior intelligence, and may be expected to carry out instructions not like automatons according to the letter, but with due regard to prevailing conditions. Equally fire control in hospitals has for long absorbed the ingenuity of architects, with the result that generally speaking they are well safeguarded. At the same time, however, certain simple devices can easily be installed, amongst the most valuable of which are fire breaks, which, acting automatically, accomplish in corridors with flames precisely what watertight doors accomplish in ships with water. In other words they delay the enemy, and if unsuccessful in their passive defense they at least hold him in check long enough to ensure the adoption of precautionary measures for those concerned. In simple language they may be described as iron drop doors, which being operated cut off the area involved from the rest of the building. Further, though properly speaking this is a structural safeguard, the employment of fire towers is strongly to be recommended. These consist of a covered staircase, adjacent to but distinct from the main building, and connected by iron gangways at each floor. Thus, by closing the exit doors which are fire-proof, a completely isolated staircase is formed, down which patients can be moved to safety without hurry or alarm. Incidentally, these towers form admirable adjuncts to all classes of structures and public edifices habitually frequented by numbers of persons, of both sexes and all ages. It seems unnecessary to insist once more upon the careful disposal of all rubbish, since such a precaution appears to belong to the obvious, but the writer's experience has taught him that it is precisely the most ordinary safeguards which are habitually neglected. Finally, the following recommendations may be accepted as applicable to all classes of buildings, and if adopted promise a large measure of safety for the occupants. A. All stairways, or a sufficient number of them, should be located in fire-proof shafts, having no communication with the main structure except indirectly by way of an open-air balcony or vestibule on each floor. Hose connections attached to stand pipes should be located on each floor in the stair-towers available either for public or private fire department use. B. Stairs, if any, inside the building and elevators, should be enclosed in shafts of masonry and have fire doors at all floor communications. C. Older buildings with inadequate fire escapes should be provided with automatic sprinklers or smoke-proof stair-towers, but outside fire escapes passing in front of or near windows should be discouraged. D. All factory buildings employing operators in the manufacture of inflammable goods should be fitted with automatic sprinklers, and this system should likewise be extended to all classes of structures generally frequented by a considerable number of persons. E. Large floor areas should be subdivided by fire-proof partitions or brick walls. The above are not councils of perfection, and are well within the reach of those having the safety of their fellow creatures at heart. End of Section 16 Recording by Maria Kasper