 If we can, we'll start with the slide deck that I put together. And obviously, what we're going to be talking about today is how the Islamic State has been exploiting, cheaply, American companies' technologies to manage one of the most aggressive and effective global influence operations of any terrorist group in history. Here's an example, of course, of how they've used these technologies to try to stimulate thinking about executing attacks, targeting Americans and our allies, a crowdsourced threat campaign against me the day before the Orlando attack. Now, obviously, the Islamic State is using social media tools and other cyber domain technologies in a variety of ways that we're going to talk about today that are much more dynamic than just that. To begin, it's important to discuss what is the Islamic State. And unlike most terrorist groups, the group self-defines itself as a terrorist group. But more specifically, it's a Salafi jihadist group. Much like al-Qaeda, its agenda is informed by Salafi jihadiyah, an intensely orthopraxic ideology whereby faith is demonstrated through a variety of actions, cheaply jihad, what we call terrorism. Since the group declared its caliphate, the key sets of narratives that the group has been employing to wage this recruitment-cum-incitement program are that all Sunni Muslims are obligated to pledge allegiance to the caliph, according to traditions in Sunni Islam. But that this allegiance is not affirmed through mere words alone. It's affirmed through actions, either immigrating into the so-called caliphate or waging jihad at home. Since the group declared its caliphate, it has claimed responsibility for six attacks in the United States. But this figure really belies the real impact of this influence capacity that it has achieved vis-a-vis this reach into the West, as you often hear about officials talking, about that reach into the West. Indeed, more than 100 people have been charged with Islamic State-related crimes in the United States and not all attacks that have been executed by the group's supporters or sympathizers have been claimed. This is a perfect example. Now, why would Ed Archer have sought to demonstrate his support for the group by attempting to murder a police officer? Well, in September of 2014, in an address posted online, distributed using things like YouTube, archive.org, other popular file-sharing sites, the group spokesperson called for just those types of attacks in Europe and the United States. So it's been pushing since 2014 for these types of attacks to occur here. Here, what you can see is a way that Twitter has been used to achieve an international broadcasting capability for the group's propaganda. Hours before Al Adnani's Ramadan address was posted online in May of 2016, the group was hashtagging the name of the media brand that put together this address. And once it reached the top hashtag and Arabic hashtag phrases that day, they released that video or rather audio message in which Al Adnani continued to push for attacks in the West and noted that killing civilians is a very important way of helping the group to advance its agenda. Here's me weeks later as a spate of attacks unfolded in the West, explaining on Dateline why Omar Mateen would have called a 911 Center. Well, as you can see in the fourth issue of the group's flagship publication, tailored to engage with audiences here in the West to be, they literally said that it is crucial that attacks be firmly attributed to the group so that they are not mistaken as random acts of violence. In other words, the group is devolving not only information about the types of attacks that it wants to have occurring, but also how to go about making sure that this is not mistaken as random violence or an attack attributed to al-Qaeda. Here you can see as in that other page that in another page of that issue of De Beek, they were appropriating not just bin Laden's but Al Alaki's mantles. And indeed, this program that I'm talking about basically is taking Al Alaki's program for engagement vis-a-vis the cyber domain to new heights. It emphasizes ease of access to the narratives that are used to recruit and incite violence, but also real group members as we're going to see. And so throughout the propaganda materials, you can see some screenshots of more examples. They continue to appropriate the mantles of these key Al-Qaeda figures. They've been claiming that they are stewarding bin Laden's minhaj or his methodology. And what you can see here in the center is Sally Jones. She's a well-known British member of the Islamic State, designated, especially designated global terrorist by the US, promoting material by Al Alaki. You can see a propagandist doing the same thing there. Now, of course, networking and building online communities has been very important for this group. And you can see an example of Sally Jones calling for others to follow a account created by an American woman who has since been charged with issuing terrorist threats online by doing things like promoting a hit list that was put out that contained more than 1,000 targets who were members of the US national security community. Now, here you can see the guy who comes to mind, Junaid Hussein, when you talk about this online recruitment and incitement program. On the left, you can see one of his Twitter accounts. You can also see an Islamic State hacking division account. He oversaw this program. And what they were trying to do was gather information about individual targets here in the United States and elsewhere in the world. And what you can see on the right is in the ninth issue of De Beek, they're highlighting some of his most well-known handiwork, the two terrorists responsible for the attack in Garland, Texas, were mobilized as Seamus Hughes, who's sitting back here has highlighted his reporting by Junaid Hussein. And if you look closely at the screenshot of his Twitter account, you'll see that it's a photo of Aulaki used in the profile pic. So again, another way that they're using social media to try to stimulate interest in attacks is pushing out things like that hit list that I mentioned earlier. They're also pushing out individual home addresses for senior current and former national security managers. Here you can see, for instance, CIA director Brennan at the time, DNI Clapper, pushing out their home addresses to try to push people to execute these types of attacks. Another way that they're trying to stimulate interest in all of this is by harassing people, analysts like me, reporters like Ruth Mini Kalamaki, who reports on the Islamic State for the New York Times, you can see Sally Jones doing just that on Twitter last year. Now, in 2016, The Wall Street Journal published a report on Twitter's efforts to suspend more rapidly all of these accounts that are being used for these purposes. And they also highlighted an exchange between me and a key Islamic State propagandist on Twitter who noted that really this has no meaningful deterrence, the suspension campaign. If anything, they were touting as credentials the number of times that their accounts had been closed. Here you can see where Telegram Messenger channels have become a preferred tool used to distribute propaganda and also engage with people globally. And what you have here is a video pushed out in November 2016 where a member of the group, a French speaker, was calling for attacks in the West saying that the barriers to making hijra or immigrating into the so-called caliphate are now too high so you must execute attacks in the West if you can. He provided a lengthy gruesome demonstration of how to kill people using knives. You can see his victim there behind him. Two days later, Artan executes just that type of attack at Ohio State University. Now, was it that video or was it that previously mentioned message from Al Adnani in September 2014 where he called for just that type of attack that stimulated this? Who knows? I imagine it might be both. Here's the claim for the attack on a Telegram channel that's run specifically to push out what you call a mock agency or headline news a la Islamic State, claims for operations and attacks and you will find dozens of these pushed out a day. And all of this helps to build this perceptibility of strength, durability, and worthiness of support. This is an example of an amok infographic that provided statistics for the number of suicide bombings in Iraq and Syria alone last year, more than 1,100. Here's the amok infographic for February. And all of this, again, has pushed out on easy to access platforms, easier than just Telegram messenger channels, which is a little bit more difficult to get into and start tracking all of the content. Other ways that they're trying to stimulate interest in executing attacks is via these short documentary type clips that amok puts out. Here you can see a victim of Turkish strikes targeting the group, a child. And this was put out hours before the attack on New Year's Eve in Turkey. And you can see screenshots of videos like this also being proliferated to try to stimulate thinking about executing attacks. Another example, here's a child victim purportedly of US strikes targeting the group's positions. So what you see with all of this is an engagement that you just don't see with al-Qaeda. You don't see al-Qaeda putting out things like daily reports that highlight all of these claims for attacks within the primary areas of operations and beyond. Here's an example of a video put out just last week. Now we've heard about this slowdown in these major productions of Islamic State videos. You can see here that they're promoting links to it on Telegram to YouTube. YouTube materials quickly get suspended, but what they also exploit are things like Google Drive, where you can't just view it alone. You can download it and help proliferate the material onto other popular file sharing sites, like Sinvid, for instance. Again, the engagement rate's so much higher. So while there may be a slowdown in some of this major production material, they have weekly publications like Al-Nabba that you can see here. Now this is a screenshot of inside a chat room on Telegram, and the reason I'm showing you this is this is me this month reporting a pro-Islamic State Twitter account, and they're posting screenshots of me doing that, because Twitter, of course, is so popular for the group and continues to be despite the suspension campaign because, again, it's about ease of access. It's about marketing, but also, concomitantly, market research capability when somebody tweets, then retweets, likes and promotes the material. They can identify prospective recruits who can be mobilized for attacks eventually. Now, of course, they expected that I had infiltrated that chat room. Here's them posting a threat against me. But again, more examples of this. This guy, these accounts back in 2015 on Twitter within a day or so, they'd have 10,000 or more followers. So now, the big question is, why are these technologies so attractive? In the process of promoting the use of Twitter, Facebook, et cetera, they've also promoted the use of tools that help to achieve a means to mask your physical location when you're online. Things like virtual private networks or VPNs, specialized browsers like Tor. So there's not a real high risk associated with the exploitation of these technologies to recruit and incite violence. Thank you for your time.