 Ladies and gentlemen, I know that since this is a meeting focusing on the Middle East, we should begin half an hour late. So I hope you will excuse us if we do not both again in a suitably late time frame. But in all seriousness, I would like to really thank Munquith Dagger for coming here. He will be presenting, I think, a briefing which goes beyond the very narrow concepts of public opinion and looks at some of the key causes and factors that are shaping that opinion that affect the overall struggle in terms of regional stability, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency. And I take a special pleasure in introducing him because I think he's focused on areas where sometimes we, at least those of us who are Americans, tend to lose focus on what is really happening. That's a nice map of the coalition, but when it comes down to the real coalition, this is a struggle which is lost or won in Arab states. It sometimes, I think, is forgotten that if we look at the data coming out of our State Department and National Counterterrorism Center, virtually all of the casualties that come in terms of terrorism are essentially Muslims killing Muslims in these particular states, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. It's important to realize that for the occasional talk about winning the war on terrorism, whatever that means, what some of the statistics that the State Department and U.S. government has issued are. In the latest State Department report, you were talking about some 300 major incidents of terrorism in the MENA area from about 1998 to 2008. They went up to figures of around 1,500 in 2010. They rose to 2,500 in 2012 into around 4,700 in 2013. If you look at the actual increase in terrorist activity and casualties over the last three years, it looks like that. It is not simply a matter of individual countries that are singled out as key sources of terrorism. State Department database breaks that out by individual country, and even in countries where the activity is low-level, there has been a significant increase. An Iran study that was done this year, you also saw estimates that the number of neo-Solafi or extremist groups rose by about 60 percent in the region over the last two years. A lot of those are very small. They're not the kind of movement that the Islamic State is, but it's very important to realize that these forces are not ones that are diminishing. I think it's also just important that as this brief goes on, we see a focus on factors like employment and on the social and economic factors that have been driving this kind of extremism and violence. If I may just give you two statistics, and for any of you who are interested both, these statistics and far more importantly the briefing will be up on the website, and for any of you who would like us to send it to you directly, just give your cards to the people who will be at the door or asking questions and will make sure that you get a copy this afternoon. But I find it striking having gone to this region first in the 1960s. When you look at some of the demographics here, the population of the MENA region is a little over six times today what it was in 1950. The number of young men and women, 24 and under, is about as a percentage, twice the percentage that it is in the United States. Depending on which European country is involved, in some cases it's about three times the percentage, which is one reason so many people have begun to flow out of North Africa and the Middle East into Europe. You're talking about the rate of urbanization more than doubling. And if you look at figures in the Arab Development Report before 2011, you would see that when it comes down to young men in a male-dominated region that are either unemployed or subject to disguised unemployment, the percentages were more than twice those of any other region in the world. These are the kinds of factors that I think we need to bear in mind when we talk about any kind of struggle against terrorism and extremism. Because obviously if those are the figures and I think you'll see some very important statistics very shortly, you can't win on a military or counter-terrorism basis. You have to deal with the ideological and the political dimension, you have to deal with the causes. Now I think Munkwith will probably do a far better job of introducing himself simply from the quality of his briefing, but I should mention that he is an academic in terms of his background. He taught public administration at Baghdad University and also taught at the Iraqi National Defense University. So he brings to this not simply expertise as a polar, but a much broader range of expertise in dealing with these issues. And with that, let me have the expert takeover. Thank you. Thank you, doctor. I really appreciate the opportunity to have the stage this morning. On 9th of June 2014, 9th of June 2014 was a really benchmark in the terrorist history. And this is not because ISIL or what I'll prefer to name it Daesh, it's not ISIL, took over the second largest city in Iraq in a few hours. But because that day thinks that we as observers in the region really took a place. We expected that a long time ago. We expected that and all our polls, numbers, it showed that something will happen. Of course, I cannot claim that we expected it at this level, yet all figures, all numbers, starting 2011 till June 2014, it showed that there is something wrong happening in this area. And actually, and unfortunately, these warning bells, no one took it seriously and things happened as you are now following. Well, after that, after 9th of June 2014, I have dedicated most of my research to understand the real reasons behind what happened. Yes, we had theories about why this took place. Why Daesh has controlled all this area in a few hours. And as Iraqi, I know for sure that at that time there wasn't more than couple thousands of Daesh fighters who entered to Mosul. And there were, of course, thousands of other Sunnis fighters who are not part of Daesh who started this. They started this, if I name it, this revolution. But ISIL took over it and benefited from it. So I try to understand what's going on. There are many theories. The first theory, of course, Dr. Korsman advised me to speak a little bit about the methodology. The methodology that I have used in this, of course, I've been working in polling in the region since 2003. And I have done over 2 million interviews in different places, mainly in Iraq, but also in other regions. And usually the standard of our poll, we are doing it, or the sample, is selected by what we call in polling by PPS, which is probability random sampling method. And most of the clients that I'm dealing with them are academics, so they dig in every single detail in methodology. So I want you to be sure that all these numbers came from reliable polls. I will skip the history of Daesh and terrorists in the region. And this shows you now, the orange shows you where is Daesh now. Whether in Syria or in Iraq. So the first theory that I wanted to test, which is very widely or very popular in the media now, that this is a religious war. This is, Daesh is extremist, Islamist, and they are now starting Islamic war against other. And the fact that I am Muslim, I have been lived in this area for the entire of my life, doing all my Islamic duties, I found it very strange to believe it that this is really the Islam. So, and the other fact is that all the area that had been controlled by ISIL or by Daesh, they are Muslims and they are conservative Muslim. So if this theory is correct, then we will see a kind of harmony between the people living there and between Daesh. So I wanted to test this and I went back to my database and also I have done other surveys to check this theory. Of course, I will not have the time to go over all slides, but I will focus on some slides that can brief my ideas. Buy and large Muslims do not believe or support Daesh. Let me show you these numbers. And by the way, the recent survey that I have done in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Jordan, it was just 10 days ago. So it's very updated data, very updated data. As you can see, the support for Al Qaeda as the godfather of Daesh is very low and Nusrah Front is very low, especially in Iraq. And in Iraq, I will also analyze it based on the sect, Sunnis and Shias, to give a better idea. Now for ISIL, 94% of Sunnis in Iraq look to ISIL as a terrorist organization or movement. And Yemen, 82%, and Jordan, 73%, and Syria, 72%. But in other countries, this is a nationwide, it's not a special segment, it's not like Iraq. Now this is breakdown by the area controlled in Syria. As you can see, the areas controlled by the Syrian opposition, it has a majority of people opposing Daesh. Same for controlled by current government. And the less support in these areas controlled by Daesh itself in Syria. And I will explain this slide later. I bet that there will be a question about it, so I will not explain it now because as you can see there, there is a support for Daesh in the areas controlled in Syria and controlled by Daesh in Syria. It's not the same in Iraq, it's not the same story in Iraq. So look at that in Iraq, legitimate, resistant or a terrorist movement. As you can see, there is no difference between Shias and Sunnis in recognizing ISIL or Daesh as a terrorist organization. This is for ISIL, sorry, for the different organizations, al-Qaeda, ISIL, Hezbollah, and al-Nusra. And as you can see, there is a very important remark to notice that al-Nusra has a lot of support in Syria. A lot of support in Syria, not a lot, 43% they regarded as not a terrorist movement. And there is an explanation for this as well, I will answer it later. Now the other thing, the support for the international coalition. As you can see, there is a real support for the international coalition against Daesh. Again, this is different between Syria, Iraq, and others. And in the same country, as you can see, there is a wide support for it in the controlled areas controlled by Syrian opposition, or Jais al-Hur. And there is also support for the, sorry, they are widely opposing that in these areas. In Syria, there is a lot of suspicious about the coalition, and also I will speak about that later. While in the Iraqi case, it's totally different, different story, opposite, totally opposite than the Syrian. The support, which is in yellow, is very high in Sunni areas, in Shia's area, or in those who are classifying themselves as Muslim and they don't want to identify themselves either Shias or Sunnis. As you can see here, this is another thing that proves the theory or denies it. Those who really believe that people might join or help Daesh, and this is in Syria, only 19%, look to the yellow numbers, only 19% think it is because of religious or agreeing with Daesh. All other reasons, or for different reasons, not a religious or believe in the ideology of Daesh itself. And this is the support versus a pause for the goals and activities, as you can see here, as you can see here in Syria. Those who are supporting the goals and activities of the ISIL or Daesh, they are nearly 17% only. In addition to this, there is a real contradiction between Daesh ideology and people who lives there, and we will test that. This is one of the standard questions that we ask to check whether people are secular or really religious in their attitudes. So asking the people the support for the government or we should implement only the laws derived from Sharia, as you can see, whether among Sunnis or among Shias or among Kurds in Iraq, in general, there is no support for that. Iraq would be a better place if religion and politics were separated. This is amazing here. Look to Sunnis, how many Sunnis agreeing with this? 81%. 81% want to separate religious from politics, and of course this is not what Daesh believe in. And this is based on a tracking study since 2004 till now on, agree or strongly agree that Iraq would be a better place if religion and politics were separated. As you can see, the blue curve is for Sunnis and the red one is for Shias. Sunnis are much higher supporting the separation between politics and religious. So how come they support Daesh? Now, this is another thing. People, whether in Iraq, Syria or other areas, I cannot show all slides, in general, they refuse a religious government or any kind of government system governed by Islamic law or a system with a strong military force. The most preferred system for them is a democratic system with different parties struggling to get the government. This is another number that can prove or deny the theory. Well, degree of agreement, religious clerics should have influence over the decisions of governments. And naturally, if people supporting the clerics and Daesh and all others Islamic movement, then the support for that will be or agreeing with that will be high. It's not the case neither in Iraq nor in Libya and in other countries as well. This is from Libya. For me and as someone who lives there, regardless of the numbers that I showed, these pictures really summarize the contradiction between Daesh and people who lives there. The upper two pictures you saw in media how these Daesh people went to the museum of Mosul and to those who don't know the history of Mosul, Assyrians who live there in Mosul, their civilization is even more ancient than ancient Egypt. It's going back to 7000 years and people in Mosul really proud of being part of this civilization. So seeing these statues smashed, crushed by Daesh will make the contradiction even more. And here there is something funny about it, which is Daesh has took over Mosul for eight months since last June, yes? So it's over nine months. Why? They just remember now, just one week ago, to go to the museum and smash all these statues. Why? It's a big question mark, because if they really believe that this is against Islam to have these statues and others, if it is really against Islam then, and as they claim that Prophet Muhammad, when he entered Mecca at that time, he smashed all these statues. Prophet Muhammad did that. At the first day he entered Mecca and it was in Kaaba, people prayed to it. So it's not the same case. Why? After nine months, they just remember now to smash it. Well, let me tell you this, because one of the most important resources of fund for Daesh was smuggling these statues, selling it to all these in black markets and getting millions of dollars on it. But because just two weeks ago the UN and United States started real sanction on the border, watching everything, it became very, very difficult for them to smuggle any more statues. So that's why they decided at that moment to go and do this. So it's not a religious thing. It's a business thing. It's a business thing and now it's a propaganda. The down two pictures, it's for what we call the mosque of Prophet Yunus, I don't know in English. Jonah, yeah. It's one of the most important mosques for Mosul and the most ancient mosque in Mosul. Really Mosul people love it. Not like they visit this mosque on a weekly base or even sometimes on daily base. So seeing Daesh destroy this benchmark for them, this important thing for them will also bring them in a big contradiction with Daesh. So if it is not religious, then the second theory. It's because of poverty or lack of services or etc. These might be the main reasons behind what's going on or ISIL taking over Mosul. Is it poverty or lack of services? Let us test this. If it is poverty or lack of services or etc. in these areas, I have made a comparison between unemployment rates in Nineveh, Al-Ambar, Salah al-Din, where Daesh is now there and between the rest of provinces in Iraq. As you can see, the average of unemployment rate is 17.9 in these three areas controlled by Daesh and it's 17.4. So and when I did the statistical test, there is no significant differences between both of them. So it's not unemployment. When we ask this question and we are asking this question nearly on a monthly base, statement comes closest to describing your household income. Shias in red, Sunnis in blue. As you can see, there are no differences in the income level of the household. So it's not the income nor the unemployment. The financial situation, there is no big difference. Standard of living, not big difference. Moreover, in Libya where now Daesh started working there, if you go back to the United Nations Human Development Reports, Libya classified among the, as you can see, the high human development rate. It's ranked 55 Libya. So if it is neither ideological things or reasons nor economic reasons, what are the reasons? What are the main reasons? I tried to investigate another set of numbers to identify these reasons. I think it's the political and social factors. Let us go to see what are the reasons that I can see. Sunnis are discontent. This is one of the astonishing slides. As you can see here, this is from January, February, March, July 2014. When we ask Sunnis about your country going in the right or the wrong direction, as you can see the blue, it's very, they are unhappy. When we compare between Sunnis Muslim and Shias Muslim, the differences are significant in all statistical level. Sunnis are unhappy, much higher than, that does not mean that Shias are happy, by the way. It does not mean that. More than 33% of Sunnis feel forced to live outside Iraq versus 20% only of Shia. And this is another number which stopped me, because right now we have in Iraq, according to the formal numbers, around 4.5 million Iraqis living abroad. So if you add to that, 33% who are thinking about leaving Iraq, Sunnis, and 20% of Shias who are thinking about leaving Iraq, you will end up with over or around 10 million Iraqis living abroad. The xenophobia, it's one of the things that we test to see how people are happy or unhappy or how they trust others. It's among Sunnis, it's the highest in the entire region. See the differences between the red and the blue. How would you describe the current security situation in Iraq today? It's very clear that Sunnis in the red, sorry in the blue, they feel totally insecure in Iraq. On 2014, only 19%, as you can see, only 19% versus 38% of Shia, the double, feel that current situation in Iraq is good. This is another end, please look to the gap in 2014. How many Sunnis say that they are unsafe in their neighborhood, and this is in Mosul and Salah-e-Din only. Around 80% of people, and by the way, this survey was on June 2014, just one week before ISIL took over Mosul and then Salah-e-Din. Over 80%, or around 80% of Sunnis feel that they are unsafe in their neighborhood. It's not in their city, it's not in Iraq, but in their neighborhood, and you can imagine that versus 10% only of Shias. So the gap is huge. This is the xenophobia. Look to the differences in 2014 between Sunnis Muslim and Shias Muslim. 76% of Sunnis think that most people are not trustworthy versus 65% among Shias. Trustworthy 17% of Sunnis versus 29% of Shias. Let's keep that. Lack of trust, and this is also, this is amazing here. Look what, how, or the differences between Shias and Sunnis in trust, whether in their government or in other institutions. As you can see in 2014, the trust, 68% of Shias, they have trust in their government versus 36% only of Sunnis. And this is in Yemen, it's the same. Confident in the parliament, it's the same. Sunni Arab, 94%, they don't trust, 94%, they don't trust parliament versus 63% of Shias. The justice system, which is the most important system in any country. Do you have confidence or you don't trust the justice system? See the trust among Shias, 68% in the justice system, while the trust among Sunnis is 68%. Sorry, the trust among Sunnis is, I don't trust, it's 60%, they don't trust. Versus 37% they trust the Sunnis. So the majority of Sunnis, they don't trust the justice system versus the majority of Shias trust the justice system. The courts, it's the same, and this is in Yemen. It's the same, the same pattern. They don't trust. Iraqi army, confident in Iraqi army. See, 91% on June 2014, one week before ISIL took over Mosul. 91% of people living there, they don't trust the army. So no wonder why Mosul fall down. Okay, so I've been told that. See this drop down in the Iraqi ID. I am Iraqi above all among Sunnis. Since 2008 it was 80% of Sunnis feeling that they are Iraqis. It dropped down to 40% on 2014. There is a basis for hope. Yes, there is. And because of the change of the government of Maliki, you can see here one important slide. The trust in government jumped in September 2014, just a few days after the establishing of the new government. And it jumped to 47% among Sunnis. If you remember the last slide, it was in June 2014, it was less than or about 10%. So it jumped 47%. Support for fighting ISIL, 63%. And this is in Mosul and Salah al-Din. Yet we have to be very cautioned because of the negative perception of militias. People or Sunnis living there, they don't trust all militias whether Sunnis militias or Shias militias. As you can see here, the negative impact for Badr militia or Ahl al-Haq militia or others, it's very low. Now they are over one million. The conclusion I will only focus on the first one. What we need to direct our attention toward today is a way to address the real social and political needs of people in these areas. Because believe me, there is no way to defeat Daesh unless we convince the people living there that there is an advantage and there is a real light in their life if they defeat Daesh. We need to convince them that what happened to them when they joined Sahwas and defeated Al-Qaeda back in 2008 will not happen to them again. They defeated Al-Qaeda in 2008 and after that most of them have been killed or sent to jail by the government. And their daily life became even worse. So if we want them to fight, really fight, then we have to convince them that there is a hope waiting for them at the end of this very dark tunnel. Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to open things up for questions, but let me make two points. First, this is a complicated set of results. There are a lot of numbers. If you wish to get a copy of it and have it sent to you directly, please just give your card either as people come by with the mics or as you leave, we'll send it to you directly. There's one other aspect I would just note. There is a rough correlation between the UN casualty data in Iraq between 2011 and 2013. While it is now the Islamic State that gets much of the attention to the rising pattern of violence, what you saw in the UN data was a steady rise back toward civil conflict from the point when U.S. forces left to the point when the Islamic State or Daesh forces first moved into Ramadi and into Fallujah. And if you looked at where the casualties were, you could see that a lot of this violence was being directed against the Sunni parts of Iraq. Now, violence and casualties are not a measure of public opinion and they are not necessarily a source of causes. But just be aware that there is a danger here in focusing on one extremist movement and not on the history of violence within the country. I will ask you, I see a number of people here I know, but I'm going to pick you out by appearance. When I do call on you, please do identify yourself as to who you are and your background. If you look around, you will see we have a full room. We have some very polished marble steps if you would like to give a speech. Please just walk outside. I am sure there will be many passersby that would like to hear a speech disguised as a question. So if I may, please do end with a question mark, a one-part question and one that is fairly short. And with that, please who would like to begin. The gentleman in the discreet cardigan. Yeah, please. I'm Harlan Oman. I'm a great admirer of Tony Cordesman. Two questions. One, this doesn't really explain why the Islamic State has been so successful so far. And I wonder if you might answer that. And Tony, what conclusions do you draw about what U.S. policy ought to be? Okay. Why it's so successful, I think this explains why it's so successful. Because right now, everyone is focusing on the ideological thing in fighting Daesh. And in dealing with Daesh as extremist, only as extremist movement. Daesh is making the other claim. They are saying that we are bringing justice back to you. We are bringing fairness after you have been treated unfair. We are defending our Sunni community. So without taking out these claims from ISIL propaganda, we will not defeat it. Harlan, I think that it's a very good question. But part of the problem with strategy is that we are in control and really have very limited influence over quite a number of the key variables. When it comes down to the divisions between Kurd and Arab, or Sunni and Shiite, these are issues where the United States has already tried to bring unity, find compromises. We've done it for a long time. The actual practical impact, as you've seen from these figures, has been very limited. Right now the other problem is that as military forces advance, the question of how in these areas you bring stability, you prevent attacks on Sunnis, you offer some kind of economic security, you are actually reintroducing a pattern of governance into these areas. These are issues we have limited influence over. No aid money, no plans for forward presence, and no clear indication that we are even going to at this point have a military presence as the forces move forward into the urban areas if indeed they do. So we have to be very careful. We are at this point committed to influencing the security dimension from the rear and by the use of air power without having US troops present even as forward advisors with regular Iraqi combat units. And there is no strategy that we have yet articulated for what we will do, if anything, in the areas that would have Daesh driven out. The other problem to remember from the Iraqi side is that the Iraqi per capita income is roughly something on the order of a quarter of the income of Iran before this crisis began. It was about $7,500, probably now down to about $4,000. And they are in the middle of a major crisis on oil revenues which raises serious questions about how they are going to afford to deal with the impact of liberation. I think these are really critical issues. They are not something that anybody has a good answer to. And if any of you have not seen what Kovani looks like after being freed, there is almost nothing left. Urban warfare is not necessarily gentle kind or something that lends itself to establishing order. Next question, please. The gentleman in the second row there. Wait for the mic. Daniel Serwer from Johns Hopkins SICE. There is an offensive going on apparently to retake Tikrit. Can you give us an idea, Munkis, what you anticipate the reaction to that will be from the population in Tikrit in particular given the role of the Shia militias? Well, I didn't have enough time to go through this because people, if you have living there, if you put them for them, the Shias and Iranian militias at one side and ISIL at the other side, they will prefer ISIL. They will prefer Daesh. I think this is... Let's see, there's a question here in the front row. Pat Burke, stressor, former public diplomacy and public affairs advisor for Iraq. And I'm just curious as to the smuggling that goes back and forth, why there hasn't been an effort in your minds, both of you, as to sealing the country off and controlling things like that. Thank you. Why? Why haven't they done more to prevent smuggling by Daesh in and out of the areas they occupy? Well, I don't think I can see the answer. The question writes... The oil smuggling. Yeah, the oil smuggling. What about it? Why this hasn't been, has Iraq made any statement? Well, first, the main smuggling areas did not go through Iraq. They go through Turkey and through Syria. Second, the smuggling went on pretty thoroughly until essentially you had both a massive deployment of border police, which at least reduced it to corruption. This is before all of this. And the sun's essentially shut down the rat lines that supplied it. The whole idea that you can secure these desert borders or a very complex pattern of Turkey, in general, efforts in conflict situations to secure borders don't work regardless of the intent of the people involved in the international community. The other factor to remember is the sheer incentive, both for Daesh and for individuals. If this is all you got, and remember literally millions of people have been displaced away from their homes and businesses, this is what you are going to do. The next question, let's say, I'm going to start in the far back. Thank you. Hi, my name is Tomoki-san, I'm the CSIS of Eastern Federal. Two Japanese journalists were killed by ISIL. So do you think if there is any way to save such cases? So not only Japanese journalists, but also the American journalists and British journalists were killed by ISIL. So would you tell me about it? Well, unfortunately, I don't think there was a way to skip that. And unfortunately, if the international community stay without doing anything to this Daesh, this monster will eat everyone at the end. They have goals, they have strategy. That's why I'm now insisting on ISIL, not ISIS, because in the media here, they insist on ISIS, ISIS, whether the Arabic translation is IS Islamic State for Levant, Iraq and Levant, which means Levant, it means Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, everything. And now they have more branches. So and you can see Daesh now knocking your backyards, whether in Europe and in Asia, maybe even here. If no one do anything about it, I don't want to make it a terror for you, but this is the fact. The gentleman toward the middle of the back there. Hi, my name is Rami and I'm a student at Columbia University. I'm just regarding the social factor that you said you are the most important factor in forming ISIL. Most of the punishment and the act that was carried by ISIL has actually a legal ground in the Islamic Syria. And they were supported as well by the most moderate University of Al-Azhar in Egypt and the carrot systematically in Saudi Arabia and Iran. How would you differentiate or call that these behavior of ISIL is terrorist behavior, while it's carried systematically, you know, like the punishment of Sadami and adultery and other apostasy, for example, and so on. Well, I didn't hear any support from Azhar or from Saudi Arabia to ISIL practices. Actually, Al-Azhar issued fatwa just when the Jordanian pilot has been burnt, and Saudis as well issued same fatwa that this is not part of Islam. And if you refer to some exercises in the Saudi interpretation for Sharia, this is a minority versus a majority of Muslims who don't believe in these interpretations for Islam and don't support this. At least for me as Iraqi, I know very well that over 99% of Iraqi, they refuse all these exercises. The gentleman there in the third row. John Rothenberg, Afghanistan specialist. Andrew Wilder at USIP has done a sort of similar research for Afghanistan and comes up with similar results, except that he also a major area of unhappiness is corruption, government corruption. Did you ask anything about that? Yeah. Actually, corruption is one of the main factor, but when I tested corruption, the differences between, in perception of corruption, between people lived under control of ISIL and other areas in Iraq, there are no differences in corruption. It means that whether she has Sunnis or Kurds, when we ask them about corruption, always over 80% believe that there is a white corruption in their country. So it's not the reason. It is somewhat ironic that both Iraq and Afghanistan are rated as two of the most corrupt countries in the world, both the World Bank and Transparency International, and there seems to be an open contest as to which can have the worst rating of overall governance. Would you give them a prize for the winner? I mean CSIS should dedicate a prize for the winner. I think the prize really comes in how much you can deposit an account in Dubai. Please, the second row. Thank you, Michelle Gelfand, Professor of Psychology, University of Maryland. Monk, can you comment on what seems to be a contradiction of the earlier data that show that Sunni label ISIL as a terrorist group? So that would seem to imply that they would have very little attraction in terms of helping to deal with these fairness issues and other unhappy motivations that you were describing. Is it just that they are seen as the best of the worst options? Yeah. And that helps to explain. Actually, you answered it. Yes, they are seeing it as the best of the worst option that they have now. And by the way, Daesh in all its propaganda, it never say that they will make their life prosperous or glorious or they recognize that. That's why they always in their propaganda focus on comparison between life under Daesh and life under the old or the Iraqi government. So they're getting benefit of that. They realize that. I think you also have to be very careful about contradictions. We tend to forget that you're talking, for example, in Mosul the city which probably still has over a million people. Out of the total fighter strength, frankly, the media is making it up because there are no reliable sources for any of these numbers. But at most we're talking 35 to 50,000 people in the entire area and if the estimates of foreign fighters are what they are, that takes us down to about 25 to 30,000 Iraqis maximum. So it is the people with guns, it is the people who are violent who get to dictate the pattern of extremism. That doesn't necessarily show up in a public opinion poll unless Monkwith has somehow found a way to only poll the extreme that are armed. And you have to keep that constantly in mind. These are not mass armed movements by historical standards. They are small groups of violent elements. Let's see. Second row. I'm El Moudaleli with the Wilson Center. Everybody is talking about the upcoming Mosul battle to take over Mosul by the Iraqi government. And there is fear that we might see massacres because of the Shia militias and stuff like that. Do you see any signs that the Iraqi Abadi government is going to deal with the situation differently from the Maliki government? And do you have any numbers about how Iraqi Shiites feel about Iranian interference and fighting on the ground in Iraq? Thank you. Well, about the new government, all what we hear till now is promises, nothing on the ground. Actually, the militias became so strong and I certainly believe that Abadi is trying to do something but it's out of the control. I mean, the militia is now over one million fighters supported by Iran and they got funds and they have all but asking me, will they be able to inter-mosul? I don't think so. I certainly believe that unless people of Mosul themselves and people of Salahuddin or Sunnis in these areas convince that there is an interest to fight ISIL, nothing will. Yes, the air strikes, the U.S. military, the Iraqi army can help but the main role will be for these fighters to fight. The Shia numbers, in public opinion, this is one of the things that maybe I agree with Dr. Kordzman about it, about public opinion. Public opinion in some times in a certain way cannot measure everything. For instance, when you ask Shias in Iraq about Iran, of course, there is a clear pattern of decrees in supporting Iran. It's clear, yet majority are supporting Iran. And when we do more focus groups and qualitative research because this cannot be identified in the surveys, it seems that people, when you ask them about Iran, the Shias, when you ask them about Iran, mostly they think that you are attacking or you are insulting them because now it is an insult for Shia's Arab made by, and this is one of the biggest mistake by Sunnis and others to accuse Shias that they are Iranian followers. So when it comes to this point, they say that, yes, we support Iran. Not because they support Iran but because it's a way of saying that we are Shias. Is it clear for you? It's not supporting Iran itself. The gentleman in the middle. Thank you. My question is about what do you think from five years from now or ten years or three years, how do we project this conflict going to evolve? Will it become more religious or will it cease? Is this will be defeated or will it get ground? Because I see this opinion as changing. Thank you. Well, it depends on how to deal with it. And this is why in the first part of my presentation, I raised up a red flag saying that don't deal with this war as a religious war because if you deal with it as a religious war, that means ISIL will recruit more and more fighters. Not because they believe in their ideology, but simply because they want to defend their existence as Muslims, as Sunnis, Muslims. And how long it will take, the way how it is going now, it will take a long time unless there is a willingness, a real willingness from the international community and from the Iraqi government to deal with the deep concerns of people who lives there. And believe me, if people believe that they have an interest in fighting ISIL, this war can be finished within a few months only. Oh, there's a lady in the middle row with the address. Mayada Sabri at Tahrir Channel. Why are not arming the Sunni trapeze until now? And who will hold the ground after the liberation from the US of you? Thank you. Well, I cannot answer why they are not arming the Sunnis now. The polls does not show this. This is based on my opinion. I think there is no clear strategy whether among the Iraqi government or the US government, unfortunately, on how to deal with this situation. That's why there are. And unfortunately, in Iraq, it's the main reason for the government, I think, is the pressures by Iran and by militias not to militarize the Sunnis. And here in US, as I can see it, it's the political debate between both wings, which make the decision very difficult to be made. I think that the United States has announced that it is sought to create the equivalent of provincial national guards in Sunni provinces. The way that is structured is would begin with local Sunni forces that would be supported by the US. As yet, several things have happened. First, the central government has not created the incentive for major factions to turn to the central government and away from Daesh. Elements that have tried have not seen a flow of money or arms with any reliability come from the central government and promises have not been kept. And understand that we have said that we are not going to deploy, at least officially, any American advisors or groups forward to recruit and shape these elements that will have to be done by the Iraqi central government, which by its very nature means that the amount of influence that we have is very limited. Now, whether that adds up to a strategy or not is an issue where I don't have a good answer to your question. Let's see. We're down to about 10 minutes, ladies and gentlemen, out of sheer mercy, the young lady and the third row there. Thank you. My name is Amanda Hare. I work in international development. My question is about the slide on Syrian public opinion of an international coalition being present in the region. I was wondering if when you asked the question if you distinguished between an armed coalition and a coalition of the UN, USAID, DFID, for example, a difference between an armed coalition to fight and a coalition to actually provide services. And then my other question for Dr. Korsman is if such a coalition were to be formed and our development work in the region to be increased specifically in Syria, where do you think the effort should be focused first? Well, for the first part of the question is we clearly defined the coalition as the armed coalition. So people in Syria in general, they don't welcome this attempt. Not because they don't want it, but because they don't trust it. And there is a difference because they have a bad experience with, unfortunately, with the U.S. air strikes. It's always, it's always aimed as they, and I have many videos in my computers to show to you with interviews with people. They deeply believe that this strike goal is to help Assad to keep his control over Syria. It does not aim Daesh itself. So that's why they don't trust the international coalition forces. I think it is nice in theory to talk about a coalition of the unarmed and the noble. You might want to look at the figures from the UN Human Rights Commissioner, Commissioner on Refugees, sorry. You now have nearly five million people in Syria basically listed as under siege or where no one can get them paid because the factions involved are fighting with each other and using the cutoff of aid in different ways as a political weapon. You also might ask, given the Afghan experience which somebody was mentioning earlier, we actually had a group called Yunama. It followed in the noble tradition set in Cambodia. It was supposed to coordinate aid over a 13-year period. It never even issued a report or a plan for coordination and never cited the actual pattern of international aid flows. One difficulty here is a coalition of whom, with what capability, to actually do what in the field or even in aiding the central government. And you might want to look at exactly what the impact of aid was after about 2007 when the money actually peaked according to World Bank and other studies in places like Afghanistan because quite frankly an awful lot of it, if not most, was simply wasted. And we saw exactly the same patterns in the SIGA reports on Iraq. If you don't have a government and a native structure that can actually absorb and handle aid in governance, you can often achieve limited project benefits but actually changing national behavior dealing with the overall needs of the people. Frankly, the end results have been remarkably discouraging when you bypass the culture and system. If you allow me, you cannot do these humanitarian efforts without a protection because you will end up with hundreds of these humanitarian workers captured by ISIL and beheaded and things will be even worse and worse. To be perfectly honest, I think the coalition of the noblest is likely to be a coalition of the ineffective and the dead. Next question. I guess we're down to... I'll take two more. One lady in the back, please. Amanda Cadlich, I'm a Libya specialist. I'm interested in how typically in Washington there's this focus on military intervention and airstrikes to address the ISIS problem. And as you suggest, we need to look at this in terms of a political and social issue and really get at the root of it. But how do we even start that? And I would totally agree that I think that airstrikes and as we have seen have rarely been beneficial in the long run because what's left at the end of it becomes a new enemy. Sort of like, you know, after the Iraq intervention, we end up creating a new enemy of ISIS. So after ISIS is defeated, what kind of new enemy will then form? So given the assumption that airstrikes aren't effective and can't be effective in the long run, where can we begin as the international community, which typically means you're up in the U.S., where can the international community begin to lay that framework? And what are the concrete steps that we can take to do that? Let me just take one more question you can answer both at the same time. There was a lady who was, okay, please go ahead. My name is Angela Ewing, Westminster Institute. I'm curious about Syria. Can you go into more detail? I believe you said earlier that the percentage of folks in Syria is actually... There's a higher percentage of folks in Syria who actually support Daesh than in Iraq. I think it's about one in three, perhaps. And, of course, it's a totally different story from Iraq, so I was hoping that you could maybe go into more detail on what's happening in Syria with that. Thanks. Now, for the international community and what it can do, I think the international community and the U.S. government, I do believe they can do a lot in this. I mean, we need to send at least three, four important messages to Sunnis lived there to satisfy their fairness, to tell them that they will not be marginalized anymore. There are certain laws which is regarded as unfair laws against them, discrimination against them. These can be sent in a few days, these messages by the government, but currently the government, the Iraqi government cannot do that or does not have the will to do that unless there are real pressures from the international community and from the U.S. government to make it, to force it to do that. And when the U.S. government insisted on changing Maliki, it has, he has been changed. When the U.S. government with the coalition or with an agreement with the Iranian government agreed to put Al Maliki on 2010 as a prime minister, although he lost the election, things went smooth. So don't tell me that the international community or the U.S. government cannot make pressures on the Iraqi government. But the question is, does the international community or the U.S. government have the will and the strategy to fight ISIL? This is a big question and I didn't show you some numbers about the conspiracy theory. There is a wide, a wide belief in the region that ISIL has been created by the United States and by the international community. Of course, I don't believe in that, but yes, I can understand why. I can understand why. I do have to say that the Middle East is famous for three exports. One is petroleum, which is useful. Another is responsibility. And the third is blame. I agree with you. But let me just say about the air side. We fly more than seven sorties, armed sorties. This doesn't include the intelligence effort for every actual strike. Actual air power strikes have been very carefully and very selectively targeted. There is very little collateral damage. War is not a pleasant structure. It produces casualties, no matter how you handle it. The basic strategy that is supposed to support the air power is the training of 12 beginning, Iraqi central government brigades. That strategy depends on the ability of U.S. advisory teams to actually train the forces, which means somebody has to provide the equipment and supplies to make training possible, which so far the central government has not been able to do with any efficiency or competence. It's a slow, difficult process, but if you don't want to use that method, it's all very well to talk about the international community, but exactly whose brigades are going to be coming in from the international community to substitute for the Iraqi forces. And if you have urban warfare with an outside power intervening between a low-level civil struggle between Sunni and Shiite or Arab and Kurd in an urban warfare context, exactly what do you think is going to happen by way of collateral damage in places like decreed or Mosul or the other areas you fight in? So there are a lot of considerations here, which frankly do require clearer U.S. choices, but be very careful about how easy or smooth this is. And if I may just conclude with a comment generally, when I taught international relations, I told my students I would flunk any student that used the phrase international community. And the reason is no one knows who is involved, what it means, or who's going to do anything. It is a generic term for not having a practical plan and not having thought out a policy. So that's the end of the lesson. And let me say this is Munquith's presentation, not mine. And may I ask you to thank him in the usual manner.