 Well, it's a great pleasure to be back, and thank you very much, and thank you for people turning up. I chose what I thought was possibly the most boring title you could imagine, which sort of setting up the external action service part two, just to see whether anyone would actually turn up. And thank you for rising to the challenge. In fact, it's, I think, nine months since I was last year, and I was trying to think if there were sort of jokes about gestation, but then I was reminded of a very good phrase of the late Robin Fogarty, who used to say that you could compare the European Union to the mating of two elephants. Everything takes place at an extremely high level. Even the smallest advance is accompanied by extremely loud trumpeting, and it takes at least two years to get a result. So maybe I should come back in two years rather than nine months. But what I wanted to do today, perhaps, was to try to talk a little bit more about some of the policy challenges which we face. I mean, I'll take you up to date on some of the organizational issues also, but in particular, where do we think we're going in terms of closer and a more consistent European foreign policy? The events in the first decade of the millennium have shaken the foundations of the global order. The tragedy of September 11th, and perhaps more importantly, the legacy of September 15th, 2008, among others, have triggered a tectonic shift in world politics. I remember Tony Blair saying he thought the real beginning of the millennium was 9-11. I sometimes think the real beginning of the new millennium may have been 1508, but we will see. The preeminence of America is no longer assured, and neither can we say that China or another rising plow is really ready to take its place. And the Euro crisis, as we know, has created a sense of fragility about Europe's place in the world. In this increasingly competitive and uncertain world, we risk losing influence as Europeans, both as individual countries and collectively, unless we can act more coherently, both internally and externally. And the new geopolitical landscape is characterized by power shifts and global realignments, a process which the recent economic and financial crisis has accelerated. So I think that we have a choice of facing the gale force winds of change alone, or we can seek strength in numbers. The Lisbon Treaty created a legal basis for more joined up foreign policy through the creation of the double-hatted, high-representative vice president role, supported by an embryonic diplomatic service, the external action service. The decision of July 2010 gave us the basic parameters of the new service. But it didn't spell out in detail how to go about doing it. And we've had to fill in the gaps ourselves since. When the EAS was launched in January, we started on a shoestring. But we managed to create a provisional organizational structure in which we put together its constituent bits, three services with different institutional cultures, and to adopt common information technology, security, and human resource procedures. The banal and sometimes boring daily stuff of any bureaucratic organization, but without which it's very difficult to deliver on the political objectives. We've negotiated a major relocation deal for our Brussels headquarters and launched a major recruitment process. We will move into a new building at the end of this year, formerly the Joyeux Entrée building, for those of you who know it, on the angle of the Rampouin-Schumann neatly positioned between the Berliment on one side and the Justice Lipsis on the other. And slightly architecturally better than the Justice Lipsis, and not quite as architecturally elegant as the Berliment. So that probably situates us in the right balance. This year we processed nearly 9,000 applications for 181 vacant posts, of which 66 were management posts, either in headquarters or in delegations. And a full 66% of all these posts have been filled by member-states diplomats, putting us well on the way to having member-states diplomats make up one-third of the entire EAS staff by 2013, which is what the decision recommended. I spent the best part of the last four months of the summer in interview panels, and while it's a rewarding experience, it's also a fairly grueling experience. So the best part of the heavy lifting is done, and that no millennium bugs have happened is already, I think, a major achievement. And the organization is, I think, on the way to setting itself on a firm footing. But the remaining tasks are the most challenging, because we've now entered the second stage of setting up the service, and we have to manage our own budget and take effective responsibility for the management of our staff. The challenge from now on is to fine-tune the organization to make sure that we've got it right. In some cases, there may be further adjustments to ensure that we match human resources to changing policy needs. We've already anticipated some of these changes by reshuffling staff in headquarters to strengthen the Middle East and North Africa Department for obvious reasons, because this has coordinated our response to the Arab Spring. And the ultimate aim, of course, is to be able to deliver effectively on our policy priorities, that is why we exist. Last January, I outlined Cathy Ashton's key policy priorities, our neighborhood, strategic partners, and security crisis management. In a broader perspective, these priorities haven't changed, but the eruption of the Arab Spring was a watershed for the high-representative vice president and for the EAS in particular, as it has tested the readiness and resolve of our young organization. Better to address these challenges, we strengthened our Middle East and North Africa Department, and we've appointed a special representative for the Southern Mediterranean, who is tasked to respond proactively to the developments in our southern neighborhood. It hasn't been easy to use a motoring analogy we've had to fix the car while the engine was running. Yet I believe we have risen to the occasion. We have reacted quickly to events and played our institutional role in support of Cathy Ashton as both a policy and a donor coordinator. Our value-added has focused on democratic transformation and economic development, involvement with civil society and development solidarity, as set out in our offer of a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the new emerging countries. We are also paying particular attention to the specific needs of our southern neighbors, as we can no longer approach each country through the same policy lens. To start the process, an EU Tunisia task force has been established. The first meeting took place last week in Tunis, on this week in Tunis, and spelled out unequivocally the EU and the international community's support to Tunisia's transition towards a free democratic and inclusive society. A strong focus was given to the economic transition challenges and opportunities, including concrete actions aiming in particular at assisting the recovery of frozen assets, boosting foreign direct investment and job creation. We have also supported the wider international effort through the use of sanctions against the Gaddafi regime in Libya and the Assad regime in Syria. The setback in New York on the UN security resolution on Syria is regrettable, but European diplomacy will continue to try to find ways of exerting the necessary pressure. On Libya, the EAS has led a diplomatic process which has resulted in a common position on Gaddafi, as well as recognition for the TNC. We've also taken part in the contact group in Libya and the Cairo group in the latter group, as the EAS is the only European participant. Still within the region, Cathy Ashton has been leading a tremendous effort on the Middle Eastern peace process, as was reflected in the UNGA ministerial week and in particular in the contribution of the EU to the Quartet Statement of 23rd September. A meeting of the Quartet will be hosted by the EU in Brussels this coming weekend, showing Cathy Ashton's continued lead in this area. She's also in the lead on the Iranian nuclear issue, not only on behalf of the EU, but also on behalf of China and Russia. And in the margins of the UN General Assembly, she provided over a meeting of the so-called E3EU-plus-3, which confirmed the unity and determination of that framework. There was a clear understanding that Iran has to engage more seriously in discussions on concrete confidence-building measures and that real progress has to be achieved if another round of talks with Iran should take place. Even as we reacted to events in the southern neighborhood, we have not neglected the eastern neighborhood. We've helped the eastern partners over the last decades to progress towards democracy, and the eastern partnership has reinvigorated our support to this region. However much remains to be done, and we've seen some regrettable steps backwards in some countries, which are still struggling with the transition towards democracy. We are extremely preoccupied with the case of political prisoners in Belarus and the sentencing or potential sentencing of Julia Timoshenko in the Ukraine. How we articulate our relations with these countries will be crucial in months to come, and this was a very important issue discussed at the eastern partnership summit held last week in Warsaw. All leaders, with the exception of Belarus, agreed to take the work forward in the years to come on the basis of a roadmap. The Western Balkans poses a particular challenge insofar as we can help resolve outstanding tensions between Kosovo and Serbia, which regrettably have intensified in recent weeks, and more generally in consolidating stability in the rest of the Balkans. And we will continue to pay particular attention to Georgia and the South Caucasus. These two priorities point to the continued significance of our neighborhood as the most important theme in our external relations, and hence the importance of driving forward the implementation of our neighborhood package set out in the May communication, presented jointly by the High Representative and the Commission. And of course, we are also intensifying our relations with Turkey, which is becoming an ever more important actor in foreign policy, especially in the region. We have also intensified our relations with strategic partners, whose support and close cooperation is essential if we want to address issues such as security, trade or climate change. The European Council conclusions of September 2010, asked Cathy Ashton to evaluate the prospects of relations with our strategic partners. The driving force of this exercise is to beef up the way we conduct our diplomacy by focusing more on core priorities, seeking greater policy and institutional coherence, and focusing on delivering more results. The transatlantic relationship is strong, not least due to the great relationship between Cathy Ashton and Hillary Clinton. There's lots of good work going on in specific issues, including Iran and also, for instance, on energy. We also have deepened the relationship with China by establishing a strategic dialogue with State Councilor Daibing Wu and stepping up contacts with the Chinese light leadership. I'm sure my good colleague, Vyrel Istokoyev, will be happy to go into more detail on that when he speaks to you tomorrow. We have a broad and very busy agenda with Russia that spans all areas of community competence, trade, mobility, energy, as well as political issues, and the main South Caucasus transnistrium. And we will have an important summit with Russia coming up before the end of the year. We've also just kicked off a reflection at ministerial level on how to improve political relations with India, Brazil and South Africa. Clearly, the only way for Europe to remain influential in the changing global landscape is for the EU to articulate value-added proposals which our partners increasingly appreciate. China is not so much having a single message but having a single voice but having a single message. And this is the big challenge in our relations with these countries is to try to make sure that our member states speak from the same hymnship cheat also in their bilateral contacts. In the area of security and crisis management we have also been extremely active. Whether in Libya, the Horn of Africa or Afghanistan, people around the world look to Europe to prevent conflicts and manage crises. And Tom Von Ash from the military staff was here and spoke to you a few weeks ago on this aspect. And as the U.S. gradually reduces its presence overseas there is going to be increased pressure for the EU to shoulder a bigger share of the burden in the security field. This is a clear reality. And Secretary Gates departing speech to NATO was a clear message to all of us. To this end we need a more integrated EU crisis response method that brings together humanitarian disaster relief and crisis management capabilities. This is also linked to peace building and security policy particularly conflict prevention where the EU has developed successful tools such as the CSDP missions. One of them where Ireland contributed massively in Chad and provided the operation commander to the great credit of the country. Ultimately we want to flesh out the EU's capacity as a peace builder through the triple areas of diplomacy, crisis management and development initiatives. Two areas we're drawing attention to would be include Afghanistan, the question of piracy off the coast of Somalia where the EU presence will become increasingly important in 2012. Particularly as this piracy problem acquires a new dimension where the pirates are no longer just seizing boats but are now actually seizing and killing civilians. The priorities I've outlined of course serve to give us guidance but our work doesn't end there. The EAS has also inherited a built in agenda which covers virtually every country in the world and touches on the external aspects of community policies from development to energy policy to transport to migration to trade. And for example, Africa remains a major focus of our financial and diplomatic effort and presents a number of very important challenges. Setting up the EAS also means working with the other institutions to develop joined up policies. I talked about the changes in institutional politics that have changed post Lisbon in my last address. Setting up the EAS part one for those of you who missed it. The single biggest challenge perhaps is learning how to support the high representative Vice President in her role as chair of the Foreign Affairs Council which was another important innovation. A job previously held by the rotating presidency. We're doing everything on the Foreign Affairs Council from agenda setting to the press conference at the end. Setting the agenda in particular is a crucial task. We have set tentative agendas until mid-2012 through an internal planning process and something the rotating presidency used to do. Of course the final agenda is fixed by Kathy Ashton based on her own priorities and on Member State's advice who can also add points in core care. This has been a learning experience for us all. And I have to say as a an EU official, former commission official who was sometimes a bit skeptical about the role of the rotating presidency. Not that I'm having to do all the things the presidency did. I have a new respect for the way in which presidencies manage some of these difficult issues. I also, I think I said this last time I have great respect for the fact that they only had to do it for six months and then could take a break. We don't have that luxury I'm afraid. Our delegations have also very successfully made the transition from commission to EU delegations with huge cooperation from the Member States in the different capitals. Taking over the presidency role and working closely with Member States embassies on the ground. Frankly, I'm convinced that the network of EU delegations is one of the most precious assets of the external action service. And it is clear that one of our challenges is radically to transform the nature of the relationship between those delegations and HQ which existed when they were commission delegations and therefore a relatively marginal part of the commission's work to the situation where as part of the external action service the delegations are absolutely central to what we do and getting the two-way interaction between headquarters and the delegations right, both in terms of policy shaping and policy execution will be a major challenge. Finally, despite some of the things you hear we have established good working relations with the commission including how to solve joint policy, programming of EU funds and management of delegations. There are occasional bureaucratic argy-bargy that goes on that will come as no surprise but I must say in general we are establishing very good working relations in the interests of serving Europe. The establishment of a common EU diplomatic service is a long-term project and we need time to establish the trust and smooth working relations with Member States who feel strongly that foreign affairs will remain a key part of their sovereign identity and of which the EU is only one, important but not exclusive dimension. And of course I do think it would be deeply unfair to judge the overall success of this project on the basis of only our first nine months at work. Having said that, I would like to just point to some important successes which I think illustrate that we are already demonstrating that we can make a difference. In the Balkans where we have helped maintain stability, diffuse tension and push forward a pro-EU agenda, our diplomatic efforts are delivering a facilitated dialogue with Serbia and Kosovo promoting stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina where Cathy Ashton was personally instrumental in calling off a controversial referendum on the Bosnian state court and prosecutor. In Kosovo we have helped dispense justice and provide stability through the ULEX mission which is handed down over 223 verdicts in a wide range of cases including corruption and organized crime. The European neighborhood, we have fast-tracked EU funds to back our effort to support democracy as well as economic and social development and in particular following an initiative by Cathy Ashton we facilitated the disbursement of additional money from the EIB and the EBOD helping to leverage funds from the private sector. In crisis response, particularly in Haiti but now in the southern neighborhood the EU is acting in a much more joined up way and for the first time we are a single coordinator of much of the activity. I've already mentioned the fight against piracy through a series of actions off the coast of Somalia and on land we've helped secure shipping lanes from the threat of piracy which represents a massive and growing threat to commercial shipping, aid delivery and to the security of eastern and southern Africa. And the Middle Eastern peace process where there is now a much more central role for the EU frankly a radically more active role than I have ever seen in many many years where we are not only a payer but also a player. Others are looking closely at what we are doing and want to follow our approach and this represents a dramatic change. We've also continued to work to support Palestinian state building to the point where they are assessed as having the right institutions in place. We've done important work with the Palestinians and the Israelis to open crossings further and there has been some progress there even if perhaps not enough. And finally, second time lucky the adoption on the 3rd of May of the resolution by the UN General Assembly giving the EU special rights of expression to take into account our new structures was a diplomatic victory. The first time round didn't go so well this time we had 108 votes in favour and I think two abstentions. Once again a huge effort by Kathy Ashton who spent two days in New York at a crucial moment and this shows I think once again there is a capacity to be diplomatic a diplomatic force. So I hope in this you get some idea of the breath of the policy challenges that we face of the fact that I do believe we have made some progress of course on all of these issues you could say yes but you haven't solved the problem this is true. I'm not sure whether diplomacy actually exists completely to solve problems or rather to manage them but I do think that this is a 5 to 10 maybe even 15 year project where the challenge will be to build a professional diplomatic service at the service of the high representative vice president which can deliver on the extent to which member states wish and choose to have common positions and to have common objectives. Of course it's a bit like the dance of Echternacht it's three steps forward two steps back and sometimes the press talks more about three steps back than the three steps forward but for me the direction of travel is absolutely clear and I'm quite certain that if I come back in ten years time for the setting up of the external action service part three we will be astounded by what has been achieved because the global pressures the budgetary pressures on foreign ministries on defense ministries all lead us in the same direction that if we want to be effective and if we want to be cost effective we have to do more and more things together and I believe that the external action service will provide the platform for implementing that increasing political will on the part of our member states so thank you very much and I'd be happy to answer any questions