 Chapter 18 of Hellenic History. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Ryan Fahey, Fairfield, Connecticut. Hellenic History by George Willis Botsford, Chapter 18. The Peloponnesian War to the beginning of the Sicilian Expedition, 431-415. Causes of the War, Conflicting Political Principles. Among the most powerful disintegrating forces referred to at the close of the last chapter was the long war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, begun in 431. From the conclusion of the 30 years truce of 445 to this date, peace had been maintained in spite of an ever-growing antipathy between the two powers. Among the causes of hostility was an Athenian claim to leadership generally considered incompatible with the liberties of individual states and with the long-established policy of Lachidamen. The Athenians asserted that their hegemony had been forced upon them by Sparta's unwillingness to continue the war with Persia. That circumstance is not under their control had converted the Confederacy into an empire, and that, though they had been compelled thus to usurp an authority, they had made good their right to it by a justice and a moderation unparalleled in history. Against this claim, their enemies, particularly the Corinthians, charging Athens with the enslavement of her allies and with the design of reducing other Hellenes to servitude, called upon Lachidamen to take the lead in putting down the tyrant. The Spartans, who for generations had been opposed to despotism, still considered themselves champions of the principle of city sovereignty, and were so regarded by their allies. The feeling of mankind was strongly on the side of the Lachidamonians, for they professed to be the liberators of Hellas. States and individuals were eager to assist them to the utmost, both by word and by deed, for the general indignation against the Athenians was intense. Some were longing to be delivered from them, others fearful of falling under their sway. A conflict of economic interests, Athenian designs upon Megara. A more particular cause of the war lay in a conflict of interests between Athens and individual allies of Lachidamen. An article of the Treaty of 445 had provided for the open door in commerce between the Athenian Empire and Peloponnes. Recently, however, the Athenians, alleging that the Megarians had encroached upon sacred land near the border and had sheltered runaway slaves, retaliated by excluding the offending state from the harbors and markets of the Empire. Megara depended economically upon Athens, whose real object undoubtedly was to force the little Isthmian country into her empire in order to secure harbourage on the Corinthian Gulf. To the commercial class at Athens and to the multitude of urban artisans and laborers, the future prosperity of the city seemed to depend on an enlargement of trade relations with Italy and Sicily. Doubtless Pericles II, who was concerned for the food supply, looked to the harvests of the West to make good any possible shortage of importation from Egypt or the Black Sea. Athenian interests in Corsera and in western Hellas. The same motive led the Athenians to interfere in a war between Corinth and her colony Corsera and to accept an alliance proposed by the latter. Among the arguments for an alliance, the Corsarian ambassadors stated that, besides offering many other advantages, Corsera is conveniently situated for the coast voyage to Italy and Sicily. It stands in the way of any fleet coming from thence to Peloponnes and can also protect a fleet on its way to Sicily. Should Athens succeed in these ambitions, her merchant vessels and her war galleys could save time and risk by sailing from the western shore of Megaris through the Corinthian Gulf to Corsera and thence to southern Italy. The Athenian Commercial Menace to Peloponnes The economic motive to the war had a still wider scope. The rise of Piraeus had destroyed the prosperity of Aegina and was choking the industrial and commercial life of both Megara and Corinth. Athenian supremacy at sea threatened to cut Peloponnes off from the rest of the world. In a Congress of Sparta's allies, deputies from Corinth clearly described this situation. Those among us who have ever had dealings with the Athenians do not require to be warned against them. But such as live inland and not on any maritime highway should clearly understand that, if they do not protect the seaboard, they will not be able to carry their produce to the sea or to receive in exchange the goods which the sea gives to the land. They should not lend a careless ear to our words, for they nearly concern them. They should remember that if they desert the cities on the coast, the danger may someday reach them. Fear of the increasing political power of Athens The real reason for the war, however, asserts Thucydides was not the complaints of allies in Congress, but Sparta's fear of the Athenians and their increasing power. The statement is true in the sense that this was Sparta's motive and that if she had not engaged in the war, either it would not have occurred or would have been carried on by only a few of her allies, and hence would have remained relatively insignificant. Athenian party politics as a cause The attitude of Pericles toward the war may only be inferred from circumstances. The oligarchic opposition, disorganized by the banishment of Thucydides, had recovered strength, but not daring as yet to attack him openly, it assailed his friends and helpers. First his enemies prosecuted Faidius on the charge of having embezzled some of the gold entrusted to him for use on the statue of Athena. Though ready to prove his innocence, he was thrown into prison, where he died while awaiting his trial. Next they prosecuted Aspasia for immoral conduct and impiety, but the tears of Pericles won the judges to a favorable verdict. About the same time, one of his opponents proposed and carried a decree for instituting legal proceedings against all persons who disbelieved in religion and held views of their own regarding the heavenly bodies. As this resolution was aimed at Anaxagoras, Pericles advised the philosopher to avoid trouble by retiring from Athens. Finally, they threatened Pericles himself with prosecution for embezzlement of public funds. Had they succeeded in overthrowing him, they would doubtless have attempted to set up an oligarchy and to return to political dependence on Lacodaman. To avoid this danger, Pericles felt compelled to seek support in the industrial and commercial class, which was determined upon political expansion. At the same time, it appeared to him that sooner or later, a trial of arms with Peloponnes was inevitable. It was better then that it should come while he was still in the prime of life and Athens in excellent military condition. Hence he persuaded his countrymen to oppose every concession to the Peloponnesians. The resources of the opposing powers. Knowing better than any contemporary the resources of Athens and her enemy, Pericles had ground for confidence. A raid against his state were the forces of nearly all Peloponnes, of the Boetian Confederacy under Theban leadership, of lesser allies in the center and west of the peninsula. The enemy could invade Attica with a force of 30,000 heavy infantry, but could not remain long in the country because most of the Peloponnesians were small farmers who personally tilled their lands and because they had to bring their food supplies with them. They could devastate the fields, but could accomplish nothing against the strong fortifications of Athens and Piraeus. The industry and commerce of Athens would continue so long as her fleets commanded the sea. The idea of borrowing from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia for building a Peloponnesian navy, though suggested, proved an idle dream. Against the almost total lack of public funds among the enemy, could be reckoned 6,000 talents stored in the treasuries on the Acropolis and an annual income from tributes and other sources amounting to about a thousand talents. Pericles' plan of conducting the war. The plan of Pericles, therefore, was to bring the entire population of the country with their movable goods into the city and permit the devastation of the fields, for an open battle with the superior force of the enemy could not be risked. Meantime, with his fleet, he would ravage the coasts of Peloponnes and cut off its commerce. Thus, while partially compensating the Athenians for damage to their fields, he would gradually force the enemy to a more favorable peace than that of 445. Gathering of the population into the city. The cold calculating plan of Pericles subjected Athenian nature to an excessive strain, notwithstanding the rapid growth of city economy, the bulk of the population still resided in the country and still depended in large part on farming. They had restored their fields and country houses after the Persian invasion, and through favoring economic conditions, they had developed a prosperity scarcely known in any other Greek country. It is impossible for us to appreciate their fond attachment to their local shrines, whose small gods, they thought, were more sympathetic protectors than the mighty warden of the Acropolis. They gathered perforce behind the walls, where few had houses of their own or hospitable friends. Most had to live in a barrack and outhouse, a hovel, a shed, in nests of the rock where the vultures are bred, in tubs and in huts and in towers of the wall. The first year of the war, 431, the funeral oration. When they heard that a Peloponnesian army was ravaging the country, cutting down orchards and destroying the ripe grain in the fields, they longed to go forth and fight the enemy. Gathering in knots in the streets, they complained bitterly of their plight and laid the whole blame of the war and their losses upon Pericles. The great statesman, who had dispatched a fleet to ravage the Peloponnesian coast, maintained his policy at home in spite of opposition. In the autumn, he persuaded the people to decree a reserve of a thousand talents to be used only in the case of an attack by sea and of a hundred of their best triremes to be ready always for the defense of Piraeus. In his naval operations and in diplomacy he had made real gains and was undoubtedly pleased with the results. After the campaign, the remains of those who had fallen in battle during the summer were solemnly conveyed in procession to the state cemetery in Cerimacus, a beautiful spot outside the walls and interred amid the lamentation of their kin, citizens and medics, women and men. After the burial, Pericles addressed the people in a funeral oration commented on in an earlier chapter. The custom was followed year by year throughout the war. The pestilence, 430 and after. In the second year, there was the usual invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians and the Athenian voyage of desolation along the Peloponnesian coastland. In fact these operations were as a rule repeated during the early period of the war. The season had not far advanced however before a terrible plague beginning in Africa south of Egypt reached Piraeus. As no aqueduct had yet been built to the port town, the inhabitants had to depend upon sister in water and these circumstances aggravated the malady. Soon it passed up between the long walls to Athens. The population of both cities was densely packed. They lacked the necessities of life. There was no sewerage or any efficient sanitation. The victims were seized with fierce internal fevers accompanied by horrible symptoms minutely described in the pages of Thucydides. Ordinarily they died on the seventh or ninth day. To be taken with the pest meant death but those who almost miraculously recovered were thereafter practically immune. As is usual in such calamities this plague called forth the noblest heroism. Physicians and relatives bravely sacrificed their lives in devotion to duty or in love of kin. At the same time it awakened in Athens the most beastly appetites and passions that dwell in depraved human nature. We shall die tomorrow let us yield today to every rabid desire. Fully a third of the population was swept away and those who survived were totally unmanned. The discouragement was all the greater because at the beginning of the war Apollo had promised aid to the foe and the people now attributed the plague to his enmity. The end of Pericles 429. Humbly they sought peace of Sparta but repulsed by her they turned against Pericles as the author of their woes. In spite of all he could say in defense of his policy they suspended him from office and find him. Having thus satisfied their resentment they soon afterward reelected him general with absolute power. He survived the beginning of the war only two years and six months. After his death the people learned his value by better experience. For he had told the Athenians that if they would be patient and would attend to their navy and not seek to enlarge their dominion while the war was going on nor imperil the existence of the city they would be victorious. These words were undoubtedly true. The misfortunes afterward suffered came through deviations from his policy. The silent revolution marked by his death. Thus passed away the only man who stood sufficiently high above all individuals and parties to command universal respect. In his death the eupatrids lost their hold upon the government whose leadership passed to men of the industrial class such as Cleon the Tanner who unable to win the powerful support of the old nobility and of the moderate class had to resort to lower politics and cater to the baser and more brutal desires and instincts of the populace. The revolution thus silently affected was as great as a century long conflict at Rome which opened the consulship to the plebeians and in its immediate consequences far more sweeping for in her war with Peloponnes Athens lost through the death of Pericles centralization of leadership and continuity of policy. The economic burden of the war the details of the various expeditions of the earlier years of the war small defeats and victories the capture or loss of points of vantage have little interest for the student of Greek life. To the majority of the population as explained above the war was a grievous affliction aggravated by the plague which in a less violent form recurred annually for several years. The income of citizens and state was vastly diminished. No land could be tilled beyond the neighborhood of Athens and Piraeus. The work in the mines of Lorium nearly ceased and in spite of the Athenian naval supremacy commerce was hampered by buccaneers and by the squadrons of the enemy. The port dues correspondingly shrank while the delinquencies in the tributes accumulated and the dues from Korea were collected only by military expeditions which sometimes ended in disaster. Whereas the revenues diminished the expenses enormously increased for a time the difference was met by loans from the funds of Athena and of the other gods at the rate of about 800 talents a year. In 428 Lesbos which alone with Chios had remained an independent ally revolted. In the face of this new peril and of the rapid melting away of the reserve the Athenians for the first time in the war resorted to a direct tax for raising 200 talents which was probably repeated during the next two years. Relative to the expenses the sum was slight but it weighed heavily upon unproductive lands and on citizens already loaded down with expensive public services. Longings for peace under these circumstances the feelings of the Athenians toward the war were so mixed as to be difficult of analysis undoubtedly the intellectuals and the land and aristocracy longed for peace. Most farmers of moderate wealth would gladly have received their discharge from hoplite service and be granted the opportunity in peace to re-establish their ruined fields. Rapidly as the growth of their civilization with its humane spirit a love of peace and of her occupations had permeated all classes. In the first year of the war Euripides could address the Athenians as inhabitants of a country preeminently of peace, wisdom, harmony, music, and love. Oh happy the race in the ages olden of Eric theus, the seed of the blessed God's line in a land unravaged, peace enfolden eye quaffing of wisdom's glorious wine. Ever through air clear shining brightly as on wings uplifted, pacing lightly where harmonia they tell of the tresses golden grew sewn by the muses the stainless nine. Militaristic motives the desire of gain however helped keep the war going. Merchants and mechanics expected to suffer little from it and might hope to extend their business through conquests, while the poor found a livelihood in naval service or looked to the enlargement of the empire for increased tributes and a lengthened payroll. Throughout the masses of citizens the patriotic motive was strong and added to it was a thirst for vengeance on the invaders of their fields. In their eyes one who dares to seek of peace is a traitor. Who has dared father Zeus gods of heaven to make a truce who has pledged faith with those who are evermore our foes upon whom war I make for my ruined vineyard's sake and I narrow from the strife will give over. No and I narrow will forbear till I pierce them in return like a reed sharply barbed dagger pointed and they learn not to tread down my vines anymore. The revolt of Lesbos 428 to 427 The years 428 and 427 were made anxious by the revolt of Lesbos. In the mid-summer of the latter year however, after trying every other resource the lesbian oligarchs armed the commoners who lost little time enforcing an unconditional surrender to Athens. Exasperated by the revolt and wishing to strike terror into the hearts of all disaffected allies the Athenians voted to put to death all the grown up citizens of Mitalin and to enslave the women and children. The upholder of this policy of terrorism was Cleon. Immediately repenting however, they gathered again in assembly on the morrow, reversed the cruel sentence and limited the punishment of death to the few most guilty. The lands of the rebels however were confiscated and divided by the Athenian colonists. Winding of the war area and the increase of the tribute. Athens was now in a position to widen the field of her operations. She sent aid to her friends in Sicily and a naval force under Demosthenes seized and held pilos on the western coast of Peloponnes. Of the force sent to its rescue nearly 300 Spartans fell into the hands of the Athenians. Cleon who had brought a reinforcement to Demosthenes during the struggle over pilos reaped the fruit of the victory. He was given a seat of honor in the theater and the lifelong right to dine in the Pratenium. He stood without a rival in the leadership of the state. Under his influence Athens emboldened by her brilliant success increased the tribute of her allies to a nominal total probably of 1,460 talents. A sum considerably greater than the amount actually collected. The volume of money in circulation had greatly expanded, prices had correspondingly risen and the wealth of the allies under the peace of Athens had multiplied. All these circumstances had rendered the increase of the tribute both necessary and relatively just. Other ordinary revenues brought the total income of the imperial city to 1,500 talents. The Athenians themselves were relieved of their burdensome direct taxes and were enabled to increase the pay of their officials and to prosecute the war with greater energy. In vain the conservatives stood against Cleon, the real though not the nominal author of this measure. In vain Aristophanes sought in his comedy of the knights to crush him with ridicule and contempt. Although without military experience he was elected general in the spring of 424 and became more popular and more dominant than ever. The tide turns against Athens 424, a year's truce 423. The Athenians followed up their success at Pelos by seizing other commanding positions along the Peloponnesian coast, but in an attempt to conquer Boetia they were disastrously beaten at Delium. More unfortunate for Athens that Bracetus, Sparta's ablest general, found the weak point in the Athenian empire. The only part assailable by a land army Chalcedes and his Thracian neighborhood. With a small force he stole northward and appearing before Amphipolis persuaded that important city to revolt. These reverses induced the Athenian majority again to think of peace. A truce of one year was followed by a renewal of the war. Before Amphipolis an engagement took place in which both Bracetus and Cleon the chief obstacles to peace were killed. War weiriness Peace of Nisius, 421 Both sides were disappointed with the results of the war. The Peloponnesians had hoped to bring Athens to speedy terms by invading her territory but had accomplished nothing in this direction. And they now saw their coast ravaged, their commerce cut off, and slaves and helots incited to desertion or rebellion by permanent garrisons on their border. In place of the naval supremacy they had hoped to win, they saw their war galleys as well as their merchant ships swept from the seas. Athens too could balance her gains by as heavy losses in life and money. The reserves in the Acropolis were nearly exhausted. The main sources of prosperity had been choked by invasions and the temper of the allies under their double load of taxation was ominous. Under these circumstances the peace party, always strong, gained a majority in the assembly. Their leader was Nisius a man of great wealth and of respectable family. In the spring of 421 he negotiated the peace which bears his name. The joys of peace Although the terms of peace were kept by neither side, the lack of demonians and the Athenians refrained from invading each other's territory for a period of seven years. To most of the Athenians, apart from armorers and others whom war nourished, peace came as a boundless joy. The marketplace overflowed with an unwanted happy life as provisions grew more plentiful and prices dropped. Nisius came with his garlic, salt, and figs while the Theban brought a greater variety of wares small articles of handicraft and the fish and fowl of Lake Copias. The men of Athens welcomed such comers and prayed for a continuance of the prosperity. Moreover we prayed that our marketplace may be furnished each day with a goodly display and for garlic and cucumbers early and rare, pomegranates and apples in heaps to be there and we little coats for our servants to wear and Boescia to send us her pigeons and widgens and her geese and her plovers, the plentiful creels, once more from Copias to journey with eels and for us to be hustling and tussling and bustling with gourmands together besieging the stall to purchase a fish. To the noise of barter was added the hum of Boescian pipes. Theban and now you minstrels that needs would follow us all the way from Thebes blow wind in the tail of your bagpipes, puff away. Athenian, get out what wind has brought him here I wonder a parcel of hornets buzzing about the door you humble bumble drones get out, get out return to the farms the piece of Aristophanes presented at the greater Dionysia of 421 represents the rural party as even more delighted with the new conditions they had suffered long from the war loving demagogues and from the military officers who had treated them with far less favor than the city folk but now, released from service on the fleet and from constant military drill at the Lyceum they promised to be milder and more yielding as jurors while they return with youthful zest to repairing their country homes farmer, oh yes, oh yes the farmers all may go back to their homes, farm implements and all, you can leave your darts behind you, yay, for sword and spear shall cease all things all around are teeming with the mellow gifts of peace shout your peyons march away to labor in your fields today, chorus farmers, day most welcome to the farmers and to all the just and true I see you, I am eager once again my vines to view and the fig trees which I planted in my boyhood's early prime I would feign salute and visit after such a weary time farmer, yes, by Zeus the well armed maddock seems to sparkle as we gaze and the burnished pitchforks glitter in the sun's delighted rays very famously with those will they clear the vineyard rose but I myself am eager homeward to my farm to go breaking up the little furrows long neglected with the hoe rural pleasures and recreations it was not merely to hard labor in the fields that the rustics trooped away on the signing of the treaty but also to rural pleasures for the farmer was a Greek with the Greek view of life in the midst of labors he found at homely festivals in the gathering of friends to a simple meal in his house rest from fatigues and an invigoration to future effort ah, there's nothing half so sweet as when the seed is in the ground God, a gracious rain is sending and a neighbor saunters round oh, comarquedes he hails me how shall we enjoy the hours drinking seems to suit my fancy what with these benignant showers therefore let three quarts my mistress of your kidney beans be fried mix them nicely up with barley and your choicest figs provide Sira, run and shout to manes call him in without delay to his no time to stand and dawdle pruning out the vines today nor to break the clods about them now the ground is soaking through bring me out from home the field fair bring me out the siskins too then there ought to be some beastings four good plates of hair besides ha, unless the cat proloined them yesterday at even tide so I'm going to bring them yesterday at even tide something scuffled in the pantry something made a noise in fuss if you find them, once for father bring the other three to us ask aiskinates to send us myrtle branches green and strong bid kerinates attend us shouting as you pass along then we'll sit and drink together god the while refreshing blessing all the labors of our hands peace forever about the same time euripides expresses the wish that the short span of human life be free henceforth from the harsh toils of war hapless mortals why do ye get you spears and deal out death to fellow men stay from such toils for bear and peaceful mid the peaceful ward your towns short is life span behooves to pass through this softly as may be not with travail torn rise of alcibides renewal of hostilities however desirable the peace the lackadamonians could not compel their allies to fulfill the terms for her own security therefore sparta entered into a close defensive union with Athens the peloponnesian league dissolved ellis and mantania joined the argives here upon Athens breaking her treaty with lackadamon sent a force to the aid of argos the new policy of Athens was due to alcibides nephew of pericles handsome, brilliant and daring this young man had been headed and spoiled by kinsfolk and fellow citizens he deported himself in reckless violation of law and custom saturated in sophisticated instruction he recognized no principle but self seeking experience in campaigning and personal fascination gave him 420 the general ship which he used in rehabilitating the war party for he hoped by war would advance his own interest under other commanders the allied forces were disastrously beaten at mantania 418 by the lackadamonians who there upon restored their league in peloponnes made a new treaty with argos and left Athens isolated political machinations at Athens ostracism of hyperbolus 417 the whole enterprise was a serious blow to the cause the defeat robbed Athens of her advantageous position and should have meant the overthrow of the young politician who was chiefly responsible for it with this understanding of the situation nisius who had stood consistently for peace now hoped to overthrow alcibides by a vote of ostracism there was however a third party to the political struggle hyperbolus the lamp maker who with no knowledge of military affairs had risen from the industrial class to the leadership of those Athenians who looked to war for gain sophistic training had made him an orator and as cleon's successor though evidently inferior in ability he dreamed of conquering sicily and even of a sailing carthage it was probably fear of overthrow that led alcibides to suggest nisius the advisability of joining forces to rid themselves of a man who was so hateful to both the result was the ostracism of hyperbolus 417 increased stability of the state milder political warfare it was the last use of this institution ancient writers suppose that ostracism was discredited by being applied to so worthless a character probably however the Athenians felt that it had been misused in the banishment of a man who did not endanger the state and certainly it was now exceedingly difficult to bring together 6000 persons in the assembly furthermore the state was at length too secure to be readily endangered by an individual and statesman found in the writ against illegality a sufficient though milder weapon for a sailing opponents these we may assume to be the chief grounds for the discontinuance of ostracism revival of the war spirit massacre of the millions 416 the event increased the importance of alcibides whose war policy continually grew in favor with the Athenians under his influence they besieged and captured the island of Milos a Lacedaemonian colony as all Aegean lands were necessarily protected by Athens there was a certain degree of justice in the policy of compelling all to pay a share of the tribute the conquerors however put to death the grown men who enslaved the women and children this abnegation of human kindness this resort to brute force though practiced also by the Peloponnesians aroused universal hatred and fear and gave to enemies a certain justification for the overthrow of Athens which in spite of such blots remain the most humane state in the ancient world End of Chapter 8 Chapter 19 of Hellenic History This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Ryan Fahey Fairfield Connecticut Hellenic History by George Willis Botsford Chapter 19 The Sicilian Expedition and the last years of the war Part 1 Italy and Sicily before the expedition 474-415 Italy after 474 Meantime events were happening in Italy and Sicily which affected the destiny of the Hellenic race the great naval battle off Kumai marks the beginning of the decline of the Etruscans their devotion to luxury their lack of a strong central authority and after no long time the aggressions of the barbarous Gauls brought political stagnation and finally decay Rome and the Latins however receptive of Hellenic culture however martial in spirit and in organization remained more than a century too weak for an imperial policy meanwhile it was left to the Sibelians a numerous virile people of the interior to succeed the Etruscans as the dominant power. Sibelians and Greeks their aggressive movements were caused by overpopulation in the latter half of the 5th century they poured down into the fertile district about the bay of Naples they seized Etruscan Capua 438 then Hellenic Kumai 421 and with the exception of Naples the whole region henceforth known as Campania the conquest by no means rested here farther south the territory about the Gulf of Celerno fell into their hands Poseidonia the seat of a beautiful temple to Poseidon among the captive cities about 400 its inhabitants forgot their native speech and adopted the institutions and habits of the conquerors once a year however they held a Hellenic festival in which they recalled their ancient speech and customs and wept over the loss of them in this region Elia alone a small state yet organized for defense by her philosophers maintained her independence the Sibelians who had thus advanced into southern Italy were grouped in one powerful tribe or federation of tribes known as the Lucanians at this time they were the strongest and most aggressive people of the peninsula most of the Greek cities which remained free formed a close defensive alliance against them these states were in general highly prosperous the Sibelians adopted from them their useful arts, their armor and even the Pythagorean philosophy prosperity of Hellenic Sicily after 474 Sicily too had wars with the natives of the interior but they were less formidable and gradually yielded to the political supremacy as well as to the culture of Hellas the republics had their internal struggles with demagogues of tyrannic aspiration or with the rising oculocracy but these troubles were little hindrance to their material and intellectual prosperity the Sicilians traded with the mother country with Latium and far more extensively with Carthage increasing wealth brought the citizens comforts unknown to the motherland fine soft garments gold and silver plate expensive furniture including especially luxurious beds and sofas at Syracuse the art of cookery reached a high degree of perfection the most to do road and comfortable carriages while the richest men of Athens journeyed on foot or at the best mounted saddle mules the people of Acragas were building a magnificent temple to Zeus those of Salinas a still greater temple to Apollo second only to that of the Ephesian Artemis within the Hellenic world and their luxuries in the magnificence of their buildings in the soft sensuousness of their fine arts they departed widely from the Hellenic precept of self restraint to assume a character and follow a career of their own Syracuse and ambition and Athenian interference the intellectual progress of the Sicilians their contribution to philosophy and rhetoric has been mentioned in another connection we have also considered the commercial relations of Athens with Italy and Sicily leading to treaties with individual cities this political interference was promoted by the growth of Syracuse in power and in ambition she built a great fleet increased her military force and with the sympathy of her Doric neighbors she began a policy of aggression against Leontini and other near lying Chelsitic cities early in the Peloponnesian war Leontini sent an embassy headed by the famous rhetorician Gorgias native of that city to Athens where his rhythmic rose entranced the Athenians who never before had heard such musical discourse they sent small aid which accomplished little 427 part two the expedition 415 to 413 the Athenians decree an expedition to Sicily 415 the triumphant rise of alcibides however meant a resumption of the policy of conquest and nowhere opened so fair a field as Sicily Sigesta a native city in alliance with Athens asked protection against Salinas and promised to pay the expenses of an expedition this was the pretext for an invasion of Sicily Nisius strenuously opposed the undertaking his contention was that Athens needed all her strength for restoring and maintaining her empire and for her own defense against Thebes and Peloponnes furthermore even if Sicily could be conquered it would be impossible to hold that great island in subjection against the judgment of Nisius alcibides persuaded the Athenians to send a fleet of 134 triremes conveying a force of 5000 heavy infantry the commanders were Nisius, Alcibides and Lamecus the last named was a splendid old fighter who had learned warfare in the school of Pericles the magnificent fleet on the fleet the greatest pains and expense had been lavished by the triarchs and the state the public treasury gave a drachma a day to each sailor and furnished empty hulls for 60 swift sailing vessels and for 40 transports carrying hoplites all these ships were manned with the best crews which could be obtained the triarchs besides the pay and by the state added somewhat more from their own means to the wages of the upper ranks of rowers and of the petty officers the figureheads and other fittings provided by them were of the most costly description everyone strove to the utmost that his own ship might excel both in beauty and swiftness the infantry had been well selected and the lists carefully made up there was the keenest rivalry among the soldiers in the matter of terms and personal equipment while at home the Athenians were thus competing with one another in the performance of their several duties to the rest of Helas the expedition seemed to be a grand display of their power and greatness rather than a preparation for war if anyone had reckoned up the whole expenditure of one the state two individual soldiers and others including in the first not only what the city had already laid out but what was entrusted to the generals and in the second what either at the time or afterward private persons spent upon their outfit or the tri-rarks upon their ships the provision for the long voyage which everyone may be supposed to have carried with him over and above his public pay and what soldiers or traders may have taken for purposes of exchange he would have found that altogether an immense sum amounting to many talents was withdrawn from the city men were quite amazed at the boldness of the scheme and the magnificence of the spectacle which were everywhere spoken of no less than at the great disproportion of the force when compared with that of the enemy against whom it was intended never had a greater expedition been sent to a foreign land never was there an enterprise in which the hope of future success seemed to be better justified by actual power mutilation of the Hermae 415 sometime before the departure of the expedition the Athenians were horrified one morning to find that the Hermae in front of their doors had all been mutilated these were square stone pillars ending at the top in the head of Hermes or of some other god and were highly venerated as the guardians of peace and public order the people were seized with terror lest as a step toward democracy a band of conspirators might thus have attempted to deprive the city of her divine protectors in a panic the citizens assembled on the pinnicks and voted immunity and rewards to any who should inform against the perpetrators on the mutilation of the Hermae there was no disclosure probably it was the act of young men in a drunken frolic informers revealed the fact however that certain persons among them alcibites had profaned the Elusinian mysteries by parodying them at private gatherings in the presence of the uninitiated democratic politicians opposed to alcibites schemed to bring him to trial for the sacrilege but appreciating his popularity with the soldiers and sailors they delayed the prosecution till the armament had sailed away the incident proves that in spite of all progress and culture the Athenian masses were as devoted as ever to the traditional religion condemnation and escape of alcibites 415 after the departure of the fleet the enemies of alcibites resumed their agitation against him an indictment for sacrilege was drawn up against him by Thessalus son of Kimon and the salaminia an official trireme sailed to Sicily to order his return on the homeward voyage he made his escape to Peloponnes and finally took up his residence at Sparta there his councils proved most potent for the overthrow of his country the Athenians in Sicily 415-414 meanwhile the Athenian commanders disagreeing as to plan frittered away nearly a year in petty undertakings wasting their resources dispiriting their own men and exciting contempt in the minds of the Sicilian Greeks in the following year they besieged Syracuse 414 but Lamechus was killed and Nysius proved wholly incompetent for vigorous offensive when autumn came the besiegers were in wretched plight and Nysius having made no appreciable headway would gladly have abandoned the siege but dare not face the Athenians in assembly when however they received his report which detailed the condition of the armament and asked that it be recalled and forced the assembly far from abandoning the enterprise voted heavy reinforcements renewal of the war in Greece second expedition to Sicily 413 Peloponnesians and Boetians resumed the war and invaded Attica in the spring of 413 on the suggestion of Alcibides they established a permanent garrison at Decalea in northern Attica as a result the Athenians gave up their homes and the farms and vineyards which they loved and withdrew permanently into the city thousands of slaves deserted to the enemy industry and commerce shrank and the people were soon cramped with want in spite of all these misfortunes and of even greater dangers impending they sent to Syracuse another great armament of 73 triremes with 5000 heavy infantry on board under the command of Demosthenes their ableist general the persistence of the Athenians in their plan of conquest and their energy in mustering for it all available resources in the midst of dangers at home are marvelous disaster 413 on his arrival at Syracuse Demosthenes found the besiegers in a miserable condition they had lost a naval battle in the harbor and this failure together with sickness and the want of material efforts had robbed them of all courage the only hope was an immediate success the strenuous offensive of Demosthenes however utterly failed and when he proposed to embark the army and sail away an eclipse of the moon delayed the superstitious Nisius meanwhile the Syracuseans again defeated the Athenian fleet after which they blocked the mouth of the harbor nothing remained to the besiegers but a retreat by land after great suffering and loss the two divisions of the retreating army led by Demosthenes and Nisius respectively were hemmed in and compelled to surrender many were taken by individual Syracuseans and privately sold into slavery the two generals were put to death the public prisoners amounting to more than 7000 Athenians and allies were imprisoned in stone quarries packed together with their wounded and their dead in a cramped place with no shelter from the rain or burning sun with insufficient food and water they suffered untold agony after 10 weeks the miserable survivors were rescued from these horrors to be sold as slaves nothing was saved from the two glorious fleets that had sailed from Piraeus and of the many who went forth few returned home a crisis in Hellenic history it was a crisis in Hellenic history the Athenians had had it in their means with wise management to build up a lasting power the strongest in Hellas to win recognition of their political leadership for many or all the other Greeks and to lift their race to a political destiny worthy of its civilization all these possibilities they sacrificed to a scheme of conquest ill conceived and managed with obstinate folly as a far off result of their failure the political supremacy of the world was to pass to a people who lacked the Hellenic refinement and brain power but who practically showed greater respect for the rights of others part 3, the last years of the war feelings of the Athenians a new system of taxation 412 for a time the Athenians at home could not believe that a disaster so great had befallen them they came to appreciate the truth they vented their rage upon the orators and the soothsayers who had persuaded them to the expedition at first they were dejected by the utter hopelessness of the situation their want of men money and ships but soon their elastic spirits rose and they determined to persist against all odds to increase their revenue to the uttermost without seeming to add new burdens to their allies they placed all tributes by a customs duty of 5% on imports and exports throughout the empire this system remained to the end of the war a universal coalition against Athens the Hellenes eagerly flocked to the Lacodemonian standard in the hope soon of trampling upon the common foe the Persian king on condition of recovering the greek cities of Asia Minor gave money and promised the aid the maritime allies began to revolt against Athens and the victorious navy of Syracuse appeared in Aegean waters but the persistence of the Athenians stripped of resources against these overwhelming odds during a period of 8 years is evidence of an almost indomitable will democracy curbed the Promuli 412-411 the Sicilian disaster had a serious effect on Athenian politics there had always been a strong minority opposed to popular government recent misfortunes strengthened their hands by seemingly proving the worthlessness of democracy and for the time being the majority recognized the need of a modification of the constitution the most crying demand was for a responsible majesty the people accordingly instituted a board of 10 Promuli committee of public safety to be filled by mature men they were to take the place of the Pertanius in initiating administrative measures to control finance and to attend to the building and the equipment of the navy this wholesome reform was largely stultified by the choice of elderly men like the poet Sophocles who lacked resolution and energy an oligarchic plot in the army 411 the first decisive step toward abolishing the democracy however was taken by an oligarchic club of officers in the army then encamped in Samoes their leading motive was to secure for themselves the place in the government to which in their opinion their rank entitled them at the same time they were receiving overtures from Elcibides it chanced that having fallen out with Aegis king of Lackadamen he had passed over to the Persians and was now plotting his return to Athens with no hope of a recall through the democracy he promised the Athenians at Samoes that if they should set up an oligarchy Tissafernes Satrap of Sardis would transfer the Persian support from Lackadamen to Athens though groundless the promise had its effect oligarchic plottings in Athens Pizander and other envoys from the club at Samoes repaired to Athens and against a storm of indignation proposed an oligarchy with a view chiefly to winning favor at the same time he joined with Antiphon a legal advisor the brain of the impending revolution in organizing the oligarchic clubs which had existed in Athens from immemorial time it was their policy to intimidate the multitude by assassinating their leaders establishment of an oligarchy of the 400 411 in a visit to Elcibides that the Wiley exile had merely been tricking him with promises nevertheless on his return to Athens he proceeded with the establishment of an oligarchy terrorized by assassinations the citizens permitted the institution of a council of 400 who should appoint officials and conduct the administration with absolute power as a sop to the moderates this form of government was termed provisional and there was proposed a definitive constitution under which the sovereignty was to be held by the 5000 wealthiest citizens organized in 4 great councils rotating annually some features of this constitution were borrowed from Boetia it is a noteworthy fact that the leaders of the oligarchic movement were neither eupatrids nor experienced politicians they were educated men who having learned their politics in the schools of the Sophists were now engaged in political experimentation normally the Athenian constitution was an aggregate of traditional customs modified by written laws now for the first time as could be expected of Sophists it was a document both the provisional and definitive constitutions were written the leading oligarchs intended by deferring the call for the 5000 to keep the 400 permanently in power a commendable feature of the new system was the abolition of all pay for civil services except to the 9 archons and the pertenius for the time being and the devotion of the entire revenue to the war the rule of the 400 al-Sabaidi's recalled 411 the 400 proved unprincipled, unpatriotic and incompetent they could maintain themselves in no other way than by terrorism and secret murder they offered to buy peace of laconamen at any price and their weakness lost to Euboea to the enemy no sooner had their position grown insecure than they split into two factions the extremists were led by Antiphon, Pizander and one or two others the moderates followed theremenes who had been largely instrumental in establishing the 400 but whose ideal was a limitation of the franchise to those who could equip themselves for service in the heavy infantry his faction was supported by the troops at Samos who having overthrown their oligarchic leaders elected Thracibolis an able and undoubted patriot to the general ship recalled al-Sabaidi's and placed him in chief command a democrat once more al-Sabaidi stood ready to devote his extraordinary talents to repairing the havoc he had wrought in his country's fortunes these circumstances emboldened theremenes and the moderates to overthrow the 400 after its rule of 4 months and to establish in power nominally the 5,000 in reality all above the thetic census command of al-Sabaidi's 411-407 battle off Saizikus 410 under the weak rule of the 400 the war which hitherto had been limited to the Aegean extended to the al-Hispanic allies of Athens thus her resources were further lessened in that quarter however al-Sabaidi's gained a brilliant victory over the enemy of Saizikus their entire fleet was taken or destroyed and Minderis their commander was killed a dispatch sent by the second in command but intercepted on its way to Sparta read ships gone, Minderis dead the men starving at her wits end what to do the Spartans now offered peace on the basis of the status quo but the Athenians led by Cleophon the lyre maker rejected the terms it proved to be a great mistake but they were unduly elated by the victory and by their hope in al-Sabaidi's complete restoration of the democracy 410 it was doubtless under the impression of the victory that the Athenians restored the complete democracy and required every citizen to take a solemn oath to support it about the same time they appointed a commission to revise various public and criminal laws and to inscribe them among the products of their labor we have preserved a mutilated inscription of Draco's laws of homicide in a still more fragmentary statute for defining the judicial competence of the 500 and of the assembly about the same time as the revenues were increasing the Athenians reintroduced pay for official service and began to celebrate the festivals with the old splendor in spite of the fact that the soldiers and sailors in default of pay had often to plunder the allies the extreme want of the poor in the city verging upon starvation led to the distribution of two obels daily among the most needy the revenue however soon dwindled and poverty increased Cyrus and Lysander at the seat of war 408 the temporary success of Athens was partly due to the vacillation and rivalry of the satraps the phoenix of sardis and pharnabasis of the helispontic region in 408 Darius sent Cyrus the younger of his two sons to take the satrapy of sardis with large powers in order to give all possible aid to the Peloponnesians the young man brought great ambition and unusual intelligence to the work in the same year there came from Sparta to the seat of war Lysander an able commander and a manager of men his ultimate object was nothing less than a throne at Sparta to reach the goal of his political hope he needed military renown and an army devoted to himself in brief he was the spartan counterpart of alcibides Cyrus readily fell under his influence battle off notium 407 retirement of alcibides in the following year Lysander defeated Athenian fleet off notium during the absence of alcibides his lieutenant Antiochus had ventured battle contrary to orders and lost 15 ships of war it was a mortal blow to the ascendancy of alcibides forgetting his uniformed success against overwhelming foes during the past four years the Athenians misled by his enemies defeated his candidacy for the following year fearing to return home he retired to the castles on the helispont and propontus which he had prepared against such a contingency and from which he quietly reviewed the further operations of the war the battle of Argonousae 406 both parties put forth herchelion efforts in the hope of deciding the struggle in one more campaign calicretidus supplanting Lysander commanded 120 ships the Athenians under eight generals met him with 150 triremes near the islands of Argonousae in no other naval battle between Greeks were so many ships and men engaged it was a complete victory for Athens 70 vessels of the Peloponnesians with their crews amounting to 14,000 men and including their commander were lost the Athenians lost 25 ships with at least 2,000 sailors held of rescue because of a storm in grief and indignation over the death of so many kinsmen and fellow citizens the Athenians at home deposed the commanders from office and brought to trial before the assembly the six who ventured to return to the city in violation of the constitution they by a single vote condemned the accused to death among these victims of popular fury was Pericles the son of Pericles battle of Aegos Potami 405 after another vain effort to negotiate peace with Athens Lacodamon again sent Lysander to the seat of war and the Athenians dispatched against him their last possible fleet manned with their last available crews 180 Athenian ships confronted 200 of the Peloponnesians in the helispont the Athenian fleet stationed on the european side at the mouth of the Aegos Potami river was taken by surprise while the crews were searching for provisions on shore possibly one or more of their generals betrayed the fleet into Lysander's hands at all events it was for him a bloodless victory the Athenian prisoners were massacred Conan one of the generals escaped to Cyprus with 8 ships having sent the official Trireme Paralus to Piraeus with the sad news the Athenians received the news it was night when the Paralus reached Athens with her evil tidings on receipt of which a bitter wail of woe broke forth from Piraeus following the line of the long walls up to the heart of the city it swept and swelled as each man to his neighbor passed on the news on that night no man slept there was mourning and sorrow for those that were lost but the lamentation for the dead was merged in even deeper sorrow as they pictured the evils they were about to suffer the like of which they had themselves inflicted on the Melians who were colonists of the Lachidamonians when they mastered them by siege or on the men of Histiaea on Scyonia and Tyrone on the Aegonetans and on many other Hellenes exhaustion of Athens measures of desperation the resolution passed next day to put the city in condition to endure a siege could not long avail for Athens had no ships men or money with which to resist all her remaining allies revolted accepting Sammos to whom in gratitude she granted her citizenship had this spirit of liberty been adopted at the beginning of the war the result would have been far different no prudence now however could rescue the city from her enemies arriving with his fleet Lysander blockaded the ports while Aegis closely invested the city by land even then no one dared speak of submission while negotiations for peace involved some hope of fair terms peace 404 in a Peloponnesian congress many allies led by Corinthians and Thebans proposed to blot Athens out of existence and to enslave her citizens the Lachidamonians replied that they would never reduce to slavery a city which was itself an integral part of Greece and had performed a great and noble service to Helos in the most perilous of emergencies the Lachidamonians were probably actuated too by the desire to maintain in central Greece a counter poise to Thebes whose self-aggrandizement had for some time been exciting their suspicion in accordance with the views of Sparta the following terms of peace were proposed that the long walls and the fortifications of Piraeus should be destroyed that the Athenian fleet with the exception of 12 ships should be surrendered that the exiles should be restored and lastly that the Athenians should acknowledge the headship of Lachidamon in peace and war leaving to her the choice of friends and foes and following her lead by land and sea necessarily Athens accepted the terms and were starving and from her position as the first power in Helos she sank to a second rate dependency of Sparta End of Chapter 19