 Good morning, everyone, and thank you very much for being here. In a moment, we will commence proceedings. You've already heard the reminder to keep your phones on silent. I'm Rory Medcalf, the head of the National Security College. And at today's event, we'll hear in a moment from our special distinguished visitor from Senator Wong. But just to remind that not only will the event be live streamed, there will be opportunity for a question and answer session towards the end of the event. So please have questions for the senator. And I'm looking in particular at some of the ANU students in the audience. We will invite the senator in a moment to speak from the podium here. And then we'll conduct the Q&A from the chairs over there. So at this point, I'm going to welcome the vice-chancellor of ANU, Professor Brian Schmidt, to begin proceedings. Please, Brian. Thank you, Rory, and thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for coming out today. Before we start, I'd like to acknowledge and celebrate the first Australians on whose traditional lands we're meeting today. Pay my respects to elders past and president of the Ngunnawal Nambri people. Welcome again, everyone, to a timely speech on expanding Australia's power and influence delivered by Senator the Honorable Penny Wong. And Senator Wong, thank you for making time to join us across the lake. I would also like to welcome our distinguished guests this morning, including colleagues from throughout the Commonwealth Government, ambassadors, high commissioners, members of the diplomatic corps, fellow academics, and of course some of our students as well. The issues we are going to hear about are plainly important. Australia's interest, foreign policy, and national security in a very difficult international environment. Providing a platform for speeches like this is at the very heart of our university's national mission to serve society underscored in our strategic plan and our compact, as indicated in the ANU Act as Australia's only Commonwealth University. The university is proud of its commitment, evidence-based, nonpartisan, to enhancing the quality of Australia's policy debate across the key issues for the nation's future. And this is very much at the core of work of the National Security College. The college led by Rory Metcalfe is entrusted by the Commonwealth Government as a strategic joint initiative with ANU to lift capabilities and contest ideas across the national security and policy workforce. Despite the challenges of operating under COVID-19 restrictions, the National Security College has quietly gone on with its core business. It has won on its redesigned master of national security policy degree. And its constant program of executive education courses are building the skills and knowledge that government agencies tell us that they need and want. The college has done much to support the national conversation on security challenges of these difficult times. Last year, we hosted Foreign Minister Senator Maurice Payne for a major speech and our national security podcast series provides in-depth perspectives from parliamentarians, policymakers, and experts. Meanwhile, in its research, the National Security College's QuadTech Network series did much to frame the agenda for the Quad Summit at the White House in September. It hardly needs saying that Australia, the Indo-Pacific, and the world face a new landscape of risk from threats to a rules-based order to social cohesion to a great power rivalry, economic pressure, the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the overarching impacts of climate change. We live in new times. Wherever you stand on these issues, the need for a national conversation is clear. So we look forward to the insights of our guest speaker, Senator the Honorable Penny Wong. Senator Wong is Senator for South Australia, leader of the opposition in the Senate and shadow minister for foreign affairs. Penny was born in Malaysia, and as an eight-year-old, she moved to Australia with her family, graduated in law and arts from the University of Adelaide, and before entering politics, she worked for a union as ministerial advisor in the New South Wales labor government and as a lawyer. Penny was elected to the Senate in 2001. She was minister for climate change and water from 2007 to 2010, then minister for finance and deregulation in 2013. I'm very much looking to your speech, Penny, and please all join me in welcoming Senator Penny Wong to take the floor. Thank you very much for that introduction, Brian, and thank you for all that you do. You really are an extraordinary Australian, and we appreciate your contribution. Can I also acknowledge the traditional owners of this land, the Ngunnawal and Nambri peoples? Can I acknowledge Rory and his colleagues and acknowledge and recognise the contribution to not just national security, but the broader discussion and debate about how we chart the course in the times that Brian has outlined that Rory and the college make? Can I acknowledge members of the diplomatic corps who have been kind enough to attend a speech by a shadow foreign minister? That's very, your courtesy is noted. So the purpose of Australian foreign policy is where I wish to start. The purpose of Australian foreign policy is to advance Australian interests and values, to ensure our security, our economic strength, and to shape the world for the better. We must build the region and the world we want, one that is prosperous, peaceful, and in which sovereignty is respected. We must expand the choices and options available to us to enable management of differences without escalation to conflict. And we should act to generate and preserve global public goods that give form to our values and which benefit all nations, including our own. And to succeed in this, we must expand Australia's power and influence. This has seldom mattered more. We live in a time of great uncertainty. Many of Australia's challenges are without precedent. We haven't known such a vexing convergence of circumstances since the end of the Second World War. Rising nationalism, fraying multilateralism, great power competition, emerging COVID strains, an ever-warming planet, and a more assertive China. We must face this reality. Our region is being reshaped. And this generation of political leaders has a responsibility in this reshaping to protect Australian interests today and in the decades ahead, to assure opportunities for the next generation as good as those created for us by the last. Our interests won't be advanced simply by a series of individual deals and transactions. Rather, the features, the architecture, and the attributes of our region and of the international system itself are being contested. We're in a contest, a race, you might say, for influence. Maximising our influence means we need to use all the tools we have. Military capability matters. And when I say military capability, I mean actual real capability, not announcements. But we need more than that. We need to deploy all aspects of state power, strategic, diplomatic, social, economic. The expansion of Australia's power and influence is grounded in a growing resilient economy. So much of our wealth comes from the markets to which we export. But increasing resilience is not just about more diverse markets as important as that is. The world's demands are changing and what we offer will need to change with it in order to maintain our economic strength. This is why it is in Australia's interests that we reinforce our economy's resilience by becoming a renewable energy superpower. And it's why we must have a future made in Australia, shoring up our resilience to supply chain failures and other economic shocks. But my focus today is how we need to better understand and better give effect to the role of foreign policy. Foreign policy must work with other elements of state power to succeed. In this, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Chief of the Defence Force, General Angus Campbell, has observed that the ADF as an instrument of hard power is best at shaping our environment and deterring behavior that is countered to our interests. When it partners with all the other elements of national power and in particular with our diplomatic service, our presence on an enduring basis out in the world. It is not a question of separating hard power to deter conflict and soft power to do nice things. Because most of the challenges that our region faces for short of kinetic military conflict, many of them fall in the gray zone. The example most resonant for Australians will be trade, increasingly a vector for geostrategic competition. Economic coercion and cyber intrusions are being deployed to pursue strategic outcomes and undermine agreed rules. And not far from us, the flouting of norms for exploitation of natural resources including energy, water and fish stocks risks livelihoods and regional stability. These are threats that can't be deterred by military might alone. Indeed, as the CDF says, the best way to confound, to respond or to undermine those kind of behaviors is to be a force and an influence for cooperation of capacity building and of common interest in the region. So foreign policy is not merely a stage for photo ops but a critical tool in delivering our national security. I would also say that it is a disturbingly underutilized tool if we are seeking to promote and protect our interests and values. There are three drivers for expanding our power and influence that will be central to Labor's foreign policy that I want to discuss with you today. The first is projecting modern Australia to the region and the world. The second is fostering genuine partnerships grounded in trust. And the third is enhancing our capability in navigating international relations including in the gray zone. Foreign policy starts with who we are. And we should understand what we project to the world about who we are is an element of national power. For generations Australians have been advantaged across all of our international endeavors by reputation for being straight shooters who pull our weight. That reputation has taken a hit thanks to recent behavior by the Prime Minister that hit the Australian people do not deserve. But beyond that traditional reputation we should also consider what is the broader story that we are telling the world about today's Australia. How we articulate modern Australia can constrain or amplify our influence from a business seeking new markets to the promotion of our national interests in a time of geo-strategic competition. There is vast untapped power in modern Australia. The world is multicultural so is Australia. Home to the world's oldest continuing cultures. 270 ancestries represented. One quarter of Australians born overseas and half of Australians having a parent born overseas. This gives us the capacity to reach into every corner of the world and say we share common ground. It is a natural asset for building alignment that we are not deploying. Conversely, expressing who we are in narrow and exclusionary terms can inhibit the potential for alignment and it can diminish the cohesion of the Australian community. Recall Tony Abbott's championing of the Anglosphere. Consider how that was received in the region and heard at home. Recall Eric Abbott's demanding Chinese Australians denounce the CPC in a Senate hearing not a demand made of any witness who wasn't Asian. And recall that our foreign minister was invited to rebuke Senator Abbott's but despite her responsibility to portray Australia to the region she declined to show any such leadership. Narratives matter as do perceptions. As we strive for maximum influence we need to understand this and we need to understand how our past attitudes and policy on race can provide others with the opportunity to promote narratives that limit our influence. We can counter that in part by articulating who we are place and our shared stake in the region. And that includes placing the experiences of First Nations peoples. This lands first diplomats at the heart of our diplomacy. Drawing on our vibrant multiculturalism we can ground a narrative which enables the possibilities of greater alignment with others and we can also strengthen our social cohesion which is in itself the foundation of our sovereignty. We can express our values and demonstrate our interests. And we need to seize this advantage to tap into the power of modern Australia to create common ground and to give us greater space to engage and to build alignment. Alignment matters because it is the basis of partnership and partnerships are the second way we will drive an expansion of national influence. As a substantial power but not a superpower it has always been critical for Australia to work with others to achieve our aims. And given the proliferation of challenges we face and the dynamics of great power competition that need just keeps growing. Creative middle power diplomacy is what Australia used to be known for because partnerships multiply our influence. But a partnership isn't just a vehicle for a grip and grin photo op stage before a stockade of flags nor is it simply a transaction. Durable and effective partnerships demand an alignment of interests. The more aligned the more powerful. But a few key things about alignment it isn't a static concept. It needs work to generate, to sustain and to develop. Australia needs stronger partnerships in the region if we are to shape it in our interests. And these should be based on alignment enabled by first a deep and detailed understanding of others perspectives and interests. Second a compelling articulation of what is or what can be shared. Third identifying and creating opportunities for collaboration. And fourth demonstrating authenticity and trustworthiness. It is now beyond doubt that authenticity and trustworthiness are not qualities that are possessed by Mr Morrison. But notwithstanding that it's clear the partnerships that need the most work are in our region. Much more effort is needed to address our shared challenges in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. And we need to treat Southeast Asia as the priority it is. Starting with more support for the pandemic recovery and boosting the vaccine rollout. The Prime Minister's announcements of 60 million vaccines by the end of 2022 is a start. But clearly won't be enough to ensure full coverage and boosters for those who need it or to strengthen frontline health systems in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. The government needs to ensure sufficient domestic manufacturing capability to deliver for ongoing vaccine needs in the region. Mr Morrison's short-term focus on temporary and targeted assistance is easily interpreted as piecemeal and uncommitted, especially given the government short-sighted decision to cut health assistance to Indonesia by 80% prior to the pandemic. And we must also address the emerging pandemic that is climate change. Calls over years from Pacific leaders for Australia to do the right thing on climate have been stubbornly ignored. Pacific leaders and Australians have come to the same conclusion. We are led by a government that isn't serious about climate change and never will be. And for proof, if more is needed, just look to the fact that before the ambassador for the environment's ink was dry on the communique, calling for greater ambition in 2030 targets, Senator Payne had disavowed it. As Julie Bishop said on Friday, this unreliable behaviour gives rise to a lack of trust in our diplomatic efforts and she went on to say our reputation is absolutely vital for the broader national interest. It's clear that a credible Pacific step up will only happen under an Albanese Labor government, a government that recognises the existential national security and economic threat climate change presents to all, particularly our Pacific friends. And Labor understands this is essential to being a trusted partner of choice, to match our strategic ambitions and to build the region we want. One that is prosperous, stable and in which sovereignty is respected. And we will have more to say on these priorities in the coming months. Finally, the third driver is capability. Australia's ability to influence the reshaping of our region is highly dependent on the capability of our foreign service. And this capability goes to both comprehending the scale and features of the external environment and the ability to identify how and where alignment can be initiated, fostered and strengthened. And it goes to our diplomatic capability as the key means by which we put foreign policy into operation. Our foreign service has many talented and skilled people but they have been hampered by lack of leadership, degraded resources and a lack of clarity as to how they are expected to deliver for Australia in these changing times. DFAT needs clearer political leadership and a sharper understanding of its role responsibilities and its potential in these times. And it needs the tools to deliver this including every building of our development assistance program. But there has been too much unnecessary collateral damage to Australia's national interests. We know that the short-term plays were a reflection of Mr Morrison's character and the obsession with announcements at the expense of doing the whole job. But it seems to me that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the national security community more widely should take the opportunity to review their advice to government and in general and also with particular reference as to the handling and implementation of the submarine announcement. An Albanese Labor government will provide the leadership and direction our foreign service needs. We would ensure a more central role for foreign policy in the content and implementation of strategy. And we would be focused on the key task of maximizing our influence in the reshaping of the region. These three elements of Australian foreign policy projecting the reality of modern Australia, partnerships and capability are also how we can shape the world for the better. Because it is in our national interests that we work to generate and preserve global public goods. Shaping the world for the better includes promoting issues and principles which we believe are of common benefit to all nations and all peoples. This is at the heart of Labor's foreign policy tradition. It requires not only effective multilateral capability and DFAT, but a clean mandate based on domestic priorities to prosecute these interests aboard. It is why we should have a more robust domestic framework to eliminate modern slavery. It's why we should inquire that our development assistance program has effective targets and oversight not only to alleviate suffering, but also to address the structural barriers that are holding women and girls back. It is why we should have Magnitsky sanctions and formalised engagement with NGOs to target those responsible for human rights abuses around the world. And why we must ensure compliance with our nuclear non-proliferation commitments and redouble our efforts towards nuclear disarmament. This should be made an urgent priority for Australia and a starting point should be for the government to appoint a standalone ambassador for arms control and counter-proliferation. The drivers of our expanded influence will work across all three core spheres of Labor's foreign policy, multilateralism, the region and our alliance with the United States. One of the most central multilateral groupings for our engagement is ASEAN. Not just because of the centrality of ASEAN as entity, but also because of our geographic reality. Labor understands this and we believe Australia can and should do more to demonstrate our ability to build trust and alignment with ASEAN leaders. As we made clear in our support for the AUKUS partnership, such engagement with our traditional partners must be in addition to more regional engagement, which is why, if elected, we will appoint an ASEAN special envoy, a roving high-level representative respected in the region to complement our diplomatic network and forge closer relationships with capitals. The countries of Southeast Asia have made clear they don't want to choose between the great powers, but they do want to exercise their own agency in how the region is being reshaped. And it's why I and many others have advocated for a settling point in the escalating strategic competition between the US and China, one that is favorable to the region and that upholds the rules of the road. President Biden has recognized the importance of managing this competition responsibly and the need to impose common-sense guardrails to ensure competition does not veer into conflict. So we welcome reports that the US and China have agreed on the need to engage on nuclear and strategic stability issues in addition to their collaboration on climate change. Clear and consistent communication and guardrails between the two powers will be vital in managing the growing number of potential flashpoints in our neighborhood. The greatest risk to peace, stability, and prosperity in our region is the risk of conflict in Taiwan. That said, it is not a risk contained to our region. The consequences of a kinetic conflict over Taiwan with the potential for escalation would be catastrophic for humanity. And that is why successive Australian, American, and regional governments have taken a careful and sober approach to cross-strait relations. It is not because everyone who has gone before us has been weak or afraid. It's because of a dispassionate clear-eyed assessment of interests and because of the need to support the people of Taiwan and maintain regional stability. In Australia, this approach has involved the bipartisan adoption of a one China policy and advocacy to deter any lateral changes to the status quo. It's not just the bipartisan Australian position, but the approach taken by successive US administrations since President Carter and reaffirmed recently by President Biden. Republic and Democratic administrations have also taken a deliberate position of strategic ambiguity in relation to Taiwan. In maintaining this position of strategic ambiguity, the US declines to declare a definitive position on military conflict, including whether to join a war if one was started by others. And as a US ally, Australia has taken a position consistent with theirs. And this strategy has rightly been adopted as the path most capable of a verting conflict and enabling the region to live in peace and prosperity. So when Peter Dutton talks about it being inconceivable that Australia would not join a war over Taiwan is wildly out of step with the strategy long adopted by Australia and our principal ally. Surely the real question is not as he suggests whether we declare our intentions, but why the defence minister is amping up war rather than working to maintain longstanding policy to preserve the status quo as advocated by the Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen. Mr. Dutton knows exactly what he is doing by using words like inconceivable in the same conflict, in the same, Mr. Dutton knows exactly what he is doing by using words like inconceivable in the same context as the threat of conflict. And after his former secretary declared the drums of war were beating. And it is notable that Mr. Morrison has not used the same febrile language sticking more closely to Australia's traditional position. This is the same duplicitous game we see from the Morrison-Joyce government in a range of areas as with climate change. When Mr. Morrison makes empty promises to sound like he cares while Barnaby-Joyce tells you what they really think. And here we have the same dynamic between Mr. Morrison and Mr. Dutton. But in this case, they play political games on something so grave as whether they commit Australia to war against the superpower. It has been widely reported that the Morrison government want to make national security a focus of the coming election. Amping up the prospect of war against a superpower is the most dangerous election tactic in Australian history. It is a tactic employed by irresponsible politicians who are desperate to hang on to power at any cost. And as the Lowy Institute's Natasha Kasam has pointed out, the PRC's narrative has long been that the only options available to Taiwan are unification or war. So Mr. Dutton does Australians and Taiwanese, no favours, by amplifying Beijing's fatalism. This is the worst in a litany of cases of the Morrison-Joyce government seeking to use foreign policy and national security for political advantage. One of the most shameless examples is when Mr. Morrison was asked a question about the French president calling him a liar. And he proved the point by telling a new lie, fabricating that the Labour leader, I'm gonna quote this, the Labour leader backed in the Chinese government and a number of others by having a crack at me as well. It is true China has changed and our relationship has become harder to manage. But desperately playing politics on China, whenever he is in trouble, does nothing to strengthen Mr. Morrison's authority with Australians or with Beijing. The underlying point though is that there is now an overwhelming body of evidence to show that Mr. Morrison's base instinct is always to lie and blame others. He lies about being at the front of the queue, about being in Hawaii during bushfires, about electric vehicles and about vaccine mandates. He lies about the mistakes he makes like describing Australia's position on Taiwan as one country, two systems. He lies about others like Anthony Albanese and even the French president. And then he tells new lies to deny his old lies. He has rendered his own word worthless and Australians can no longer believe a word he says. And neither can world leaders who will never trust him again after he leaked private text messages, which in fact proved that President Macron did not know what was coming, exposing another lie. Mr. Morrison does not have the character to be the custodian of Australian interests in the world. And when he lies, Australia loses. Australia's leaders should take the world as it is and seek to shape it for the better. It's what we need now as much as we have ever needed it. And to expand Australia's power and influence, we need to set political interests aside from our national interests. We need to look beyond the news of the day. We need to focus on more than announcements. We need to do the whole job. We need foresight. We need to bring all the aspects of our statecraft together to protect and to advance our interests. We need to improve our performance across the whole range of capabilities required to shape outcomes in the world, including our effectiveness in navigating the gray zone. We need genuine partnerships grounded in trust. And we need to reach into the vast untapped power of our people and project a confident, unified modern Australia to the modern world. Thank you very much. Just making sure I get the right water, Rory. Could be embarrassing. So thank you very much, Senator. That was wide-ranging. It was substantial. It was compelling. It will attract even more of media interest perhaps it already has. I've made Rory nervous. I pointed out to him that it's okay. My words are not his. Not at all. I think the contest of ideas is what the university is about, as you know. So it's a real privilege to be a platform for that. I do want to open to questions from our audience and not only do we have friends from the press here, but we also have A&U colleagues, including students. So I hope you're sharpening your questions as we speak. I might begin if that's okay to draw you out, particularly on the Taiwan issue because at one level, as you know, and I'm not alone in this, I've been a strong advocate of bipartisanship across the foreign and security policy spectrum. At another level, there's no question that the Taiwan issue is of increasing concern and silence in our and everyone's debate in the region. Correct me if I'm wrong, but the message I draw from you is something along the lines that Labor would support if you like the people or the society of Taiwan and regional stability. At the same time, you draw a distinction about some of the messages that we've been hearing from some in the government. One would argue that when it comes to regional stability, deterrence has a role to play. You've spoken about gray zone coercion, which I take to mean, I guess, a lot of the intimidation and the interference that we've seen from Beijing towards Taiwan, and they're my words. If the government is essentially expressing support for a democracy of our size in our region against that kind of intimidation, what's wrong with that and what would Labor do differently? Well, obviously the issue of Taiwan is just very resonant, is a finely balanced and complex issue, and you're correct to assess that the threat of conflict is rising. I think the question is, what is it that Australia can do most to preserve the status quo? You use the word deterrence, which is a word that focuses very much on military deterrence. The point I'm making is that if you look at the history of a finely balanced position that different parties associated with the issue and the Taiwan Straits has taken, whether it's US administrations, Australia, or the Taiwanese, and Beijing, my point is that our job is really to ensure that we create the disincentive collectively for conflict and continue to create as many incentives as possible for peace. And I accept that this is historically and now an issue where there is, governments have recognized the downside of the sort of binary way Mr. Dutton is construing it. I'm making a point that I do not believe, particularly given the US position, that that is the way in which we most, are most likely to create that incentive for the status quo. And that is what we have to do. And I'll make a point about the region, actually. I mean, a thing we need to recall that countries in the region may have different views about aspects of US China competition. But the countries in the region do not want conflict. The countries in the region, our near region, want the preservation of the status quo as the best way of maintaining peace and stability. Can I draw you out on one other, pardon me, can I draw you out on one other point and then I'll go to the room. Projecting modern Australia, which was a theme that you came back to a few times and that idea of, I think in your words, amplifying Australia's influence through projecting modern Australia. At one level, that's a very fine aspiration. And in terms of national identity or national values, I can see that. But in a practical sense, do you have any examples of where you would see that as being effective? Well, I think in part it is how the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister of the day speak about who we are and how they speak about our place and our stake in the region. And how you draw on aspects of who we are in your engagement with the region. And at times, Australia and the current government, I think has, and I'll try to show, give you a couple of examples, but there's a bit of tone deafness around how this might be heard in other parts of Australia. I'll tell you where this comes from. I mean, there's lots of people who have spoken about productive diversity and multiculturalism, I think, as a diplomatic kind of strength. But something happened years ago. Can I tell a quick anecdote? So my father, who, when we left Malaysia, he stayed there until he was 17-5. And the first iteration of Pauline Hansen. So when she first called for, which first said, what was it? We were swamping Australia. Australia was in danger of being swamped by Asians. And I remember calling him. So dad is an educator man. He was a Colombo Plan Scholar to Adelaide University, did architecture here in the 60s. So he understands, has that understanding of Australian politics and Australian society. And he said to me, do you want to come home? And I thought, this is really interesting. It shows the extent now, he and my mother married just at the end of the wide Australia policy. But this was in what, 90s, was it? I think so. Yeah, well, thank you. It shows, doesn't it? The extent to which even someone like him, as soon as that was said, what that evoked in him. And that stayed with me actually, because it reminds us when engaging with the region. And diplomacy isn't just about being nice, it's about being persuasive. How we engage with them and what we speak to people about, including talking about parts of the diaspora or engaging the diaspora with the country in which you're dealing, these are very powerful narratives and powerful initiatives, I think. Thank you. We're going to open it up. And so if anyone has a question or a comment. I haven't seen my glasses. But a question, squarely. I'm not filming. And a brief question in the room, I will come to you and I'm going to particularly keep an eye out for any of the ANU students or some of my younger colleagues. And we'll work it from there. So please, the floor is yours. It's your opportunity. If you don't ask now, you never will. I'm kind of nice. I'll begin. Yeah, all right. And it is very hard to see in this room. So I'll actually begin at the front here and then I'll go to my colleague Will Stolz next. Thank you. Thanks for your comments. Please. Thanks very much for your comments, Senator Wong. I wanted to ask about Australia's experience of economic coercion by China in the last 18 months or so. What would you do differently? Well, on this, there is clear bipartisanship. I mean, I have described China's behavior across a range of contexts as not being the behavior of a responsible global power. And I think that is the reason I said that was I was seeking to frame this as recognizing these are not behaviors that those with power in an international system can engage with and have others believe that, you know, there is with capacity for cooperation. So, and China's behaviors in the trade area are inconsistent with its commitments. This is the Australian position, its commitments in the WTO and CHAFTA. You know, I think we have to be very clearly and collectively from across the political spectrum. And I think from, you know, people like those represented here push back on. It is an example of where we are in the China relationship. And the China relationship, China has changed. Our nature of the relationship has changed. And there will be enduring differences that need to be managed and dealt with by whomever is in government. And that will not change. And I think of it as these other structural aspects of the relationship. It doesn't. However, we know that we have to continue to engage. And the question for governments over the coming years is how, what does that, how to do that? And how do we do that in a way that recognizes these and manages these differences which are going to ensure? Thank you. And we'll take a question over in the far room. I'll start with my colleague from the National Security College, Will Stoltz. And then I'll move around. Thank you. Thank you, Rory. And thank you, Senator, on a very engaging speech this morning. You mentioned that if elected, your government would be bringing more credibility to the Pacific step up. I'd like to tease you out to kind of bring some more detail to that. You mentioned climate change as being a big aspect of that effort. I also know that there's a degree of unresolved business in relation to the status of West Papua and Bogenville that may arise in the next decade or so. I'd be interested to kind of tease out your thoughts on those thorny issues as well. And from here on, one question for... Yeah, yeah. Can I just do with West Papua and Bogenville? I might just leave those for another time if I may, but I will do with the first one. The Pacific is the point I was trying to make in the contribution on that, actually, was, and in part, I draw on my experience when I was climate minister, and we worked quite closely with Pacific Island nations in different form, you know, they had different... Was it small island developing states and as well as the PIF in the context of the Congress of the Parties of Climate? And we worked quite closely with them. And my observation then, and then I was... I did a bipartisan trip to the Pacific twice with Julie Bishop. And those experiences really reinforced for me the extent which climate change for these nations is not the same identity, contested identity issue that it is here in Australia, all right? So the point about climate in Australia and why we've been unable to progress the issue is it has become an identity issue. So actually the policy, we know what we need to do, but we've been unable to do it because we've been locked into a very bitter, unproductive identity argument. What is fascinating when you visit the Pacific is it isn't that for them. So you have quite conservative people of faith, leading countries, who will talk to you about, this is the critical issue for them. So when we throw a lot of money at them, and I could point to some of, you know, Vanya Marama's comments or Anote Tongue's comments, et cetera, but when we just say, here's all this money and we're gonna work with you, but we fundamentally don't listen and understand that for them, this is a present existential economic national security risk that they are managing and seeking to manage and how difficult that is for them. I don't see how you build credible, durable partnerships if their fundamentally is not that recognition of that experience. Now, we will have all to say about this, and I'm very privileged to have Pat Conroy working with me, who is very, very good policy person on the Pacific, and will say more about specifically Pacific and ODA, but I do think it is, if you do not have a government that actually is prepared to act on climate in its domestic policy, I don't see how you can actually deal with the Pacific on the basis of what they identify as their priorities. Thank you. We're gonna take three more questions in quick succession, because I know if I do that, then you won't dare dodge the hard ones. You'll take them all, but it also gives more of our colleagues, it'll give more of our colleagues, it'll give more of our colleagues, it'll give more of our colleagues to say. So I'm actually gonna go to... We're gonna take a time... ...who I saw earlier, and then Ingrid in the far corner. Genevieve, please. Thank you so much for that, Senator Wong. I guess in reflecting on that notion of the three pieces that you were talking about, an idea of narrative, the idea of collaboration, and the idea of capability building, I'm interested in where you think technology flows through all of that. And Ingrid, my name. Thank you, Rory, and thank you, Senator Wong, for today's presentation. I had a question about the art of state craft. In particular, a lot of the challenges that Australia faces are much more than foreign policy challenges. A lot of it relates to what you spoke on diversifying not only our trading partners, but what we offer championing the diversity of modern Australia as well as adopting renewable energy sources. But at the same time, by virtue of our democracy, our leaders are beholden to short-term priorities, bureaucratic and political forces. So how would a Labor government practice the art of state craft and achieve and address some of the domestic social economic reforms that underpin foreign policy challenges? Thank you. Thank you. And then final question. I think John Blacksland down the front was waiting a while, so we'll give you the last question, John. Who gives you a smorgasbord, Senator? Yeah, thanks very much, Rory, and Senator Wong. You didn't touch at all on the Quad or Indonesia? Or the Indo-Pacific, I realise, partway through the speech. I would usually make sure I actually say it, because Rory's here. Otherwise, I'd get a black mark. So I'm just wondering how they weigh in your mind, how did India... Well, sorry, the Quad and what was the last one? Indonesia. So India, Japan, Indonesia. So there's three very good questions, if I may say. The first one was the role of technology. And I'm glad you actually heard what I said about the three bits or something. Thank you for hearing that. Hello? Yep, OK. I see technology as particularly... OK, I'm cutting out, speaking of technology. We're back, we're back. I see technology as we're not back. There's a very ironic... There you go. We scripted that. I see technology as relevant, particularly to the second two, so the nature of partnerships and also capability. Obviously... So, for example, obviously, in terms of cyber, we could do more there, in terms of collaboration, I think the authors is a good example of, great deeper, formalising the deep technological and technological cooperation we have with the UK and the US. So I see technology as a domain in which all three of those, but particularly the second two, can be expanded. Are we getting... Do I have to keep shouting? No. Secondly, Statecraft, I actually was trying to talk about Statecraft. Maybe I should have made that clear. I think I only used the word a couple of times because other than people who study, you know, international relations, it's not a term that most people understand. But what I was actually trying to lay out was essentially a proposition around competent and effective Statecraft, which is how do you utilise all aspects of national power? And I think there's a paragraph where I talk about economic, military economic, strategic economic, social, something else, can't remember. Because my point is that sometimes the discussion becomes very narrow. And when we are... And that, you know, human beings like that, we like clarity, we like to make things simple. And so it's much easier to deal with a narrow, simple concept than to try and deal with a multiplicity. But my point is we're in a reshaping of our region. And so the complex task for leaders is to actually think about how it is that you utilise all these aspects of national power. And that's why engaging minds for a secure Australia. The work that you do here is so important because that is precisely the debate or the discussion that you're engaged in. John, there was nothing... You know, I've given speeches and written op-eds about the Coordination. I've talked a lot about Indonesia really. It was just that I wanted in this speech... So there were lots of things I could have spoken about, and I will. But I wanted in this speech to really try and get a stronger sense of the place of foreign policy in the operation of Statecraft because I think it is important for us to think a little more laterally about how we engage in the reshaping of our region, how we amplify our power and influence to that end. So I promise you I will speak more about, particularly Indonesia before the election. Did I cover everything? I think you dodged none. So I think the ASEAN envoy is another theme that I think we'd love to tease out if we had more time. So we'll have to pause that now. We're getting close to the end of our time here and I'm going to, in a moment, invite my colleague, Professor Helen Sullivan, to give the vote of thanks. But just on a personal note from me, Senator, thank you for bringing us into the context of ideas today. Professor Sullivan. Yes, as Rory says, my name's Helen Sullivan, and I have the great privilege to be the Dean of College of Asia and the Pacific. Thank you, Senator Wong, for those very substantial remarks outlining your perspective on the challenges faced by Australia, our region, and the world in achieving a secure, stable, and sustainable future. And importantly, sharing your framework for understanding foreign policy, including in terms of national security and Australia's national interests and the potential policy directions that result. Your articulation of foreign policy is necessarily engaged with issues and ideas that cross government portfolios, including economic policy, climate policy, and social cohesion, is ambitious. And your assessment of the corresponding need for the appropriate Australian capability and collaboration with others in our region reminds us of the significant challenges inherent in addressing complex contemporary issues. These are challenges that we too at the Australian National University are committed to addressing. Part of our mission is to increase knowledge and understanding about the complex nature of our region and Australia's place in the world, which is so central to the work of the College of Asia and the Pacific. The Vice Chancellor has already noted the role that ANU, and in particular the National Security College, plays as a platform for a quality national conversation on security issues and other big policy challenges of our time. I would also emphasize the role of our research and teaching in ensuring that the next generation of policymakers, some of whom are in this room, and citizens in general, bring an informed awareness to problems that defy single academic disciplines or the short span of our electoral cycles. In the College of Asia and the Pacific, we aim to do this by supporting serious scholarship and its translation into impact. This rigorous scholarship takes time, sometimes more time than policymakers have, and is the product of robust and critical debate, a combination that means that its impact is enduring over time and across governments. Our education offerings bring students together from across the region and indeed the world and equip them with the knowledge and skills to navigate pathways to a better future for all of us. Our research and teaching helps us understand how the past shapes the present and the future, but also how we might use the agency we have in the present to shape viable policy options. And I'd just like to reference here how proud I am of the remarkable work of the ANU in general and CAP in particular in supporting the discussions at COP26. We sent to COP26 to Glasgow, one of our finest Indigenous scholars, a Pacific scholar and a legal scholar, two of whom were involved in the negotiations of loss and damage, and their ability to both represent the ANU, but also to represent Pacific Islands, I think speaks incredibly highly of the scholarship and the focus on impact that we have here. But in all of this, the point is not to speak with one voice, but to make the patient evidence-based contributions that universities are designed for, to ensure that the national and international response to risk and uncertainty is genuinely strategic and long-term. Threats to security, prosperity, social cohesion and environmental sustainability cannot be addressed in isolation. And what we have heard today reinforces that foundation for policy. So please join me in thanking Senator Penny Wong.