 The situation the moment is this, either there's been an intentional attack and there's considerable evidence that there was an intentional attack, although it isn't entirely conclusive at the moment, or at the very least there's been a substantial engagement. There were four or five PT boats, they were on both sides of our destroyers, our destroyers fired back, the destroyers believed they sank three of the PT boats, the engagement took place over a period of an hour or so, after the first shots were fired and these were warning shots by the destroyers against the PT boats, the PT boats continued to close on the destroyers. So either there's been an intentional attack or a very substantial engagement. I'm inclined to think it requires some response in the form of US military action other than simply firing on the PT boats. What that form of response should be is the major question, is this, the chiefs if there's to be any attack on North Vietnam believe that it should come in two waves, a night wave against the makes on the airfields in North Vietnam roughly 24 hours from now, a day wave following that night wave by roughly 12 hours, say roughly 36 hours from now against certain selected targets in North Vietnam, assuming that for the minute that that were the course of action, we can't wait 24 and 36 hours before saying something. The first thing that has to be said is about 45 minutes from now and I've got to respond to questions that are coming into our press room as to why I didn't go to Chicago, I got 2,000 people waiting at lunch out there for a speech, I sent the secretary of the army in my place. I've got to say why I didn't go. I would propose in about half an hour to simply say that certain matters came up here that demand my attention and therefore the secretary of the army substituted for me and just say nothing more than that. And that will get us five, two or three or four hours. The press will be unhappy but they can't do anything about it. Then about three or four hours from now, I think we're going to have to say something about this attack, experience shows we can't hold this information more than that. It will be leaking out as it began to last time. Before we say anything about the attack on the destroyers, I think we should try to make a decision as to our follow on action and therefore I propose this. I get Dean Rusk and Mack Bundy over here that we meet with the chiefs, discuss all these alternatives and then be prepared to see you about an hour or two from now at your convenience. That's good. I'll be ready in time. You're ready. And I think we ought to follow the same procedure that we did last time and that looks like to me that you pretty well know what the alternatives are when you come here so that we don't explore around and I'll do that and we'll follow the same procedure. Now what do we have in that area if we start messing around in the airfield and they come out of there coming out of there, are we sufficient residents? We believe so. We have two carriers there now, the Bonhomme and the Constellation. We have a third one, the Ranger, which is 400 and some odd miles from the DeSoto patrol at present and is already radioed in that they can launch if necessary immediately, or I should say from their present position. We have two P-57 squadrons in South Vietnam at present time available for this kind of action. We have certain F-100 aircraft, I've forgotten how many on the order 10 or 12 or something like that in South Vietnam. We have an F-100 squadron in Thailand that could be moved over to South Vietnam for this action and we could move I think an additional squadron, oh I'm not sure of this, in from the Philippines in time for this. So we have, I would say to answer your question, ample force is available for whatever course of action you wish to carry out against North Vietnam. Bob, I have found that we see and we hear and we imagine a lot of things in the form of attacks and shots. People are running at us and I think it would be very vulnerable, make us very vulnerable if we conclude that these people were attacked and we were merely responding and it develops that that just wasn't true at all and I think we ought to check that very, very carefully and I don't know why in the hell sometimes they can't be sure that they're being attacked. It looks like me they'd hear a shot or see a shot or do something before they just get worked up and start pulling a little may on us and I think that if we have this kind of response and it develops, that we just started with our own destroyers, that people are going to conclude incorrectly and unjustly, but that we just plant cops and trying to get a lot of attention and trying to show how tough we are and I want to be tough where we need to be tough and where we justify it being tough and I want to do whatever is necessary but I sure want more caution on the part of these admirals and these destroyer commanders or whoever they are about whether they're being fired on or not. I don't want them just to have some changed life woman running up and saying that I got cheese being raped when just because a man walks in the room and that looks like to me that's what happens and the 30 years I've been watching them. Well this is amazing. If a man gets enough braid on him, he walks in the room and he just immediately concludes that he's being attacked and that's the basic argument between you and Goldwater. That's exactly right. Now let's don't get sucked in on his side of it right and that's what we're trying to probe here. This is the reason why I have to take the best military man you have though. Just tell them I have, I've been watching and listening to these stories for 30 years before the armed service committee and we're always sure we've been attacked and a day or two we're not sure and a day or two more we're sure it wasn't didn't happen at all. And I just say that you want to be sure before you tell me that we were fired upon and that we were fired upon because you just came in like a few weeks ago and said to that man they're launching an attack on us they're firing on us and we got through the whole of the firing which included maybe they hadn't fired at all. Well we will certainly be prepared for that Mr. President that's really what we've been doing in the two hours since I first called you and we've got a number of messages here now and considerable evidence but as I say there was either an intentional attack or a substantial engagement I differentiate one from the other. What is a substantial gain that means that we could have started it and they just responded. They stayed there for an hour or so. The first. They'd be just about staying off we start shooting at them. Well you'd have thought they'd break off. We shot a warning shot across their bow so the messages say and instead of turning around they kept coming toward the destroyers and they split up and passed on either side of them which is what you would do if you were closing for an attack instead of breaking off. But as of in any case I couldn't agree with you more the question you raise is a basic question and this is what we've been trying to develop in evidence. Did you get any what's your reaction to our disclosure in California anything bad. Oh no no on the contrary I think very good. I met with the press this morning at nine o'clock for half an hour on that subject and briefed them as much as I could criticism or no no they matter of fact I thought the basic question would be why do you disclose this now isn't it being done for political reasons but the question didn't even arise now they may still take off on me and the press on that but they didn't raise that question what is the answer. Well the answer is that that we hold all information classified relating to new weapon systems as long as we can and we only disclose it when it's likely to be disclosed anyhow we've held this for a year or so very very successfully but now we're bringing in so many industrial contractors that magazines have begun to refer to this a likely there was an article three months ago in aviation week there's been another article in the last several weeks and therefore it's being disclosed piecemeal erroneously and our own people are going to be informed by the Soviets or others about one of their own weapon systems and we felt we had a responsibility to them to inform them directly. I don't know bear in mind you got six more weeks to go. I know I'm running out of your weapon so you better you better get your people busy over there I've seen the Navy is putting out this and that just tell them all now they got real responsibilities to get you tell them each week and I'm asking you what are you doing in that big department 50 billion and you want some answers. I have a meeting with the Secretary's every Monday morning at 8 30 on this they've got a long list of projects that are all aware of that. I'd have some economy and I'd have some orders out to 4th Army, 8th Army, 7th Army whatever you got different ones on you got different drippings on you know efficiencies and things of that kind I take every imaginative step I could in these these prudent fields and that we can refer to. Okay so very good.