 Hello and welcome to NewsClick for the second part of our discussion of the larger strategic issues regarding West Asia and North Africa. We have with us Professor Rajaz Ahmad and we will continue our discussions with Syria. Syria has been of much larger strategic significance in just one country. It also has strategic influence on Lebanon. It also has a border with Israel and of course the Palestinian influence is there. In a larger sense, can you explain to at least our audience what is the strategic role of Syria in West Asia and why is its current political scenario so important? For one thing, Syria is the last remaining representative of Arab nationalism as it used to be understood historically. It still calls itself socialist even though it has implemented a great deal of this neoliberal reform. State sector sector is still dominant. It does, it bans, literally bans religion from politics, not just separates, it will not recognize the existence of a religious political party in the political spectrum. It is the historic opponent of Israel for a variety of reasons and one of them is that in the historic imagination of Syria, Palestine is a part of Syria. Part of the larger shams during the Ottoman days. The region of shams was Syria, Lebanon, part of Jordan and Palestine. It is completely reconciled to the separation of Palestine but there is that historic bond so that the result has been that the Palestinians, refugees even, have been treated in Syria very differently and much more fraternally than in any other Arab country. Very much as if they are first cousins, of course such a large population making claims on national resources of Syria there is some resentment also but by and large they have absorbed Palestinians much better than any other Arab country has. They have an absolutely adamant claim on a preeminent role as a foreign power but preeminent role in Lebanon. This they find is absolutely important for their security that is one part, the historic representative of Arab nationalism claims and that is how they are perceived. Part of their territory is occupied by Israel, the Jolan and annexed actually by the Israelis. So there is that territorial dispute in fact there is a part of southern Lebanon where again there is a Syrian claim, Lebanese claim and Israeli occupation of it. One of the reasons for this relationship with a very close relationship with Hezbollah is that Hezbollah fought against Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, pushed them out, still is fighting and will and hopes to push them out of that remaining region which is claimed by both Syria and Lebanon. So there is that which brings me to the other factor that Syria has a very close relationship both with Hezbollah in Lebanon and with Hamas. As you know Damascus is the place where Khaled Mishal lives. So and then on regional strategic level the only country with which Syria is otherwise aligned very closely is Iran. It's not Syria's choice by any means. It is simply that that is the only country left with which Syrian strategic interests actually coincide. So if you remove Syria then the Cogdon Sanithir around Israel is complete. There is no adversary left. There is then Iran not sharing a border, not a part of the historic Arab world. Iran gets isolated and their perception is that both Hezbollah and Hamas will lose enormously. But there is then this Cogdon Sanithir around them. So Syria has that kind of a strategic situation there. In the old days it was very closely aligned with the socialist bloc and some of that kind of alignment still remains. But that is a larger part of the strategic opposition to Israel and therefore also confrontation with American imperialism. There one can argue that for Arab nationalism to align with the socialist bloc earlier was really a part of the same process that you talked about today. Not so much out of choice alone but also out of the fact that there is only one which could align strategically given the kind of. I had in mind imperialism, Zionism but also Arab reaction. That the historic battle that has been fought in the Arab world since the late 1940s between secular, well not terribly democratic but secular Arab nationalism, secular, republican, anti-Zionist, anti-monarchical nationalism. And in its social economic policy is quite progressive. I mean it destroyed let's say feudal remnants in Egypt for example. So it is, Syria is the last remaining representative of that. So the Saudi, for example, Saudis and the Qataris and all of these people, the monarchical Gulf Council and all these people, their hatred of Syria comes from that old base and then gets connected with Syria's more recent alignment with Iran. This is a very recent alignment, it's not a historic alignment. So there is that. It's an interesting issue that you're raising because you really look at it. The first American alignment in this region against Arab nationalism was with Muslim brotherhood both in Egypt and in Syria and of course also with the Saudis for almost similar reasons. It was really an opposition to Arab nationalism that they were really fighting. The Truman Doctrine says so. Since the days of the Truman Doctrine, Islam has been looked at as a great bulwark against all of these insurgent forces in this part of the world. The then one of the prominent leaders of the Muslim brotherhood and a whole gang of them were welcomed in the White House by Eisenhower. It goes back that far, this alignment with the Muslim brotherhood. And finally they're famous photograph with Eisenhower. That's right, that's right. And it is that same process that brought the jihadis to Afghanistan. Islam will fight against Arab nationalism, against communism, this, that, and the other. So it's a whole configuration. And having defeated them in one place after another after another, Syria is perceived as that. So there is a Syria accountability act passed by the US Congress since then and the undermining of the Syrian government with the view to regime change has been an objective of successive US administrations. So if you look at it for them, Arab Spring or the democratic sturdings in the Arab world was in that sense also an opportunity for regime change they're interested in in any case. Of course, that does not say that the Basad al-Assad regime is particularly democratic. It is not, but given this fact that there was this already a configuration of forces looking for regime change, would you say that this was considered as an opportunity to therefore effect what they always wanted? The way I see the Arab Spring becoming this occasion, the Mubarak regime was being perceived as torturing his 82 years old. Something had to be done about that regime. So I don't think the US was that keen to protect that regime. The second is that, yes, there were disgruntled elements in Libya, in Syria, for a variety of reasons. But in Syria, certainly, they were very small. The Muslim Brotherhood historically had a very small base. They were very powerful in the 60s, quite powerful in the 60s and the early 70s. When half of the al-Assad regime came in, since then, they were on the defensive. Then they tried to take the initiative after the Iranian Revolution and the Israeli occupation of Lebanon when Syrian regime was not quite sure, you know, was sort of on the defensive. But that hit back. The regime contained them very well. So what you had in Syria was Muslim Brotherhood inside the country and a whole lot of exiled intellectuals in Paris and mainly in Paris, you know, elsewhere. There were all kinds of dissatisfaction and so on. Americans have known from the beginning, the West has known from the beginning, that their only chance in Syria would be if they could have, they could establish so-called liberated zone, preferably on the borders of Turkey, which could become a kind of Benghazi. And here you could supply and which could become the ground for intervention. They have known that there would not be a popular uprising of the kind that, I mean, they have given all kinds of disinformation, but that there would never be a popular uprising of the sort, let's say, even that you had in Egypt. In Syria, there are too many forces afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood. Syria is a generally secular country for by and large. 25% of the population consists of various kinds of minorities. The fact that the Assad regime absolutely insists on very hard variant of secularism gives that 25% great sense of security with the state and all that. So there was no, there were no grounds that they could use. So this is very much manufactured, very much manufactured from the beginning. And killings have been going on. Killings of the state personnel have been going on from the beginning. Over a thousand members of the state personnel have been killed so far. So almost 30% of the total number of casualties that have taken place in Syria. Yes, yes, but you will never know it from the established media. That has been going on from the beginning. And the violence has been then from the beginning because the kind of popular uprising you saw in Tunisia or Egypt, or Yemen, for example, or Bahrain. There were no grounds for that sort of thing in Syria. You could not bring hundreds of thousands of people in the streets. And that's not because the Assad regime is more authoritarian than all those other regimes. Or less authoritarian than the Assad regime. No, what I meant was that it's more authoritarian and therefore people can't come out. Not true. That's not the reason why you couldn't have huge demonstrations of various sorts. Disinformation in the case of Syria is actually, in my view, even greater than there was in the case of Libya. But there is one issue within Syria itself which needs some discussion, which is that the Bashar al-Assad regime at one point did promise a certain kind of democratic reforms. This set of events that have been orchestrated seems to have also squeezed the middle ground. And it does look as if those reforms will remain only on paper. And in that sense, a relaxation of the kind of repressive regime, if you will, is not likely to be on the agenda soon. And this is one of the unexpected consequences of what's happening. There are a number of things that are going on. And this question of the offering of the reforms, very extensive reforms, by the way, very extensive reforms. The only thing on which they dug in their heels was the issue of Muslim brotherhood. And that is the issue I am told on which the negotiations with Turkey broke down. Turkey wanted 50, 60% of the transitional umbrella organization, 50% of the seats to be allotted to the Muslim brotherhood. And the Syrian regime said constitutionally we cannot give a seat to a religious party, et cetera. So reforms were rejected out of hand because the objective is regime change. Do you think the Bashar al-Assad regime can ride it on? Because at the moment it seems that he has tied it over the initial crisis which was there. And he seems to be very much in control except one or two spots like Homs and a couple of other places. Do you think that this particular phase is actually over? The control of the regime is not in question. What the regime has been able to do is to deny them that creation of that sanctuary where these people could all be brought together. The creation of the women has been able to, the amount of weaponry and the quality of weaponry that has come into Syria in the hands of the anti-state elements, what the Syrians are calling the armed gangs is extraordinary, extremely sophisticated. Weaponry has come in. It has come from Israel, it has come from Turkey, it has come through Lebanon, paid for by Saudi Arabia and so on. So it is quite an achievement on the part of the regime so far to have denied them a place where the army could not penetrate. This much they have been able to do so far. How long this will last? We don't know. The other difference is that the international, at least community, at least the BRICS, China has also denied the kind of sanction that the United States and NATO got in Libya. Yes, so far and in fact I am told that some of the helicopters of the Assad regime have been flying a Russian and Chinese flags and appreciation of it to be photographed. So far, yes. But we have seen the Russians and the Chinese knuckle under from Iraq to Libya. How long this will go on, we don't know. It's perfectly possible if the Americans decide it, if the French decide it, if the Turks want it, for them to go to the Security Council, let Russia and China veto. The rest of them say international community in the proper sense, which is the West, says this mechanism has broken down, NATO has to move in on its own. In the case of Libya, they did not get a resolution for military intervention. They converted it to one leg. Completely, I mean, it had no resemblance to the resolution that was there. And after they had captured Tripoli, they were bombing Syrta just to capture Kandafir. It had no resemblance to the resolution that they had got. So now they can say we didn't get a resolution. Remember, they went into Iraq without a resolution. So not getting a resolution of the Security Council is not going to stop them if they make the decision. Will they make the decision? That's a question. Now, the Syrian army has been able to do that. But Syrian army has a very low level of weaponry. They're really fighting with the 1980s level of weaponry. So a real invasion, they cannot fight against. That's clear. That's never really in question. The kind of firepower NATO brings to an operation. So I mean, they don't even have modern missiles of that sort. They don't even have the weaponry that Iran has, for example. Iran, the kind of weaponry that the Russians have given them, especially missiles, it's a completely different league. The question is, are the Americans going to decide that? The creation of this National Council in Ankara is a very alarming development. And the Ankara gang that they have collected is willing to give the Muslim Brotherhood a very prominent role. Burhan Qailayoun is the man who has been lobbying both EU and the United States for a long time. He has no base. He's a professor at quite a decent professor in his subject in Paris. But he has no political base. He has emerged as the leader. They can always make him president. They may, of course, make president. So we have to see which way the events will go. At the moment, it does seem that the Basad regime is holding. So even if they cannot face it in May. Thank you very much, Azaz. We'll continue to watch the developments as it happens. Please click. Thank you. Thank you.