 To get this conversation started, we're going to have a conversation between two people who barely need an introduction. Extended biographies are available in your program for all of our speakers today, so we won't spend a lot of time introducing people. I do want to say that Ambassador Jim Dobbins is a name that should be quite familiar to all of you. He has spent many years in the field, back here in Washington working at RAND, studying nation building, studying conflict, understanding how we can do it better. And when he was named the new special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, it occurred to me that there were very, very few people in the world who could really step up to that challenge of that position. So I'm extremely pleased that Jim Dobbins will be joining us this morning. In the media, a lot of people have gone negative on our field, and some of it is justified, some of it is not so justified. But David Ignatius of the Washington Post has been one of the few mainstream journalists, columnists, who regularly write about the things that are happening in our field with the depth of knowledge and intelligence that many of us in this room would envy. It's my pleasure to have David Ignatius and Jim Dobbins join us on the stage for a conversation about where this field is going. So thank you to Robert Land. Thanks to all of you. I'm David Ignatius. I want to introduce Jim Dobbins, who's really our speaker, but I want to do so with a few introductory remarks. As Robert said, I have been looking at and thinking about this problem now for, feels like a couple dozen years. I have to say that I think you're gathered here to discuss really the most important issue for U.S. national security policy. It isn't often seen that way, and I think that's part of the problem. But the more I think about where we are in 2013, the more this set of issues seems to me to be absolutely central. Just to think for a couple of minutes with you about what you've all seen, what I've seen as a journalist visiting in and out. I visited over this last decade so many PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, trying to find a new way to bring development assistance, counter-insurgency assistance, intimate contact with people. I can recall going up and down the Kunar River Valley hearing about the road strategy and roads were going to bring business, and business was going to bring stability, and I can remember all the things in Helmand province, walking around Marjor with people who were just telling you that stability was going to happen, and maybe tomorrow if it hadn't happened yesterday and in the belts west of Kandahar, the same feeling of positive energy and dynamism, a whole similar set of hopes and expectations in Iraq before that. And if we're honest and look at the accomplishments of those programs, we have to admit that they're not what we dreamed, that we spent an awful lot of money with, let's be generous, with uncertain results, where we're still hopeful and we'll talk to Jim about what Jim's own expectations are. But now we're in the period where the expeditionary armies that allowed programs like the ones that I'm describing, and I bet most people in the audience can remember clearly, those expeditionary armies are coming home. And as the President says, as his challenger Mitt Romney really ended up by the end of the campaign, echoing the period in which we'll do that, we'll send these big armies abroad to stabilize conflict zones, probably is ending for some good long while. And so what I've been writing about is what I see as the power gap that exists as the armies come home. How does our country project power and shape events in this incredibly turbulent world that we see stretching across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia? When I look at the institutions in Washington that are nominally charged with dealing with problems like the ones that you're going to talk about today, here's what I see. I'm a journalist, I get to say whatever I want, so I'm going to be as frank as I can. I see first USAID, an institution with a long and admirable history, but an institution that in the eyes of many people has become more of a contractor than an operating agency, an agency that's got an awful lot of its own bureaucracy that it has to deal with, an agency that worries an awful lot about what congressional appropriators and authorizers think and gets pretty nervous about steps that it has to take. So an agency whose mission is central, but whose performance is a complicated set of problems. I see the U.S. Institute of Peace, its magnificent building next to the State Department, the nicest real estate in town, and I see many friends there who are doing wonderful work, wonderful studies. But I see an institution that really, if I were to say, how does the USIP fit as an instrument of national power? I think a lot of people in the building would kind of run the other way because that's not the way they want to be seen, and they feel that they can't do their mission if they're seen as being tasked by the NSC, the interagency process. They're very deliberately and self-consciously a boutique. I see the conflict and stabilization operations Bureau of the State Department. You'll be hearing from its director at the end of your session today a wonderful idea, the projects that it's doing, I think seem really good, but it's pretty small. And we're talking about the biggest foreign policy problem that the United States has by my account, and we have less than 200 people the last I counted. They've had to really narrow their focus to a few particular areas where they're going to try to make these operations work. So that can't be the answer. You see the CIA, which has, as its political covert action mission, shaping developments in parts of the world that are in turmoil. That's a complicated function, intersects in complicated ways with political leadership. But also you'd have to say the new director, John Brennan, has made clear that he wants to bring that agency back towards its traditional mission of collecting intelligence. So to the extent that that would be a place you'd look, you have to be careful. Finally, NGOs doing such incredible work, the expertise that's been built up in that sector, the way that it's learned to cooperate and interact with governments is magnificent. And yet if you look from the former Soviet Union, Russia itself and the surrounding countries, Egypt and other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, you see that this is a world in which NGOs are having more and more difficulty, than just American NGOs in operating in this turbulent political climate. I was just down in Tampa visiting Special Operations Command. They bid large to fill this space. No one should have any doubts that Admiral McRaven and SOCOM think if you have a power gap that needs to be filled, there is a network of people in 80 countries around the world and they're ready to fill it. And there are a lot of ways that I'm sure you all understand in which there are compelling participant in efforts to deal with this stabilization reconstruction problem. So that's what I see when I look at the map, when I look at the news or when I travel, I'm seeing Egypt struggling to make a revolution work. You'd have to say so far, honestly, unsuccessfully. I see Syria in the throes of a revolution that you'd have to say honestly right now is leading to the breakup of the country, the collapse of Syria's ability to function as one country. So the agenda couldn't be larger. The stakes couldn't be higher. I feel as a journalist that we in my business don't write enough about what all of you in this room do, that it really is at the center of our national security going forward. The way that we're going to project power is interwoven with what you do. So that's why when Robert Lam asked me if I would come today I said you bet. And I'm eager to hear formally, informally about your experiences as you go forward and struggle with this problem. So that's my word of introduction. Let me turn now to Jim Dobbins. There's a phrase that one of my professors in college used when he was talking about the structure of the medieval world and he talked about the great chain of being where power and knowledge was handed from person to person, generation to generation. And I hope I'm not overdoing it when I say that Jim Dobbins is part of the great chain of being in U.S. national security policy. We have great figures whose names we celebrate at CIS in particular, Dr. Kestcher, Dr. Brzezinski, Richard Holbrook. And then if you were going to extend that list you'd extend it to Jim Dobbins. First on Afghanistan, which I hope we'll talk a good deal about. That's now at the center of what Ambassador Dobbins does because he has replaced Mark Grossman replacing Richard Holbrook as our special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. It's fitting that he has this job because he was the person who was in there at the beginning at the Bonn conference when today's modern, postmodern, modern, post-Taliban Afghanistan was created. And so I think really more than anyone he knows the personalities in the story. He also was deeply involved in the transitions in the former Yugoslavia in the state, in the intervention and post-intervention stabilization in Bosnia, in Kosovo, across that region. And so you could say that he's seen the toughest example of this challenge in Afghanistan, but also seen areas where it can be successful. And I hope that Jim will explain to us what the source of the success where it's been found has been. But with that introduction, I just would like to ask Jim to begin by talking about his current mission. I think Afghanistan has receded from the news some, but not from our concerns. Jim has overall responsibility as a special representative for guiding this policy. And I'd ask Jim to describe where we are now as you see it and where we're heading as we move toward the crucial year of 2014 in which our combat forces will leave and a handover to the Afghans will take place. Well, thank you. We are indeed facing a number of important transitions over the next 18 months. A transition from NATO and American combat operations to Afghan-dominated combat operations, although our plans do retain a small American combat force there after 2015, directed largely toward Al Qaeda and its affiliates. A transition from an externally funded economic growth to a more internally promoted economic growth. And a transition from no peace talks to ideally some peace talks. But the most important transition is the transition from a Karzai-led government to a somebody else-led government. Assuming this takes place, and I think there's every reason to believe it will take place, it'll be the first time in Afghanistan's history that you've had a peaceful transition from one civilian government to another, indeed from any government to another. And this transition more than anything else I think will determine the prospects for Afghanistan. If it's successful then the other pieces will fall into place and if it's unsuccessful it's going to be much more difficult. But let me try to put the experience in Afghanistan in some perspective given the larger topic that we're here with today. I've been in the back in the State Department for two months now and I spent the previous 11 years reflecting on an earlier set of experiences and looking at experiences of others in the post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization field. And just a few weeks before leaving the RAND Corporation, Laurel Miller, a colleague and I finished a study which I think illustrates the overall experience in this area and puts the Iraq and Afghan experience in some perspective because I think we're in danger of over-learning those lessons because they're first of all the largest of these efforts and they're the ones that we're most heavily engaged in. But they're not the only efforts. At RAND we looked at 20 cases in which there had been a combination of a civilian and military intervention in a conflict or post-conflict society since 1989. In other words, nearly 25 years of experience. And this is a pretty comprehensive list. It includes all the big American experiences, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. It includes a dozen or more smaller UN civil-military operations and a few that were conducted by others. And we tried to measure the outcomes in these operations. That is, what did they accomplish? And we used a number of criteria. We used World Bank figures to determine government effectiveness. Did the effectiveness of the government improve? The World Bank rates every country every year. So we've got an index and so you can look over a 10-year period what was achieved and when we took a 10-year period. We used IMF data for economic growth. We used Freedom House data for democratization. And we used UNTP data for human development, which is a combination of education, health and standard of living. And of course we tried to determine whether or not the country or society was peaceful at the end of the 10 years. And then rated all 20 of them. Now these 2016 were at peace. So the success rate for peace was quite high, 16 out of 20. Across the other indices, they almost all, even the ones that weren't peaceful, showed a good deal of progress. That is to say there was an improvement in democratization. There was economic growth. There was improvement in human development. And there was increases in democratization. And in terms of human development for instance, these societies on average improved at a higher rate than the world as a whole. In economic growth, they grew at a rate higher for the most part than their regions and their sectors. In other words, lesser developed, middle developed. They grew faster than those. So the efforts, the assistance efforts, the reconstruction efforts, broadly speaking, achieved measurable results across all of those. And I'll come to Afghanistan because its results were quite striking. In democratization, it was about at the average point. I think about a 15% improvement in your Freedom House score over a decade. In economic growth, it was the second highest of all 20. In government effectiveness, it was the third highest of all 20. And in human development, it was the highest of all 20. And you can see that, and I'm not talking about absolute levels. Obviously, Afghanistan is not the most highly developed country in the world. It was the level of growth, the improvement in the index over that period that we're talking about. So all of these societies, if they started poor, ended up poor. If they were poorly governed, they ended up poorly governed. They were just less poorly governed and less poor at the end of the period. And Afghanistan in the area of human development was the highest. And this is because longevity has gone from 44 years to 60 years. Literacy has gone from 15% to 30-some percent. And it will be over 60% by 2025 if the kids in school now stay in school. Per capita GDP is up 130%. So across these indices, you see significant improvements. Now, Afghanistan was one of the four countries that wasn't at peace, which, of course, is why we intervene in countries. We don't intervene militarily in poor countries to make them rich. Neither does the UN. And we don't send troops to authoritarian countries to make them democratic. We, the United States, we, the United Nations, we, the international community, sometimes intervene in violent countries to make them peaceful. And if you don't make them peaceful, then whatever else you've achieved, you haven't achieved your central purpose. And we haven't achieved that yet in Afghanistan. We didn't achieve it entirely in Iraq. And the other two cases that were found to be not peaceful were the Congo and Somalia. What was it that differentiated the peaceful from non-peaceful? The major differentiation was whether or not the entry of foreign troops was consensual. In cases where there was a peace agreement that needed to be enforced and the parties invited an intervention with one exception, they were all successful. And this included cases where the peace was coerced. In other words, in Bosnia and Kosovo, we kept bombing them until we said, we're going to continue to bomb you until you agree. But they did agree. In other words, it was a coerced agreement, but it wasn't an agreement. We didn't just enter and disperse the one regime and replace it with another regime. We compelled the regime to agree. And so there were peace agreements in Bosnia and Kosovo which have held. So that's the main differentiator between peace and non-peace. The other one is size. The country the size of the Congo was just very difficult to stabilize. They have a weak government that can't control that much territory. And the international community simply can't afford to dispose the kind of assets that would actually be able to stabilize the country of that size. We found that none of the other factors that you would think would determine success or failure, that is ethnic diversity, levels of poverty, levels of education, levels of democratic experience, all of those things had no effect on levels of improvement. They obviously had an effect on absolute outcomes. If they started rich, they ended up rich. If they started democratic, they ended up democratic. But in terms of level of improvements, those had no effect. The two things that had effect were geopolitics, whether you could curb the behavior of maligned neighbors. And secondly, whether you could successfully co-opt competing patronage networks within the societies in order to get them to essentially seek rents peacefully and competitively within a peaceful environment rather than violently. And in cases where you didn't curb the maligned behavior of neighbors, and in cases like Iraq and Afghanistan where you actually tried to exterminate one of the patronage networks rather than co-opt it, you had less success in promoting peace. So those were the lessons of the study. And I think it puts the Iraq and the Afghan experience in some perspective and suggests that in drawing lessons for other situations around the world, we need to look at a broader universe of cases than just those two. Let me take Afghanistan and your immediate challenge over the next year, 18 months. And that is the political transition from President Karzai, a man that you know all too well I would expect over many years. But we can assume that with this election transition, we'll have some new political leader. The question I want to ask you is one that I find myself scratching my head over all the time. And that is how on this absolutely crucial decision for a country that we have decided is of enormous importance to the United States to the point that we have spent some hundreds of billions of dollars to influence its future, how can we effectively shape this political transition so as to get the best possible result for Afghanistan and for the United States, its interests including the interests of neighboring countries without going over the line. And I'll just leave that definition fuzzy for the moment. What are your thoughts about that? How do we shape a political environment without doing something that we shouldn't? Well, it's difficult. As I said, this is the most important transition, the one that's most crucial for American interests as well as Afghan interests. It's also the one over which we have the least leverage. And to the extent we have influence, we have to be careful about using it for precisely the reasons you suggested that it could be counterproductive. I think we need to be, first of all, we need to look at both process and outcomes. The international community, American public, European public, are going to focus heavily on process. It is the election free and fair. Most Afghans are going to focus on outcome. Did the process produce somebody in whom they have confidence and somebody with whom they can live? And I think the polling after the last presidential election is indicative. Most Afghans, according to opinion polls, thought the election was fraudulent and were quite satisfied with the result. And so, ideally, we need to go for something which meets both those criteria. If the election is procedurally flawed to a severe degree, that is, it skews the outcome. And the fraud in the last election didn't skew the outcome. I mean, it was clear that Karzai was going to win, that the degree of fraud which inflated his vote was unnecessary. He might have had to go to a second round, but he was 20 points ahead and was certainly going to win. So the fraud in that case didn't skew the outcome. The fraud that did or could have skewed the outcome would be much more problematic. So process does matter, but so does outcome. And Karzai is a controversial figure increasingly, but he has been successful in creating a political and patronage network which transcends sectarian boundaries in that country and which allows him to project political influence in Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, and Pashtun communities in areas where the formal institutions of the state don't exist or extremely weak. And so it's going to be important that this upcoming campaign, you know, produce an outcome which results in a leader that has a substantial constituency across sectarian lines. And this means encouraging Afghan elites to do as they are doing to try to coalesce, to try to put together not just individual candidates based on personalities and command of small voter allegiances within narrow sectarian communities, which is the natural pattern in an electoral system in which there are no parties in which anybody can run and you have a two-term presidential system, but rather to put together slates in which a candidate has a couple of vice presidential intentions who are of different ethnicities than himself or herself that has indicated who's going to be the defense minister, who's going to be the interior minister, who's going to be the economic minister in general terms so that they're running as a slate in effect. And there are conversations among Afghan elites trying to coalesce around one or several candidacies that transcend narrow sectarian divides. And I think, you know, to the extent we can encourage that and frankly it's not something that we can directly influence other than benignly noticing that it's going on and applauding it, I think if that succeeds and if you get one, two, or three candidates who have coalitions of that sort, you know, then the election is more likely to produce a result that is of enduring value for the country. So let me just bracket that and ask you to briefly expand on a part of it and not necessarily restrict yourself to Afghanistan, but you neatly described a basic dilemma that the United States has encountered every place I can think of starting with Vietnam, which is that it's in our interest to find a leader who can put together a patronage network that allows the leader to govern across what are inevitably different ethnic clan tribes tribal divisions and operate effectively as a leader. To that leader's opponents, to people who are not part of the network, that looks like corruption. And so as you travel in Kandahar and Helmand Province and you hear about Karzai and you wait for the government to deliver services, what you discover is that the government is seen as, and to some extent is, this network of patronage appointees but not really a national government. And so how do you, Jim, resolve that tension between having an effective patronage network and having something that's a clean enough national government that it meets those first world tests? Well, first of all, I think it's overstatement and indeed quite inaccurate to argue that the Afghan government doesn't deliver services. You're not getting a doubling in literacy rates because the Afghan government isn't delivering education. It is delivering education. There are millions of children in school. You're not getting increases in longevity because they're not projecting healthcare more broadly in the population than it's ever existed in the past. You're not getting increases in public participation because the government isn't supporting a private network of 75 TV stations, cell phone towers that give coverage to 90% of the country, 18 million telephone users where they were only 40,000 ten years ago. The government's either directly promoting those services, healthcare and education, or largely government-run services in the country, or it's creating a framework in which private enterprise can profitably project things like cell phone, television, half the families in the country have access to television. So the government is providing some degree of services. Now, you're absolutely right that one person's patronage network is somebody else's corruption, and I think the levels of corruption in the country are unacceptably high. Although, again, if you compare the country to its immediate neighbors, it has a slightly more efficient tax collection system than Pakistan. It certainly is more democratic than China, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or Turkmenistan, and it's not noticeably more corrupt than many of those, and those are better comparisons than Switzerland or even the Balkans in terms of how quickly you expect this society to evolve. But that said, I mean, I think that we do need to continue to try to contain corruption and criticize it where we see it, but at the same time, we do need to understand that in a country with very weak institutions, none of which are more than a decade old, none of which therefore inspire the kind of loyalty that our institutions inspire in us, people are going to focus on how to help their brothers, their cousins, their extended family, their tribe. Those are the primary loyalties that are likely to dominate the society, and one is working against that gradually by building up these formal institutions. That's a good answer. I want to ask you to reflect a little bit on what I was describing as the toolkit for reconstruction and stabilization, this array of agencies in Washington in the period that we're now living in. You're going to take care of the rest of this story of Afghanistan while our troops remain, but looking beyond that, looking at a toolkit that as I said has USAID, USIP, CSB, CIA, NGOs of various descriptions. How do you in your own mind think about the use of those different instruments and what do you think we need to do better to fill what I describe as the power gap as our big armies leave? How do we fill that with those agencies, how directed, or maybe with some new institutions that we don't yet have? Well, I think the civilian elements of our government are not as functional and not as integrated as they could be, and so I'll come back to that in a second, but I do want to put this in some perspective. You know, I commented before I took my current job on a number of occasions that modern generals are fond of saying that there's no military solution to the problem they face, and this usually means they're losing. And they're usually losing not because there hasn't been enough civilian capacity directed to the problem, but because there hasn't been enough military capacity directed to the problem. That's not to say that, you know, in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2008 or so, or in Iraq for the first year, a year and a half, there were enough civilians. But the inadequacy of the civilian response wasn't the reason those societies plunged back into civil war. The reason was that they weren't, we hadn't deployed a stabilization force that was adequate to the task. It didn't have a mandate and it didn't have the training and doctrine necessary to conduct those kind of stability operations and as a result those societies degenerated back into civil war. So it's very difficult in a conflict or post-conflict environment to register the kind of progress I talked about across these 20 societies if there's no security. And civilians are not going to bring security. Civilians operate in an environment in which somebody else is going to have to provide security now. In some cases, indigenous institutions are capable of doing that. But increasingly, we are finding ourselves in situations like Egypt, like Tunisia, like Syria where we the West, we the international community, we the United Nations are not ready to deploy peacekeeping forces among other reasons because the societies don't want them. I'm not suggesting this is necessarily a viable option. I'm just suggesting that trying to stable those societies with purely civilian assets is difficult. And the lessons from the studies I've done really probably don't entirely apply in situations like that. Now, in terms of the efficacy of our institutions, my preference would be to see the Agency for International Development rebranded the Agency for Reconstruction and Development that the various civilian programmatic functions that are carried out elsewhere in the US government transferred to that agency along with development activities like AIDS combating and the Millennium Challenge times things put all these development and reconstruction functions in a single agency still supporting that agency to the State Department because in post-conflict environments as I said the most important factor for success or failure is the geopolitical factor. It's curbing the behavior of maligned neighbors and a reconstruction strategy has to be directed from a policy standpoint not from a developmental standpoint but put all those including the things in the State Department now into a bulked up, much more substantial agency. I mean, that's my answer. That's what I suggested in the last what was it called the QDDR Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. I think it's probably not going to fly in the Congress. It certainly didn't fly in the administration. I don't expect to have any more success now that I'm in the administration and it's not an area for which I have any responsibility. So that's really a comment not from somebody in office but from somebody who had a lot of experience and sometimes studying these problems. Might make a good newspaper column though. It's all yours. So I want to ask you one last question and then ask you to sum up the points that you most want to make to this audience. My last question is, again, one that vexes me when I travel and that's the intensity and persistence of anti-Americanism sometimes in the countries that we have tried hardest to assist and I think in particular of Pakistan and Egypt. These are two countries that we know that every policy analyst knows are crucial for the security and stability of the regions where they are. They're anchors for those regions. They're countries where there are historic ties between the U.S. and the military that ought to give us a good starting point. They're places where heaven knows we've appropriated a lot of money. It's not as if we weren't spending the money in those places. And yet I find year after year we just seem to get less popular. To the point that the other day the leader of this Egyptian liberal uprising won't even meet with Bill Burns. Holy smokes! How did that happen? So let me just ask you to ruminate a little bit on this problem of anti-Americanism sometimes in the places we've tried hardest to help. I don't know if I can give you a generic answer but there's clearly, you know, people have written Why Do They Hate Us as it relates largely to the Arab or Muslim world. There's a big literature on that and there are historic reasons that really have relatively little to do with the specificity of what's happening in Egypt or Syria at the moment. I do think that in places where we've successfully contributed to stabilization and reconstruction societies that are peaceful and more prosperous as a result of our efforts there's usually substantial gratitude and a quite pro-American attitude. Not necessarily shared by those who were marginalized as a result of our intervention or who were our initial adversaries but even there there's a grudging respect since it's in the Balkans. And so this problem doesn't exist. I mean I think it's partially a function of the broader issues of integrating the Muslim world into a modern globalized world and us as the primary face of globalization, westernization, secular democracy that creates some of this. And in some cases it's simply where we haven't succeeded that our efforts however well meaning have been ineffectual and because we're being powerful we get blamed for the difficulties of a society not successfully making a transition. So Jim let me ask you to wrap up this portion of the discussion. This group will talk through the day about really all the important stabilization challenges around the world and perhaps you could just leave them with your parting thoughts about the issues they need to think about. Well I guess I would just argue again for trying to put these problems in some perspective. You know because we're living in the middle of an admittedly somewhat turbulent era we tend to think that we're overwhelmed by the range of challenges and that the world is chaotic and violent but in fact there seldom been periods where the world has been more peaceful and less threatened by catastrophic violence of the sort that we saw throughout the 20th century and indeed for much longer stretches of history. Now maybe we're coming out of a period of unusual peace but certainly since the end of the Cold War certainly up to 9-11 and even after 9-11 the number of people getting killed in wars was going way down the number of internally displaced and refugees was going way down the number of conflicts was going way down I mean we reduced the number of conflicts in the world between 1989 and about 2000 by more than 50% and the casualties resulted from those conflicts by well more than 50% and although that pace of reductions slowed in the subsequent decade it didn't stop entirely and in Africa there are far less civil wars and violence today than there have been historically since the end of the colonial era we're focused on the threat of militant Islam in a few countries in Africa and it's certainly something worth being concerned about but in terms of levels of violence in that continent it pales in comparisons with what you were seeing in earlier decades so I think the whole thing has to be put in some perspective and similarly the success or failure of international interventions as a whole again I think looking at the experience overall suggests that we're successful more often than not there is a big difference between trying to stabilize large populist countries and small countries there's a big difference between trying to do it in countries you don't care a lot about and countries you do care a lot about and clearly if the country is small and you care a lot about it you're going to be able to have a more transformative effect on Kosovo or Bosnia for instance then if the country is really big and you don't care that much about it the Congo for instance and you just have to accept that you can't replicate that level of success in big countries that you're not that you're not willing to commit that level of engagement to that was for me fascinating I hope also for the audience have a wonderful day talking about the biggest problem in the world and we wish you luck and join me in thanking Jim Dobbins