 In the last class, as we have seen that, I was explaining about consciousness and creativity, I was explaining in respect to creativity, human and machines and how can we ascribe creativity to machines and is there any machine creativity or not. In order to prove that, whether of machines and creativity or not, we have to discuss about the consciousness and creativity. But in this second lectures on creativity, human versus machines, deals with the problem of the relationship between creativity and consciousness. There are many philosophical problems which can be raised in this connection. What is consciousness? What role, if any, does consciousness plays in the explanation of creativity? Here, I am not arguing whether machines or robots have consciousness or creativity, which we have already discussed in the last section. But in this section, I want to show how consciousness and creativity goes together. And what role consciousness has in a creative act? Philosophers have treated consciousness as a mystery for a long time. In the recent years, researchers from diverse fields like psychology, neuroscience, computer science, physics, etc. are showing interest in the subject and are coming forward to share their findings with others. Consciousness is very much related to the creative activities, because a human being cannot be creative without being conscious. This does not mean that a man who is conscious is necessarily creative, but consciousness is an essential feature of the human mind. If consciousness truly is such an essential feature of our mind, then the question is, is it, definitely, there are no universal accepted answers to these questions. We are still in search of a true theory of consciousness. Consciousness, all we know about consciousness that it is a phenomena which cannot be measured or observed or experienced in public, because it is a subjective experience as we have seen. It can be known only from a first person perspective, but not from the third person or scientific or objective perspective. Because the self is the subject which feels, thinks and perceives. This is the qualitative character of the human experience. Thomas Nagel, one of the profounder of this thesis on consciousness, he says that an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism, something it is like for the organism. We may call this the subjective character of experience. All experiences, therefore, are essentially subjective. As Searle has argued, subjectivity is the most important feature of the conscious mental state and processes. According to him, the conscious mental states do not have objective criteria and so are essentially first person experiences. For him, subjectivity is an ontological category. Searle puts it in this way. When we realize the world with this in our eyes, we cannot see consciousness. Indeed, it is the very subjective of consciousness that makes it visible in the crucial way. If we try to draw a picture of someone else's consciousness, we just end up drawing the other people's. Perhaps with a balloon growing out of his or her head. If we try to draw our own consciousness, we end up drawing whatever it is that we are conscious of. According to Searle, for the first person phenomenon of consciousness, it is irreducible and so cannot be explained objectively. It cannot be observed the way objective phenomena are observed. He comes to this conclusion by the following reasoning that the notion of observation of seeing something works on the presupposition that there is a distinction. There is a distinction between the thing seen and the thing seeing of it. But for observation, there is simply no way to make this separation. Any interpretation we have of our own conscious state is itself that conscious state. Now we have to explore what role, if any, does consciousness play in the explanation of creativity. In general sense, all conscious beings are creative because creativity is a feature of consciousness. We human beings manifest or show our creativity in our day to day life. For example, writing poems, musical compositions, scientific theories, painting and many other things are creative acts. This also shows that creativity is an essential feature of mind or consciousness because creativity presupposes that the creative being is conscious. There are many creative ideas which have followed from human consciousness. For example, creating computer or robots is an unexpected use of everyday objects that could have happened before. These machines have been created by creative minds. They themselves cannot be creative because they lack consciousness. Creativity is itself mystery which cannot be scientifically explained. As Borden writes, creativity is puzzle, a paradox. Some says a mystery. Inventors, scientists and artists really know how their original ideas arise. They maintain intuitions but cannot say how it works. Creativity is due to human intuitions which is beyond the scope of scientific investigation. Thus intuition is itself a creative process beyond the realm of scientific investigations. As we have already discussed, there are two kinds of creativity. Psychological creativity or Pe creativity and historical creativity or H creativity. There are some important features on creativity that I am not going to repeat here. But I am going to explain in comparison to human creativity and human consciousness. Now, we have to see machine consciousness and creativity is derivative. How the machine consciousness and creativity is derivative? The key words here are machines, consciousness and creativity. Now, it is entirely possible that the meaning of these words may change. Consequently, the statement involving them may no longer stand in the same logical relation to the other statement as they do now. This may occur for a variety of reasons. However, moving beyond the reasons for the time being, it can be asked whether it is possible for a machine to do self-conscious. The user answer is no. Woodenstein makes the following remarks while answering these questions in his philosophical investigations. He says, only of a living human being and what responsible behaves like a living human being can one say it has sensations. It sees, is blind, hears, is deaf, is conscious or unconscious. Again, he remarks, we do indeed say of an inanimate thing that is in pain. When playing with dolls, for example, but this use of the concept of pain is a secondary one. Imagine a case in which people ascribe pain only to inanimate things, pitide only to dolls. Thus, only of what behaves like a living thing can we say that it is conscious. This claim connects consciousness with life, but not with what constitutes life rather than with what manifests or express it. A living thing might, therefore, in principle qualify for the ascription of consciousness. So, long as it behaves like a living conscious thing, we are so prone to count the robbers of science fiction films as conscious beings, because though they are not alive, they act as if they are, as if they are. We cannot make a conscious stone, because the stone does not behave in a way we recognize as experience of its supposed consciousness. However, it may be claimed by some that machine can examine their own mechanism. Artificial intelligence programs, for example, suggest that their program have inbuilt mechanism to examine their own mechanisms. For example, as we have seen the movie on i-Robot and of Spider-Man 2 and many other movies which are based on artificial intelligence, and there you will find some kind of self-gama mechanism in the robot. And that shows that the self-gama mechanism is sufficient to explain the self-consciousness according to artificial intelligence scientist or machine intelligent scientist. The field of machine intelligence, a devoted in large measure to the goal of reproducing mentality in computational machines. So far as the program have been limited, but supporters argue that they have every reason to believe that eventually computers will, too, will have minds. It is easy to say that machines have consciousness, because it is logically possible to design and build computer-based machines that are intelligent and can read meaning in symbols. This is to say that intelligence is not necessarily embedded in living organisms, but many occur in a computer system based on silicon. One of the important strong claim is that any physical system that is capable of carrying out the necessary processes can be meaningfully intelligent. Hence, it is very easy to say that a machine has intelligence, because it performs important tasks like live human beings. It is hard to believe that machine is conscious, because there is no conscious effort in machines that is there is no subjective experience of machines. Now, we have to face the questions, is it possible that unintelligent machines could give rise to an intelligent conscious experiences? Consciousness is defined as the having of the perception of thought, feeling and awareness. It is the basic presupposition of all that we do in our working life. It is something we know directly. From this point of view, the machines are not conscious the way human beings are. As David Chalmers claims, one of the founder of non-mechanistic concept of mind in his book on the conscious mind, he has explained about this and that. The subjective quality is the consciousness is something the subjective quality of experience. He says that consciousness has subjective quality of experience. Consciousness has subjective quality because the subjective experience is a mental state. It is i who feels the i. The i possesses the central problem relating to consciousness. The i is not a part of the body, but it is more than the body. This is to say that the i is distinct from the body. This qualitative feature i is treated as the subjectivity of consciousness. That is why consciousness is defined in terms of qualitative field of experience or qualia and on which we have already explained, but I will be discussing in relation to creativity. Furthermore, as we have already seen, consciousness stands for an internal aspect. Since there is something, it feels to be like a cognitive agent. This internal aspect is conscious experiences. We know perfectly well that we are conscious of things around us, including other people, but we do not grasp consciousness itself. However, it is this common features, consciousness which may be said to be the central element in the concept of mind. The distinction between conscious and unconscious things, the fact that we cannot draw a line between the non-conscious and the conscious is similar to the fact that we cannot draw a line in the spectrum where blue ends and green begins. That we cannot draw a dividing line does not mean that there is no difference between the two extremes. It is the central issue in philosophy to draw the dividing line between the conscious and the unconscious. Therefore, philosophy of mind is concerned with all mental phenomena where mental phenomena are to be understood as all phenomena that involves consciousness. Intentionality is a unique characteristics of the mental phenomena. This is because our consciousness is always consciousness of something. As all puts it, intentionality is that feature of certain mental states and events that consist in their, in special sense of these words, being directed at and being about, being of or representing certain other entities and state of affairs. Assault shows that all our conscious experiences are not intentional in the sense that there may be conscious experience which are not about anything to particular. of or representing certain other entities and state of affairs. Sol shows that all our conscious experiences are not intentional in the sense that there may be conscious experience which are not about anything to particular. Sol writes beliefs, fears, hopes and desires are intentional. But there are forms of nervousness, relations and undirected anxiety that are not intentional. Thus, intentionality is not the same as consciousness because once feeling of a sudden happiness or relation may not have any cause and so that a person may not able to cite the intentional referent of his or her happiness or relation. For example, if I have a fear or desire, it must be a desire, fear of something. Sol thus argues that conscious state in general are intentional in character. This intentionality already Prof. Ranjan Pandah has explained in his lectures and I will be explaining this intention in respect to creativity and consciousness. The intentionality of mental states relates the intentional state with state of affairs in the world. According to Sol, intentional states represent objects and state of affairs in the sense of represent that speech acts represent objects and state of affairs. According to him, just as there is a distinction between the propositional content and the illusionary force in a speech act and in the same way in the case of intentionality, there is a distinction between the representational content and the psychological mode. As we have already discussed that the instrumentalist reduce intentionality to mechanical processes. According to instrumentalists, we can attribute intentionality to a mechanical systems. Since the machine can have an intentional stance, as Dennett points out, the definition of intentional systems I have given does not say that intentional systems really have beliefs and desires but that one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. Again, Sol has argued that intentionality cannot be reduced to the causal processes in the brain since it is a part of consciousness. Intentional and mental phenomena are part of our natural biological life history. As Sol puts it, intentional phenomena like other biological phenomena are really increasing feature of certain biological algorithm in the same way that metosis, meiosis and other secretions of bile are really increasing feature of certain biological algorithm which we have already explained some of lectures. For Sol, human beings have certain intrinsic intentional states which are caused by processes in the nervous systems of these organisms and they are realized in the structure of these nervous systems. He advocated that what is called biological naturalism according to which mind is really real in the natural world. This entails a form of property dualism in the Cartesian traditions which accept mind as an emergent property of the natural order. Like John Sol, David Chalmers also has explained, argued that no reductive explanation of consciousness is possible because consciousness logically does not supervenient on the physically fact. According to him, a consciousness is naturally supervenient but not logically supervenient on the physical facts. His argument is that consciousness different from all other properties including biological properties such as life. For example, in the case of a Jumbi though they are physical features of a human organism yet it lacks consciousness. According to Chalmers the logical possibility of Jumbi seems equally obvious to me. A Jumbi is just something a physical identical to me but which has no conscious experience. All is dark inside the physical identity between a Jumbi and a human being does not entail the Jumbi being conscious thus we have to accept that there is an explanatory gap between physical processes and mental processes which we will explore in the next sections. According to strong artificial intelligence the machines like computers have intelligence though they have no consciousness but the question is do computers have intelligence in a derivative sense but that does not make them have conscious intentional experience. This raises possibility that intelligence cognitions and information processing do not require consciousness. If machines are not conscious it does not mean that human beings are not conscious it is consciousness which makes the distinction between mind and machines. And again it is consciousness which accounts for the first person or subjective experience. Machines lack consciousness as they are designed to function mechanically. It is important to discuss the relationship between consciousness and free will in this connection. It is not easy to prove that the one is impossible without the other but it is certain that we cannot prove that the robot is conscious and that it has a free will. We have complete causal explanation of all its behavior and this explanation does not at any stage depend on its consciousness and so its behavior cannot be a proof of position of consciousness. Consciousness is not a property that can be detected in a machine by any physical examinations because it cannot be identified with any physical characteristics but a conscious robot is just an assemblies of more elementary artifacts, silicon chips etc. Therefore it has no element of consciousness and free will in it. Machine consciousness is thus impossible and which needs no elaborate demonstrations. Machines or robots are purely material things and consciousness requires immaterial mind stuff and mental states and events are a product of the person of the brain. Program is not in that way a product of the computer. A machine is inorganic and consciousness can exist only in organic brain. It is not that consciousness is necessary to explain certain behavior in machines although one may feel that consciousness can go along with actions of the machines. It does not follow the follow from it that in fact consciousness accompanies them. Machines that seems to use the word conscious correctly do so simply because they are programmed in a certain way. Machines remains life less and in and in not devices even if they are manipulated intelligently by the human designers. The robot is simply a machine which is essentially distinct from the human in its behavior aspects. Therefore humans and not robots are conscious. It is true that a robot can be can do many things which human beings do. Another important fact regarding machine is that machines or robots can do more work than humans being. Even then a robot has no consciousness, no free will and no mind. It is really absurd to talk of a stone or a stopwatch whatever it is conscious because it is absurd to talk of as it is being dead, asleep, drugged or unconscious. However there are case where it is very difficult to decide the question of consciousness. That is bacteria, jellyfish, etcetera which are unlike stones, stopwatches and the computers. In these cases it is difficult to say whether these organisms have minds like ours. As we know some qualities that belong to human minds do not belong to any other organism. In contrast to these however idea of a conscious machine is a contradiction in terms because the word consciousness stand for something natural and the word machine stand for something artificial. It is absurd to say that machines are conscious. Thus the idea of machine consciousness and creativity is at least derivative concept and at worst a self contradictory notion. Now we have to see that how machine intelligence and consciousness fails in explaining consciousness and creativity. As we have seen already that the way artificial intelligence explains the concept of creativity and consciousness is very mechanical and artificial. It explains consciousness in terms of computational of the brain and so it fails to account for the creative feature of consciousness. As we have already argued that creativity is one of the essential feature of the consciousness because artificial intelligence removes explanatory gap between mind and body because according to it there is no distinction between mind and between the mental activity that mechanical functions of the brain. Now we have to see the hard problem of consciousness which is very interesting. The hard problem of consciousness are the aversalmas are shown is the problem of experience special to first person perspective character which cannot be explained within a scientific framework. Cognitive science can explains a systems function in terms of its internal mechanism but it is not possible to explain what it is to have subjective experiences because it is not a problem about the performance of functions. In recent times all sort of mental phenomena have yielded scientific explanation but consciousness has stubbornly resisted this explanations. Many philosophers and scientist have tried to explain it but the explanation always seems to fall of the target. Now the question is what is it so difficult to explain according to Chalmers. Cognitive science has explained why there is conscious experience at all. We think and perceive there is a way of information processing but there are also subject to individual aspect of consciousness which go beyond information processing. Chalmers writes that when it comes to conscious experience this sort of explanation fails what makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond the problem about the problem of performance of functions. To see this not that even when we explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience perceptual discriminations categorizations internal access verbal report there may still remain a further questions why the performance of these functions accompanied by experiences according to him. Even if all the functions of a systems are well articulated there is further questions as to why there is any experience at all accompanying their functions. Cognitive science fails to explain why there is any experience at all even though it explains all the brain functions according to Chalmers. The hard problem of consciousness consists in the why questions regarding consciousness but the question is why is the hard problem is hard and why are the easy problem is so easy according to Chalmers. The easy problems are easy because this concerns the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. To explains a cognitive function we need a mechanism that can perform the functions the cognitive science offers this type of explanation and so are well suited to the easy problem of consciousness which can see this now. On the other hand so the hard problem is hard because it is not a problem about the performance of functions. The problem persists even when the performance of all the relevant functions are explained. Machine intelligence has not solved the hard problem of consciousness because as we have seen it has explained consciousness only in terms of easy problem of consciousness. Easy problems are all concerned with how a cognitive or behavioral function is performed. These are questions about how the brain carries out the cognitive task that is how it discriminates stimulus, integrates information and so on. Whereas the hard problem of consciousness was beyond the problem of about how functions are performed. If artificial intelligence tried to give a definite definition of consciousness then it leaves out the explanatory gap that is to say it discusses the discussion between mind and body. If this is so then it leaves out subjective experience and out for there will be only a third person perspective of consciousness and if that is a third person perspective of consciousness then machine consciousness is possible. Now we have to see explanatory gap and subjectivity which is one of the important aspects of human creativity and human consciousness. Consciousness makes the mind body problem really intractable. The reductionist deny that there is a mind body problem at all. For them there is no explanatory gap between mind and body because there is no distinction between mind and body. Mind can be explained in terms of body and there is nothing called the mind. Since the mind itself is a part of the body therefore for them the mind is reductively explainable in terms of body. On the other hand many philosophers hold that mental states are not reducible to any physical states that is the mental states are not reductively explainable. Chalmers argues that no reductive explanation of consciousness can succeed because there is subjective quality of experience therefore he argues that this quality of consciousness makes it different from all other properties including emergent biological properties such as life and these things we I have already explained in the few lectures. The essence of body is special extensions and the essence of mind is thought though it takes to be the defining attributes of mind which in an incorporeal substance a substance that is non-special in nature. What follows from Descartes view is that consciousness is essentially a first person for subjective phenomena and conscious states cannot be reduced or eliminated in to third person perspective therefore it is consciousness which make the explanatory gap between the first person and third person perspective. But according to Cartesian conceptions we have access to the contents of our own mind in a way denied us in respect to matter there is something special about our own knowledge of our own minds that naturally goes with the Cartesian view. Pradhan argues that the mental life with his qualia cannot be nomologically determined by the physical conditions of the universe. The following as are the reason for the thesis that the mental life is independent of the physical body though they coexist. First with the qualia of the mental life mental state cannot be reduced to any unartificial machines like the robot or machines tables they are unique of the person concerned. Secondly the qualia are the essence of consciousness and so must the increasing to the conscious subject there is integrally gap between the qualia and the physical world remains at the qualia are understood widely as belonging to the conscious subject. Consciousness according to Nagel makes the gap between mind and body and subjectivity is its most troublesome features self is the subject which encompasses our feelings thinking and presumption. The qualitative character of consciousness or experiences is what it is like is the subjectivity and subjective experience as we have seen in the section subjectivities cannot be explained reductively. It is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory systems of functional states or internal states since they could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing there is a subjective feeling attached to our conscious experience because subjective feelings are the outcome of our conscious experience that is consciousness itself cannot be established simply on the basis of what we observe about the brain and its physical effects. We can explain which property of the brain accounts for consciousness distinct cognitive properties namely perceptions and introductions necessarily mediate our relationship with the brain and with consciousness. We cannot understand how the subject aspect of experience depends upon the brain that is really the problem. Consciousness according to salt is essential subjectivity and this is not a mechanical state as many philosophers believes some of these are biological systems are consciousness and that consciousness is essential subjectivity. The term pain is subjective as it is not ascribed to any observable because it is a first person experience. The pain itself has a subjective mode of experience. John sol puts it like this he says that conscious states exist only when they are experienced by some humans or animal subject. In that sense they are essential subjective. I used to treat subjectivity and qualitiveness as distinct features but it now seems to me that properly understood. Qualitiveness implies subjectivity because in order for that to be qualitative feel to some event there must be some subjective that is experience or event no subjectivity and no experiences. That is to say that the qualitative experience can exist only as experienced by some subjects because conscious states are subjective in this sense it is legitimate to hold that there is a first person ontology as opposed to the third person ontology of mountains and molecules which can exist even when there are no living creatures. Therefore, subjective conscious states have a first person ontology because they exist only when they are experienced by a subjective as self. It is I who has experience in this sense it has the subjective existence. This gap between the self and the body not only establishes explanatory gap but also gives the ontology of first person perspective. Therefore, the subjectivity or I is the central problem of the explanatory gap. Cognitive science tries to explains how conscious experience arise from the electrical processes of the brain but it cannot show how and why conscious states belong to the subjective or I. This qualitative feature of mental states brings the existence of qualia which are the qualitative experience of the human mind which I have already discussed about while I was discussing on qualia but I would like to discuss here on qualia in relation to machine creativity and consciousness. Now, let us see qualia in respect to consciousness and the creativity. Qualia are the interesting quality of consciousness and conscious experiences. For example, the experience of testing a suit is very different from that of watching a movie because both of these have a different qualitative character of experience. This shows that there are different qualitative features of conscious experiences. That is why we cannot derive the pleasure of eating suites by watching movies and vice versa. David Chalmers writes that a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in the mental state. To put it in another way, we can say that a mental state is conscious if it has qualitative field and associated quality of experience. These qualitative fields are also known as phenomenal qualities or qualia for short but functionalists like Dennett have argued that he has been eliminating qualia from this course of mind. The basic reason is that the mind is a machine, it cannot entertain the so called qualitative subjective experiences called the qualia. We have to show how the mentality of human mind cannot be represented in a mechanistic model and that are subjective mental states which need a fast person according to Dennett. Qualia are supposed to be properties of subjects that are ineffable, increasing directly or immediately appraisable in consciousness. Qualia are ineffable because one cannot say exactly what way one is currently seeing, tasting, smelling and so forth. Why qualia are ineffable is that there are increasing properties which seems to imply entirely that they are somehow atomic and unanalysable since they are simply there is nothing to get hold of when trying to describe such properties. Since qualia are ineffable and intrinsic, qualia are private because are interpersonal comparison of these appearing are systematically impossible. Lastly, since they are properties of experiences, qualia are directly accessible to the consciousness because qualia are properties of one's experiences with which one is immediately apprehensible in consciousness. Thus, qualia constitute the phenomenal structure of the mind in that they enrich our understanding of the mind and also provide clue to the ontology of the mental state. What the ultimately is as distinguished from the physical is to known from what the qualia revealed about mind. Therefore, the qualia play a very vital role in the understanding of human mind and human creativity. The important question is that, is Janet Wright in calling qualia the private and ineffable experiences of pure sort? Obviously not. The notion of privacy as we have we known from Wittgenstein's private language argument does not apply to the qualia in the sense that the qualia are intersubjectively intelligibly and that they are available for interpersonal communications. The qualia of color perceptions are such that any two persons belonging to the same linguistic community can easily communicate their color experience and can understand each other well. This shows that the qualia in spite of being subjective are not private at all as to their ineffability or otherwise goes without saying that they are expressible in an interpersonal languages that is the reason why they are accessible to all because if they are suitable placed. Thus, Janet's main argument that the qualia are inaccessible to all except the subject of qualia does not hold good. Again, Janet's argument that qualia are atomic and non-relational is equal weak for reason that the subjective experiences need not be atomic at all because they can be taken as constituting the stream of consciousness in that way they constitute a single unbroken series of conscious experiences. In this sense, the qualia are holistic rather than atomistic. The fact of the matter is that the qualia never exist in the isolation and that they are always in a constellation. For example, the color of experience of a red rose is not only that of the color red, but also that rose plant of certain shape and size. Here, the two experiences do not stand apparent, but constitute the whole. The Janet is skeptical about the reality of the qualia because he believes qualia to be the private experience and there is nothing in the mind that can correspond to these qualitative features of mental states. According to him, the qualitative features are the appearance of the brain state which really are the functional state of the brain. Janet argues against qualia because for him the brain functions as a machine. The brain performs multiple function that is to say that all varieties of thoughts, all mental activities are accomplished in the brain by parallel multi-terror process of interpretations and elaborations of sensory input. That is to say that that is why this model of mind is called multiple draft model of mind. This model which I have already explained in the some of the lectures while I was explaining the artificial model of mind. I am not going to repeat all these things, but Janet has been arguing that the possibility of machines, consciousness and machine creativity, but in order to show that the impossibility of machine, consciousness and machine creativity, we have to argue against Janet's view on mechanistic model of mind. The nature of mind under this model is unfolded in cognitive process which the mind undertakes. For Janet, the mind it turns out to be computing machines programmed to cope with the cognitive representation of the world. For machine functionality like him, the structure of the mind is the structure of the machine consciousness. Therefore, in this respect there is no place for the subject qualia among the mechanical state of the mind. Now, the question is can the qualia be made a part of the third person perspective? Janet's directionistic program is fully committed to the reducibility of the qualia to the brain state. However, this can be opposed on the ground that the qualia are ascribed to a conscious subject and not to the brain because the brain is a physical state though with infinite physical capacity. The subject is not reducible to the brain in the sense that brain itself belongs to the subject. Our conscious mental states have different conscious experiences. For example, a man can see something as red today, but tomorrow he may see the same as green. That is the thing remaining same as man's color experiences can vary from seeing red to seeing green. In this case, the person's color experience undergoes an inversion in the sense that he sees something different from what he used to see earlier. Here, the man is not misidentifying the same object. Rather, he systematically goes on describing his previous experience of red as that of green now. Therefore, we cannot deny the logical possibility of our qualia being inverted in the sense of oneself and of others. The qualia inversions does not entail the physical and the machine functionalist notion of consciousness because qualia inversion would not be possible if the conscious states would have been functionalist states of the brain. The qualia inversion cannot be ascribed to the physical and the machine state. Therefore, functionality approach to consciousness must be rejected on the ground that conscious state are not physical state because conscious states have qualia. Schumacher is one of the profounder of this inverted qualia. He says that in inverted spectrum, there should be a systematic difference between the character of someone's color experience and a certain time and the character of that same person's color experience at another time. But it is conceivable that the two people have similar functioning visual system, but only the thing looks red to one person while they look green to the others. In this spectrum inversions, way things look is possible, but that cannot be given because person's mental life cannot be explained in mechanical terms. As we have mentioned earlier, there is a first person dimensions of the conscious states in that only for the first person point of view we can understand the conscious state. The first person point of view is such that it takes the mental state as belonging to a person's from his or her subjective point of view. In this connection, we can mention source view the first person perspective provides an ontological state to the subjective mental state. Mental states are subjective not in the epistemological sense of being known exclusively by the subject, but in the ontological sense that they are essentially revealed only to subject. The mental life of man cannot be fully represented in a mechanistic system and there are subjective mental state which need a first person perspective of their proper understanding. Functionalism is incompatible with our semantic externalism because functional organism is not simply a matter of sensory inputs, transition from one state to another and motor outputs. Semantic externalism refers to the content of our words and thoughts which is partly determined by our relation with things in environment. Therefore, a robot which has a program encoded into its system does not have any relation to the external element and this kind of limitations is existing not only into machine functions but also to touring machines. Therefore, functionalism is wrong in holding the thesis that a proposition attitude is just like a computational state of for the brain. For example, to believe that there is a cat on the mat is not the same thing that there is a physical state or a computational state believing that there is a cat on the mat. Then the question is whether the semantic and propositional attitudes propositions, attitudes, properties and relations are irreducible to computational, propositional relation. This is impossible because propositional attitudes refers to the intentional state that is to say that it refers to various states of affairs in the world. If I say that I am doing some kind of activities and I will be planning to do some kind of activities and in that sense I have many kind of intentional state and that intentional state cannot be reducible. Therefore, functionality is wrong in saying that semantic and propositional attitudes predicates are semantically reducible to computational predicates. There is no reason why the study of cognitions is required that we try to reduce cognition either to computations or to the brain process. We may well succeeding in discovering theoretical models of the brain which vastly increase our understanding of how the brain works but if we will reduce the human mind into brain in no way helps us understanding the mind. Therefore, functionality fails accounts for the real nature of the mental state because of unsuccessful attempts to reduce mental state to the mechanical state. It fails as a theory of mind because fails in a reductionistic domain and it explains in the meaningless way of about the human mind. And therefore, fails the mind in explaining in the non-computational way. Therefore, if it fails then it cannot explain the consciousness and the creativity and even if it explain the consciousness and creativity epistemologically the subject of consciousness is intimately known to raw feeling. Metaphysical speaking of the raw feeling things are real part of the mental world. Logically there is you can think of something there is a artificial machines and which has artificial consciousness and artificial creativity but metaphysically it is impossible and necessarily it is impossible. And therefore, mechanistic approach of mind is not possible to explain consciousness and creativity. This is all about creativity machine versus human or human versus machines. Thank you.