 Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to our third webinar organized by the King's Japan program. My name is Alessio Patlano and I'm reading East Asian War for Insecurity and the Department of War Studies. And today I am delighted to welcome back, dual virtually I say, Sheila Smith from the Council of Foreign Relations. And we are back together because as I've made a point of the last couple of webinars, it's always good during a period of social distancing and lockdown, to have a book ready close at your hands to read, to enjoy and to learn something new. And today we're going to be talking about Sheila's latest book which certainly ticks all these boxes and some more. In particular, what I am very pleased with is that over the past couple of weeks we've been talking about how the Indo-Pacific as a concept, as a framework, is highlighting the importance within or under the broader umbrella of major power competition, the importance and the contribution of actors other than the major powers to regional dynamics. In this context, today's discussion is extremely timely because it allows us to engage with Japan, an actor that has changed incredibly. And that's under its own version of an Indo-Pacific concept has expanded and reached out in economic, political and military terms in particular over the last decade under the leadership of Shinzo Abe. And certainly this book is timely and it allows us to engage with this question and see both the highlights of the other legacy, as well as some of the shadows and the sort of unanswered questions that is brought about. And I am pleased to say that few people could be sort of more better placed to talk to us about this. Sheila needs no introduction. Her work at the Council of Foreign Relations is well known. Her last book, Intimate Rivals, was an absolutely fascinating sort of journey into the meanings, the different meanings and the depth that are behind Japan's China policy. So today I am particularly pleased to welcome her back to talk about Japan Re-Armed. Sheila, without any further ado, please do tell us more about the book. Before I do so, so let me sort of make a one quick point. And we are going to be sort of organizing the webinar as usual, 20-25 minutes remarks, then followed by question answers. You see your question answers tab at the bottom of the screen. Please click on it and start typing in whenever you feel to ask something. Sheila, the floor is yours. Thank you very much for joining us. Alessio, thank you so much. I'm delighted to be back at King's College and even if it's virtually, I'm delighted to have the chance to talk with you. Your writing and work on Japanese maritime strategy and Japan's foreign policy writ large has been on my bookshelf for some time and I always enjoy the conversation. So let me just say a little thing, a little intro about the book for those of you listening who haven't had a chance to read it yet. I wrote it largely because I've been looking at Japanese self-defense force and thinking about this dilemma for policymakers in Tokyo. The dilemma between conforming to the spirit of Article 9 of the post-war constitution, which we all know is imposed by General MacArthur during the US occupation way back when. But also being an ally of the United States in the Cold War and the post-Cold War world actually being in one of the most important and changing geo-strategic environments in the globe, I would say. So Japan has had to wrestle with both its post-war identity as a state that wanted great power status but without putting its military prowess at the forefront of its statecraft. In fact, the military was way back in the list of instruments that Japan could draw on. That being said, though, the debate over the, you know, even during the Cold War, but in the aftermath of the Cold War, the debate largely focused on this kind of dichotomy between thinking about Japan as a pacifist nation or a militarist nation. And did not, I think, dig down deeply from policymakers on, well, what are the framing, what are the variables, what are the pressures, the influences, the pulls and the tugs on the policymaking process and how do they work their way through as we see a Japan that is increasingly willing to embrace this military as an instrument of statecraft. And as you said, LSEO, you can see it more and more in the Asia Pacific. It is also welcomed, and that's the other side of the coin. This is not just Japanese thinking is changing. Regional thinking is also changing about the need for and receptivity to the Japanese as a military power in coalition with other powers. So, so the book for me is a, this is decades of thinking for those of you who might be in the audience who are struggling with PhD dissertations. This began way back when when I wrote my PhD at Columbia and I was doing the same thing I was looking at this tug and pull between limitation, domestic political limitation at home, and also this tug and pull of the United States and the Alliance expectations of Japan. The book is largely about the post Cold War period, right, so I have an introductory chapter about the Cold War and what happened, but it really walks through the post Cold War so the last 30 years or so of transformation for Japan. The other piece of the puzzle it's important for those of you who don't know me as well. I work in the Council on Foreign Relations. I live in Washington DC. I was there at the moment of the crisis between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands. So the first fishing trawler incident with the Japanese Coast Guard in 2010. And then again when it really became much, much more of a state to state contest in 2012. And what was interesting to me is we have such a deep integrated military to military relationship the United States and Japan. We've got generations of military officers who served together. My father, for example, was a naval officer in the Pacific for most of his career. We've got deep integration of Alliance managers what we call Alliance managers so State Department of Defense National Security Council. Even people who are well versed in the region and well versed in Japan, we're having trouble thinking about when and how Japan might respond to this increasing pressure from China over its own territory, right. So there were questions in there for the Alliance. There were questions in there about predicting the Japanese willingness to use force in a territorial challenge. And there were questions about how the Alliance might organize itself better, not necessarily to fight back, but to prevent testing of the military Alliance in the way that China was clearly testing Japan and that continued and continues today. So there was a there was a need, I think, for our policymakers to have a little bit of a step back and say, well, what are the variables, what are the political context but also how are the SDF themselves thinking about their mission and how has that changed over time. So that was an audience I was particularly aware of when I sat down to write the book. I don't know how much you want the conclusion but in the fast forward version of this presentation. There are four chapters really one that deals with the SDF going abroad, which was largely begun, but continues to extend. There's a really rich chapter on mobilizing for self defense for territorial defense which we can talk more about I'm sure there's a chapter about the Constitution and that large meta narrative. And it's particularly poignant today because of course Abhishanzo is Prime Minister and he feels very strongly, but the need to revise the Japanese Constitution to put a Japanese imprimatur on that document. But the final chapter is the chapter I entitled borrowed power, which is how does the, how does Japan as a US ally seek to engage with our military power. How does it try to shape our thinking about the use of that military power. There are some interesting issues on the table today, you know medium range missiles intermediate range missiles and the region for example that missile gap that Japan feels acutely because it doesn't have that kind of capability. So there's many dimensions of Japanese policymaking that I separate out into these separate chapters. The conclusion though for those of you who want to understand is Japan coming is Japan expanding in Asia. So the changing threat perception we all know it's the rise of China it's the ambitions of North Korea for a nuclear capability and a deliverable capability with its missiles missile arsenal threat perception alone is not going to move Japan out of its post war strategic inclination is alliance with the United States and limiting military power to the mission of self defense or national security. What will move Japan out of the box I conclude is should the alliance no longer be viable should no longer be reliable. And we can talk about what conditions I think that might tease through the policymaking process but Japan has never had to think about the possibility that the United States could say one day, you know, you should go it alone to quote a president at the moment, or, you know what, I don't care if North Korea has short medium range missiles. We don't really care. That's your problem Japan right so there's all there all kinds of variants here whether you could see the United States walking back it's it's commitment to defending and deterring aggression against Japan, and that I think is the very critical for real transformation in Japanese strategic outlook. Let me stop there sorry I could go on forever. Fantastic. Thank you very much. I mean, there's there's a lot there and I, I for one, have quite a few questions, but perhaps present them more as an opportunity to elaborate some of the very good points you were raising. I couldn't agree with you more than then one of the key issues that even if it is a short chapter, but you kind of like laid out quite nicely. The relationship between Cold War and post Cold War is quite important because there is a lot of assumption about what Japan was not doing. And we need to go back and understand the parameters that make a distinction between the mythology of Cold War Japan and the reality of Cold War Japan because without that, that is very difficult to see what is changing what is not changing. And I think that comes across very strongly in the book. If I were to sort of look at the various chapters and sort of highlight one area where I thought certainly the other years have made the contribution in that sort of change, not only in terms of using the self defense forces and Japanese military power but also changing the public perception in Japan about the self defense forces. It's really the reintegration of military power within the tools of statecraft particularly in form and security policy, not as a war fighting or just a HADR type of contribution, but as as as an integrated role. And you know, interestingly, you know, Minister Connor having been Minister of Foreign Affairs, and when he was a Minister of Foreign Affairs, he would always reference how economic foreign policy and security matters were all going hand in hand. Now he's a defense minister, and he continues to work along those sort of concepts. And so if I would take one thing away from the various sort of elements of the book. Perhaps it's really this idea of the role of military power in foreign policy that has changed. And I wonder whether you would agree that that perhaps could be seen as one of our best, more important contribution, both in terms of the ability to create institutionally reforms in Japan to allow that to happen, and in terms of creating awareness of the importance of doing it. But at the same time, even though now the institutions are there, the consciousness is there, I've always wondered, will it last once Abe sort of steps down, will be, will be we looking at a Japan that in which military power is more reintegrated into foreign policy as a standard as a new normal, or was this like a very long bleep that depending on who's the lead that will no longer materialize once he's gone. Thank you. I said a great, great comments and questions as well. Let me try to answer your second. I also felt that the Cold War setup was really critical because a lot of people just didn't understand, you know, just exactly what the self defense forces were doing or what the Japanese themselves wanted the self defense forces to be doing. And of course, the civilian control debate that was so much a part of the politics was was huge there. You know, I was lucky in a way because I got to be I was in Tokyo when the first Gulf War happened. So this is 1990 91, and I was working at Jaya Japan Institute for International Affairs. And that was the main one of the majors, you know, one of the major foreign policy think tanks run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And so when the United States began asking for Japanese contributions, right? And in particular, SDF, this is pre-armitage, you know, Secretary, Deputy Secretary armages boots on the ground phrase, but but that's kind of what they want. They wanted a military component, because they wanted this transformative coalition in the post Cold War era to be the US and its allies who like minded partners. It's very early in that right. And I can remember going to conferences and where it was about the US Japan Alliance and the mofa guys did not want the SDF in the in the group. They just did not want them there and they had long drinking sessions in the evening about I'm like, what, you know, let me give you some pre war history. So institutional memory lived long, even through 1990 91 about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the and the military right uniform military so there's a lot underneath the underneath the surface here we could talk about but let me address the question about Abe years because I think it's really interesting. I think the thing about Abe is, one is a kind of facilitative answer to your question which is, until you get up a who is supportive of the reinterpretation of the right of collective self defense he had been in his first time in office back in 2006, seven, and he had commissioned serious thinkers to say, we need to be able to use our self defense force with the Americans, and under what conditions do we, with that effect, Japanese security so he had begun that kind of policy thinking process when he was first term Prime Minister. So you had a leader like that. But the second thing you had is you had a legislative super majority, they could do what they want I mean they still can and the lower houses you know right so the kind of legislation needed to correct for that interpretation to really put in place the policy that would allow that reinterpretation to actually be implemented, couldn't happen without that two thirds majority, and without a fairly sensitive sympathetic Komei Party ruling coalition elite. So, the thing about Abe is yes he had these focal, he had his attention on some of these critical security reforms, many of them, right out of the box that first or second year right, a national security strategy a secrecy law, went on later to be a conspiracy right all of this ticking the box across new guidelines etc. Many of those things were teed up, they weren't all about Abe, but he had that political capacity to get it all done, and he had the political will to get it done that's that was his agenda that's what he wanted and frankly the Japanese public by then, which is always the important, you know backdrop to thinking about this, the back Japanese public by then we're quite comfortable with the idea that Japan needed to step up its game. For Japanese defenses, so if you look at opinion polling, Asahi, Yomiuri so right left leaning right, you'll get the same answer. Not necessarily that constitutional revision, but about defense perceptions you'll get the same answer about Japan's need to contend with a more aggressive China, and increasingly worrisome North Korea. So I've had a lot of things going for him, including his own interest and his own ability to pull the security reforms forward in the way that we watched him do so successfully. But the Japanese public was also quite ready to be sure that you know Japan was going to be able to defend itself and again remember he came back in December of 2012, which is the year of the most difficult clash with China over the Sankaku Island so you've got a worried public at the same time in a way I think you really haven't any previous leader. Now you asked me about what happens now post abe, and one of the greatest innovations and from the US Japan Alliance point of view, one of the most active coordinating roll pieces of the puzzle, in addition to all these other bigger changes is the creation of the national security national security secretariat right which we sometimes call the National Security Council but it's the NSS. And with Mr. Yachi form, former advisor to candidate abe but also in the first term of abe's government, the author of that report on collective self defense so it's somebody of a new and trusted and had very similar kinds of ambitions for Japan's strategic shift. He was at the head of it right very influential diplomat very influential political advisor, but very astute strategist at the same time and then they built this organization that integrated the bureaucracies that had the tension I was alluding to at the beginning. You had the best and the brightest for mofa, the best and the brightest from the Ministry of Defense by this time right, you had the best and the brightest from the self defense forces so now you've got uniformed personnel coming into that advisory body right for the first integrated into the policy process, you also have police and to a lesser extent you had met the economic team. So it was a new institutional policy engine for a lot of the kinds of changes that we saw under of it. That's my question about the future. Is it institutionalized. Will it still be used by whoever comes as Prime Minister, whether it's corner paddle or Kishida or whoever may, you know, and that's going to be important because whether they see that as an asset for them as they lead Japan in this particular moment of Asia's geopolitics will depend on whether they use it and whether it's still seen by the bureaucrats as the right place for them to be to affect policy making. So I think it's a great excellent question I can't answer it but I think the NSS and the institutionalization of some of these reforms is really pretty key. But I think it's actually on the critical aspect here, the question of how the perception of the level of institutionalization of the NSS will then last long after I was gone. In combative terms, even for a medium sized sort of for a country with a medium sized sort of civil service or bureaucratic establishment if you compare to the UK and NSS is relatively small in terms of a number of people fielding it. And but there was a certainly under our perception that needs to have more people precisely to be able to create that sense of institutional gravitas that is essential to make it last. And I think you're absolutely right. That's it. That's a key question. And also the other point you were making about how the NSS not only is becoming a centralizing factor that highlights the importance of coordinating different aspects including military matters in different policy, which is very important. But also physically, basically, in some cases you have the MOD out, out numbering other institutions by after one because if you have one director of office and two deputy directors, you got three people in some cases you got one civilian MOD one military from the SDF one person from more far from the SDF. And so you have a progressive reintegration, physical reintegration of personnel into these things. I want to go because I'm going to ask you this just because it's a naughty question, because now that you know we know we know that was as you said an astute strategist and a diplomat, a person with a strong view on international affairs. And it is fair to say, and please correct me if I'm wrong, I think it is fair to say that he was one of the persons that shaped the way the international relations and certainly between him and Kanihara, you can have a powerful combo that really gave a sense of thrust that we've seen in the past few years to the other. But of course now Yajie has stepped down and he's been replaced by someone who comes from the police, who has been there at the NSS since its inception. But I wonder whether it would extend that change in this critical position and actually might impact how the NSS sees itself within the economy of the Japanese sort of bureaucratic establishment or government establishment as it were. And therein lies the question about the institutionalization is, as you know, like every government everywhere, right, personalities matter, right, who the Prime Minister turns to when he needs advice matters, which institution is stronger, the informal National Security Council in the United States or the Secretary of Defense's office. We've had our share of severe bureaucratic battles over the decision making for our strategy as well. So this is not just a Japan issue. This is all of our governments have this challenge. And personalities do matter. And, you know, early teams and then later teams, the longer Abe stays in office, right, the, you know, for Yajie-san didn't get to retire for a long time, right. But it does, it does sort of bring up the possibility that this bureaucratic tug and pull which is not far under the surface and any government, right. I don't think they always rule the day, but it will depend on strong political management from the content. And the population also, we talked about NSS, but there's also the Kante itself, right, which is where Mr. Kantehata was, right. So whoever comes in will have to build a structure that he or potentially she but we don't have a she candidate at the moment in Japan, I think, but what they must have a vision and then they must think about the implementation of that vision. And I think that's the big challenge for the post-Abe era. We could have a shorter timeframe of a lame duck kind of Abe, which we may be looking at now. I don't know. His approval rating has taken a hit from the COVID-19. And it's surprising because Japan is turning out to have navigated the storm reasonably well. Not with all the bells and whistles of Taiwan or South Korea, right, but certainly, certainly well compared to many European countries or obviously us, right. But he's not, that's not redounding in his favor. He's had some real pushback and his disapproval rate has gone way up. So you could have a period at the end of the Abe cabinet, even where this, you know, the integration of the policy mechanisms with a larger strategic vision and loyalty to the Prime Minister that those variables are all starting to dissipate somewhat. And I, you know, I think that Japan is not alone in having its bureaucratic politics, but the grasp of certain policies of the Kante and of political potential successors to Abe, that battle is ongoing. Without a doubt, I have no particular evidence to share with you. But we all know that these wheels will be turning already, right. So you may get a little pushback on some of these issues. On the other hand, Chinese behavior is not, right, is not conducive to people who say, oh, let's be a little bit more quiet or calm about our use of the military instrument. The Chinese are, if not ramping up, they are certainly keeping the pressure up across Asia. So I don't see that anybody coming in as a likely successor will really pull back a lot from the foundation that Abe has built. I think absolutely right. It was interesting, the point you were making about the fact that even though Japan is doing relatively better than most European countries, for example, and it is interesting, very recent poll from a couple of days ago in Japan was pointing out how people in Japan perceived that Japan is doing okay, but it's not thanks to the government's action. So it's actually quite remarkable in that sense, how there is a lack of recognition that the government's behavior in the crisis has been up to the task. And of course, the point you're making about, I think, if one were studying more cynical, you could say that one of the greatest gifts that Abe certainly has proved to have over the last, particularly when he returned to power in 2012 was to identify regional disturbances, whether it was a North Korean nuclear missile testing, whether it was Chinese behavior, it certainly managed to seize the initiative and bring security sort of front and center to move the agenda of reforms, institutional reforms or forward. And again, I think this is going to be crucial that whoever comes next, whoever has that sort of ability will probably manage to get more out of the current situation than not. And at the same time, I think, the point you were making about Abe's continuous needs, even though they had a pretty safe majority, but to remain in dialogue with its coalition partners, in particular, Krumato, on matters of defense and security, I think it's been a fascinating development in the Japanese political sort of debating it, because absent an opposition presenting valid case. And I'm currently working on a project on the early Cold War stages where you read diet meetings and meets whereby the Communist Party is talking about defense and security matters with a depth of knowledge, technical knowledge. Amazing. And you think this is the Japanese Communist Party, right? And the socialists, right? I mean, unbelievable. But at the same time, you don't see that kind of depth coming across in the past few years from the opposition. And I think in democracies, it's the tension between different parties that usually forces whoever is in power to come up with a better answer, at least that's the idea. But the negotiation and the activities with Komei, I think, have been a very enlightening moment, if you want, of the last few years in terms of how defense and security had to be regeared in a way, if that's the objective, how do we get there? We need to get our partners in political partners on board with it. I don't know if you'd agree with this, but it seems to me that was a really fascinating development that, again, is very much of an Abe era. Yeah, you know, it's interesting. So Yamaguchi Natsuo, the head of the Komei Party came to Washington when Abisan came back to government. And maybe it was before that. It may have been a little bit before that, but it was an interesting conversation because he gave a talk at Carnegie and we all went, of course, I raised my hand. Komeito, you know, when you always talk about yourself, you as in the campaign, we're talking about yourself as the hadomen, the break, and the LDP on Abe in particular. But now you're here in Washington and you're actually advocating for Japan stepping up in the alliance. And I said, I just would like you to put those two pieces together. And of course I know him well. And he kind of looked at me and he goes, ah, Sheila. And he said, I just want to remind the audience that every time there's been significant improvement in alliance security cooperation, Komeito was in partner with the LDP and governments. And it's an interesting point, you know, if you wanted to go back and look at, right, Komeito at home has, as you know, has its own, you know, its own constituencies, you know, that it must sort of continue to listen to. But it has been in coalition with the LDP on security policy. It has maybe played the role of the break, right, tempering some of the impulses of the Abe cabinet to be sure on the new security legislation they pulled the cabinet back from where it really wanted to go. But that's a nice interesting balancing out for a very small party, right, for a very urban, non-form policy, non-security identified political party, right. So there's times when politics doesn't require expertise at the level of the technical details and you can still be very influential over the outcome, right. But that period, that early period in Japanese diet debates is fascinating as you get out. I just went, I just wrote an article for the Columbia Law Journal. Columbia, there was a big constitutional revision. I actually have it. It's brilliant. It was a great one, and I couldn't actually attend the conference at the last minute because of a family emergency, but I did write the article with for the journal. And because I had a piece that I wanted to get in the book, but I couldn't because it just didn't fit, you know, where I this book, but it was on the 1954 self-defense force law. And it was the very first time when Japan came out of occupation under Yoshida and Hato Yama and them were locking heads. But it was really about well, how do what kind of military do we have. And what does this military look like. It was the kind of moment of definition of how does article nine translate into our military. Fascinating stuff but leftist socialist rightist socialist Communist Party members all kinds of opinion in the LDP deep split or not the future LDP it was going to be the liberals and the Democrats so you had a whole multitude of parties at the table. Fascinating. And you know the thing, unless you're that's so interesting though, a lot of the conversation is not that much different than the tensions and the issues that still struggle, you know, the policymakers still struggle with today, but fascinating time in Japanese politics for looking at security debates. I congratulate you for going back and taking a look. You know, by accident, I learned I realized that that's in the sort of second half of the sixties long before Nakasone and about, you know, Japan's more sort of digital boy more more independent defense posture, already in 1967 there is a debate over whether Japan should acquire nuclear powered submarines. And one of the things that struck me was the debate was not done in matters of principles as it's like that's just not possible period particularly on the sort of on the left. It was argued on technical matters on on on on opinions based on on strategic. It was absolutely incredible, the depth of and the sort of the substance around the discussion. And again, the critical voices coming from the socialist party and Communist Party were absolutely essential in shaping up a debate which eventually led in 1971 to the discussion over what kind of defense posture and then the changes that we have in in the first cycle. And if you don't go back to those debates in the sixties and really miss out the development of thinking around it and the institutional legacy within the values called parties over these issues. And then there's a result of that. Absolutely. I mean, a lot of those conversations are essential to understand where we are today and how similar they are in terms of dynamic. Now, yes, there's, there's, there's a lot of people sort of selling queue up with with question. And, and I think it's time that we let others join the conversation. Otherwise we'll do this forever. Now that I have you, we can carry on. I think there's a question that the first one that I have here. It's something also that I had down on on on my list of points to raise. So first of all, in is a question from someone who's who's loving the discussion and he's certainly going to buy the book. Thank you. Thank you. My son can finish college. Thank you. And he's, but there's a legitimate point about the sort of the part in the book where you talk about borrowed power and what is sort of what lay what lies beyond the US Japan Alliance. And the question is about how it is important at the moment for Japan to start considering what if the United States knocked your door and it's like, you know what you, you may want to sort of look elsewhere because we're not really sure about the alliance as it is anymore. And the question here is very specific on if you are looking at Japan as an international security after outside from outside the United States, particularly if you're European or if you're in Australia, you have certainly witnessed a different kind of country. There is a leap into now that is starting to emerge about the diversification through the alliance. So the Japanese using the US Japan Alliance and its business card to diversify its opportunities with others as it were. So the question is, what do you think this new flurry of interactions with diplomatic and defense related. And the question in particular highlights the bilateral and trilateral link that has existed between UK and Japan and UK Japan US in particular. What do you think this all means. If you were sitting here in London and you're looking at Japan of what's been happening. What do you think all this sort of flurry of activities mean in the long term, because Japan become the sort of what kind of actor is, if you want, from a UK perspective. And to what extent you think that this diversification of interactions both bilaterally without the countries, as well as through the United States with third parties as the trilateral UK US Japan. But what do these all mean for Japan and from a Japanese perspective. Are we likely to see more. And what can we expect. How can we expect these things to develop. Excellent question. It could it deserves a book of its own, frankly, almost the diversification side and when I was writing the book I realized that, you know, there could be a whole chapter on that, but it was involving at the time I was writing and so I was premature for this book. Let me try it just a cursory kind of tackle that question, as I see it when when we first started when you first started asking the question about the borrowed power right. I thought we were heading for an extended deterrence conversation right because a lot of what I started out conceptualizing that chapter to be about was really. How does Tokyo influence the way in which America uses its strategic power it's offensive strike it's it's it's willingness to defend its, its intercession with Beijing on Japanese behalf etc etc right. And we've got a lot of evidence already about what's been happening on that side and how much right Japanese thinking about using the alliance as a tool for Japanese security has evolved right in the post Cold War World. But what I think is fascinating about this bilateral trilateral that starts in Asia but also has implications I think for European partners is that the US was critical at the beginning, right. So you got the US Japan Australia, that trilateral that very quickly within a couple of years turned into a Japan Australia, the United States wasn't missing in action. And it was still a very important backdrop, both, you know, for both allies, but it was such a what it just transformed into such especially surveillance and information sharing and stuff like that. And now a status of forces agreement all kinds of stuff that the Japanese and Australians can do together. Not with that in our absence, but they don't need us to be sitting at the table for it all to happen and I think that's been really a transformative relationship. That's the kind of relationship I could envision for Japan UK, right, perhaps even Japan France. But, you know, for European NATO actors because that foundation is there right of the integration of the United States and any kind of strategic concept of how to use force right going forward. But you've also seen a US Japan India. Right now the bar exercises that you write about the the maritime presence is now a huge part of what the Japanese are engaged in right it's not like they're going to go defend India. But that presence that signaling that they care about what's happening right. That's important. Another piece of that would be important for European actors as well. In fact, I think one of the pieces that I found most fascinating is the way in which the new sanctions against North Korea is being used as an opportunity to build those capacities and those presence kinds of opportunities right with the UK with France. With Australia as well. I mean the what's going on the East China Sea to monitor North Korean behavior has all kinds of actors that we wouldn't expect to be sitting down there in the East China Sea. But I think the presence piece where you want to demonstrate the norms right freedom of navigation maybe not quite yet, but at least freedom of the seas and the kinds of norms that you'd like to see globally employed I think the partners in Europe, particularly the naval partners in Europe or somebody or partners that Japan really would like to continue to encourage to show up in Asia but also maybe as a platform for Japan to move beyond the Indo Pacific at some point. So presence norms right is the second category, and the final category and this is probably one of the more important ones is technology. The defense of course now has at law. I always forget the full name at low what it stands for acquisition and technology and the L I always forget agency right but basically what it is is for the first time Japan has entered now into a Ministry of Defense sponsored technology acquisition of technology and leveraging Japanese technological capability for the purpose of military, right strategic aims. And, you know, this is partly a response to demographics right Japan won't have billions of people in the future. Technology is is a critical lever here. But now Japan, the Japanese Ministry really wants research and development, right. It wants its private sector to be that that's also including universities to be engaged in this right. It wants its private sector to be much more active in global arms sales and defense technology right purchase and acquisition as well as is selling. So you see sea planes and rescue planes with the Indians as you had that. Not very successful but interesting large mega submarine bid with Australia, right. And you've got conversations ongoing with the UK and various kinds of technology right. So it weapons enhancement, and I can see that developing into a two way street where the Japanese are going to not only want to be part of a larger economy of scale for technology weapons military technology right globally, but they're going to want to compete more with Europeans and I, you know, that next generation fighter is right for opportunity for people who really want to compete and who compete better who can compete better than the UK and France. But you'll have competition coming from Europe I think to test the premise that the United States must be the main partner Japan and some of these and some of these issues. But there's a lot more other than the big ticket weapons right there's other things along the way, your cyber there's a whole host of areas where Japan and Europe have mutual interest in the next generation of technologies and especially those applied to for military use so I think those three things would be where I keep my eye on the ball. And it's not just exercising and, you know, kind of readiness kinds of collaboration it's also presence for normative, you know, sustenance of the order that we want to continue to see, and also this last technological innovation and its applications for the military. I don't want to take anything away from the other questions because we have some really pointed question but today quick reactions that I think under to specifically to some of the points you're making on the question of presence, perhaps on many people know the point you made, you know, the little thing you mentioned about the UN Security Council resolution on North Korea. As a matter of fact, the first two countries to start implementing it were the UK and Japan. When you have the first frigate going back to the Asia Pacific, joining the Japanese at the very beginning of the activity, and perhaps at the same time, would you link the, I think for me it's interesting is that the moment we see is Europe going really far east, not as far east but far eastwards, right. At the same time, Japan coming really far west because the deployment, the recent deployment in Hormuz for the intelligence gathering activity. I think they kind of like nicely sort of encapsulate geographically and intellectually the point you were making about presence that it has to be a two way streets. And it's also a place there, contrary to a not very far distant past is not the kind of place where Japan would say that you're absolutely welcome to come our way. Us coming there, we don't really know. I think there's actually quite an interesting development there. And the other point about the technology aspect, absolutely. At the moment I think the future, the next generation fighter jet is going to be really interesting one to watch, particularly in terms of the point you were making at connecting point one and point three. The U.S. Japan Alliance has a launching plan for Japan to do more. The U.S. Japan Alliance also has a something that United States wants to cash in, if you want at some point, because we've seen the pressure that Japan is getting on this election process for the next generation fighter. So absolutely fascinating stuff, I would say, but Lots of opportunity, I think you can see it in it. The critical piece is going to be how much is this going to be competition between Right, the UK, UK, for example, or France or whoever and the United States right and where Japan starts to feel the pressure but, frankly, I think we probably did the Japanese a disservice by insisting that all their f 35s be built off the shelf by workers in Texas right Closing down production lines in Japan if you're thinking of a longer term strategic asset. It's not a good idea. It doesn't, it doesn't help war fighting it doesn't help anything so if United States still has that short timeframe in mind that more transactional approach to putting pressure on Japan on these things I think you're going to see people who are going to be looking for alternatives. And the question of supply chains that we're all asking right now for very different reason will play to the strength of the constituencies who politically argue for greater diversification and ability to produce at home to an extent. Because the time of crisis that will make a fundamental difference. Now, on this point, or in particular, the one aspect that you mentioned India, there's a question that that it can actually sort of tie into what we're talking about. And how do you see the India Japan defense relationship developing and what are the prospects for our experts and join our developments. Sorry, I did get the last part. So, what are the Arms experts and arms development. Um, so I, this is not an area where I have a deep knowledge so I'm just going to put that little flag out there especially on the arms expert conversations that are currently ongoing with India the one that I that I did a little bit of research on was the sea plane it was a sea rescue plane right. I think there's two pieces on the India Japan the first of courses. I remember the first time I went to New Delhi to talk about Japan and to talk about US strategy and you know all that kind of stuff this is pre US Japan, India collaboration on the Malabar exercises so I think there was a certain idea that the certain table setting needed to happen. But I went and I talked all kinds of Indian policymakers. But I also talked to academics and it was a fun conversation for me, because you know the intellectual climate in India is is is energizing for anybody but for an American it's particularly eye opening it's not the conversation we typically have but but you know I was sitting around tables of experts, strategic experts talking about so Japan just needs nuclear weapons, you know, needs to stop its relationship with the Americans and get its independence and, you know, that's how we're going to counter China China and I was like, Oh, okay. You know, but it was, it was fun for me because you'd never have that conversation in Tokyo, right. Or we wouldn't probably we may over a cup of a glass of beer in the evening but we would never have it as as an intellectual right debate and academic setting. But so I think there's there's there's different voices inside India to consider about expectations of Japan and Japan will never I think fulfill the larger expectation of a strategic that counterbalance to China on the other side right. So that's one of the one of the ways in which some of New Delhi strategists think about Japan. However, in the maritime space, they have moved pretty carefully towards slow and steady and conspicuous but not over the top implementation of the kinds of things I'm calling present so the Indians coming to East Asia, right to exercise with the Japanese the Japanese obviously going the other way. They're going to South East Asia exercising together. Right. So you're starting to see a kind of integrative. This is not odd. You know the same way Europeans were going East the Indians have looked East and they have since they're small, maybe but nonetheless they have participated in some interesting demonstrations that India's interests are also in East Asia so I think there's lots of ways in which the Japanese would like to similarly, maybe not have boots in the ground in India. Certainly continue the Ground Self Defense Force staff dialogue their Air Self Defense Force staff dialogue it's not all about the Navy. And it's a lot about China. And it's a lot about, especially if we see what's going on now with China and India. I would expect some of that to intensify because part of it is the Chinese militaries at least want to be aware of the ways in which China is testing both countries, right, not just alliance allies in the United States but the ways which the Chinese are using their military power to test and to look for reaction. And the one cautionary note on that relationship of course is that even Prime Minister Modi, who is deeply embraced the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Japanese leg of that Indo-Pacific strategy at least in rhetoric right and in commerce and in infrastructure and other things. Even Prime Minister Modi is cautious about an India Japan military or being perceived as, you know, trying to have a more military alliance with Japan so I think New Delhi, no matter who's in power is always going to be careful about that, because of course the China card plays large in India, even though we have a fairly similar strategic take on China at the moment. It's not going to be an it's not going to be an in cautious kind of embrace of Japan as a strategic partner on the export side again I think it's still at a small scale. Again, the search and rescue airplane is a good example. I don't think you're going to have destroyers being built. I think there's, you know, the Indian Navy is still, you know better than ILSO, but I think the Indian Navy is still not at the same level and scope as the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force. I don't see major weapons systems being a focal point anytime soon. But again, I'm happy to turn that back to you to comment on. No, I can agree more. I think there was a very interesting point you're making there about and I think in that sense Australia, Japan, India are all similar in one way, as they are all becoming particularly aware of the challenge that an opportunities that China presents. But they're also very careful about giving a sort of an outright impression of containment and the way the dynamics in the court, for example, are panning out. It's extremely interesting. Japan is very similar in behavior to India is very understanding when he is reluctant to engage in court related. Although, at the same time, Japan has been very supportive of court. In fact, if it makes you feel better to drop court, then we're calling multilateral and we call someone else. By all means, let's go for that. On the particular point that you were raising on strategic deterrence, nuclear deterrence. There's a question I have here about, what do you think the concept of unacceptable damage applied to the US would lead Japan to doubt the extended nuclear deterrence credibility? And if so, to what extent? So this is the part of the book that again would require my chapter of my conclusion is a small conclusion and it's not a big large developed argument on when would Japan change, which is something I've been thinking about for a while writing something separate. So there's two pieces on the nuclear debate in Japan unless you you're very familiar with this but for your audience. One is people think that the Japanese have never considered a nuclear option and that's just not true. So even going back to the diet debates that you and I were referencing earlier on, you know, Kintaiteki, Kintaiteki Senso or modern warfare was the word that was being used in 1953 and 54 as the self-defense forces were being created. That was a reference to nuclear weapons, right? Later on, you get into the 60s, the period that you were looking at diet debates in the Hatoyama period, right? You also get more, you know, are they prohibited by Article 9? And the answer was no. If they were necessary for Japan's defense, we would have to consider them. That has always been the political predicate of a policy debate about whether they would be good for Japan's defense, right? So you see coming into, you know, when the Chinese developed the hydrogen bomb, you see when Japan prepared to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. You see it at the end of the Cold War and then you saw it again more recently. There have been internal policy reviews, some of which have leaked out into the public. And the nuclear question is largely on the military side. Japan doesn't have strategic depth. It's an archipelagic state. Basically, two of what we think of as the nuclear triad, the survivability of nuclear arsenal delivered by airplane and delivered by intercontinental ballistic missile, those would be taken out immediately because Japan doesn't have the strategic depth to maintain them. So if Japan sees its autonomy as being served by a nuclear platform, it would be an SLBM force. It would look an awful lot like the de Gaulle argument for a force to frown. It would probably not be a war fighting doctrine, right? And so I always say, I mean, if you're sitting in Washington or New York, you know, when I launched the book with Richard Haas back in April last year, lots of questions about Japan going nuclear. Well, it has the scientists. It has the physical material, although post 2011 we have a question mark there, but it certainly has the capability if it shows to, right? But it would have to choose to do so because it makes sense to enhance Japanese security, right? And so that calculus is what people don't normally think through and in very rare circumstances would that help Japan. And I think the political calculus has largely been our scientists may not participate in a weapons program. So there's the domestic politics side of that. There's the, you know, the military argument, the lack of strategic depth that I just rolled out. And then there's the other is it would simply attract, you know, more attention and more pressure by the militaries of Japan's neighbors on Japan. The impetus for a strike on Japan to neutralize any capability would be overwhelmingly not a Japanese favor. So the logic of the nuclear deterrent as Japan's, at least what has appeared in the public domain, I can't say anything about, I don't know. None of the evidence points to a real willingness it would be a very reluctant choice by Japan. And I don't even think it would be the first step, if an alliance with the United States was no longer, you know, the option for deterrence. I can very easily see that the Japan would try to find some accommodation with Beijing. And depending on the leadership in Beijing, they might find accommodation with Japan to be a preferable alternative than the arms race that a nuclear program would reveal. So, people don't like to hear accommodation because it's a bad word, but it could, you know, conceivably you always have to think what is the, what are the other options. Well the other options could be collective action. It could be specific. It could be accommodation with Beijing. Sure, it could be a nuclear weapon but I don't think that's the first place the Japanese are going to go. Now the unacceptable damage, not defending Japan from an attack, be it be it North Korea or China, those are the obvious ones, right. Another unacceptable damage I think would be too much compromise with Beijing or North Korea. Some Japanese foreign policy and security experts have come to Washington and said if you, if you openly acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear power, the alliance is over. I don't think that's right, by the way. I think it, as we watched in South Asia, we will adjust. I don't think it automatically cancels out the alliance. So I think you'd have to have a pretty stark declaration by the United States that it is no longer offering strategic protection to Japan. For domestic politics reasons, for whatever calculus the United States would make that decision, or you'd have a failed US response to a serious threat against Japanese, the Japanese home islands. Hard for us to imagine that we're actually talking about those two scenarios, but under the presidency of Donald Trump, frankly, they have become conceivable. And Alessio, you and I are probably, I'm not saying that Trump is doing that, by the way, but the language and the rhetoric that has been used by the US president has startled a lot of people into thinking, oh, maybe we better start thinking a little bit about the steps and the alternatives. Not that anybody wants a plan B. They don't, right? And Abe has done everything possible to narrow the gap with President Trump on that. But again, I think it would have to be pretty convincingly obvious that the United States has failed Japan. And, you know, in one sense, the point you were making about the fact, if anything, this pushes you towards starting considering what are the other options available out there. And the CSBA reports on comparing Japanese and Chinese maritime capability that came out last week, I think was interesting because it points towards a space in terms of conventional capabilities where Japan can go, which would fit both in terms of options, of its own territorial defense, as well as the alliance. And, you know, I've always say this for a while now, you know, Japanese submarines by design can operate T-Lams, conventional T-Lams, if the capability with position strikes strike or satellite guided position strike option were available and acceptable politically. So there are places where Japan can go, as you were saying, that are very, very important without their nuclear question. But the ultimate option, as in like, do we have to go nuclear? In a way, prompts people seriously about options other than that one, because you know that that is the one scenario that you really want to avoid. And there's this assumption, and I think, and again, I'm not a nuclear strategist, but all of us have been schooled in the logic of nuclear deterrence if we've come up in this field. But there is, you know, it has to work. I mean, the nuclear option can't just say, hi, we've got a weapon. I mean, it has to be a viable nuclear option. And that's where the questioning, as I can see it, what available, you know, peaks in those windows of Japanese thinking, both military, political and strategic, you know, writ large, those people who have been thinking, it's not all that clear that a nuclear weapon would enhance Japanese security, given the neighborhood, given the territorial configuration of Japan and given the fact that they're up against the western Pacific on the other side, right? So maritime, conventional, much, much bigger maritime, right? But there is a lot of space that Japan still has yet to explore before it actually gets to that final declaration, and I'm not even sure that it would ever make sense for Japan to do it. But we have not said anything about the standoff capability. You mentioned the submarines and Japan has now entered into the standoff strike capability, which will pull its ability to shoot further off shore. You don't have to go far offshore of Japan to hit other countries, by the way, right? For those of you envisioning that mental map of Northeast Asia. But I think offensive strike is not that far behind. I mean, a deep penetrating strike, and that's why I think it's going to be very interesting to watch the next year or two to see what China is ready to tell Japan about its intentions towards Japan. You're going to see Tokyo get pressure if it's a second Trump administration, even if it's not, but I think especially if it's a second Trump administration, you get an awful lot of pressure for these intermediate range ballistic missiles to be deployed, American missiles to be deployed in Japan. Now, whether they're dual key or dual control, I mean, there's all kinds of interesting questions there for the Alliance to tackle. But I think there's a fairly significant political desire in Japan for their own missile capabilities. Absolutely. I would say that's exactly the impression that I've had now for the better part of the last year and a half. And precisely on the back of the point you were making that somehow the unpredictability of Trump is not making them question the Alliance, but rather why the need to widen the realm of politically possible in defense terms and standoff capabilities are absolutely within that part of the debate. So for that very reason, it's a sensible way of thinking. And there's a result of that also one that is likely to remain on the agenda if not increase given also where the sort of US-China relationship is going. And that seems to be regardless of whether it's going to be a second Trump presidency or a Biden presidency, given how the debate of a China is going. Now I'm conscious of the time and I want to sort of try to tie things together because there's two questions that back to what we were mentioning earlier. And then there's one final question that I think it's perfectly suited for sort of drawing this to a close. So the first two I'll bring them together. The rise of Kante led, if you want, diplomacy as showed to have some limitations and the COVID crisis perhaps has highlighted that. At the same time, bureaucracy is not decided to be declining as a force that was driving Japanese policy action. Given the current socioeconomic situation of Japan, which do you think would work better as we move forward? Politician let diplomacy or bureaucrat let diplomacy or whether sort of finding balance or whether the NSS will become sort of like something in between. And slightly related because it's always about the basic politics in Japan. There's another question here about how do you see the future of the constitutional reinterpretation within the current sort of political configuration to go. Particularly the question is asking about whether there will be a popular support for referendum over the change of the constitution. Or has the Abed legacy become one in which we can do stuff without actually going to that constitutional revision. Or as James Tukoff has always sort of pointed out, have we reached a plateau and therefore constitutional revision is then necessary. So two questions on the basic politics, very relevant. One, where's the balance between bureaucracy and Kante. The other one, how we reached the end of the road for reinterpretation and is that appetite publicly anyway. And in the more the public sphere for a referendum on constitutional changes. That's the final question. Okay, good. Is that like the two pre-final? There's a one final but we'll do everything together. Okay, so on the Kante versus bureaucracy, you know, you're sitting in London. Your audience knows this better than anybody in the Westminster system right the bureaucracy and the politicians and party right it's a constant tug of war it's the same and it's a parliamentary system in Japan it's constituted the same way. You can't draw on the public for your presidential race so the dynamics of electoral politics are actually structured in a way that gives the bureaucracy a nice counterweight to the politicians. But it also gives the party a great counterweight to the bureaucracy right so I think that's that's going to continue. I don't think anything has gone one way or gone the other. I think what's been noticeable about Kante led diplomacy is you've had several prime ministers who have used it well and I would say even before we use the word Kante diplomacy somebody you mentioned much earlier in a conversation. Kante used it extraordinarily well. If you have a political leader in Japan who is savvy, interested and effective on the international stage and is a strategic thinker writ large not necessarily just military but strategic about Japan's place in the world and what Japan needs to accomplish to to prosper. You know those kinds of Prime Ministers I would put Hashimoto is another one, although he didn't effectively translate everything and he wanted to get done. He did do the administrative reform piece which really upended some of the bureaucratic grip on power so you've got successive Japanese Prime Ministers who've managed to tease that balance a bit to restructure it. Koizumi was the classic right in terms of do you want you know 120,000 bureaucrats determining your life. That was his electoral slogan right so he I think very effectively got the Japanese public to understand their political leaders needed to step up and could step up to the challenge of leading Japan they didn't have to turn to the tool they educated or kill the educated bureaucrats right anymore. So he has not distinguished itself at moments right and has also come down a little bit I think in the estimation of the Japanese public lots of scandals corruption things like that. So I think you're going to still see this tug and pull. I think bureaucrats and politicians are still going to define it that way. I think the interesting thing about the this last tenure of Abbe is there's a law now in place. Right, that gives the political leader of Japan the ability to determine whether somebody is a director general or above in the bureaucracy. That is a fatal blow to the bureaucracy, frankly, it is a great coup by the political elite. So the future careers of bureaucrats will no longer be protected from the political will of who's elected. And that's pretty key. That's pretty important. So I think there is greater leverage now from the political side, but I think the tug and pull is going to continue to be there. The constitutional question we have a hate to advertise CFR work but I'll do it. We have an info guide that I worked on last year it's called Japan's constitutional debate. For those of you who are teaching it's a great tool, it was meant to be a tool rather for people who are not Japan experts or not even could be Japan interested but not constitution experts so it's got three sections the history which we all know. But it's also got a section on legislative change changes over the revision debate and some people are surprised they don't remember that the DPJ had a platform for constitutional revision that Japanese newspapers got in the game that there was a whole uptick of over revision, not all of it, not most of it, not about article nine by the way. And then the last is obviously the public opinion piece but I think revision is coming. I think it's more likely when Abbe is not Prime Minister for all of his advocacy of you know the origins debate and this is you know drafted by foreigners and eight days need to Japanese debate. I think lots of people actually would enjoy a conversation. The article nine pieces the hard one. And the minute at which constitution the revision of the collective self defense force interpretation was made in 2014 by the Abbe cabinet, you start to see public opinion drop way down. And that was Yomi Udi Endesaki left and right right center left and right. Drop way down for revision after that defense reinterpretation had happened so I think article nine is always going to be hard. Very hard. But I think the larger writ large the Japanese debate over do we need privacy rights. Should we have the state involved in education to a larger responsibility. Should we have emergency powers act that allows the executive branch to respond to an emergency. These are the issues now on the table that have nothing to do with article nine and I think we're going to see that debate happen. I tend to be, I think reinterpretation I think we're done. Yeah, with CSD. I don't Jim is Jim and I are probably in a pretty pretty much the same page. I'm not quite sure why he's at that page but I'm at that page because I don't see any other political party out there. People are going to be willing to use reinterpretation and even Japan's let's call them the hawks to be to be shorthanded about it. People like she but she get to, they would rather revise article nine, then to tweak. And, you know, she but I've talked about this many times but he's also written about it extensively he said it's not a time for Japan to be ambiguous. People need to understand when and how we're going to use force if we're going to use force and we ought to stop hiding behind article nine and be clear about our ability and willingness to defend ourselves for example. Now he doesn't take that in a big direction that says you know we're going to get rid of article nine, but I think the people who are more inclined towards communicating Japanese intentions would rather rewrite than reinterpret. And that's where the push is going to come from right it's not it's not going to come from anybody else but from there and the Japanese people may or may not support that. But I don't think reinterpretation gives people what they really want which is clarity. Which leads us to the very last question, which I think is a very good question. And in a way it allows us to bring together and sort of it takes us to some points you're raising the conclusions of the book. And threat perception, to what extent do you think Japan and US are currently on the same page in terms of threat perception, and perhaps in a slightly more even abstract way. Is it even possible today need to be on the same page and if not, is that sort of what are the parameters for the Alliance to continue to grow. I mean, in practical and operational terms, when it comes to threat perception, how much of this alignment if you want is good for the Alliance to continue to grow. And I think that's an important question, especially as a sort of abe losing his grip to power and of course the elections coming up in the United States. So what are we in that in the sense of third perception and where, where should we be as we move forward. So it's a great question. Also because we don't have much time I'll try to be succinct. So, one of the big points of difference I was feeling in the Japan US policy conversation during the latter Obama years was over this question of China, right. There was a lot of, you know, you know, the United a lot of critique that the United States was too focused on for solving problems with China and China had to come first and G2 and all that stuff. Some of it was personally directed at Susan Rice, but I think there was an M there was an underlying sense you could feel this in the self defense force you could feel it across different interest groups so it wasn't just a personality issue right. And that is Japan overwhelmingly sees its long term existential threat is China. Overwhelming despite the missiles from North Korea and all that kind of stuff. And the American having the United States and Japan on the same page is, is something felt viscerally by the Japanese policy community, not just the conservatives, right, but most of them are aligned more on the conservative side of politics but, but it is by almost everybody, right. So if the Chinese come with the Americans really hold us, you know, will this alliance hold right. And I think there's a suspicion of long term, you know, a long view of the US Japan post war alliance that goes back to the Nixon shocks right, and the opening to China and there's fingers have been burnt in the past over differing tempos and willingness to embrace Beijing right. There's also a split in the conservatives among those who see China as a potential economic partner if a strategic challenge to Japan versus the anti communist folks who are more focused on the ideological proclivities of the leadership of Beijing and that strain is used to define China policy that doesn't so much anymore, but it's still there. So as you watch Hong Kong, and as you watch the over spill over to Taiwan, I would pay attention to what you're starting to hear from different quarters in Japan about whether or not that constitutes a challenge right to Japanese identity to Japanese way to democracy right so be prepared for a little bit of parsing between the Chinese military coming and then the democratic values piece. And that's going to come. But I think the. So that's, that's where we're going to have a challenge, whether it's President Trump or President Biden, I think we're going to continue to have that challenge will be very deep sensitivity in Tokyo about Washington's approach to China and vice versa Even this, the plan state visit by she and April inside the beltway there was like, hmm, what kind of agreement are they going to sign. What are they going to compromise so it's a place of alertness and suspicion not suspicions too strong a word but alertness to the historically been a slightly different way of dealing with with Beijing right. There was a very interesting piece if you, I'm sure you've read it. If your listeners haven't you should read it. It's in the national interest, and it's an anonymous Japanese government official Yes. And it's, you know, it's got initials that look an awful lot like Mr. Yachty's who knows. But anyway, it's basically that we're not up for engagement. Thank you very much. Even smart engagement. We want straight on confrontational American And even if it's badly implemented, i.e. even if it's a Trump badly implemented strategy, we'd rather have that than have a sophisticated engagement strategy that was well implemented. So that's a signal loud and clear right across the across the deck for the coming November election. And it's basically telling the insiders in Washington, we want the hard line. We want you to be hard line. We're not no more engagement. Thank you very much. So that's the China sensitivity it's still there. I would say there's other pieces under the radar though of the China radar North Korea I think is still a question it goes right to the heart of the extended deterrent. I think I've been navigated the relationship with Trump quite well to fire and fury and into, you know, you know, Singapore and Hanoi. But the reality is Japan doesn't have a horse in Pyongyang right until I'll be can have a direct dialogue or a successor. It's not sitting at the table in current Northeast Asia when it comes to the future of North Korea. So I think that's still there, not just the missile threat but the what's the negotiating approach. And then there's Russia. And actually, we haven't talked a lot about it but there's an awful lot of increasing demonstration that Russia and China are quite willing to exercise together to test the Japanese and the South Koreans in the middle of their, you know, deteriorating relationship to test Doktor Takeshima right and to play in a bad way with the military balance in the region. I think the Russians, you know, Air Self Defense Force pilots will tell me we know the Russians. We've known them from the Cold War, we scramble we know how they're going to behave the Chinese less predictable, but you're starting to see a deeper concern about Russian Chinese collusion and cooperation. And I think you see it in the exercising you see it in the scrambles you see it in the readiness. And I think that's something that Abbe has not managed to do and I don't want to call it a failure but the discussions with Putin have not let where Abbe had really wanted them to leave which was not necessarily territorial response, but at least inviting Russia a little bit back from too much cooperation strategically with China so you noticed in December 2018 the next the last Tycho the last 10 year defense plan. Russia was on the threat perception list was on the for the first time named. And that was done to say, Okay, America, you're worried about the Russian behavior. We understand that, as long as you're worried about the Chinese with us will worry about the Russians with you and I think that was an interesting indicator to me. There was an active attempt to make the United States and Japan look a little bit more that they were on the same page in terms of threat perception. So long answer. I think we need to at least understand each other's threat perception and where they're varying degrees of behaviors that we would think were not acceptable. I'm not sure that we're there yet in this particular political moment in the United States and I think the COVID-19 confusion raise can will require some resetting of Tokyo and Washington's perceptions about what's coming as we move out of this right. Wonderful. I mean, thank you. This was absolutely fascinating. I think we could sort of continue carry on conversing about this for another 10 hours, but that turned around for me hijacking your life. So I shall not do that. And but for all those who want to continue to learn about this question learn about trans rule in the region how it is evolving and sort of have some foundations or consolidate their foundations. And as we move forward with this debate, I can recommend she spoke more and other than that, thank you very much Sheila for taking the time to join us today to talk about the themes in the book and how relevant and timely they continue to be. And thank you everybody for staying with us for a little longer than we anticipated but the conversation was so good that I couldn't possibly stop it. And so I apologize to those who have that shop and and the recording of the session will be available shortly thereafter on our YouTube channel at Warsaw's Kings College London other than that. And please stay tuned the followers and Twitter and keep an eye out will be back with other new webinars and new book to recommend you other than that. Thank you very much Sheila and thank you very much everybody for joining us today. Thank you.