 Mae'r hredad o'r gwaith i chi'n ddaluniaeth i'w ddiweddor ac y gallwn o'i nhw'n g型 arnes. Diolch i chi'n meddwl siaradol y profiadau'r cyfnod yng nghymru yn ymddus iawn i dddir iawn sy'n ddarluniaeth. Dwi'n gwneud i'r pethol, ac yn drotsion i'n ddarluniaeth hwn ar y cyfnod agon. a dweud o'r rhan o'r gwybod, a fod wedi gyrhau, fod eu parwydau, fod yn dda i'r argymdeithasel, a'r gwybod i'n fyddechrau yn eu hŷn o'r rhagleniaeth, ddweud i'r jwg, dwi'n fath o'r gwaith i'r ddweud o'r gwybod i'r ddweud. Felly wrth ymydd o gyfweld, o gyfweld y bywydau, o fwyaf, o'r ymddindodau hyn o'r rhaid, o'r ymddindodau hyn o'r cyffredinol, oherwydd mae'r fawr yn ddechrau wahanol, mae'n ddiddordeb sy'n gwybod i'w fywydau o'r fywdau o'r bywyd. ond there's general agreement that there's one thing that should not figure in that way and process. And that is an assessment of the plausibility, visual illness or validity of a belief. Rather that has taken a place value. Now that's what I've described as a no assessment principle. mwyn wrth gwrs, mae'r ceg-dweithio ychydig yn fwyasio sioedd o'r amgylchedd i lawr hynny i'r hyn o'r pyramid trwy lythu dawnodol o gyrfa Brytyn oedd yn ei wneud o'r wych gan gyda'r aboutauib. Nid yw eisiau ym handledd o cwestiynau unrhyw o sydd wedi'i meddwl i gweithio yma. Mae'r cydnodig, os ydw i gael gweithio beth yna, yn y rhefyrdd, ond mae'n gweithio sydd yn ei dynnu cyffinig i rhan o hynodol yn digwydd. Felly, mae'n ddweud o'r lluniau hynny o'r lluniau hynny, o'r ddweud i'r llwyddiadau, a wnaeth y byddai yn ddych chi i gydigol. Ond mae'n mynd i'ch ddim yn ymddangos ei ddweud. Mae'r ddweud o'r ffobl yn ymwygau yma, mae'n ddweud yn un o'r ddweud, ac mae'n ddweud o'r ddweud. Yn o'r ffobl, mae'n dod o'r ddweud, mae'n meddwl yn yn ei hyn. ac mae'r cyfeirio'r lleol yn ei wneud yn fwy o'ch cymdeithasol, mae'r cymdeithasol ymlaen i'w mwyaf ar hyn yn ei ddweud. Felly yn ddweud, ar y dyfodol, nid yn gallu gydigol iawn, mae'r cyfwyr yn cyfwyr yn cyfeirio'i gyrfaenol yn cyfwyr yn Ynysol. Felly mae'r cyfwyr yn cyfwyr yn cyfwyr yn cyfwyr yn cyfwyr yn cyfwyr. Mae'r cyfwyr yn cyfwyr yn cyfwyr yn cyfwyr yn cyfwyr. Rwy'n mynd i'n cael ei fath oherwydd ar wyf, ac ymgyrchu llyfr y byddai eu cyflwynio bethau arddangos i'r llyfr iawn i'r ganhig, gallu rhywbeth yma o'n gwneud yn cael ei gŽed yn ei gyrhyn brydau. Ac mae'n griffen hwn i'r ddweud efallai ymlu'r ddweud i'r lawr, ac mae hwn i'r ganddysgr ymlaen i'r llyfr ei ddweud i'r cynllun hyn yn ymlaen i'r ymlaen i'r ymlaen, ac mae'n wych yn llawer ouates fel nesaf, Mae gweithio ymlaen, yw i'r ysgolion sydd yn gwneud o'r adnod yn y cyfrifio, ac yn ymhyfyrwyr ar gyfer y cyfrifio. Mae gwaith yn amlwg, mae'n meddwl ymlaen ymddir iawn. Mae'n rhaid i'r eich cyfrifio sydd yn ymwneud yma? Ym wythig o'r gweithio, ym mwynt o'r adnod, dyma'r cyfrifio, ac mae'n rhaid i'r adnod yn rhoi'r cyfrifio, ac mae'n rhaid i'r adnod, Felly, mae'r rhwng yn ddweud i'r Pita Eidr o'r cymdeithas. Mae'r rhwng yn ddweud i'r Llyfrgellol, a'r Llanthyrs Chartol. Mae'r Pita, wrth gwrs, yn ei ddweud, ond mae'n rhaid i'r rhaid i'r cyfeidliad, mae'r rhwng yn ddweud i'r cyfrwng yng nghymru, mae'r prynsibl yn ymdill yng nghymru. Felly, mae'r rhwng yn ddweud, mae'r rhwng yn ddweud i'r cyfrwng ynghwm, ac mae'n bod yn rhaid am y cymdeithas. Mae'r rhwng yn ddweud i'r cymdeithas. Felly, mae'r rhwng yn ddweud i'r cyfeidliad, mae'n ddweud i fyÙn yn ymdill, mae'r rhwng yn ddweud a'u Rhyngg Asgol, mae'r rhwng yn cyknolus. Mae'n ddweud i'r rhwng yn ddweud i'r Y ac not yn ymdill yng nghymru. Mae'n ddweud hynny'n ddweud o'r Rhwng a chymdeithas. Yn y gwahoddiad hyn, y bydd wedi gwneud bod y mhwysau mwydu mewn ymwysol eich ddaeth yn mynd i gael. Felly, mae'r gweithio'n cyfyrd yn bwys adviser yn ei ffadiciad hyn. Hefyd, mae'r gweithio'r dydyn nhw'n gwybod, mae'n gweithio'n ddifft, mae y mwysol eich ddech chi'n cael y ddweud y gwil o'r yfraith ryw. Mae'n ddiddordeb, mae'r ddifft yn ddifft, mae'r ddifft yn maes hwn yn ddifft, Iol fan ryw. shouldn thayl y ffurthiddoedd o ddysgu fath o'r llai. Thank know diddor hwn. Thoes claim to an exemption. In the paper I give a number of examples. I'd like to give better examples but I get rid of them. Examples of the kind of case I think which raises this issue. Oherwydd, mae'r cas yng Nghymru yn trafnod i'rferfer iawn yn y cyllideu mawr yma, nhw nawr o'r maslyg, ac yng Nghymru yna ddaodraeth cael gwir, ac dwi'n dweud rydyn ni o'n sërtu'r reifidau i weld o'r iawn am gyd yn ei sétio'n cael ei sétio'n ddrwy i ddodraethieid. Mae chwarae sydd oed o'r sétio'r meddwl arwain, a'r sétio'n ddodraeth â'r bethau, When Saintsbury's took advice from Muslim authorities, and was told... No, Islam does not require, does not make it wrong around the handle of alcohol, or poor, the reason that Saintsbury's dropped is practice. A more recent case he said of a four-year-old girl in Birmingham who was sent to a Catholic primary school wearing a hijab. That caused the company as well. A dylai oherwydd mae'r drwy'r gŵr ac mae'n gwybod lle iawn ac mae eich gymryd o'r bwlch chi isgwr yn ddylch yn sefydl Faradau i'r ei ddau i'n gwybod i gydigfynol i'r gwrdd yr ydy oedd, ac mae'n dda. Felly mae'n dan o'ch byw hyn o'n gwybod lliol a rhai o'r bwyd a'r ymddangos sydd wedi'u gwneud o'r gyrthwydd. now those two cases didn't go to law, a case that did go to law, but a very old one, that of Mr Sagart, this is back in the regulator clothes shop, and he claimed that as a Jehovah's witness he was forbidden from joining a trade union. At the tribunal an extra witness from the Jehovah's Witness church testified there is nothing in adopting the church that makes it wrong for a Jehovah's witness to joining a trade Yn y gallu'r cychwyn, mae cyntaf i'r Cyngor Saga, mae'r cyfrifio'r cyllid fel y cyfrifio'r cyfrifio'r cyfrifio'r cyfrifio'r cyfrifio, mae'n hynny yn ddod i'r cyfrifio'r cyfrifio'r cyfrifio'r cyfrifio. I think there are two types of reasons. Reasons of principle and reasons of pragmatism. I'll take them in turn. So first of all reasons of principle. How could there be a principle of art? What kind of deployment would support the no assessment principle? The most obvious one is the moral right to religious freedom. That is the idea that if he were to assess some of his belief, find it wanting and allow it to affect my decision, that would be a violation of the person's right. So these rights are my previous example. So that's neatly summed up with indoor nipples and another sentence from the freedom of religion to protect the subjective belief of the individual. But one I want to ask is that or perhaps I should say should that be true of the law? Is that the way the law should operate in the case of religious belief? Now there are two suspects in which religious belief is not typically subjective. Since I've got a bit more time I'll just say a bit more about this. In the paper I try to make that point by contrasting it with a way of thinking about conscience. There is a way of thinking about conscience, talking about conscience, which makes it very subjective to two respects. One is it is the subject, the conscience holder, who is the source, the sole source of what conscience requires for that person. And I think that's unlike religious belief in that in the case of religious belief most commonly the source of people's belief is outside of themselves. It applies the sacred texts in the doctrines of established religion, community, faith and so on and so forth. Secondly, conscience is often associated with the kind of relativism. That is, it's often associated with people's consciences speak differently to them, but they should still comply with their consciences. Therefore what it's right for one person to do won't be right for another person to do. So that conscience is subjective in that relative sense. Now again that doesn't apply to religion in its own self-conception, at least not ordinarily. As a habit there, yes, the believer doesn't, the religious believer does not suppose that a belief is correct for him only if and because he believed it to be so. So religious prescription is not typically exercised in some legislation, it is simply or to get more objective than that. And of course, assumption cannot be that correct belief for an individual must know that the religious oaths it to be. It can't operate upon that assumption because, A, that's the thought of the truth of religious belief as we know it. So for the fact of religious belief as we know it. And secondly, if they use that assumption, they will itself be a kind of theological stance which is just a little thing of course that they shouldn't have to do. So, I just want to make this simple for you that it seems to be just obvious that there's great scope rhythm of faith for knowledge, learning, expertise, informed interpretation and so on, about the same term when there's so-called ignorance, error and misconception. I think it's very odd to deny that. Second point I want to make is that that sort of judgment is at issue here. It's not a first order moral judgment, the judgment of whether X requires Y or forbids Z. It is a judgment of fact or interpretation and therefore when we assess that it's not like violating a primary dignity conscience. It's not a moral matter to talk in and of itself, even though it has moral consequences. It's a silver here. I wrote this a silver in my mind. I'm sure she would say, but look, the badness of having to act contrary to your beliefs or having your beliefs burdened is independent of whether belief is well or ill-founded. The pain and the anguish of having to be unable to act contrary to your belief is quite independent of whether belief is well or ill-founded. I would prefer not to put it in those cycles of returns myself. I'd rather appeal to the idea of integrity, but it takes the idea of integrity. Again, it doesn't matter whether a belief is ill-founded or well-founded for the way in which it bears upon a person's integrity. A person is conforming to what that person believes. Now, that might accept entirely, but it doesn't follow from that, therefore, that the ill-foundedness of the belief is unaffected by those affected by the belief. One thing I haven't said, which I try and emphasise in the paper, is that I think this ill-foundedness only arises against a certain sort of background. It doesn't affect an individual's right to hold a belief. A human rights law, the right to hold a belief, is absolute and nothing I say challenges that. Nor does it, in ordinary circumstances, that a person's right to manifest their belief. Mr Sagger is free to manifest his belief by avoiding employment and, of course, joining a trade union. Muslims are free to manifest their belief that it's around to handle alcohol or poor, by avoiding forms of employment that involve doing those things. The issue I'm addressing arises only when my religious belief comes up against other people's legitimate interests and there's a competition between the two, as is typically the case when you're considering exemptions. On what I'm saying, given that other regarding dimension, this thing about the ill-foundedness of a belief, making a difference to integrity, is not conclusive because my argument is one about a belief that is affecting other people and then does become their business. I need to go back. Something else I don't say enough about this in the paper is something else that's mobilised in this area is canting ideas of respect. The idea that allowing people to live according to their own beliefs, freedom of belief and so on, is an elementary requirement of respecting human beings in consistency with the idea of human rights law. However, I don't think those kind of arguments, again, are decisive in this area. I'll just commit to living myself to a kind of parallel, again, with the themes of culture. In the political philosophy literature on exemptions, exemptions are characterised variously as religious or cultural. What I should say is that they flip-flop between the two, so one might call a religious exemption, another might call the cultural exemption. And it's often supposed that, in a sense, there is too much of a peace in the same things applied to them, but I don't think they do always. Well, let's see. Suppose I claim that a practice is a part of my culture and I go on to a claim of indirect discrimination on grounds of my ethnicity. In that case, my claim is probably subject to an objective judgement. Am I a member of the ethnic group of which I claim? And is the practice I'm claiming for a practice of that ethnic group? That's an objective judgement, and if a court or a court rules that applies against me, I cannot see how uncomplausible they argue that's a gross act of disrespect. That would just seem weird. But equally then, in that case, if I were to accept that, why should it be any more outrageous that a court should take a faith in my own Catholicism and judge whether it really does entail x, so it doesn't tell y, or they're not doing it today. So the sum of all that is that I'm not persuaded that there is a good in principle argument which makes it would make it wrong, morally not legally, for a court to assess persons beliefs and allow that assessment to affect whether it grants exemption or not. But then on to more pragmatic reasons. Now I'm going to be quite brief about this. In the paper I huff and puff a bit about the issue where it really is the case that courts are incapable of doing the kind of assessment I'm talking about, whether it's impossible to do it or it's simply inconvenient. Jesyro is protesting that it is. In here I come down to accepting that there are good reasons why courts should avoid getting entangled reasons as far as they want to, but they're at this time that if they could do that it would be very demanding in time, a heavy reliant on expert advice. Given the internal diversity of religions, often it would be an uncertain exercise, a difficult thing to do, and of course there's always this question about evidence and logic as applied within religion. Finally, these would be areas that would be contentious, controversial, attract claims advice, the kind of thing that courts don't want to get involved in. So perhaps unsprisingly I do come to the conclusion that there was a pragmatic justification if there's not a moral principle justification, but as I say, the justification now is not the high peaks of moral principle in the jumping foots of pragmatism improvements. As you perhaps I should have said it earlier, while you're reliquary to 10LAs. Having done that, I go on to look at whether there's a proxy test we could use for wealth out of those, rather than a testing for wealth out of those directly. And those obvious proxy tests is to use a group. So does a group believe so and so, but the group believes that that indicates a lot of found evidence if it doesn't, if it's ill-founded. A group test not used in that way, but at that sort of standard in direct discrimination law. I might say more about the people I really should because I'm interested in that area, but really comes down to two fairly obvious problems. One is the problem of how you identify the group for the test case. Of course there's already an issue in indirect discrimination law as it is. Why don't I make a claim in direct discrimination? I have to indicate not merely that I have suffered discrimination, but other people like me have suffered discrimination. And the question is who are those others like for me, the other person, and that can be defined in various ways, which can have a radical effect on the challenge. And the second thing is simply that a group test is quite upsetting, a very unreliable indicator of wealth out of those, so I just don't think some proxy of that kind could do the job for us. So there it is, my conclusion is that pragmatism justifies an assessment rule rather than principle, but there is one implication that follows from that. And that is religion, which is belief, will sometimes get to walk in its dew. It will sometimes, in your exemptions, to its inquisital, be ill-faginous of the belief he is in no right. But I think that's a moral loophole we have to tolerate for the sake of pragmatism. Thank you.