 So let's start with the assessment of damages because this trade war has been going on for some time now and it has caused a lot of difficulties. The head of the IMF was saying that gross is going to GDP gross is slowing down but commercial gross is slowing down. So, Mr. Rark, what do you see as the first damages of this trade war already? And we'll go back to the reasons afterwards. Yes, the damages are at the beginning, it looks like very insignificant. But as time goes by, especially by the view of economists, this negative effect of gross retaliation is spreading rapidly into the whole of the US economy. Of course, China also. So more direct damages between US and China. I think in the case of China, of course, the exporters, producers of export items which are heading to the United States are hurt, most hurt. According to my simple calculation, out of total China's export, 19% are going to United States. It's not a small number. So the exporters are hurt very much. These exporters include not only Chinese but also other foreign companies too. In the case of the United States, as Marcus pointed out, of course, the consumers and the users of goods imported from China and also US farmers who are exporting agricultural product to China. So in terms of some small numbers, out of total US imports, 22%, almost 22% are coming from China. It's a big number. So that's why I'm saying consumers and producers are hurting. And also the farmers, I think I heard also 17% of total agricultural export of US is going to China. So overall, these two countries are, we know that clearly they are hurting. And these days, many researchers are analyzing more specific results. And Korea, for example, Korea, Dr. Sago mentioned this morning, but China and United States is Korea's number one and number two training partner. So Korea is caught by these two big giants. And according to the WTO reports, for the first seven months, from January to July this year, Korea's export reduced by almost 9%, 8.6%, something like that. This is the worst record among top 10 world exporting countries. So we are really hurt. And what about our export to China? Similar period, we lost almost 17% reduction compared to the same period of previous year. So Korea is really hurt. And also, if you look at the details, mostly the parts and components and equipment producers who are exporting to China, they are really hurt because our exports, out of our export, almost 79% are those kind of items. So I can give you some example of damages. Yeah, that's pretty impressive figures. This morning, around the roundtable, you were moderating, Gabriel. One of the consequences was all put so on FDI, direct investments. Can you tell us, or whoever wants to, about the effect that trade war has on that because of the uncertainty it creates? Exactly. So I mean, if you look at the big macroeconomic aggregates, investments is by far the most volatile. And it reacts most to news or to change the information and also to uncertainty. You can postpone investment, but you can't postpone consumption so much when people need to eat and so on. And so this procrastination is what matters so much now, as Olivier Blanchard explained this morning. If you look at Korea, another striking feature of the Korean economy right now is how much investment is suffering. So it's been negative for the last quarters, I think three or four quarters already. And that simply reflects the fact that if you don't know what the markets are in the future, whether there are tariffs or not tariffs, what can you do as an entrepreneur? You can only wait. What you can also do, and that's the counter argument, is, and that is valid, for example, for the United States. You say if there is a large net importing market like the United States, and you face as an exporter from Europe, you face uncertainty about the market access conditions, about the tariffs, then the only hands you have is actually to produce more in the United States. And if you talk to the German car manufacturers, what they do, what do they do is as well, we need to restructure operations in the United States. So it's relocation of factories? Yes, but they don't invest more, because traditionally also produce their SUVs in in Spartanburg, let's say, for the Chinese market. And that market is going down, so it's going close to up. So there is two things. So there's procrastination, and then there is investment redirection into large markets where you can hedge, where you can use investment as a hedge. And so in some, theoretically, the effect on investment is ambiguous. But if you look, if you go through simple models, the direct effect on procrastination effect is much larger. So it's not good for investment. Marcus, you want to add something? Sure. So we know that since the United States initiated these tariff wars, the Treasury has collected about 35 or 36 billion dollars in tariff revenue from the special protection. So that's that's a fact. We have economic models that are now coming out where people are trying to model the effects of this. And the results are coming up with, while negative are not particularly large. And there's reasons to believe that those models are underestimating the effects for two reasons. The first one is the one Olivier spoke about this morning, which is we just have, we have a really hard time capturing in our model fundamental policy uncertainty and hence the impact on investment. So that we know. The second thing which Olivier didn't mention is supply chains. When Donald Trump was running for president in the summer of 2016, my institution did a project where we tried to model the trade policy proposals of the two major candidates. And in the case of Trump, we took his statements at face value and we were trying to figure out how to model them. We ended up talking to some of our corporate supporters and had some really interesting conversations with them. And I'm not going to name the firm, but we had a conversation with one that went something like this. Okay. If Donald Trump puts a 30% tariff on Mexico, which is what he was threatening to do, and we estimate or we assess that it's not going to last more than six months, we'll just wait it out and we'll lose X billion dollars a month. If it's going to last more than six months, then we have to, we have to get out of Mexico. Now, if we're going to shut down activities in Mexico, where are we going to start them again? And the corporate leadership found out they did not understand their own supply chains to actually make their contingency plans. They had the drill down to the level of individual product line managers. And in the case of this firm, they decided, well, a lot of that production in Mexico would be moved to Singapore. Well, to make room in Singapore, we're going to have to move things out of Singapore. And some of that's going to go to China. Some of it was going to go to Central Europe, I think the Czech Republic. So you had a situation in which a threatened action against Mexico could end up with increased production in Czech Republic. There is no way any economist using a model and publicly available data is going to come up with that result. And so just, we know this stuff is bad, but our models are not good at capturing some of the basic channels through which these types of policies operate. You're totally right, Marcus, but what this does is it gives huge incentives to us economists. And, you know, there's a lot of research now and how to incorporate supply chains into models. And that's the good thing about Donald Trump. It creates a lot of variance in the data and it creates a lot of things that we thought are not worth while investigating. And now we think we need really to understand those old-fashioned items like tariffs. That's the only positive that I have. We could give Donald Trump and Boris Johnson the Nobel Prize in Economics for the stimulation of new research. They're actually doing good for your profession. I only wanted to point out the 37 billion that the Treasury collected, they collected from the American consumer. They did not collect it from the Chinese or from anybody they collect. I mean, I see your hand movement. I know your studies on it. You say that there is a benefit because the Chinese lowered their prices. But the fact remains that 37 billion were collected from the American consumers. Can I add one more thing about investment, international investment? It's not my research area, but as a journalistic kind of opinions from other people, because of the Obama's period, the U.S. emphasized so-called remaking America. And also, Trump says America first kind of policies, providing a lot of incentives to the U.S. companies who are operating abroad. Please come back to U.S. And has that happened? That's what I'm saying. I don't have any statistics about recent years, but from 2010 to 2016, 80 cunning actually calculated cumulative numbers. By that six years period, more than 800 firms returned back to U.S. They are talking about this issue as so-called reshoring rather than foreign investment. That could happen. And I visited Taipei before I came here, and Taiwan is also doing the same thing. And lots of companies who are operating in China, they return to Taiwan. But of course, government is providing a lot of incentives. So in other words, under this kind of uncertain kind of world trade environment, and also government is really pursuing so-called inward-looking trade policies, then maybe investment will be reduced, which could have gone to other parts of the world. It's interesting what you were saying about the dismantling of the value chain, because there was a report from the World Bank about last week actually asking for more globalization. Saying that globalization had been the way to take countries out of poverty. And if you start breaking the value chains, you're going to put them back where they were, or you're not going to help everybody rising. Do you agree with that opinion? Yes, absolutely. So I think the multilateral order that we have, let's say until 2010 or so, produced convergence. The period of hyper globalization, as some say, led to the great convergence. And in a world where power dominates and where international rules are no longer taken for granted, can be changed all the time, so the uncertainty, this hurts small countries most. And the largest countries have big uniform single markets least. So it's maybe not a surprise that the country with the largest single market in the United States is doing this. But we should expect that this breakdown of multilateral order hurts the poor smallest countries most to the extent that they are not able to organize themselves. And if you look at initiatives like the African continental free trade area, that could counterbalance that. But if that's not going on, then we'll see this convergence process stopped. And actually, there's already science for that. Because trade growth has become very weak. We're not getting the stimulus from trade to those economies as we used to. Yeah, I wanted to point out that the value chains are, of course, disturbed by tariffs, but they are also very strongly disturbed by rules of origin. The new agreement, the USMCA is one of the examples where you have rules of origin that I would call perverted. And they have a real effect on also what can be sourced. I had a meeting with Bosch. And Bosch has set up a huge data center in Vietnam, where they want to optimize the components that they deliver to other producers in order to make sure that the rules of origin are met. This is highly complex and it's getting more complex. Yes. So one of the characteristics, so Trump is a protectionist. So one of the characteristics of the renegotiation or the negotiations of these trade deals is they move them away from free trade. So in the case of the United States Korea deal, we moved it away from free trade by extending the periods of liberalization. In the case of the agreement that we have with Canada and Mexico, we did it through rules of origin and other measures such that we call it NAFTA 0.8 because it's actually pulling you away from free trade. And you see the same sorts of things going on now with respect to some of these other deals as well. I was wondering, yeah, just I'm going to ask my question. You can answer right away. Actually, I want to add Carl's point. More specifically, USMCA has closed saying that if you want to use USMCA, in other words, you have to export automobile by paying no tariff. You must produce your output with 35% to 40% of the local content should be produced by the laborers whose hourly income is above $16. Very, very specific. That means Mexican hourly wage is very low. So you must import from United States, for example, those parts and component to produce something and export back to United States. Which is a little stupid because the idea was to raise salaries. We add a little anecdote from research. I mean, I've done some work on rules of origin. And what we can find there is that almost always rules of origin have no real economic justification. And they are usually meant to be there to avoid in bilateral preferential trade agreements that third countries don't benefit from the trade references. But we know there is some... It's a defense mechanism, isn't it? Yes, but in most cases, really most cases, there is no danger of the so-called trade deflection anyway, because it's costly to transport goods and because the tariff structure is not such that it makes this deflection very profitable. So we have outrageous cases of rules of origin, like in the USMCA, that are clearly protectionist. But I would say that almost all rules of origin is hundreds of pages, also in EU trade agreements. It's a lot of stuff, and most of it has no rationale. Well, the French care a lot about it. It wouldn't happen. Yes, I know. Our cheese or wine, you know, we like to protect it. Yes. Well, I mean, there's other... There's the GIs that protect these food items. But the point is that there is legitimate case for rules of origin to avoid trade deflection, but there is no economic basis for that, very rarely. So what then remains is really just the protectionist element. And that has been the case for the last 30 years. Now, the Trump administration is playing it very hard on that, but it's not a new feature. The EU knows that quite as well. And if you look at those rules of origin, how detailed they are, sometimes it's really ridiculous. And that's true also, for example, in the EU career trade agreement. It's not something that we can blame the current US administration alone.