 CHAPTER 27 OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY PART I Another occasion the mind often takes of comparing is the very being of things. When considering anything as existing at any determined time and place, we compare it with itself existing at another time, and thereon form the ideas of identity and diversity. When we see anything to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure, be it what it will, that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in another place. How like and undistinguishable, so ever it may be in all other respects, and in this consists identity, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were at that moment wherein we considered their former existence, and to which we compare the present. For we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly conclude that whatever exists anywhere at any time excludes all of the same kind, and is therefore itself alone. When therefore we demand whether anything be the same or no, it refers always to something that existed at such a time and such a place, which it was certain at that instant was the same with itself and no other. From whence it follows that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning? It being impossible for two things of the same kind to be or exist in the same instant in the very same place, or one in the same thing in different places. That therefore that had one beginning is the same thing, and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that is not the same, but diverse. That which has made the difficulty about this relation has been the little care and attention used in having precise notions of the things to which it is attributed. Two, we have the ideas of but three sorts of substances. One, God. Two, finite intelligences. Three, bodies. First, God is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and everywhere, and therefore concerning his identity there can be no doubt. Secondly, finite spirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its identity as long as it exists. Thirdly, the same will hold of every particle of matter to which no addition or subtraction of matter being made, it is the same. For though these three sorts of substances as we term them do not exclude one another out of the same place yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same kind out of the same place, or else the notions and names of identity and diversity would be in vain, and there could be no such distinctions of substances, or anything else one from another. For example, could two bodies be in the same place at the same time, then those two parcels of matters must be one and the same, take them great or little. Nay, all bodies must be one and the same. For by the same reason that two particles of matter may be in one place, all bodies may be in one place, which, when it can be supposed, takes away the distinction of identity and diversity of one and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a contradiction that two or more should be one, identity and diversity are relations in ways of comparing well-founded and of use to the understanding. All other things being but modes or relations ultimately terminated in substances, the identity and diversity of each particular existence of them too will be by the same way determined, only as to things whose existence is in succession, such as are the actions of finite beings, VG, motion and thought, both which consist in a continued train of succession concerning their diversity, there can be no question, because each perishing the moment it begins, they cannot exist in different times or in different places, as permanent beings can at different times exist in distant places and therefore no motion or thought, considered as at different times, can be the same, each part thereof having a different beginning of existence. 3. From what has been said, it is easy to discover what is so much inquired after, the principium individuationus, and that, it is plain, is existence itself, which determines a being of any sort to a particular time and place, incommunicatable to two beings of the same kind. This, though it seems easier to conceive in simple substances or modes, yet when reflected on is not more difficult in compound ones, if care be taken to what it is applied. VG, let us suppose an atom, i.e., a continued body under one immutable superficies existing in a determined time and place, it is evident that, considered in any instant of its existence, it is in that instant the same with itself. For being at that instant what it is, and nothing else, it is the same, and so must continue as long as its existence is continued, for so long it will be the same and no other. In like manner, if two or more atoms be joint together into the same mass, every one of those atoms will be the same, by the foregoing rule, and whilst they exist united together, the mass consisting of the same atoms must be the same mass or the same body, let the parts be ever so differently jumbled. But if one of these atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the same mass or the same body. In the state of living creatures, their identity depends not on a mass of the same particles, but on something else. For in them the variation of great parcels of matters alters not the identity, an oak growing from a plant to a great tree, and then lop is still the same oak, and a cult grown up to the horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the same horse, though in both these cases there may be a manifest change of the parts, so that truly they are not either of them the same masses of matter, though they be truly one of them the same oak and the other the same horse. The reason whereof is, that in these two cases, a mass of matter and a living body identity is not applied to the same thing. Four. We must therefore consider wherein an oak differs from a mass of matter, and that seems to me to be in this, that the one is only the cohesion of particles of matter anyhow united, the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the part of an oak, and such an organization of those parts as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, etc., of an oak, in which consists the vegetable life. That being then one plant which has such an organization of parts and one coherent body partaking of one common life, it continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the same life, though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant, and a like continued organization conformable to that sort of plants. For this organization being at any one instant in any one collection of matter is in that particular concrete distinguished from all other, and is that individual life which exists constantly from that moment both forwards and backwards in the same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts united to the living body of the plant, it has that identity which makes the same plant, and all the parts of it parts of the same plant, during all the time that they exist united in that continued organization which is fit to convey that common life to all the parts so united. Five. The case is not so much different in brutes, but that anyone may hence see what makes an animal and continues it the same, something we have like this in machines and may serve to illustrate it. For example, what is a watch? It is plain it is nothing but a fit organization or construction of parts to a certain end which when a sufficient force is added to it it is capable to attain. If we would suppose this machine one continued body, all whose organized parts were repaired, increased or diminished by a constant addition or separation of insensible parts with one common life we should have something very much like the body of an animal. With this difference, that in an animal the fitness of the organization and the motion wherein life consists begin together the motion coming from within, but in machines the force coming sensibly from without is often away when the organ is in order and well fitted to receive it. Six. This also shows wherein the identity of the same man consists, viz, in nothing but a participation of the same continued life by constantly fleeting particles of matter in succession vital united to the same organized body. He that shall place the identity of man in anything else but like that of other animals in one fitly organized body taken in any one instant and from thence continued under one organization of life in several successively fleeting particles of matter united to it will find it hard to make an embryo one of years mad and sober the same man by any supposition that will not make it possible for Seth, Ismail, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin and Caesar Borgia to be the same man. For if the identity of soul alone makes the same man and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies it will be impossible that those men living in distant ages and of different tempers may have been the same man. Which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the word man applied to an idea out of which body and shape are excluded and that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the notions of those philosophers who allow of transmigration and are of opinion that the souls of men may for their miscarriages be detruded into the bodies of beasts as fit habitations with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal inclinations. But yet I think nobody could he be sure that the soul of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs would yet say that hog were a man or Heliogabalus. Seven, it is not therefore unity of substance that comprehends all sorts of identity or will determine it in every case but to conceive and judge of it all right we must consider what idea the word it is applied to stands for it being one thing to be the same substance another the same man and a third the same person if person man and substance or three names standing for three different ideas for such as is the idea belonging to that name such must be the identity which if it had been a little more carefully attended to would possibly have prevented a great deal of that confusion which often occurs about this matter with no small seeming difficulties especially concerning personal identity which therefore we shall in the next place a little consider. Eight, an animal is a living organized body and consequently the same animal as we have observed is the same continued life communicated to different particles of matter as they happen successively to be united to that organized living body and whatever is talk of other definitions ingenious observation puts it past doubt that the idea in our minds of which the sound man in our mouths is the sign is nothing else but of an animal of such a certain form since I think I may be confident that whoever should see a creature of his own shape and make though it had no more reason all its life than a cat or a parrot will call him still a man or whoever should hear a cat or a parrot discourse reason and philosophize would call or think it nothing but a cat or a parrot and say the one was a dull irrational man and the other a very intelligent rational parrot a relation we have in an author of great note is sufficient to countenance the supposition of a rational parrot his words are quote I had a mind to know from Prince Maurice's own mouth the account of a common but much credited story that I heard so often from many others of an old parrot he had in brazil during his government there that spoke and asked and answered common questions like a reasonable creature so that those of his train there generally concluded it to be witchery or possession and one of his chaplains who lived long afterwards in Holland would never from that time endure a parrot but said they all had a devil in them I had heard many particulars of the story and a severed by people hard to be discredited which made me ask Prince Maurice what there was of it he said with his usual plainness and dryness and talk there was something true but a great deal false of what had been reported I desired to know of him what there was of the first he told me short and coldly that he had heard of such an old parrot when he had been at brazil and though he believed nothing of it and it was a good way off yet he had so much curiosity as to send for it that it was a very great and a very old one and when it came first into the room where the prince was with a great many dutchmen about him it said presently what a company of white men are here they asked it what it thought that man was pointing to the prince it answered some general or other when they brought it close to him he asked it do van evu it answered the marinin the prince a qui est vu the parrot a un portugais prince que fait tu la parrot je garde les poulets the prince laughed and said vous gardez les poulets the parrot answered oui moi et je s'cambiens fier and made the chuck four or five times that people use to make to chickens when they call them translating to english the prince asked it whence come ye it answered from marinin the prince to whom do you belong the parrot to a portuguese prince what do you there parrot i look after the chickens the prince laughed and said you look after the chickens the parrot answered yes i and i know well enough how to do it end of translation i set down the words of this worthy dialogue in french just as prince marie said them to me i asked him in what language the parrot spoke and he said in brazilian i asked whether he understood brazilian he said no but he had taken care to have two interpreters by him the one a dutchman that spoke brazilian and the other a brazilian that spoke dutch that he asked them separately and privately and both of them agreed and telling him just the same thing that the parrot i could not but tell this odd story because it is so much out of the way and from the first hand and what may pass for a good one for i dare say this prince at least believed himself in all he told me having ever passed for a very honest and pious man i leave it to naturalists to reason and to other men to believe as they please upon it however it is not perhaps a miss to relieve or enliven a busy scene sometimes with such digressions whether to the purpose or no end quote i have taken care that the readers should have the story at large in the author's own words because he seems to me not to have thought it incredible for it cannot be imagined that so able a man as he who had sufficiency enough to warrant all the testimonies he gives of himself should take so much pains in a place where it had nothing to do to pin so close not only on a man whom he mentions as his friend but on a prince in whom he acknowledges very great honesty and piety a story which if he himself thought incredible he could not but also think ridiculous the prince it is plain who vouches the story and our author who relates it from him both of them call this talker a parrot and i ask anyone else who thinks such a story fit to be told whether if this parrot and all of its kind had always talked as we have a prince's word for it this one did whether i say they would not have passed for a race of rational animals but yet whether for all that they would have been allowed to be men and not parrots for i presume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the idea of a man and most people sense but of a body so and so shaped joined to it and if that be the idea of a man the same successive body not shifted all at once must as well as the same in material spirit go to the making of the same man nine this being premised to find where in personal identity consists we must consider what person stands for which i think is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself the same thinking thing in different times and places which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and as it seems to me essential to it it being impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive when we see here smell taste feel meditate or will anything we know that we do thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions and by this everyone is to himself that which he calls self it not being considered in this case whether the same self be continued in the same or diverse substances for since consciousness always accompanies thinking and it is that which makes everyone to be what he calls self and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things in this alone consists personal identity i.e. the sameness of a rational being and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought so far reaches the identity of that person it is the same self now it was then and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it that that action was done ten but it is farther inquired whether it be the same identical substance this few would think they had reason to doubt of if these perceptions with their consciousness always remain present in the mind whereby the same thinking thing would be always consciously present and as would be thought evidently the same to itself but that which seems to make the difficulty is this that this consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes and one view but even the best memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another and we sometimes and that the greatest part of our lives not reflecting on our past selves being intent on our present thoughts and in sound sleep having no thoughts at all or at least none with that consciousness which remarks are waking thoughts i say in all these cases our consciousness being interrupted and we losing the sight of our past selves doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing i.e. the same substance or no which however reasonable or unreasonable concerns not personal identity at all the question being what makes the same person and not whether it be the same identical substance which always thinks in the same person which in this case matters not at all different substances by the same consciousness where they do partake in it being united into one person as well as different bodies by the same life are united into one animal whose identity is preserved in that change of substances by the unity of one continued life for it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself personal identity depends on that only whether it be annex solely to one individual substance or can be continued in a succession of several substances for as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first and with the same consciousness it has of any present action so far it is the same personal self for it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions that it is self to itself now and so will be the same self as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come and would be by distance of time or change of substance no more two persons then a man be two men by wearing other clothes today than he did yesterday with a long or a short sleep between the same consciousness uniting those distant actions into the same person whatever substances contributed to their production 11 that this is so we have some kind of evidence in our very bodies all whose particles whilst vitally united to the same thinking conscious self so that we feel when they are touched and are affected by and conscious of good or harm that happens to them are a part of ourselves i.e. of our thinking conscious self thus the limbs of his body are to everyone a part of himself he sympathizes and is concerned for them cut off a hand and thereby separated from that consciousness he had of its heat cold and other affections and it is then no longer a part of that which is himself any more than the remotest part of matter thus we see the substance where a personal self consisted at one time may be varied at another without the change of personal identity there being no question about the same person though the limbs which but now were a part of it be cut off 12 but the question is quote whether if the same substance which thinks be changed it can be the same person or remaining the same it can be different persons end quote and to this i answer first this can be no question at all through those who place thought in a purely material animal constitution void of an immaterial substance for whether their supposition be true or no it is plain they conceive personal identity preserved in something else than identity of substance as animal identity is preserved in identity of life and not of substance and therefore those who place thinking in an immaterial substance only before they can come to deal with these men must show why personal identity cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial substances or a variety of particular immaterial substances as well as animal identity is preserved in the change of material substances or a variety of particular bodies unless they will say it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same life in brutes as it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same person and men which the cartesians at least will not admit for fear of making brutes thinking things too 13 but next as to the first part of the question quote whether if the same thinking substance supposing immaterial substance only to think be changed it can be the same person end quote i answer that cannot be resolved but by those who know what kind of substances they are that do think and whether the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one thinking substance to another i grant we're the same consciousness the same individual action it could not but it being a present representation of a past action why it may not be possible that that may be represented to the mind to have been which really never was will remain to be shown and therefore how far the consciousness of past actions is annexed to any individual agent so that another cannot possibly have it will be hard for us to determine till we know what kind of action it is that cannot be done without a reflex act of perception accompanying it and how performed by thinking substances who cannot think without being conscious of it but that which we call the same consciousness not being the same individual act why one intellectual substance may not have represented to it as done by itself what it never did and was perhaps done by some other agent why i say such a representation may not possibly be without reality of matter effect as well as several representations in streams are which yet while streaming we take for true will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things and that it never is so will by us till we have clearer views of the nature of thinking substances be best resolved into the goodness of god who as far as the happiness or misery of any of the sensible creatures is concerned in it will not by a fatal error of theirs transfer from one to another that consciousness which draws reward or punishment with it how far this may be an argument against those who would place thinking in a system of fleeting animal spirits i leave to be considered but yet to return to the question before us it must be allowed that if the same consciousness which as has been shown is quite a different thing from the same numerical figure or motion in body can be transferred from one thinking substance to another it will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one person for the same consciousness being preserved whether in the same or different substances the personal identity is preserved 14 as to the second part of the question quote whether the same immaterial substance remaining there may be two distinct persons and quote which question seems to me to be built on this whether the same immaterial being being conscious of the action of its past duration may be wholly stripped of all the consciousness of its past existence and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving again and so as it were beginning a new account from a new period having consciousness that cannot reach beyond this new state all those who hold pre-existence are evidently of this mind since they allow the soul to have no remaining consciousness of what it did in that pre-existent state either wholly separate from body or informing in any other body and if they should not it is plain experience would be against them so that personal identity reaching no further than consciousness reaches a pre-existent spirit not having continued so many ages and a state of silence must needs make different persons suppose a Christian platonist or Pythagorean should upon gods having ended all his works of creation the seventh day think his soul hath existed ever since and would imagine it has revolved in several human bodies as I once met with one who was persuaded his had been the soul of Socrates how reasonably I will not dispute this I know that in the post he filled which was no inconsiderable one he passed for a very rational man and the press has shown that he wanted not parts or learning when anyone say that he being not conscious of any of Socrates actions or thoughts could be the same person with Socrates let anyone reflect upon himself and conclude that he has in himself an immaterial spirit which is that which thinks in him and in the constant change of his body keeps him the same and is that which he calls himself let him also suppose it to be the same soul that was in Nestor or Thercities at the siege of Troy for souls being as far as we know anything of them in their nature indifferent to any parcel of matter the supposition has no apparent absurdity on it which it may have been as well as it is now the soul of another man but he now having no consciousness of any of the actions of either Nestor or Thercities does or can he conceive himself the same person with either of them can he be concerned in either of their actions attribute them to himself or think them his own more than the actions of any other men that ever existed so that this consciousness not reaching to any of the actions of either of those men he is no more oneself with either of them then if the soul or immaterial spirit that now informs him had been created and began to exist when it began to inform his present body though it were ever so true that the same spirit that informed Nestor's or Thercities body were numerically the same that now informs his for this would no more make him the same person with Nestor than if some of the particles of matter that were once a part of Nestor were now a part of this man the same immaterial substance without the same consciousness no more making the same person by being united to anybody than the same particle of matter without consciousness united to anybody makes the same person but let him once find himself conscious of any of the actions of Nestor he then finds himself the same person with Nestor 15 and thus we may be able without any difficulty to conceive the same person at the resurrection though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here the same consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it but yet the soul alone in the change of bodies would scarce to anyone but to him that makes the soul the man be enough to make the same man for should the soul of a prince carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's past life enter and inform the body of a cobbler as soon as deserted by his own soul everyone sees he would be the same person with the prince accountable only for the prince's actions but who would say it was the same man the body too goes to the making of the man and would I guess to everybody determine the man in this case wherein the soul with all its princely thoughts about it would not make another man but he would be the same cobbler to everyone besides himself I know that in the ordinary way of speaking the same person and the same man stand for one and the same thing and indeed everyone will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases and to apply what articulate sounds to what ideas he thinks fit and change them as often as he pleases but yet when we will inquire what makes the same spirit man or person we must fix the ideas of spirit man or person in our minds and having resolved with ourselves what we mean by them it will not be hard to determine in either of them or the like when it is the same and when not 16 but though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone wherever it be and in whatever state make the same man yet it is plain consciousness as far as ever it can be extended should it be to ages past unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same person as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions is the same person to whom they both belong had I the same consciousness that I saw the Ark and Noah's flood as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter or as that I right now I could no more doubt that I who write this now that saw the Thames overflowed last winter and that viewed the flood as the general deluge was the same self place that self in what substance you please then that I who write this and the same myself now while I write whether I consist of all the same substance material or immaterial or no that I was yesterday for as to this point of being the same self it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances I being as much concerned and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years since appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness as I am for what I did the last moment end of section 23 recording by Gary B Clayton section 24 of an essay concerning human understanding book two by John Locke this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Gary B Clayton chapter 27 of identity and diversity part 2 17 self is that conscious thinking thing whatever substance made up of whether spiritual or material simple or compounded it matters not which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain capable of happiness or misery and so is concerned for itself as far as that consciousness extends thus everyone finds that whilst comprehended under that consciousness the little finger is as much a part of himself as what is most so upon separation of this little finger should this consciousness go along with the little finger and leave the rest of the body it is evident the little finger would be the person the same person and self then would have nothing to do with the rest of the body as in this case it is the consciousness that goes along with the substance when one part is separate from another which makes the same person and constitutes this inseparable self so it is in reference to substances remote in time that with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing can join itself makes the same person and is one self with it and with nothing else and so attributes to itself and owns all the actions of that thing as its own as far as that consciousness reaches and no further as everyone who reflects will perceive 18 in this personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment happiness and misery being that for which everyone is concerned for himself and not mattering what becomes of any substance not joined to or affected with that consciousness for as it is evident in the instance I gave but now if the consciousness went along with the little finger when it was cut off that would be the same self which was concerned for the whole body yesterday as making part of itself whose actions then it cannot but admit as its own now though if the same body should still live and immediately from the separation of the little finger have its own peculiar consciousness where of the little finger knew nothing it would not at all be concerned for it as a part of itself or could own any of its actions or have any of them imputed to him 19 this may show us wherein personal identity consists not in the identity of substance but as I have said in the identity of consciousness wherein if socrates and the present mayor of queen burrow agree they are the same person if the same socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person and to punish socrates waking for what sleeping socrates thought and waking socrates was never conscious of would be no more of right than to punish one twin for what his brother twin did whereof he knew nothing because their outsides were so like that they could not be distinguished for such twins have been seen 20 but yet possibly it will still be objected suppose I wholly use the memory of some parts of my life beyond a possibility of retrieving them so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again yet am I not the same person that did those actions had those thoughts that I once was conscious of though I have now forgot them to which I answer that we must here take notice what the word I is applied to which in this case is the man only and the same man being presumed to be the same person I is easily here supposed to stand also for the same person but if it be possible for the same man to have distinct and communicable consciousness at different times it is passed out the same man would at different times make different persons which we see is the sense of mankind in the solemnly declaration of their opinions human laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man's actions nor the sober man for what the mad man did thereby making them two persons which is somewhat explained by our way of speaking in English when we say such and one is not himself or is beside himself in which phrases it is insinuated as if those who now or at least first use them thought that self was changed the same self person was no longer in that man 21 but yet it is hard to concede that Socrates the same individual man should be two persons to help us a little in this we must consider what is meant by Socrates or the same individual man first it must be either the same individual immaterial thinking substance in short the same numerical soul and nothing else secondly or the same animal without any regard to an immaterial soul thirdly or the same immaterial spirit united to the same animal now take which of these suppositions you please it is impossible to make personal identity to consist in anything but consciousness or reach any farther than that does for by the first of them it must be allowed possible that a man born of different women and in distant times may be the same man a way of speaking which whoever admits must allow it possible for the same man to be two distinct persons as any two that have lived in different ages without the knowledge of one another's thoughts by the second and third Socrates in this life and after it cannot be the same man anyway but by the same consciousness and so making human identity to consist in the same thing where when we place personal identity there will be no difficulty to allow the same man to be the same person but then they who place human identity and consciousness only and not in something else must consider how they will make the infant Socrates the same man with Socrates after the resurrection but whatsoever to some men makes a man and consequently the same individual man wherein perhaps few are agreed personal identity can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness which is that alone which makes what we call self without involving us and great absurdities 22 but is not a man drunk and sober the same person why else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk though he be never afterwards conscious of it just as much the same person is a man that walks and does other things in his sleep is the same person and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it human laws punish both with a justice suitable to their way of knowledge because in these cases they cannot distinguish certainly what is real what counterfeit and so the ignorance and drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea for though punishment be annexed to personality and personality to consciousness and a drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he did yet human judicatures justly punish him because the fact is proved against him but one of consciousness cannot be proved for him but in the great day wherein the secrets of all heart shall be laid open it may be reasonable to think no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of but shall receive his doom his conscience accusing or excusing him 23 nothing but consciousness can unite remote existences into the same person the identity of substance will not do it for whatever substance there is however framed without consciousness there is no person and a carcass may be a person as well as any sort of substance be so without consciousness could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same body the one constantly by day the other by night and on the other side the same consciousness acting by intervals two distinct bodies i ask in the first place whether the day and the night man would not be too as distinct persons as Socrates and Plato and whether in the second case there would not be one person in two distinct bodies as much as one man is the same in two distinct clothings nor is it at all material to say that the same and this distinct consciousness in the cases above mentioned is owing to the same and distinct immaterial substances bringing it with them to those bodies which whether true or no all there's not the case since it is evident the personal identity would equally be determined by the consciousness whether that consciousness were annexed to some individual immaterial substance or no for granting that the thinking substance in man must be necessarily supposed immaterial it is evident that immaterial thinking thing may sometimes part with its past consciousness and be restored to it again as appears in the forgetfulness men often have of their past actions and the mind many times recovers the memory of a past consciousness which it had lost for 20 years together make these intervals of memory and forgetfulness to take their turns regularly by day and night and you have two persons with the same immaterial spirit as much as in the former instance two persons with the same body so that self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance which it cannot be sure of but only by identity of consciousness 24 indeed it may conceive the substance whereof it is now made up to have existed formally united in the same conscious being but consciousness removed that substance is no more itself or makes no more a part of it than any other substance as is evident in the instance we have already given of a limb cut off of whose heat or cold or other affections having no longer any consciousness it is no more of a man's self than any other matter of the universe in like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial substance which is void of that consciousness whereby I am myself to myself if there be any part of its existence which I cannot upon recollection joined with that present consciousness whereby I am now myself it is in that part of its existence no more myself than any other immaterial being for whatsoever any substance has thought or done which I cannot recollect and by my consciousness make my own thought and action it will no more belong to me whether a part of me thought or did it than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial being anywhere existing 25 I agree the more probable opinion is that this consciousness is annexed to and the affection of one individual immaterial substance but let men according to their diverse hypotheses resolve of that as they please this every intelligent being sensible of happiness or misery must grant that there is something that is himself that he is concerned for and would have happy that this self has existed in a continued duration more than one instant and therefore it is possible may exist as it has done months and years to come without any certain bounds to be set to its duration and may be the same self by the same consciousness continued on for the future and thus by this consciousness he finds himself to be the same self which did such or such an action some years since by which he comes to be happy or miserable now in all which account of self the same numerical substance is not considered as making the same self but the same continued consciousness in which several substances may have been united and again separated from it which while stay continued in a vital union with that wherein this consciousness then resided made a part of that same self thus any part of our bodies vital united to that which is conscious in us makes a part of ourselves but upon separation from the vital union by which that consciousness is communicated that which a moment since was part of ourselves is now no more so than a part of another man's self is a part of me and it is not impossible but in a little time may become a real part of another person and so we have the same numerical substance become a part of two different persons and the same person preserved under the change of various substances could we suppose any spirit wholly stripped of all its memory or consciousness of past actions as we find our minds always are of a great part of ours and sometimes of them all the union or separation of such a spiritual substance would make no variation of personal identity any more than that of any particle of matter does any substance vital united to the present thinking being is a part of that very same self which now is anything united to it by a consciousness of former actions makes also a part of the same self which is the same both then and now 26 person as I take it is the name for this self wherever a man finds what he calls himself there I think another may say is the same person it is a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law and happiness and misery this personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past only by consciousness whereby it becomes concerned and accountable owns and imputes to itself past actions just upon the same ground and for the same reason that it does the present all which is founded in a concern for happiness the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness that which is conscious of pleasure and pain desiring that that self that is conscious should be happy and therefore whatever past actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present self by consciousness it can be no more concerned then then if they had never been done and to receive pleasure or pain i.e. reward or punishment on the account of any such action is all one as to be made happy or miserable in its first being without any demerit at all for supposing a man punished now for what he had done in another life whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all what difference is there between that punishment and being created miserable and therefore conformable to this the apostle tells us that at the great day when everyone shall quote receive according to his doings the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open end quote the sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all person shall have that they themselves in what bodies so ever they appear or what substances so ever that consciousness adheres to are the same that committed those actions and deserve that punishment for them 27 i am apt enough to think i have and treating of this subject made some suppositions that will look strange to some readers and possibly they are so in themselves but yet i think they are such as are pardonable in this ignorance we are in of the nature of that thinking thing that is in us and which we look on as ourselves did we know what it was or how it was tied to a certain system of fleeting animal spirits or whether it could or could not perform its operations of thinking and memory out of a body organized as ours is and whether it has pleased god that no one such spirit shall ever be united to anyone but such body upon the right constitution of whose organs its memory should depend we might see the absurdity of some of those suppositions i have made but taking as we ordinarily now do in the dark concerning these matters the soul of a man for an immaterial substance independent from matter and indifferent alike to it all there can from the nature of things be no absurdity at all to suppose that the same soul may at different times be united to different bodies and with them make up for that time one man as well as we suppose a part of a sheep's body yesterday should be a part of a man's body tomorrow and in that union make a vital part of malibu us himself as well as it did of his ram 28 to conclude whatever substance begins to exist it must during its existence necessarily be the same whatever compositions of substances begin to exist during the union of those substances the concrete must be the same whatsoever mode begins to exist during its existence it is the same and so if the composition be of distinct substances and different modes the same rule holds whereby it will appear that the difficulty or obscurity that has been about this matter rather rises from the names ill used than from any obscurity in things themselves for whatever makes the specific idea to which the name is applied if that idea be steadily kept to the distinction of anything into the same and divers will easily be conceived and there can arise no doubt about it 29 for supposing a rational spirit be the idea of a man it is easy to know what is the same man vis the same spirit whether separate or in a body will be the same man supposing a rational spirit vital united to a body of a certain confirmation of parts to make a man whilst that rational spirit with that vital confirmation of parts though continued in a fleeting successive body remains it will be the same but if to any one the idea of a man be but the vital union of parts in a certain shape as long as that vital union and shape remain in a concrete no otherwise the same but by a continuous succession of fleeting particles it will be the same for whatever be the composition where of the complex idea is made whenever existence makes it one particular thing under any denomination the same existence continued preserves it the same individual under the same denomination end of section 24 recording by Gary B Clayton section 25 of an essay concerning human understanding book two by John Locke this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Gary B Clayton chapter 27 footnote Locke discusses the bishop of Worcester part one the doctrine of identity and diversity contained in this chapter the bishop of Worcester pretends to be inconsistent with the doctrines of the Christian faith concerning the resurrection of the dead his way of arguing from it is this he says quote the reason of believing the resurrection of the same body upon Mr. Locke's grounds is from the idea of identity end quote to which our author answers give me leave my lord to say that the reason of believing any article of the Christian faith such as your lordship is here speaking of to me and upon my grounds is it's being a part of divine revelation upon this ground I believed it before I either writ that chapter of identity and diversity and before I ever thought of those propositions which your lordship quotes out of that chapter and upon the same ground I believe it still and not from my idea of identity this saying of your lordships therefore being a proposition neither self-evident nor allowed by me to be true remains to be proved so that your foundation failing all your large superstructure built thereon comes to nothing but my lord before we go any farther I crave leave humbly to represent to your lordship that I thought you undertook to make out that my notion of ideas was inconsistent with the articles of the Christian faith but that which your lordship instances in here is not then I yet know an article of the Christian faith the resurrection of the dead I acknowledge to be an article of the Christian faith but that the resurrection of the same body in your lordship sense of the same body is an article of the Christian faith is what I confess I do not yet know in the New Testament wherein I think are contained all the articles of the Christian faith I find our savior and the apostles to preach the resurrection of the dead and the resurrection from the dead in many places but I do not remember any place where the resurrection of the same body is so much as mentioned. Nay which is very remarkable in the case I do not remember in any place of the New Testament where the general resurrection at the last day is spoken of any such expression as the resurrection of the body much less of the same body I say the general resurrection at the last day because where the resurrection of some particular persons presently upon our savior's resurrection is mentioned the words are the graves were opened and many bodies of saints which slept arose and came out of the graves after his resurrection and went into the holy city and appeared to many of which peculiar way of speaking of this resurrection the passage itself gives a reason in these words appeared to many i.e those who slept appeared so as to be known to be risen but this could not be known unless they brought with them the evidence that they were those who had been dead where of there were these two proofs their graves were opened and their bodies not only gone out of them but appeared to be the same to those who had known them formally alive and knew them to be dead and buried for if they had been those who had been dead so long that all who knew them once alive were now gone those to whom they appeared might have known them to be men but could not have known they were risen from the dead because they never knew they had been dead all that by their appearing they could have known was that they were so many living strangers of whose resurrection they knew nothing it was necessary therefore that they should come in such bodies as might and make and size etc appeared to be the same they had before that they might be known to those of their acquaintance whom they appeared to and it is probable they were such as were newly dead whose bodies were not yet dissolved and dissipated and therefore it is particularly said here differently from what is said of the general resurrection that their bodies arose because they were the same that were then lying in their graves the moment before they arose but your lordship endeavors to prove it must be the same body and let us grant that your lordship nay and others too think you have proved it must be the same body will you therefore say that he holds what is inconsistent with an article of faith who having never seen this your lordship's interpretation of the scripture nor your reasons for the same body and your sense of same body or if he has seen them yet not understanding them or not perceiving the force of them believes what the scripture proposes to him is that at the last day the dead shall be raised without determining whether it shall be with the very same bodies or no i know your lordship pretends not to erect your particular interpretations of scriptures into articles of faith and if you do not he that believes the dead shall be raised believes that article of faith which the scripture proposes and cannot be accused of holding anything inconsistent with it if it should happen that what he holds is inconsistent with another proposition viz that the dead shall be raised with the same bodies in your lordship sense which i do not find proposed and holy writ as an article of faith but your lordship argues it must be the same body which as you explain same body is not the same individual particles of matter which were united at the point of death nor the same particles of matter that the center had at the time of the commission of his sins but that it must be the same material substance which was vitally united to the soul here i.e as i understand it the same individual particles of matter which were sometime or other during his life here vitally united to a soul your first argument to prove that it must be the same body in this sense of the same body is taken from these words of our savior quote all that are in the grave shall hear his voice and shall come forth end quote from which your lordship argues that these words all that are in their graves relate to no other substance than what was united to the soul in life because a different substance cannot be said to be in the graves and to come out of them which words of your lordships if they prove anything prove that the soul too is lodged in the grave and raised out of it at the last day for your lordship says can a different substance be said to be in the graves and come out of them so that according to this interpretation of these words of our savior no other substance being raised but what hears his voice and no other substance hearing his voice but what being called comes out of the grave and no other substance coming out of the grave but what was in the grave anyone must conclude that the soul unless it be in the grave will make no part of the person that is raised unless as your lordship argues against me you can make it out that a substance which never was in the grave may come out of it or that the soul is no substance but setting aside the substance of the soul another thing that will make anyone doubt whether this your interpretation of our savior's words be necessarily to be received as their true sense is that it will not be very easily reconciled to your saying you do not mean by the same body the same individual particles which were united at the point of death and yet by this interpretation of our savior's words you can mean no other particles but such as were united at the point of death because you mean no other substance but what comes out of the grave and no substance no particles come out you say but what were in the grave and i think your lordship will not say that the particles that were separate from the body by perspiration before the point of death were laid up in the grave but your lordship i find has an answer to this vis that by comparing this with other places you find that the words of our savior above quoted are to be understood of the substance of the body to which the soul was united and not to i suppose your lordship writ of these individual particles i.e those individual particles that are in the grave at the resurrection for so they must be read to make your lordship sense entire and to the purpose of your answer here and then me thinks this last sense of our savior's words given by your lordship wholly overturns the sense which we have given of them above where from those words you press the belief of the resurrection of the same body by this strong argument that a substance could not upon hearing the voice of christ come out of the grave which was never in the grave there as far as i can understand your words your lordship argues that our savior's words are to be understood of the particles in the grave unless as your lordship says one can make it out that a substance which never was in the grave may come out of it and here your lordship expressly says that our savior's words are to be understood of the substance of that body to which the soul was at any time united and not to those individual particles that are in the grave which put together seems to me to say that our savior's words are to be understood of those particles only that are in the grave and not of those particles which only are in the grave but of others also which have at any time been vitally united to the soul but never were in the grave the next text your lordship brings to make the resurrection of the same body in your sense an article of faith are these words of st paul quote for we must all appear before the judgment seat of christ that everyone may receive the things done in his body according to that he hath done whether it be good or bad end quote to which your lordship subjoins this question can these words be understood of any other material substance but that body in which these things were done answer a man may suspend his determining the meaning of the apostle to be that the sinner shall suffer for his sins in the very same body wherein he committed them because faint paul does not say that he shall have the very same body when he suffers that he had when he sinned the apostle says indeed done in his body the body he had and did things in at five or fifteen was no down his body as much as that which he did things in at fifty was his body though his body were not the very same body at those different ages and so will the body which he shall have after the resurrection be his body though it be not the very same with that which he had at five or fifteen or fifty he that at three score is broke on the wheel for a murder he committed at twenty is punished for what he did in his body though the body he has ie his body at three score be not the same ie made up of the same individual particles of matter that that body was which he had forty years before when your lordship has resolved with yourself what that same immutable he is which at the last judgment shall receive the things done in his body your lordship will easily see that the body he had when an embryo in the womb when a child playing in coats when a man marrying a wife and when bed rid dying of a consumption and at last which he shall have after his resurrection are each of them his body though neither of them be the same body the one with the other but farther to your lordship's question can these words be understood of any other material substance but that body in which these things were done i answer these words of st paul may be understood of another material substance then that body in which these things were done because your lordship teaches me and gives me a strong reason so to understand them your lordship says that you do not say the same particles of matter which the center had at the very time of the commission of ascends shall be raised at the last day and your lordship gives this reason for it for then a long center must have a vast body considering the continued spending of particles by perspiration now my lord if the apostles words as your lordship would argue cannot be understood of any other material substance but that body in which these things were done and nobody upon the removal or change of some of the particles that at any time make it up is the same material substance or the same body it will i think thence follow that either the center must have all the same individual particles vitally united to a soul when he is raised that he had vitally united to his soul when he sinned or else st paul's words here cannot be understood to mean the same body in which these things were done for if there were other particles of matter in the body wherein the things were done then in that which is raised that which is raised cannot be the same body in which they were done unless that alone which has just all the same individual particles when any action is done being the same body wherein it was done that also which has not the same individual particles wherein that action was done can be the same body wherein it was done which is an effect to make the same body sometimes to be the same and sometimes not the same your lordship think it suffices to make the same body to have not all but no other particles of matter but such as were some time or other vitally united to the soul before but such a body made up of part of the particles some time or other vitally united to the soul is no more the same body wherein the actions were done in the distant parts of the long sinner's life then that is the same body in which a quarter or half or three quarters of the same particles that made it up or wanting for example a sinner has acted here in his body in hundred years he is raised at the last day but with what body the same says your lordship that he acted in because Saint Paul says he must receive the things done in his body what therefore must his body at the resurrection consist of must it consist of all the particles of matter that have ever been vitally united to his soul for they in succession have all of them made up his body wherein he did these things no says your lordship that would make his body too vast it suffices to make the same body in which the things were done that it consists of some of the particles and no other but such as were sometime during his life vitally united to his soul but according to this account his body at the resurrection being as your lordship seems to limit it near the same size it was in some part of his life it will be no more the same body in which the things were done in the distant parts of his life then that is the same body in which half or three quarters or more of the individual matter that then made it up is now wanting for example let his body at fifty years old consist of a million of parts five hundred thousand at least of those parts will be different from those which made up his body at ten years and at a hundred so that to take the numerical particles that made up his body at fifty or any other season of his life or to gather them promiscuously out of those which at different times have successively been vitally united to his soul they will no more make the same body which was his where in some of his actions were done then that is the same body which has but half the same particles and yet all your lordship's argument here for the same body is because saint paul says it must be his body in which these things were done which it could not be if any other substance were joined to it i.e. if any other particles of matter made up the body which were not vital united to the soul when the action was done again your lordship says quote that you do not say the same individual particles shall make up the body at the resurrection which were united at the point of death for there must be a great alteration in them in a lingering disease as if a fat man falls into a consumption end quote because it is likely your lordship thinks these particles of a decrepit wasted withered body would be too few or unfit to make such a plump strong vigorous well-sized body as it has pleased your lordship to proportion out in your thoughts to men at the resurrection and therefore some small portion of the particles formally united vitally to that man's soul shall be reassumed to make up his body to the bulk your lordship judges convenient but the greatest part of them shall be left out to avoid making his body more vast than your lordship thinks will be fit as appears by these your lordship's words immediately following this quote that you do not say the same particles the center had at the very time of commission of ascends for then a long center must have a vast body end quote but then pray my lord what must an embryo do who dying within a few hours after his body was vitally united to his soul has no particles of matter which were formally vitally united to it to make up his body of that size and proportion which your lordship seems to require in bodies at the resurrection or must we believe he shall remain content with that small pittance of matter and that yet imperfect body to eternity because it is an article of faith to believe the resurrection of the very same body i.e made up of only such particles has had been vitally united to the soul for if it be so as your lordship says quote that life is the result of the union of soul and body end quote it will follow that the body of an embryo dying in the womb may be very little not the thousandth part of an ordinary man for since from the first conception and beginning of formation it has life end quote life is the result of the union of the soul with the body end quote an embryo that shall die either by the untimely death of the mother or by any other accident presently after it has life must according to your lordship's doctrine remain a man not an inch long to eternity because there are not particles of matter formally united to a soul to make him bigger and no other can be made use of to that purpose though what greater congruity the soul hath with any particles of matter which were once vitally united to it but are now so no longer then it hath with particles of matter which it was never united to would be hard to determine if that should be demanded by these and not a few other the like consequences one may see what service they do to religion and a christian doctrine who raise questions and make articles of faith about the resurrection of the same body where the scripture says nothing of the same body or if it does it is with no small reprimand to those who make such an inquiry quote but some men will say how are the dead raised up and with what body do they come thou fool thou which thou sowest is not quickened except it die and that which thou sowest thou sowest not that body that shall be but bare grain it may chance of wheat or of some other grain but god giveth it a body as it hath pleased him end quote words i should think sufficient to deter us from determining anything for or against the same bodies being raised at the last day it suffices that all the dead shall be raised and everyone appear and answer for the things done in his life and receive according to the things he has done in his body whether good or bad he that believes this and has said nothing in consistent herewith i presume may and must be acquitted from being guilty of anything inconsistent with the article of the resurrection of the dead but your lordship to prove the resurrection of the same body to be an article of faith further asks quote how could it be said if any other substance be joined to the soul as a resurrection as its body that they were the things done in or by the body end quote answer just as it may be said of a man at at hundred years old that hath then another substance joined to a soul then he had at twenty that the murder or drunkenness he was guilty of at twenty were things done in the body how quote by the body end quote comes in here i do not see your lordship adds quote and say peter's dispute about the matter of raising the body might soon have ended if there were no necessity of the same body end quote answer when i understand what argument there is in these words to prove the resurrection of the same body without the mixture of one new atom of matter i shall know what to say to it in the meantime this i understand that st paul would have put as short an end to all disputes about this matter if he had said that there was the necessity of the same body or that it should be the same body the next text of scripture you bring for the same body is quote if there will be no resurrection of the dead then is not christ raised end quote from which your lordship argues quote it seems then other bodies are to be raised as his was end quote i grant other dead as certainly raised as christ was for else his resurrection would be of no use to mankind but i do not see how it follows that they shall be raised with the same body as christ was raised with the same body as your lordship infers in these words and next quote and can there be any doubt whether his body was the same material substance which was united to his soul before end quote i answer none at all nor that it had just the same distinguishing linements and marks yay and the same wounds that it had at the time of his death if therefore your lordship will argue from other bodies being raised as his was that they must keep proportions with his and sameness then we must believe that every man shall be raised with the same linements and other notes of distinction he had at the time of his death even with his wounds yet open if he had any because our savior was so raised which seems to me scarce reconcilable with what your lordship says of a fat man falling into a consumption and dying but whether it will consist or know with your lordship's meaning in that place this to me seems a consequence that will need to be better proved this that our bodies must be raised the same just as our saviors was because saint paul says quote if there be no resurrection of the dead then is not christ risen end quote for it may be a good consequence christ is risen and therefore there shall be a resurrection of the dead and yet this may not be a good consequence christ was raised with the same body he had at his death therefore all men shall be raised with the same body they had at their death contrary to what your lordship says concerning a fat man dying of a consumption but the case i think far different betwixt our savior and those to be raised at the last day one his body saw not corruption and therefore to give him another body new molded mixed with other particles which were not contained in it as it lay in the grave whole and entire as it was laid there had been to destroy his body to frame him a new one without any need but why with the remaining particles of a man's body long since dissolved and molded into dust and atoms whereof possibly a great part may have undergone variety of changes and entered into other concretions even in the bodies of other men other new particles of matter mixed with them may not serve to make his body again as well as the mixture of new and different particles of matter with the old did in the compass of his life make his body i think no reason can be given this may serve to show why though the materials of our savior's body were not changed at his resurrection yet it does not follow but that the body of a man dead and rotten in his grave or burnt made at the last day have several new particles in it and that without any inconvenience since whatever matter is vitally united to his soul is his body as much as that which was united to it when he was born or in any other part of his life two in the next place the size shape figure and linements of our savior's body even to his wounds into which doubting thomas put his fingers in his hand were to be kept in the raised body of our savior the same they were at his death to be a conviction to his disciples to whom he showed himself and who were to be witnesses of his resurrection that their master the very same man was crucified dead and buried and raised again and therefore he was handled by them and eat before them after he was risen to give them in all points full satisfaction that it was really he the same and not another nor a specter or apparition of him though i do not think your lordship will thence argue that because others are to be raised as he was therefore it is necessary to believe that because he eat after his resurrection others at the last day shall eat and drink after they are raised from the dead which seems to me as good an argument as because his undissolved body was raised out of the grave just as it lay there entire without the mixture of any new particles therefore the corrupted and consumed bodies of the dead at the resurrection shall be new framed only out of those scattered particles which were once vitally united to their souls without the least mixture of any one single atom of new matter but at the last day when all men are raised there will be no need to be assured of any one particular man resurrection it is enough that everyone shall appear before the judgment seat of christ to receive according to what he had done in his former life but in what sort of body he shall appear or of what particles made up the scriptures having said nothing but that it shall be a spiritual body raised in in corruption it is not for me to determine your lordship asks quote were they who saw our savior after his resurrection witnesses only of some material substance then united to his soul end quote in answer I beg your lordship to consider whether you suppose our savior was to be known to be the same man to the witnesses that were to see him and testify his resurrection by his soul that could neither be seen or known to be the same or by his body that could be seen and by the discernible structure and marks of it be known to be the same when your lordship has resolved that all that you can say in that page will answer itself but because one man cannot know another to be the same but by the outward visible lineaments and sensible marks he has been want to be known and distinguished by will your lordship therefore argue that the great judge at the last day who gives to each man whom he raises his new body shall not be able to know who is who unless he give to every one of them a body just of the same figures size and features and made up of the very same individual particles he had in his former life whether such a way of arguing for the resurrection of the same body to be an article of faith contributes much to the strengthening of the credibility of the article of the resurrection of the death I shall leave to the judgment of others further for the proving this resurrection of the same body to be an article of faith your lordship says quote but the apostle insists upon the resurrection of Christ not merely as an argument of the possibility of ours but of the certainty of it because he rose as the first fruits Christ the first fruit afterwards they that are Christ's at his coming end quote answer no doubt the resurrection of Christ is a proof of the certainty of our resurrection but it is therefore a proof of the resurrection of the same body consisting of the same individual particles which concurred to the making up of our body here without the mixture of any one other particle of matter I confess I see no such consequence but your lordship goes on quote Saint Paul was aware of the objections in men's minds about the resurrection of the same body and it is of great consequence as to this article to show upon what grounds he proceeds but some men will say how are the dead raised up and with what body do they come first he shows that the seminal parts of plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary providence of God in the manner of their vegetation end quote answer I do not perfectly understand what it is quote for the seminal parts of plants to be wonderfully improved by the ordinary providence of God in the manner of their vegetation end quote or else perhaps I should better see how this here tends to the proof of the resurrection of the same body in your lordship sense it continues quote they so bear grain of wheat or of some other grain but God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him and to every seed his own body here says your lordship is an identity of the material substance supposed end quote it may be so but to me a diversity of the material substance ie of the component particles is here supposed or indirect word said for the words of st paul taken all together run thus quote that which thou soweth thou soweth not that body which thou be but bear grain end quote and so on as your lordship has set down in the remainder of them from which words of st paul the natural argument seems to me to stand thus if the body that is put in the earth in sowing is not that body which shall be then the body that is put in the grave is not ie the same body that shall be but your lordship proves it to be the same body by these three greek words of the text which your lordship interprets thus quote that proper body which belongs to it end quote answer indeed by those greek words whether our translators have rightly rendered them quote his own body end quote or your lordship more rightly quote that proper body which belongs to it end quote i formally understood no more about this that in the production of wheat and other grade from seed god continued every species distinct so that from grains of wheat's own root stock blade ear grains of wheat were produced and not those of marley and so of the rest which i took to be the meaning of quote to every seed his own body end quote no such your lordship these words prove that to every plant of wheat and to every grain of wheat produced in it it is given the proper body that belongs to it which is the same body with the grain that was sown answer this i confess i do not understand because i do not understand how one individual grain can be the same with 20 50 or 100 individual grains for such sometimes as the increase but your lordship proves it four says your lordship quote every seed having that body in little which is afterwards so much enlarged and in grain the seed is corrupted before its germination but it hath its proper organical parts which make it the same body with that which it grows up to for although grain be not divided into lobes as other seeds are yet it had been found by the most accurate observations that upon separating the membranes these seminal parts are discerned in them which afterwards grow up to that body which we call corn end quote in which words i crave leaf to observe that your lordship supposes that a body may be enlarged by the addition of a hundred or a thousand times as much in bulk as its own matter and yet continues the same body which i confess i cannot understand but in the next place if that could be so and that the plant in its full growth had harvest increased by a thousand or a million of times as much new matter added to it as it had when it lay in little concealed in the grain that was sown was a very same body yet i do not think that your lordship will say that every minute insensible and inconceivably small grain of the hundred grains contained in that little organized seminal plant is every one of them the very same with that grain which contains that whole seminal plant and all those invisible grains in it for then it will follow that one grain is the same with n hundred and n hundred distinct grains the same with one which i shall be able to assent to when i can conceive that all the wheat in the world is but one grain for i beseech you my lord consider what it is st paul here speaks of it is plain he speaks of that which is sown and dies i.e the grain that the husbandman takes out of his barn to sow in his field and of this grain st paul says quote that it is not that body that shall be end quote these two vis quote that which is sown and that body that shall be end quote are all the bodies that st paul here speaks of to represent the agreement or difference of men's bodies after the resurrection with those they had before they died now i crave leave to ask your lordship which of these two is that little invisible seminal plant which your lordship here speaks of does your lordship mean by it the grain that is sown but that is not what st paul speaks of he could not mean this embryonated little plant for he could not denoted by these words quote that which thou sowest end quote for that he says must die but this little embryonated plant contained in the seed that is sown dies not or does your lordship mean by it quote the body that shall be end quote but neither by these words quote the body that shall be end quote can st paul be supposed to denote this insensible little embryonated plant for that is already in being contained in the seed that is sown and therefore could not be spoken of under the name of the body that shall be and therefore i confess i cannot see of what use it is to your lordship to introduce here this third body which st paul mentions not and to make that the same or not the same with any other when those which st paul speaks of are as i homily conceive these two visible sensible bodies the grain sown and the corn grown up to ear with neither of which this insensible embryonated plant can be the same body unless an insensible body can be the same body with a sensible body and a little body can be the same body with one ten thousand or and hundred thousand times as big as itself so that yet i confess i see not the resurrection of the same body proof from these words of st paul to be an article of faith your lordship goes on quote st paul indeed saith that we sow not that body that shall be but he speaks not of the identity but the perfection of it end quote here my understanding fails me again for i cannot understand st paul to say that the same identical sensible grain of wheat which was sown at seed time is the very same with every grain of wheat in the ear at harvest that sprang from it yet so must i understand it to make it prove that the same sensible body that is laid in the grave shall be the very same with that which shall be raised at the resurrection for i do not know of any seminal body and little contained in the dead carcass of any man or woman which as your lordship says in seeds having its proper organical parts shall afterwards be enlarged and at the resurrection grow up into the same man for i never thought of any seed or seminal parts either of plant or animal quote so wonderfully improved by the providence of god end quote whereby the same plant or animal should be get itself nor ever heard that it was by divine providence designed to produce the same individual quote but for the producing of future and distinct individuals for the continuations of the same species end quote your lordship's next words are quote and although there be such a difference from the grain itself when it comes up to be perfect corn with root stock blade and ear that it may be said to outward appearance not to be the same body yet with regard to the seminal and organic parts it is as much the same as a man grown up is the same with the embryo in the womb end quote answer it does not appear by anything i can find in the text that saint paul here compared the body produced with the seminal and organic parts contained in the grain it sprang from but with the whole sensible grain that was grown microscopes had not then discovered the little embryo plant in the seed and supposing it should have been revealed to saint paul though in the scripture we find little revelation of natural philosophy yet an argument taken from a thing perfectly unknown to the Corinthians whom he writ to could be of no manner of use to them nor serve at all either to instruct or convince them but granting that those saint paul writ to knew it as well as mr louvin heck yet your lordship thereby proves not the raising of the same body your lordship says it is as much the same i crave to leave to add body quote as a man grown up is the same end quote same one i beseech your lordship quote with the embryo in the womb end quote for that the body of the embryo in the womb and body of the man grown up is the same body i think no one will say unless he can persuade himself that a body that is not the hundredth part of another is the same with that other which i think no one will do till having renounced this dangerous way by ideas of thinking and reasoning he has learned to say that a part and the whole are the same your lordship goes on quote and although many arguments may be used to prove that a man is not the same because life which depends upon the course of the blood and the manner of respiration and nutrition is so different in both states yet that man would be thought ridiculous that should seriously affirm that it was not the same man end quote and your lordship says quote i grant that the variation of great parcels of matter in plants alters not the identity and that the organization of the parts in one coherent body partaking of one common life makes the identity of a plant end quote answer my lord i think the question is not about the same man but the same body for though i do say somewhat differently from what your lordship sets down as my words here quote that that which has such an organization as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment so as to continue and frame the wood bark and leaves etc of a plant in which consists of vegetable life continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the same life though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant end quote yet i do not remember that i anywhere say that a plant which was once no bigger than an otan straw and afterwards grows to be above a fathom about is the same body though it's be still the same plant end of section 25 recording by gary b clayton