 I think that the end point there of Dahi's presentation where he quoted David Cameron is a very good starting point. This article, a rather very long interview with David Cameron appeared fortuitously last Friday in the Financial Times, which covered a wide spectrum of issues. And during the course of that he refers to the process of Britain's sleep walking out of Europe towards the exit as he puts it. So if he's thinking that this is something that's happening and he's the Prime Minister who initiated this whole process, then we had, I think, even take it more seriously than we had when we commenced this study. As Dahi said, this is the third in a series which now stretched back over 22 years of work on the United Kingdom. To great extent it was initiated by Gareth Fitzgerald who chaired the project group that led to the first two books. Paul Gillespie as the editor of those two books and as he is now the editor of this current publication. And Dahi is the person who has stepped into those very large shoes of Gareth Fitzgerald. Dahi, of course, is a great advantage of having been ambassador in London for seven years at the beginning of the last decade. And I think knows the United Kingdom and the political scene better than most, to say the least. It is his conviction that a referendum is inevitable, one that the rest of the authors share but it has been his great contribution to focus on this irrespective of who wins the election. My own belief is that of the British Labour Party win that they will buckle. I know it's a party I know for over 50 years. I don't oppose the greatness of trust in it or in its word. So to go back to where we started 20 years ago, let me just say at the back of it that great concern for Gareth Fitzgerald was not unexpectedly was Northern Ireland. This was always, this was always at the centre of this analysis and as Paul Gillespie will tell you later, the key to Northern Ireland is actually Scotland. We were writing about Scotland 15 years ago. It's not something we just suddenly cooked up. This is something we had foreseen and of course it's come to the Norway's flood tide and it's going to be critical in terms of the future of the United Kingdom itself. But back to the United Kingdom as a whole and Europe. The second book gives you a key insight because it's called Blair's Britain, which is to do with the federal question and devolution, England's Europe. Our belief is that the problem of Britain with Europe is actually England and Europe. It's not Scotland, it's not Wales, it's England and it applies to both parties. We developed a series of scenarios to try and explain where Britain might wind up with Europe. We have modified the scenarios in the second book by reducing them down to four and they are fully in, half in, half out and fully out. The fully in scenario in fact can now be eliminated. There is no political party in Britain committed to being fully in the European Union. I think it's a reasonable forecast that for the foreseeable future they will not, for example, join the Euro, which has become the core of the European Union. They most certainly will not join Schengen, that's for sure, and they are certainly hesitant about taking on many of the obligations of the justice and home affairs policies. And of course we saw at the, about three years ago, that they refused to sign the fiscal compact. So being fully in I think is a scenario that doesn't apply any longer, no longer relevant. Half in is basically the situation supported by the British Labour Party. Its current leadership and the mood of the party is generally well disposed towards Europe. Let's not forget that that was not always the case. I appeared before the joint committee of the, of the eruptus on European, on the European Union to present this book about three weeks ago, and my companion was Baroness Quinn from the Labour Party. She and I had served in the European Parliament together and we had been friends. There were seven members of the British Labour Party, MEPs, who were pro-European. Those were the ones I went out and dealt with at night in Strasbourg. Two of them were deselected in the 84, for the 84 election because we're pro-European. Francis Jacobs who was here and who knows them is nodding his head. And I was present at the European, at the British Labour Party conference where Neil Kinock produced a change of 180 degrees, I think in Brighton. So this is a, it's a fairly recent conversion on the part of the British Labour Party. The Conservative Party has been going in the other direction. It was after all heat who brought the Conservatives into the European economic community. The only time that Britain was really fully in was for the first year and a half. At the moment, they are half out. And for many in the British Conservative Party, they would wish to be fully out. The survey recently shows that over 60% of the membership of the Conservative Party once Britain fully out. And there is a strong belief that, of course, the majority of the parliamentary party want out. Cameron refers to this in his interview and he foresees a split in the party over the referendum, which he believes will be healed after the referendum result. I suppose the feeling in this of the authors is that what the tread ahead is that the half out will morph into a fully out unless the situation is managed. In other words, to avoid the sleepwalking. So hence we have described this as a moment of great danger for Ireland, for Britain, for Europe. We conclude it's in everybody's interest that the United Kingdom should stay in. That's dealt with in the book in great length. As Dohey mentioned, it's particularly important for British-Irish relations. This was the great concern of Gareth Fitzgerald that the relationship between Ireland and Britain has been utterly and absolutely transformed by our joint membership of the European Union, as it now is. And by the fact that around the council table, we are at least formally equal and has given us a framework inside which then handled the bilateral relationship. Now, I'm long enough around politics to remember as General Secretary of the Labor Party back in the middle 1960s, when we had absolutely no relationship good, bad or indifferent or whatever with British politics, with the British political system. There were, of course, embassies, but that's different. And that was true of the exact moment when the troubles broke out in Derry and in Belfast in 1969. Now, that's been transformed since. And I haven't been told it was none of your interest. You were not to be involved in this, as I was told by Lord Stunham, the Home Secretary, well, junior minister at the Home Secretary's office in 1969. We're now in a situation where Cameron and then the Kenny are jointly managing Northern Ireland. Interestingly enough, by the way, is an interesting insight into Northern Ireland where it figured at that stage the junior minister at the Home Office with Lord Stunham was actually Victor Carton, an official of the Transport Union in real life, was responsible for the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, the licensing of London taxis and Northern Ireland. That is not where we wish to go back to. I think that is self-evident that it's in our economic interest. They're at stake here, and John Bradley will be dealing with that, and I've talked about Northern Ireland. I think the key point of, one of the key points of the analysis is, as question has been raised here by visitors to the House from other member states, is would you please explain to us what the British are actually looking for? We're not quite sure. Would you explain, interpret? In the book, you'll find an analysis of the speech that Cameron deliberately gave to, at Bloomberg's headquarters in London, in which he outlined a list of demands for what he calls the reform of the European Union. That was added to then in a major interview he gave to the Daily Telegraph. So we've taken these two exposés of what it is they're looking for, and you come down to seven demands. When you break them down, you look at the fall into three different categories. Five of them are capable of resolution, but good will all round. For example, less red tape is one of them. But what's at issue here is something rather fundamental. You've got two issues. The United Kingdom under the Conservatives wishes to stay inside the single market, but to change the rules unilaterally, governing itself in terms of the free movement of persons. So as we know, there are four freedoms governing the single market, and they wish to change one of them for reasons of immigration, mass immigration, as the Swiss call it. As the Swiss have discovered, this is not an option. And indeed, for example, the other great country that applies as part of the single market, although outside the European Union, at Norway, applies a completely open border policy. So basically, as we said, that Cameron is looking for something that's a contradiction. He wants to have the cake and eat it. But this is a big issue. The other is, of course, that as he has expressed it very clearly, he does not want Britain to participate any further in the ever closer union amongst the peoples of Europe, which is, after all, the basic rationale and fundamental principle of the European Union as a whole, expressed in the Treaty of Rome in its first recital. And not only that, but they're actually saying that we don't want the rest of you to go any further with this project. So freeze our membership in the form in which it now is, and freeze the development of the European Union at the point at which it now is. Now, both of those are extraordinarily difficult to deal with. There is a third one, which is the repatriation of certain powers to national parliaments, which would, of course, absolutely undermine what Paul Gillespie, a wonderful word he coined 20 years ago, the unicity of the whole European Union experiment. So that's the demands of Cameron. And I think that what we're saying is that the origin of this really lies in what he was talking about earlier, which is in English exceptionalism. I think if one doesn't see this as a psychological and cultural problem to be solved rather than a bureaucratic or technocratic problem, then one's not going to have a solution that endures, as Dahi has said is the real objective here. So we also develop ideas about negotiating strategies. Remember that what we're going to have is a series of demands made by the United Kingdom, which will be presented in the European Council, where it's where the real negotiations will go on. And what we're saying in that context really is that what we have to look for are multilateral solutions. Solutions that apply to everybody, not just to Britain, on border controls and welfare tourism, and accept, swallow very hard, and accept that Britain will not join some core functions for the foreseeable future, such as the European Union, create new ones, however, which they can join. And we propose in the book the creation of four core unions for the European Union as a whole. Clearly, Economic and Monetary Union is one. At the moment, the single market is another. The Capital Markets Union, as proposed by Junker, is another possibility. And then we have a fourth one, which we're calling a Security Union, which clearly would cover borders. On the one hand, we'll also include things like cybersecurity and energy. That can produce, we think, a political accommodation that will endure. To bring that about, the book ends with two chapters dealing with an agenda for Europe and an agenda for Ireland. As Donnie has said, this is a departure from established methodology here. We have for 23, 24 years refused ever to give policy advice. We've said it's, we present the facts, we present the analysis, we present the implications of the various issues that are arising and solutions that might be an offer. We leave that to the body politic to decide. On this occasion, we think the issue was so important, we have departed from that principle. The first time, maybe it'll be the only time. And we come up with a series of agenda actions for the European Union as a whole, but for the other, for 27 member states and for Ireland in particular. And what we're saying, I suppose psychologically, is it's critical in terms of a negotiating stance to avoid a situation in which it's Britain versus the rest. If it's Britain versus the rest, you can be guaranteed that it will fail. It's got to be something in which we all agree on and look for win-win outcomes. Yomane said once, and I think it was his own methodology, that he applied consistently when faced with an intractable problem and an extraordinarily difficult question, he said, you want to get an answer? Change the question. So we propose in this the change of context. And that's not Britain versus the rest. It's all of us together looking for common solutions that apply equally. And may I say, after record, well, if at the end of the day Mr. Kamlin were to go home and say, actually, I've won. As the famous words of John Major, after Maastricht, as you recall, game, set, and match. Well, if he gets game, set, and match, and they vote yes, who cares? Thank you very much.