 to say is normally we follow what the U.S. government does and we follow OPM and we got the message this morning that the federal government was closed at which point we thought this event was not going to happen. Then I guess it was 15 minutes later we received an e-mail from our present CEO, John Hammery, said we're opening today. So this event is probably one of the only ones that is going on today in Washington this morning. And it just goes to show you that, you know, Korea watches are really diehard people. So it's a very special event. This is something that we wanted to do for quite some time to bring together some of the former commanders in Korea to help us think about the security situation in the region, Korea and the region more broadly. And in planning for an event like this, we were looking for, in addition to our commanders, someone from both the policy world with a strong academic background who could talk about both policy issues and strategy and planning issues and there was no better person than Dr. Hicks. So we'll begin today by, I will start by introducing, formally introducing our participants and they will have a discussion and then we will open it up to the audience for questions. I apologize both to our audience and to our panelists for the, not that you are all chopped liver, but for the meager showing today. I think many people are watching this livecast on the CSIS website to avoid the difficult weather. So let me start with General, John Tellele. General Tellele served as Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command Republic of Korea, USC and USFK from July 1996 to December 1999. His command positions include Commander, 7th Army Training Command and Combat Maneuver Training Center, Commander 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Vice Chief of the Staff of the Army and Commander United States Army Forces Command. He served two tours in Vietnam and four tours in Virginia. The staff assignments included three tours of the Pentagon, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research Development and Acquisition, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans Department of the Army. After his retirement, he was appointed as President and CEO of USO Worldwide Operations. He currently is Chairman and CEO of Cyprus International. He graduated from Pennsylvania Military College, now Widener College University, where he received a degree in Economics and was commissioned as an Armor Officer. He holds a Master's Degree in Administration from Lehigh and graduated from the US Army War College. General Skip Sharpe served as Commander-in-Chief of UNC, CFC and USFK from June 3, 2008 to July 14, 2011. His command positions included Division Commander, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia, Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver, 2nd Infantry Division, Camp Red Cloud, South Korea, Regimental Commander, 2nd Army, Armored Calvary Regiment, Fort Polk, Louisiana, Squadron Commander, 1st Squadron, 7th US Calvary, 1st Calvary Division, Fort Hood, Texas, and Army Company Commander, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored and 2nd Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas. He commanded troops in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti and the Stabilization Force Multinational Division in Bosnia. He is now consulting for several US and Korean firms, so on the board of the directors of the Korea Society and involved in strategy and policy discussions at several DC think tanks, including CSIS. General Sharpe graduated from West Point in 1974 and was commissioned as an armor officer. He earned a Master's of Science degree in Operations Research and System Analysis from Renssela Polytechnic Institute. General James D. Thurman, J.D. Thurman, served as Commander-in-Chief UNC, CFC and USFK from July 14, 2011 to October 2, 2013. General Thurman's command positions included 5th Corps, Germany, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, and Baghdad, Iraq. Commanding General National Training Center Operations Group National Training Center, 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia. 3rd Squadron, 4th Calvary Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division, 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment, and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. He has extensive Army and Joint Staff experience, including Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Director of Army Aviation Task Force, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Chief Operations, Coalition Forces, Land Component Command, and Kuwait, Director of Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army. He also served as Chief of the Plans and Policy Division for Allied Forces Southern Europe in Kosovo and his Battalion Executive Officer in the 1st Calvary Division during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. General Thurman earned his commission through ROTC at East Central Oklahoma University. He is a graduate of Command and General Staff College and the Army War College and holds a BA in History from East Central Oklahoma University and an MA in Management from Webster University. Dr. Kathleen Hicks is our Senior Vice President, Henry Kissinger Chair and Director of the International Security Program at CSIS. He previously served as Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces. As Principal Deputy Undersecretary for Policy, Dr. Hicks was responsible for advising the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on issues pertaining to the development and execution of U.S. national defense policy and strategy. As Deputy Undersecretary for Strategy, Plans, and Forces, she led the development of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and oversaw the Strategic Guidance Development Review and Plans for the day-to-day military activities of the combatant commanders. Prior to her service at the Defense Department, she was a Senior Fellow at CSIS where she co-directed the CSIS Task Force on non-traditional security assistance, led strategy planning and process assessments on the project for national security reform and assessed the national security community's role in improving global health. Dr. Hicks holds a PhD in political science from MIT and MA from University of Maryland School of Public Affairs and a BA, Magna Cum Laude, from Mount Holyoke College. As you know, SITSILO will be joining us for lunch, so I'll introduce him then. I think part of the purpose of the long and extended introductions was not because I like to hear myself talk, but I just wanted you to all really have a sense of the wealth of experience that we have on the stage today. So on behalf of CSIS, Dr. Hicks and I were very happy to host these three generals, and I will turn it over to you now. Great. Thank you very much, Victor. And I'm reminded that the last time I had an event this season that we had a snow day, it was hosting the Canadian Chief of Defense Forces, and I have a similar feeling today with snow barely falling, and here we're going to have hardy generals who survived Korean winters. So I appreciate you showing just how wimpy we here in Washington are that this snow puts us off. Gentlemen, let me begin very, very broadly. I'm going to ask each of you beginning with General Tilelli of a pretty open-ended question. The U.S. and the Republic of Korea have recently signed, as you know, a renewal, essentially of the Special Measures Agreement provides extensive support to U.S. Forces Korea and reinforce the presidential statement made last May. And I'm interested based on your own history and experiences, each of you at a different time in the U.S. ROC relationship, how you think about and would characterize the state of the security relationship between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea right now. And maybe to help refine that a little if you can think of anything in particular that gives you the greatest degree of hope for that alliance and what causes you the greatest concern to the alliance. I'd be interested in hearing that broad overview from you. General Tilelli, if we could start with you. Well, thanks for allowing me to be here and inviting me. I've always said, and I still believe to this date, that the ROC and the U.S. Alliance is a model alliance. It's the model of any alliance that the U.S. would engage in. It's a very strong alliance. It's an alliance that's been born in blood and carried through multiple activities. In a real sense, when you think of the ROC and the U.S. Alliance, I think one of the terms that all of us have used when we're in the Republic of Korea, we say, we go together. And truly that's the sense and spirit of the ROC U.S. Alliance over over many years. You look for a positive indication. I think the positive indication is the close working relationship between the leadership of not only the ROC armed forces, but also the ROC administrations over time. I think second, secondarily, and in my view, my personal view, when you think of the friendships that have been bred over 60 years of working together, it's not only an alliance of people and countries and military, it's an alliance of friends and families that have been born over relationships bred over time. You look at one positive activity, and I think a positive activity that we need to think about is, in each and every time the United States has been engaged overseas, where we have asked the Republic of Korea government to assist the United States. You can look at Vietnam, you can look at Iraq, you can look at Afghanistan, you can look at many places that we've been. The ROC have always contributed forces. So how positive is that when you think about it in the context of our other alliances that we've had? When you think, in my mind, what's the biggest threat to our alliance? I think the biggest threat to the alliance, of course, is not a function of differences of opinion because each nation has its own vital interests, but I think it's how you work those interests over time. For example, the United States Defense Department is in a time of budgetary constraints. So what does that mean towards the alliance? That's not a large threat because the alliance is strong. But it is a threat to how we execute things. So that's my view. I think it's a strong model alliance, best alliance in the world. I've always thought that and after serving there for close to four years and being very close to the ROC forces and administration, I still believe that. I think General Kali said it very well. I believe that the Republic of Korea US Alliance is the strongest alliance anywhere in the world that the United States has, bar none. And it's not just from a military perspective, it's from a diplomatic and economic perspective, a social perspective. We work together very closely to be able to try to maintain peace and stability and security around the world and to promote the values of democracy, freedom and human rights around the world. And as General Kali says, we've historically been doing that for 60 years now as we go through. I think that that strength, that understanding that having the same basic core values between our two countries enables us to work through some of the difficult issues that face us now and will face us in the future, continue to face us in the future. Of course, the biggest one is to be able to maintain stability with Kim Jong-un in North Korea and in what he's been doing in his father before him. But I am very confident that this alliance will be able to continue to work together to be able to maintain that strength that's needed for anything that comes in the future. Thanks. And first off, it's an honor for me to be here this morning with two great general officers and Dr. Hitch and Dr. Choi. I would tell you the alliance is very strong and I'm probably three months removed. I had never served in Korea, but it was the best military partnership I was ever part of. And we were talking about contributions to us in Iraq. I had the opportunity to serve with the previous two times removed rock chairman who ended up being my deputy and in the rock chairman General Jung. He and I were in Iraq at the same time. And the strength of that alliance over right now, I believe is built not only from the blood and sacrifice of the Korean War, but on the mutual trust that you see every day, particularly inside of combined forces command, which I believe is one of the key lynchpins of the alliance with how combined forces command works. And I spent the majority of my time with the three hats I had with combined forces command. But I would agree with both the general officers here about their perspectives. I think the budgetary constraints that we see out there today can cause some issues for the future. But I think the alliance does two things. It provides strong deterrence. And it also provides assurance not only to the region, but to the rock public. And I think that's very important. It's what I saw over the course of the last few months. Thank you. Let's talk a little bit first about the North Korean threat. You know, for for everybody, I think, but JD, you dealt with a prior leader. You now have Kim Jong-un in place. We've had, if you will, the cycle of provocation that we are used to are repeated under him to include the nuclear tests last year. Let me start, if I may, with JD. How do you how do you talk to people in Washington when you came back here about or people out across the country about the North Korean threat? And what is it Americans most need to understand that maybe they don't about that threat? Okay, thank you very much. Right after I took over, of course, Kim Jong-il was was in charge. And we talked a lot about what's going to happen when this guy dies. And so just by a coincidence, we did a rehearsal inside of combined forces command on what are we going to do when Kim Jong-il dies? Turns out that he dies on 15 December of 2011. And we find out on the 17th that he's dead. And then Kim Jong-un is going to be the successor. I was a bit hopeful that things may change. Again, I had not been there in Korea. So I had an open mind about what I was seeing. One, he had been educated in the Western world. So I was a bit hopeful. But what I watched happen over time, during my time is we roll in with kind of the quiet period, the the morning period after the death of the leader, and the new leaders starting to get on board. And we have the 29 February 2012 leap year deal that's made, you know, where we're not going to do any nuclear testing exchange for subsistence, nutritional subsistence. And then that fails. And as a result of North Korean saying they're going to do a peaceful satellite launch. So I started seeing things change. And so I was becoming convinced that things were not probably gonna be as good as what I was optimistic about. And so the period that I served over there was one failed missile launch, a successful missile launch where they put a satellite in orbit. The KN08 appears the missile portfolio, the the use of asymmetric type threats. I had followed General Sharp, as you know, we had had the sinking of the Chonin, which had occurred in March, where we lost 46 rock sailors. And then we had the the shelling of the young Pungdol island. And where there was another loss of life. So I was watching all this and then we have the nuclear test, largest yield to date that we know of. And so one, what I tried to do is not overstate the problem to Washington DC, but to give my honest assessment as the commander of what I was seeing from an asymmetric point of view. I think that is probably our greatest threats over there today. I was not that much worried about North Korean ground forces. Yes, they have large force, but I do think their ground capability is atrophic. But the missile portfolio that they continue to develop. And with the long range missile, they put a satellite in orbit, which could be at some point become an ICBM, I think that's a real threat. Road mobile capability is hard to find on the battlefield. And that's something particularly in that terrain that we got to pay attention to. So my emphasis during that period of time as I talked to Washington was on what I was seeing from an asymmetric portfolio, the WMD portfolio, not only missiles in the nuclear piece is disturbing, but also chemical. They have large chemical stockpiles up there. They also have cyber capability. So that's what I think we have to worry about for the future. And I think when you're talking to Washington DC, it's important not to overstate the problem. And that's what I tried to do is because we dealt with many challenges, and it's easy to get things very excited here and do the wrong thing. But I went back to two things. One I had to maintain armistice. And I had to prevent war and preserve options. That's how I looked at my job every day. So thank you. I think my message to Washington and the people of the United States would be twofold. Number one, Kim Jong-un only cares about one thing. That's regime survival. Period end of statement. He will do anything necessary both internally and externally to maintain the regime. And I think he has proven that over the last since he's been in power in his father before beforehand. Secondly, is people talk about the status quo, the recurring cycles of provocation. And my message has always been you have to think about that not as status quo, meaning a straight even line, but as a line that is becoming increasingly more dangerous because of the increased capability that North Korea is gaining with that time to build the nuclear capability and a ballistic missile capability. So I believe that we in Washington and I'm confident the Republic of Korea also needs to think about the threat of Korea, North Korea along those two different axes and be prepared to defend South Korea, be prepared for instability within North Korea. And I I do not believe that Kim Jong-un and the regime will change and open up period. Gentleman, you have the longest perspective on on North Korea. What are your views in terms of the threat? Well, the first thing I will say when dealing with North Korea, hope is not a method. The fact of the matter is, is we've counted on hope for many, many years that North Korea will change and they have not. You can look at the various sine curves, if you will, on what we've tried to do to persuade them to cease and denuclearize if I can use that term. And at the same time stop their missile programs. General Schrock's exactly right. When you look at the regime, job one is to keep the regime in power. And that's the very danger of the entire situation there. The asymmetric piece of nuclear missiles, cyber, other weapons of mass destruction, special operational forces pose a very serious threat on the peninsula. In a very real sense, when you think about the peninsula itself, it really is a hub for stability within Northeast Asia. So what happens there really has a very serious or positive effect throughout the region. General Schrock's term is exactly right. The responsibility of the commander there is to keep the armistice, maintain peace and stability on the peninsula, and be prepared with our allies to defend the Republic of Korea if necessary. I do not see, even though we perceive right now that there's a great charm initiative going on by Kim Jong-un. I do not perceive that as anything differently that has been done in the past. We've seen it before. We hold out our hand and at one point they get what they want and they go back to business as usual. So I think as General Thurman said, I think you have to be calm when you analyze it. You have to look at it over a long period of time. You have to understand what's happening. And you don't want anyone in Washington DC to set their hair on fire so you're taking the wrong action. Because miscalculation potentially is the grave is danger. Miscalculation is a grave danger. I want to come back to that. But first let me ask about the stability of the North Korean regime. Of course, Korea watchers often talk about collapse being a potential scenario for instability as much as aggression might be. I open that up to whoever'd like to go first. What are your thoughts on how stable the regime is and what the prospects are for a collapse scenario? We already had a chance. I think that Kim Jong-un and what he just did in killing Chung Song-taek is an example of concern in North Korea of Kim Jong-un has about how stable his regime could be and it's proof that he will go to any means to be able to try to maintain that stability. I think more and more information is slowly, very slowly starting to get into North Korea and people are very, very slowly starting to understand how their government now and in the past has robbed them of the human rights that they deserve or the freedoms that they deserve. And because of that, the economy is in such bad, bad shape. So I think for if you look internally from a North Korean perspective, Kim Jong-un is understandably concerned where this is going in the future. If his number one concern is how does his regime survive? And I think we have to be prepared for possible instability in the future. I would agree with Skip that the fact of the matter is I think Kim Jong-un will take whatever steps necessary to keep the regime in power. Secondarily, with some of the events that have occurred in purging leadership within the regime shows that there is some inconsistency in ideology, if you will, within the regime on directly where they should go. But I think he has it under control. I think he has it under good control. I mean, it's easy to control folks with a gun to their head. In my mind's eye, when you think of the regime and you think about some of the things that have occurred, you know, I can remember when I just before I took command and I got briefings from every smart person I could think of about North Korea. And General Sharp was my executive officer. And everyone was predicting collapse within my tenure as sink in Korea. And at that point we developed the plan. Here we are many years later and we're still talking about collapse. I think even though the people have been deprived, there are prison camps all over the country. The economy has been on a downturn where you count it positive if it becomes a half a percent off the negative. You look at you look at the military, you look at where the investment is going, it's going to nuclear and missiles and cyber and all of those things. I think we must focus on the main responsibilities and that is to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula, maintain the armistice and be prepared for any contingency that might occur. And whether that is a hostile provocation or whether that's instability in North, I think between the rock and the US alliance, we are strong enough to cope with any of those contingencies. Well, I think first off with the recent death of Chang Sun-Tek, I was not surprised. I really wasn't because he continues to purge leaders up there. He has replaced more of his commanders than both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. And so when a person is doing that, that tells me that he's kind of worried about the folks around him and he wants to continue to further consolidate power. I do think you have to be ready for collapse at some point. So you build contingencies in the military plans. That's what we do. And so you have to have good plans and you have to have good common sharing of intelligence and information and you've got to protect that information. That is very important and it doesn't need to be debated out in the open public. But I think for the future, again, it is very important, I believe when dealing with, first off, I don't trust the North Koreans. After my time over, I don't trust what they say. And I worry when we're in a period of charm offensive. Because if you go back through history, that's when things can potentially occur. So I think one, we got to remain absolutely vigilant. And we got to question all the things we see every day. And that's why the day to day interface that you find in on the peninsula with the military with combined forces command is so important. Because that is in itself a strong deterrent. Again, is what I got out of this. But I think Kim Jong Un will continue some of this behavior. I think their road to eventual collapse is going to be the economic situation. I really do. I think if you know, if you look at what's occurring over today, we're spending a lot of resources on tourism. And while you got over 200,000 people in political prison camps, basically, and people starving to death. And then you've got also in this day and age, everybody has a cell phone. Or they got some device. And I think access to the Western world at some point could be something that can cause a fracture through social media and that sort of business. But I don't think we should ever underestimate the impact that that regime has had on its people for the for the many years that we've been dealing with this problem. Because there's a human dimension to this thing. And I think when we start trying to predict that, we'll probably get it wrong. You know, just add on just very briefly is, you know, one of the things that Kim Jong Un in his in his father did and I think continue to do is to try to convince the people of North Korea that they have an enemy, a very strong enemy in the Republic of Korea and the United States, and that they have to be prepared for that enemy. And that's why the military first policy is absolutely needed and why their sacrifices are needed. We have seen in the past, and I believe we will see again in the future, a way that he reinforces that is to be able to do attacks, do provocations against South Korea, and then coalesce his military and his people that say, okay, look, they're struck back, we've got to be prepared to do anything that that we need to defend North Korea. And, you know, following on what General Thurmond said about the importance of the alliance and the combined nature of it. I think we all worry very much about in that type of scenario, how do you control escalation? So the thing does not spin out of control very, very quickly. And the way you do it is to make sure you're of one voice of one mind, not just drawing the time of conflict, but all throughout your training throughout armistice period in order to be able to do that. And that's why I'm confident, as General Thurmond says, we will be able to handle the situations in the future as they become more difficult. You just started to answer the next question is going to ask. It was very well done. But let me first plug the frontline piece that aired recently, which featured Victor Chah and others on the state of North Korea, I commend anyone to watch that brief. It's just an hour piece. On calculation and miscalculation, that is clearly for any alliance, a significant issue. For the US Rock Alliance, we've just gone through this period, certainly with the Cheonan and the Waipido incidents, where you have a sovereign nation, the Republic of Korea that feels it's been attacked. The US is an ally through Combined Forces Command. We operate together. I'd like to hear a little bit about how you walk through with an ally, that dynamic to make sure that we're calculating together in a way that doesn't worsen a situation and in fact improves the situation. Any lessons learned, either from those incidents that I just relayed or others that you had, where you feel that the alliance was able to reassure the rock public and improve the situation maybe by not escalating, as Skip just relayed. Maybe we start JD. Yes. Well, one of the things that I inherited from General Sharp was the counter provocation plan. And in March of 13, we signed that. A lot of great work in that. And the whole purpose of that was an alliance mechanism to solve problems for the alliance to control de-escalation and respond to a provocation. And I think that is a great example of an alliance working together over some very tough issues and emotional issues. You know, when people get killed, people get emotional when blood spilled. And what is important about all of that, I think, is that I learned is the constant assessment of what is actually going on. And throughout the whole process, this is not denying anybody the right of self-defense. That's an inherent right. But in any type of military operation, what I've learned, before you take the first couple of steps, you better know where you're going to end up and kind of how you want this to end. And that was always at the forefront of what I was dealing with on a day to day basis, that one, you got to be ready. Two, you respond to protect people. But if you're not careful, you can allow that to get out of control. So I think that's a good example of one of the things that is good for the alliance. Again, it's a deterrent against the north, but it also assures people that you've got two very, very close allies working together. And I think that's important. Every situation is different. But you better take time to think through a situation before you react. If you do it through pure emotion, you're going to get it wrong. That's what I've learned. And I learned that on the battlefield. Well, I think the reassurance is exactly as General Thurman described. We have an alliance. We have a strong alliance. We have a counter provocation plan. We have a modality or methodology through which when a provocation occurs together, and again, going back to its first rules, the rule of self defense is always preeminent. But going back to the rule of provocation, that together you're working to solve the provocation issues and what action should be taken. The fact that the matter is, I believe that the statements made by President Lee and now President Park have been a deterrent because the North Koreans know now that the rock armed forces and the rock government is not going to sit back and take these terrible shots from North Korea without some sort of action to those provocations. So I think JD has it exactly right. There's a plan. The plan has been worked together. There's command and control methodologies in place to react to any provocation that might occur and not react months later but react quickly enough so it's tied to the provocation rather than tied to some study of a provocation. I would agree with both. I believe that Kim Jong-un is clearly understands that if he does another attack like he father did in 2010, either the Chunin or the attack of Waipido, that the response coming back not just from South Korea but from the alliance. South Korea initially with self-defense and then the alliance is going to be very strong and very precise against North Korea. And I think strength and the willingness to use that strength is the strongest way you deter someone from acting. And I believe that the statements that have been made, the kind of provocation plan that was continued in Ashley Sein is a clear signal to North Korea and Kim Jong-un. You better not do that again because things will not be like they were back in 2010. I promise we're going to conclude my portion of this on broad regional issues but I'm going to spend a little time here on the really nitty gritty defense to defense military to military issues in the U.S. rock relationship. And I think those begin with issues surrounding rock military modernization and op-con transition. And General Sharp, you have actually written a piece on op-con transition which makes you the victim to begin this conversation. Talk a little bit about how you think the rock is doing in terms of maintaining or upgrading, modernizing its forces and what implications that has for transitioning the operational control of forces. I think what they have in this year's budget is a very good indication that the Republic of Korea is committed to getting the capabilities they need in order to be able to defend the Republic of Korea with the U.S. as a strong alliance. If you look at ISR, if you look at PAC-3, if you look at their continuing discussions about the next jet fighter, I think they are clearly demonstrating that. It has to be followed through. This is not a one-year shot to be able to do that but I think the indications of some of the capabilities that all three of us have talked about that they need to develop and continue to develop, there's good indications that they're moving along those lines. On op-con transition, I guess I'd like to make three points on op-con transition. First off, if you look at it from are the Republic of Korea military professional enough and ready to command and control in the warfight, in my view they are absolutely. I do not question the professionalism and the capability of the leadership of the Republic of Korea to lead the warfight, any type of warfight or instability that we would have. We have been with them for 60 years right now. We've all seen them in action not just in exercises in Korea but around the world and I am absolutely confident in that leadership. That's point number one. Point number two is I really believe that we got to look at what is the appropriate command and control relationship from maybe two different dimensions. First off is I do believe that a combined command center, a combined command structure, should stay. I do not agree we should go supporting supported relationship. It ought to be some sort of combined structure and I think that needs to be thought of really in two dimensions. First off is from armistice through conflict so the whole dimension of both today and then what happens in the future and then the second dimension is the dimension of provocations that are getting more and more dangerous instability in an all out warfight attack. So if you look at those six different blocks if you will what is the best command and control structure to put in place in order to be able to do what may be the most likely or the most dangerous scenario to go through and I think that is exactly what this group, the Republic of Korea, the US group led by the Minister of Defense and the Secretary of Defense are taking a look at what are the conditions that need to be in place for the best time to do op-con transition and exactly what should that command and control structure take a look at and then the last point and I think General Teller will probably say even more about this is you really do need to look at it from a regional perspective not just a perspective on the Korean peninsula but what is best for security and stability in northeast Asia with all the different things that are going on. So I'm confident that the study the work that's going on now to determine where should this command and control relationship and how should it evolve over time will come up looking at all those different factors with the right answer because the Republic of Korea US alliance has been so strong and we are willing and able to sit down and talk to each other and say okay here's what we think across the board you know I guess the final point I'll make is this is like a marriage but it's a good marriage I mean we're we're not fighting like we want a divorce we're trying to figure out how to strengthen and both sides will have to agree on if there's going to be a change or not. Well first off I agree with what General Sharp has talked about one I spent a lot of time in this tough subject of op-con transitions matter of fact when I first got over folks said you know be careful you can't talk about that but that's at the heart of the matter command and control in every operation I've been part of it boils down to command and control joint combined command and control first off I agree completely on the professionalism of the military and rock leadership I have great confidence in them and that's first thing but when you start bringing a lot of joint capabilities in to put together a joint command and control you better have a failsafe system of command and control so I think that needs to be talked about it needs to be conditions-based one you must stay in a combined arrangement supporting and supported doesn't work in my mind in in an operation that could potentially occur on the peninsula because it could happen very fast and you do not have time to start trying to go from armistice into crisis and start talking about how you're going to command and control it won't work I've been part of these operations where you go in and we throw together a c2 apparatus and borrow people and all that today you have people that are training together every day for a common purpose but I think as you go through and evaluate rock capabilities joint capabilities then that needs to be a determining factor and the number one factor has to be the c4i architecture because that's how you rapidly bring joint capabilities together because anything that happens on the peninsula is going to end up being a joint type warfight if we get back into that situation but I agree completely about the fact that you have to plan that from armistice through the whole spectrum of potential conflict in there I think as you look at capabilities and I would agree this year's defense budget is has got a good mix of capabilities in there and you have to follow through you don't build that in one year that it takes time to do that but I think you over a period of time with the alliance is evaluating a constant evaluation of where the rock military's at and across its whole joint capability portfolio is something that needs to be looked at on a reoccurring basis I would say probably about four things and try not to be redundant but I must be redundant on one thing the rock forces and leadership are well trained well disciplined well led that that is a given the second part is when we think about op-con transfer the republic of korea has come back to united states of america and asked the united states government to delay op-con transfer and make it condition-based in my mind's eye that has to be we have to abide by what our rock allies desire the study should not be a study on dates and as some of you know in this room I opposed op-con transfer dates from the very beginning where it should be condition-based but based on conditions and conditions have to do with the threat conditions have to do with capability conditions have to do with the mission and in my mind's eye the glue that has held the defense the stability the relationships on the peninsula militarily have been the combined forces command so when you think about condition-based I think you not only think about capability you have to think about threat you have to think about the organizational it's the organization itself and it's some would say well it's an issue of who's in charge when you're working towards a common goal if the common goal is the same it doesn't make any difference as to who's in charge you know and I don't know who said it but someone said when if it's not broke don't fix it CFC and the arrangements we have within the combined forces command are not broken today and I think that's the piece that with a very tenuous situation in the north new leadership nuclear capability long-range missile capability that the rock president and minister of national defense saw that the best organizational construct at this particular time with these particular conditions are to keep the CFC and the op-con transfer as condition-based now should it be studied for the long term and when the conditions are right defining what those conditions are I agree but in my view we should agree with the request by the rock administration to keep it as it is today until the conditions are are correct okay I'm going to let that stand for the for the Q&A I think there's some interesting differences there that we can draw on further if folks are interested. General Telly let's talk a little bit about China as again as I said before you really have the longest perspective on the peninsula and the role of at least the way I think the United States policymakers have come to see China's role vis-a-vis the peninsula debates has grown there's a growing sense if you will that China has a major role to play here. What are your thoughts on the North Korea-China relationship and China's potential role positive or negative in terms of a potential conflict on the peninsula? Well again I don't think it's changed much okay I think that China role in North Korea has been one of for lack of a better script of providing those assets resources necessary to keep the regime in power and that's been done over time. Now it's almost like a family relationship that you have one of your family who is dysfunctional they're still part of the family. North Korea is a dysfunctional activity but the fact of the matter is China is supporting them they may not like the activities they have taken steps to try to stifle some of the activities nuclear for example missile tests for example. In some cases they've probably been successful in some cases in most cases they've not been. China could play a very critical role I believe in modifying the behavior of North Korea to this point I don't think they've been very successful. At the same time do I believe that China would like a benign buffer state between China and the Republic of Korea? Yes so the consequences is I think they play a big role. I think they have played a role in six-party talks. I think they have played a role in modifying the the conversation with North Korea. I do believe they could do more and I believe that the United States and China have to agree on what that more is. You not only can talk to talk but you have to walk to walk and do something about it. The other issue becomes it's a very tenuous situation when you turn the spigot on and off of resources you have to also understand as JD said what are the consequences of that occurring so China is in that role now. They have the spigot they can turn it on they can turn it off they can modulate it but they must understand the consequences of everything they do so I think China has a big role. I don't think they have exerted the muscle that they have to modify the behavior of North Korea. General Thurman thoughts on the role of China? No I would agree with a lot of the comments that General Tallulahe just spoke of. I think China is okay with us having a North Korean problem for the U.S. and I think oftentimes they I think they're quite satisfied that we're there and I say that because we are a stabilizing factor while at the same time I think they view us as a threat into the overall region in there with our military. I think China plays a huge role though in trying to control behavior of North Korea and I don't know if they're able to do that to the extent that we would like to see them do that. I think it is important today to have good meal-to-meal relations with the Chinese and to work close together. I think the economic side of the house drives a lot of things in not only from the peninsula but for the whole region over there when you put all that together but I think as we move to the future I think one of the key things that we need to be in particular or observation of is the whole economic situation you know from the international currency and the cost of doing business in that region. I think it's just something that will eventually be a deciding point from an economic standpoint but I do think it's important for the Chinese to keep a stable peninsula and again I think the wildcard is what does North Korea do in the future and I would like to see the Chinese be more involved in controlling North Korean behavior. I'll just add one thing that I mean China just like any other country will do what's in their vital national interest that's how they as any other country takes a look at it and I think that China is starting to concern be concerned about their vital national interest as a result of some in North Korean activities. I'm convinced China does not want a nuclear North Korea. I'm convinced China does not want the chance of proliferation through their borders or an accident near their borders a nuclear accident. Do I believe that they have taken enough steps in order to be able to prevent that and to be able to prevent escalation because of strong provocations? No I believe they could do more. I think that we ought to be working very hard and trying to work hard with China, Republic of Korea, Japan and other parts of the region to determine what does a reunified peninsula look like and how is that in the vital national how does that increase the vital national interest of all the countries that are involved because I believe that's the ultimate solution to this. One of the consequences of more recent North Korean provocations was further US deployments in direct response to that which were then communicated to China as a reaction from the US toward North Korea but of course were deployments that the Chinese did not welcome into the region and that brings me to the final piece I wanted to talk about before we open it up to the audience and that's the rebalance. I'd be interested in each of your perspectives on the to the extent that you think the US is living up to the rebalance theme how well you think the theme itself resonates in the region and moving if you will even off-pen how you think about the US as a stabilizing influence for issues such as in the ages dispute with the Chinese or Korea you excuse me Korea Japan relations what the rebalance may bring or what its limitations may be with regard to stabilizing the region so let me start maybe with JD if you don't mind. Well I think for the whole rebalance issue I think you got to look at not only military but all of the diplomatic informational economic things that occur inside of of rebalance I think from a military point of view and I'm going to speak for the peninsula I was asked to take a look at capabilities so we did a little capability review and so that's why it was clear to me we need to strengthen some of the ground capabilities and we were able to modernize the US army forces on the ground we were able to strengthen missile defense and these are all joint capabilities and it the whole purpose was not to you know increase capabilities to cause a lot of anxiety but if you look at what's been what we've been able to do we added a helicopters I asked for a helicopter squadron to be brought back in there because one it's all about mobility on the peninsula and it's a mix of joint capabilities that that you got inside of CFC it also gives us more experiences in that part of the region but I think some of the things we were able to do from the military side was nothing more than strengthening the capabilities inside the 28-5 number and I felt that was needed over there but I think as you go forward and you look at the the region as a whole I think a lot of times rebalances looked at as a as a threat not only to the Chinese being number one but also with the North Koreans as they see what we're doing militarily the greatest threat to rebalance I believe is the budget because when you reduce forces you can't be everywhere and I think that's one of the things that the Defense Department's got to deal with as globally as as we look to the future I tried to maintain a very close relationship with Admiral Sam Locklear who's the PAKOM commander as we looked at across all of PAKOM all of the regional assets were were available that we could use not only inside of PAKOM but also in the peninsula but this is something that I think continues to develop you can't do that overnight particularly when you're involved in in Afghanistan and you're trying to reduce the U.S. military now I I think rebalance unfortunately is not well understood and sometimes used by people to point to the U.S. doing some things that they think that the U.S. shouldn't be doing because when you really look at rebalance as JD said it really is about much more than just military it's about diplomatic with more ties diplomatically between the United States and countries within the Pacific more diplomatic visits to make sure that we understand each other and are working towards the same goal more free trade agreements to make sure that our economies are continuing to improve and yes militarily to make sure that we're prepared for any sort of instability or conflict within Asia so I think the rebalance when viewed from the perspective of what we're trying to do is to work in an area that's a vital national interest to the United States to maintain peace security prosperity and around the world but especially in that region and it is the proper thing to do and I think in many cases we are putting putting our our people putting our money behind it in order to be able to help do that throughout the region I would agree with skip the fact is is that the United States is a global power we must look at the globe rather than one area it does include all the elements of national resources as skip and JD described it includes engagement includes engagement with all the countries in the Pacific we had a hard time just defining defining to people who would ask what does that mean so we went from focus to about rebalance so in that context you could see there was a little bit of pivoting and pivoting I mean we've changed the the dialogue and and the the narrative so rebalancing is probably the right word at this point and what it includes is relationship building around around the Pacific it includes engagement engagement around the Pacific it includes all the elements as skip and JD pointed out diplomatic information on military and economic for all sorts of reasons for example I can the United States Army Pacific commander is conducting many engagement exercises in the Pacific right now which have nothing to do with threat it has to do with engaging and understanding and cooperation and that's the essence I think many people put the trappings of a military wrapper around this rebalancing but it's not that's not the wrapper that's part of the means if you will as you think about engagement in the region so in that context I think it's the right thing to do at the same time we must we must remain focused globally to ensure that around the world our vital interests are protected and maintained very good well we have covered a lot of ground and yet there are many topics we did not touch on so I'll be interested to hear the questions from the audience we have microphones that will go around so if you raise your hand and I call on you give your name and your affiliation and we'll give you a microphone yeah please Victor he has his own microphone I have my own microphone so we um so this is being live webcast and it's also on a live twitter feed so we had some questions that came into twitter um and so one of the questions is uh you have a lot of stars on the stage I don't know if they mean movie stars or general stars um and the question is um for each of them uh what is your what was your biggest surprise uh as commander and what is your fondest memory who wants to begin that well the junior guy the biggest surprise I had was the volatility of the media I was not expecting what I found out and I have been a guy that hadn't really done a lot of media engagements but what was important what was interesting one morning I picked up one of the papers the one of the sole papers and it's got my picture on the front page and it says general thurman is bullying the media well I hadn't even talked to anybody and I so we were in the traps and this guy uh apparently wrote an article because he thought I was holding something back but I suddenly realized is how perceptive people are but that was probably the one of the surprises I had that I probably should have prepared myself a little bit better for and I of course that was back in washington so I get a couple of calls hey you know if it's in the early bird you're going to get a call about it nine times out of ten but early bird doesn't exist anymore I don't think uh but that was one of the things and so it did it was instructive to me because it told me that we had to develop a good uh outreach campaign uh and to make sure one that we're in obviously with the policies inside of of not only in department of defense but also here in washington my fondest memory uh was the close relationship and the friends that uh that I established uh one was with general pax son yep uh who is a true patriot and also uh as I set and observed the 60th anniversary uh of the armistice and I watched people who had gone before me and go up to pan moon john and look at the look on those Korean war veterans that struck home to me and it also told me the importance once again the alliance that was shared in blood and sacrifice and so I mean that's probably the greatest uh memory best uh middle to middle partnership I ever had so um I think my biggest surprise came in how hard I had to continue to work to make sure that people in washington and DC in the united states understand the importance of this alliance and understand the importance of it in relation to peace and security in northeast asian how strong this alliance can be in that that realm of peace and security um as some of us have talked you know about you know the the u.s during the time I was there was really primarily focused on the middle east what was going on in Iran and in afghanistan um in that part of the world and to be able to say look what's happening here and if we want to maintain peace and security the alliance what is going on within korea is important not just for the korean peninsula but for the entire region and uh and that took that took a lot of work not just by me but by kathy stevens by our other diplomatic folks that are there and uh i am convinced that we now completely realize that and with a shift the rebalance into the pacific that we are as i said earlier putting our money where our mouth is that this is an important region to us uh what was the best memory very much along the same lines as what JD said it's the personal relationships and the personal friendships that for both general tello and myself go back to 1996 and still have friends that we established and I speak for myself but I'm sure it's the same for general tello that we established in july of 1996 when we first got there friends that we still go see on every visit that's over there um but it's also not just the personal relationships and friendships but it's the professional also that you can really you've established the trust and confidence between our two nations and our two militaries and our two diplomatic corps that you can really sit down face to face and and talk out what are the issues and how are we going to resolve this as an alliance as as one channel 12 I think the biggest uh surprise uh in my my personal view was when you get a bit of intelligence information the interpretate how the interpretation of that information would be so different among two or three different people and two or three and two countries and the consequences of that I think I think that always was a an issue uh that surprised me but was always resolved the the thing that uh are my fondest memories and are no not memories because they're truly act activities right now one is the kamaya forces command which is a tremendous uh headquarters and the relationships in that headquarters which is not just between the rock the republican korea officers and non-commissioned officers and the us officers and non-commissioned officers but with the families uh the other piece of it which is one of my fondest memories is the graciousness of the korean people overall in my view they're the most gracious people I've ever dealt with individually and collectively so just like skip and jd when we go back when I go back to korea I I see friends that I've established over a long period of time uh when they come here we get together each and every time and in the interim we're communicating by email or other means so it's when you think about the rock alliance what has the cfc bread the combined forces command bread it is bread relationships with with with stands frictions over time you always come back to those relationships and that's the fondest memories that I have like to mention just one one more thing because I think it's it's important to recognize the what the republican korea has done to honor our veterans that fought there 60 years ago I know of no other country in the world that thanks veterans like the republic of korea does I mean just think about it the thousands that the republic of korea have paid to come paid for to be able to come back to the republic of korea to see what their sacrifices has developed over those past 60 years again to all koreans I think we are all really thankful for you remember the past and you remember what the sacrifices of veterans in the united states the republic of korea and the un nations from around the world did 60 years ago and that's that is to be that is to be greatly congratulated very good okay other questions right over here good morning gentlemen and it's uh worked with two of you and it's great seeing you gentlemen and general shark I wanted to ask a question about China now in the event of a crisis on the peninsula be it a conflict or instability uh that results in the U.S. and rock as an alliance intervening in north korea you have the chance of the PRC intervening as well so the U.S. and rock have entered into north korea you have PRC intervening in its own interest how do you keep the alliance from unraveling in this situation because of differing perspectives on how PRC intervention should be handled so that you can accomplish the objectives that both sides want thank you I'll give him again my personal opinion I think the assumption that there would be intervention may not be correct the way I would first of all I don't see the rock in the U.S. alliance unraveling number one secondly I think providing information and discussion with China's leadership before any event which lays out the intent of the alliance before the event might mitigate any for lack of a better descriptive incursion into whether it be instability or or a crisis so I believe in coordination before the fact discussion before the fact and at least annunciating the intent of the alliance under different scenarios so they do not perceive that it's we're moving up to seize and hold territory I don't know if I could say it any better I agreed that that we need to be working now we the United States and the Republic of Korea need to be working now with China to look through various different scenarios that could happen in north korea and to make sure we've got a clear line of communications between the alliance and China to make sure that the intentions where we're going what the end states are going to be or are clearly understood and and how the three countries and I'll include Japan also the four countries could work together to resolve the situation as quickly as possible that that's absolutely critical and to be able to do now I would just add a couple of things to that I think where you run into a problem is when there is a surprise which breeds mistrust and I think that's why it's important today with pacific rebalance is more mill to mill relations so there's better understanding of true intentions when you don't know the intentions of something then that breeds speculation and it causes uncertainty and it causes a lot of anxiety so I would agree 100 percent I think understanding what your end state is going to be up front when you get involved in any military use of military force has got to be paramount and if you don't understand kind of if it's going to be reunification of the peninsula or whatever if you don't understand where you're going with that then that could cause a problem but I think I'm confident the alliance can work through that just like these other two gentlemen are and will stay close but it it requires close coordination and exchange of information that can be protected good morning this is Changmin Seok from Asan Academy Republic of Korea first of all thank you for your sharing your ideas recently to strengthen US ROK joint military capability kill chain and RAMD are on the construction very fast however what is worrying about is inclining the level of threat to say security dilemma which might end up into the arms race independence law I'd like to ask you is there any prospect of Washington that North Korea would strengthen its military capability especially making you making more nuclear bombs or chemical weapons after US ROK's toughening joint military capability? I didn't get your question. I didn't get your question. Do you have a hard time hearing but you were asking if there was anything go ahead you can repeat anything the North Koreans yeah is there any prospect of Washington that nuclear would strengthen its military capability after US ROK's toughening joint military capability? Strengthen US nuclear capability, my understanding? Yes so do you all see prospects for let's broaden this out a little bit to a question on the US nuclear deterrent overall for Republic of Korea the strength of that deterrent anything that could call that into question if that generally gets to the issue and what prospects you see for either the ROK's own proliferation or what the US might do to strengthen that deterrent if necessary? Well I think there's an agreement between the Republic of Korea government and the United States government that the United States will protect a Republic of Korea. They are under our nuclear umbrella so if that's the question is there a need to strengthen that? I think the agreement is rock solid I think there have been discussions between various ministerials and also between the the presidents of the Republic of Korea and the United States so I think it's a rock solid agreement right now if you're asking me if the the the nuance question is should there be nuclear weapons placed on the on the peninsula themselves I would say absolutely not. You know I agree with what John Clowley says and I think that the alliance is is moving forward in the in the right direction to strengthen the alliance's capability to be able to deter and defeat a nuclear type of threat. You know if you look at what South Korea is buying as far as increased ISR increased capability to strike into North Korea that is the right type of systems in order to be able to help deter the use of nuclear or any other type of weapon so I think it's it's moving in the right direction. I do think that that as we move forward that that increased intelligence sharing especially with Japan is is really critical. I believe that there should be an intel sharing agreement between the Republic of Korea and Japan and the alliance because of the capabilities that that would bring in order to be able to help detect what's going on in North Korea. I applaud what South Korea has done is looking at you know buying more PAC-3 lower tier type of systems. I think in the future South Korea needs to look at an upper tier system also. So again I think we're moving in the right direction capability wise. I agree completely with John Clowley says the nuclear umbrella is strong and and steadfast and and we are prepared to be able to respond to a nuclear threat and we do not need nuclear weapons on the peninsula to make that happen. I would say the same thing. Our policy of extended deterrence I believe is the right policy and one there does not need to be any reentry of nuclear weapons on the peninsula. You're talking about a global and regional issue here that needs to really be looked at and I think the policies are right in regard to that. I too think that the rock government's making the right investments in their lower tier missile defense. I remain concerned about the growing population when you look at Seoul and how close it is to the demilitarized zone. Your greatest threats is long-range artillery and missiles. You know the other thing that's something we should be mindful of is a nuclear disaster of some sort that could occur at one of their test facilities up there. That is probably one of the greater threats that we got to be prepared to deal with because it's not only going to affect the peninsula, it's going to affect the Chinese, the Russians and the Japanese and it's going to excite a lot of people and so that's something I think is a vulnerability that we need to be paying attention to for the future. And the other vulnerability along those lines is proliferation. I mean Kim Jong-un is not stupid and I'm sure that if he could sell something to terrorist organizations to get some hard cash he would do that and being able to watch to make sure that proliferation is not happening is absolutely critical. Jada, I'm going to put you on the spot a little bit since you most recently left and of course there has been talk in South Korea though it's my understanding not in serious government circles about South Korean nuclear capability. What's your sense of what that would do to the regional dynamic if the South Koreans were to pursue their own nuclear capability? Well one I think it would potentially tip the scale on the balance of deterrence and the true intention. I think that would excite a lot of folks over there and again I was asked several times about that and I think through the policy of extended deterrence there is sufficient capability and you know we talk about nuclear war and all that. Folks need to really examine what that really means and the threat of that. So again I think as long as you got the right mix of capabilities that should be sufficient deterrence. I think our greatest threat would be if the regime is threatened up there to a sense that they're going to lose it all then that is something we better be very mindful of of what the young leader may or may not do in the protection of that nuclear capability. It's something we need to pay attention to every day and make sure that we remain absolutely vigilant but you should not put nuclear weapons back on the peninsula. There's no reason for it. Okay let's say have it all the way in the back over here. Gilbert Rosman the ASEAN forum. General Sharp has brought our attention to Japan on a couple of occasions and I'm wondering if each of you could comment on what you've tried to do to improve the coordination with Japan and so that we have more trilateral activity and how you've been disappointed by things that haven't worked. I'll start. I mean you know obviously as the commander over there looked at it from a military perspective and I think we would all agree that if you have an alliance that if you if you have coordination and intelligence sharing between not just the Republic of Korea and the United States but also Japan that that's that that would greatly enhance the deterrence in the actual fighting capability. So specifically we tried to work through intel sharing agreements that did not work. We tried to work through having more combined exercises with the Republic of Korea and the United States mainly around search and rescue, humanitarian assistance types of things in order to be able to establish the coordinating mechanisms between the militaries. I think that needs to continue. We need to try to find ways to be able to work together. I understand the issues that are out there on the side of what President Abe and others have done in the recent past and not taking responsibility for what that country did many years ago and I understand those concerns but I I hope that we're able to continue that would not continue. I hope we're able to to work with Japan in order to be able to come up with mechanisms that if we had to go to war because I am confident if we had to go to war Japan would be there on this side of the alliance and I am confident of that but I'd rather work through the details of how all that's going to work now in armistice rather than waiting till after the bullets start flying. I agree with General Sharp. You have to work it beforehand. You can't have that hawkery during a time of crisis. Two of the critical capabilities that I think would not only strengthen the alliance, strengthen the region and be very if you will positive from the standpoint of moving ahead is one the intelligence sharing agreement and secondly an integrated missile defense system where both parties are threatened very seriously both countries. So in my view I think to continue to pursue these things I think is very very important for both the Republic of Korea and the United States and Japan. Well I would agree with with both General Sharp and General Tilelli. I think first off it is important particularly in the East Sea area to do more trilateral military operations. One that allows you to get a better common understanding. Now I spent a lot of time on missile defense over there just like both of these gentlemen I'm sure and the most important thing with missile defense to make sure assets joint assets whether it be Aegis ships or your ground-based missiles or your airborne platforms are in the right place you have to share information you have to have connectivity and that's important not only for the peninsula but it's also important for the region. The Musadon missile is an example that has a 3500 kilometer range on it okay that's a good distance everybody's in that threat so it would be nice to be able to share those type of data links and information and I think that's important I watched us come together several times whether it be a nuclear test or two missile launches and we were able to talk to each other not only with the inside the rock us but also with the with Japan and I think that's something for the future that we really need to strengthen and I know there are some deep rooted historical problems but what I was confident of in our military operations particularly in combined forces command and the fact of the matter is there are seven UN sending state bases that are in the Republic of Korea that would be necessary should there be and I'm sorry in Japan if there was a some type of situation where you had to rapidly reinforce the peninsula that's there I'm confident that that's going to be available but I think I that's one of the things in the future I think we got to keep chipping away at and try to get past the old historical problems that are out there and I know they're deep rooted. So I'm going to re-read the SBS assault broadcasting system from Korea. I understand that General Scott Parity indicated that he wants troops stationed in the region north of Han River as a strong indication of deterrence do you agree with that view or do you think that the relocation plan should go on as scheduled and and as agreed upon between two countries? Well I'll take that on I can take that on I know a little bit about that. When I looked at the relocation again I think that's it's all conditions based and I think we've got to be careful of setting the date on the calendar and says everybody's repositioned at this time because you have to look at the threat the fact of the matter one of the most significant threats outside of missiles is the long-range artillery that the North Koreans have that's 240 millimeters and 170 guns and the close proximity so examining the capabilities from a combined perspective joint and combined I think is important and there is a timeline to move all that so maybe you have to look at when you move that capability and make sure that one you can protect the peninsula. So one thing that got my attention up front when I read the terms of reference the commander of combined forces command is health accountable for the defense and protection of the Korean people the rocks. So you got to kind of look hard at that but again I think it's a review conditions based and examine that with the rock minister of defense along with our department of defense and make sure that we've got the threat covered and we've got the right mix of capabilities and that's a constant assessment you as a commander you have to do a running estimate every day so you understand the threats around you and make sure you're living up to your end of the bargain of if something goes wrong so I think that's what this is all about and having the right readiness that is expected for the joint and combined forces that are operating on the peninsula. Okay let's do one last question please. Olivia Enos from the Heritage Foundation my question is in the event of a regime collapse in North Korea what role do you see the US military playing in providing humanitarian assistance to ensure that there's not a greater human rights crisis on the peninsula? Well I'll jump on this and then pass off here but I think we always have a responsibility for humanitarian assistance always and in our planning efforts we always plan for that. Now if there is a collapse over I would like to see the rocks in the lead because these are Korean people taking care of Korean people and you know where we come into play is again making sure we got the balance right with the military capabilities but there's planning that goes on all the time with that if there's a humanitarian crisis and a collapse you know getting a common understanding of how bad the situation is is really going to be important and what do you need whether it be medical capability or food or you know it's a whole wide range but that's something I think we always need to be prepared for because we already know there is there are problems up there when it comes to nutrition and medical and the threat of other diseases and that sort of business. I would agree I think we've learned in Iraq and Afghanistan that humanitarian assistance has to start from day one when the bullets start in order to be able to make sure that the people the common people are best protected and taken care of as possible and in a situation like North Korea it's probably even my view is it's even more important because of the indoctrination of the North Korea people have gotten since they were born of how the south in the United States are complete enemies and all they care about is killing you. If we don't have plans which I know we do plans that along with going to destroy the North Korean military or get them in check at the same time we're trying to help the people and get the right information as to what our goals are in North Korea are the rock u.s alliance goals in North Korea then the it will be much more difficult to regain stability up there so I believe that that we've learned that we have horses that can help with that being able to get supplies and be able to get information in North Korea and it's a critical part of the plan that I agree with J.D. should be led by the Republic of Korea. Certainly General Sharpe and General Thurman are closer to the existing plan but I'm very confident that every contingency starting with humanitarian support through crisis has been planned for in ultimate detail by the Republic of Korea and the United States in the combined force command so I'm very confident that any contingency that might arise has been thought through in a lot of detail and who does what to whom has also been thought through so is that part of any any plan of course it is how is executed I think has been planned for very good well that concludes our morning session I'm going to turn it back over to Victor to move us along thank you very much well again I thought a wonderful discussion the social I don't know if any of you generals are on social media but the social media universe was exploding there are lots of questions you'll be happy to know that USFK was also on and retweeting any of things that you're saying tough questions right so a couple things the first thing is that so we will now take a break lunch is served for those of you out on the conquest level for our guests if you just be seated lunch will be brought to you we will be having a Dr. Sid Seiler from the White House joining us for lunch as it has arrived despite the blizzard and then the last thing of course is I want all of us to thank these four individuals on the stage not just for this morning's event but for their service both to the United States to the Alliance truly a real a real tribute to to you guys for all that you've done so thank you very much thank you