 ki proječujem, če ne možem se zapraviti, ne koncerti neč vse postavnih. Ale je vznik tehnologij, kaj je zelo zemljena in vsega poživnje kemikalne komparacije in vznik kemikalne zelo. Zelo življno. Zelo je tudi pravda. S k�om počkaj kaj je večjava spolivna, tvoj je zelo načiniv. Vse bolj je tehnoloč jazil. Tko je izhtjev, zelo je tudi tehnoloč, ne v sej načiniv Bogu, uhronovajnega, zato v Vzbek, tvoj tehnoloč je zelo načiniv. Zelo je to zelo. OK, tako... OK, tako... Zdaj sem pačil na... ...recykljnej technologi, in... ...nač sem pačil na moj prezentacij... ...z nekaj nekaj način, nekaj način polisih... ...zapravil v nekaj način... ...z nekaj nekaj nekaj nekaj nekaj nekaj nekaj nekaj nekaj nekaj... ...zakulje, uskoli, čak je neča, nekaj nekaj nekaj nekaj način... ...koč, uskoli, nismo pikaj ne bodo odrednje izgledaj. ... bljebo, ...l autumn sem bolj... ...kaj ne hade nekaj način. ...tehnačenček, tom, časno tomh let postoč, ...zapravil tegeto, ...nečasak, ...zapravil repsizu besedunje in je to predstavila do vse zelo, ukotno bora od več kot odbranje, s platimom srkvom in hradinom se zpravili. So nalega se vas stojev na tem, ki se poglede in že težer pas pozet Opera. Sva, da je v pomembnje v tem, prihvori se obč links, And US will find some decision. I would like to underline that in 1977, after some special degree of President Carter, US stopped any activity in reprozession and stopped reprozession. Now they also only accumulated fuel. Some examples from other countries. Finland, patlj, before sent, were there for 40 fuel for reprocessing, but during last 30 years they kept fuel for in-wet storage and a reactor sent will dispose it. Canada can do it, now it's more acceptable way, it's really a disposal. Sweden also open fuel cycle and they are going to put in operation some specific repository. Germany with their very specific policy, they stop sending off, they spent fuel to France from 2005 and now all fuel should be prepared for disposal, but they did not yet select place for disposal of fuel so on, so on. Switzerland also have the same strategy, now they have from reactor dry storage and continue considerate some places for repository. In other group of countries we've closed fuel cycle, France, leading country in area of recycling and additional to storage and reprocessing, they have very advanced project for repository of high-level waste in vure place, but this place not for spent fuel, place for high-level waste after reprocessing. Japan, in spite of different political problems, they kept close fuel cycle as key line for future. Unfortunately, we have not very good example here from point of view of commissioning of Rakhash Murpland. Here, it's very long project. I remember some articles about its opening in the beginning of 2001-2001, but now, of course, but this facility is interesting bit more advanced in comparison of Mayako, Laak plant, Russian and France, Japanese colleague will receive directly mix of uranium and plutonium so from point of view of safeguardability is one of key interesting decision. China has program for construction of new reprocessing plant. They had old military plant in Lanzhou region, but now first pilot reprocessing plant under operation. It's also purics process, modified process and second reprocessing plant is under construction from last year. Russia has Mayako plant. This is one of very flexible reprocessing plant in the world. And I worked with them many, many years and they can now reprocess big variety of fuel from research reactors, from some submarine, ice breakers and the cycle of this technology taken to account relatively high enrichment from research reactors can produce the fuel close to relatively high enrichment that can be used directly in RBMK or some other Russian reactors. Russia has another place for wet storage and dry storage of spent fuel of air, not only from Russia and from some other countries. U.K. had very interesting from historical point of view program for reprocessing of fuel. First of all, they complete reprocessing of magnox fuel, they had the best in the world from technological point of view reprocessing plant, Thorpe. But unfortunately, political and other reasons and some problems in the past regarding mox fuel production, finally they decided to stop this reprocessing. And India now has group of small reprocessing facility. Truly speaking, part of the M were constructed in parallel for military goals. But India has also strong direction to close fuel cycle in future and India has program for fast reactor construction. We can, you can see the world is different, some countries has different approaches and we can say that we have now new or maybe renew approaches. No, first of all, key tendency, as we used to mention, more than 70%, 75% of fuel, it's storage or now one of renewed idea under discussion with some countries that send back to manufacturer for reprocessing. Now this option fixed on the paper only, only in relation between Russia and Iran. I know that Bangladesh, Belarus, Turkey, now you pronunciation, Turkey, also considered this system, but we will see in future. From other hand, France and Russia had very long term experience for reprocessing taken and managing of products. France as usual send back materials after reprocessing, but Soviet Union and Russia has interesting conception historically. The plutonium kept in Russian Federation after reprocessing and belong Russian Federation for other recycling. Another line of current approaches, it's discussion about international repository, but this discussion start and close, start and close during last 40 years. And number of states express interest through international spent nuclear fuel story. So, from other hand, agency is one of platform for discussion about future fuel cycle and the idea about internationalization of fuel cycle can be split on two line. Assurance of supply of low-reach uranium for current fleet of nuclear power plants, front end and also some attempt to establish some multilateral approach regarding spent fuel. Currently, we can say that first point now decided international level. Some countries which have enrichment capacity, UK, Germany has initiative for preparation of long term contract without any political obligations. Russia prepared some special reserve in Angarsk plus also some initiative. U.S. also has initiative. And plus final last point, it's special low-reach uranium bank of IEA in Kazakhstan, 160 tons of enriched uranium for if some country, some state will have some specific situation then from political reason other states will stop. Delivery of uranium agency should help. Next part, it's a hundred discussion now. And very simple picture prepared maybe ten years ago, maybe more, one of my friend, why the country have discussed about international repository. For example, U.S. big territory, they have and will have expected two places for repository. We have a mountain and we have waste in Los Alamos, also facility for disposal of radioactive waste that contains actinates. If we compare with Europe, Europe has a lot of states. And if every states will construct national repository, we will have a lot of repository in different places. And it is, yes, yes, yes. So it is one of simple explanation why the discussion about multinational approach for backend of fuel cycle continues. And I remind especially one of picture from previous lecture about in pro, one of the way it's establishing of some international cooperation, separation of responsibility between different countries. And it is one of expected tendency to establish of international regime for control and managing with spent nuclear fuel. So some countries have only nuclear reactors, some countries have additional fuel service in backend or long term storage. And some countries can burn plutonium and can reduce radio toxicity effect of nuclear power on environment. And agency prepared, it's only last 20 years, 25 years, a lot of papers related multilateral issues. But till now we have no strong decisions, we have only some proposals, suggestions, limited contracts due to specific of national and illegal aspects. And I will explain these aspects a little bit later. Some remarks about spent nuclear fuel strategy, first of all backend is one of key problems in nuclear power as a whole. And from many points of view, most nuclear countries do not have final strategy for backend of fuel cycle. Long term storage, it's intermediate decision, it's not yet final decision. Final disposal keeps long term dangerous related actinates and long lift fishing product. But reprocessing options is sensitive from non proliferation point of view. Second important point, absence of standard and easy approaches to backend also give some strong effect to decision makers in countries. And also additional maybe negative point for decision makers for new countries. It's necessary or necessary start construction of nuclear power plants. No, it's about necessity of control, but it's very specific current legal situation. Joint convention on safety of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management radioactive waste. Safety fundamentals, ISFT standards, European Union waste management directive 90, all emphasize that ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management rest with the state. In that case, sometimes not very easy to transform responsibility from one country to another, maybe necessary to update some legal documents and so on, so on, so on. But in any case, we have relatively bright future. Currently, we've considered all market of fuel. We work in area of uranium 235 fuel cycle. We have good experience and good understanding of next advanced options uranium plutonium fuel cycle. And a lot of research and development and some pilot studies related innovative fuel cycle based on uranium plutonium minor actinates and thorium uranium system 2. Taken to account reactor system, accelerated driving system, maybe in future systems with fusion fusion and so on. So it's last slide of my yesterday presentation. Vladimir, what idea? Now questions about fuel cycle or after second lecture, small. Or maybe you have some questions related fuel cycle. Quick questions on nuclear fuel cycle or we can let me check our audience here. OK, they will have time. I will continue. So, but I need to change presentation. OK, now we have finally short presentation on legal and institutional aspects of new nuclear technologies development. Yes. Through speaking, this lecture is relatively fresh. I had idea to prepare some type materials last year, but partly it was demonstrated during some meetings in Prague, but I think your auditorium also should receive these doubts or ideas related legal and institutional aspects in new nuclear technology. Like 15 minutes or more? 20. So, first of all, why legal aspects are important for nuclear power and fuel cycle? First of all, we consider the world safety from national and international level, nuclear security from international and national level and non-proliferation on international level mainly. These aspects are covered complex of international treaty and conventions. For example, in legal framework on nuclear security we have convention on nuclear safety. Oh, no, nuclear safety, sorry. Nuclear safety convention on early notification of accident and joint convention on safety of spent fuel management and safety of radioactive waste management. So, they established some system that includes other documents plus agency provide some system for review of participants of all conventions. And of course, the whole hierarchy of safety standards also based on these conventions and they cover a number of areas related safety, nuclear installation, waste, transport, radiation protection, emergency preparedness. And truly speaking, now we have a lot of guidance, guidance, number of requirement, and of course one fundamental basis for this system. Security convention on physical protection of nuclear material based document and it has amendment after 2001. And now this convention and followed document on nuclear security also cover all relation between states regarding transportation, protection of nuclear materials, more anti-terroristic system. And of course third line, maybe not visible from point of view of research development and international legal framework for civil liability. It is one of conclusion from previous systems if some state will have some accident and this accident will effect on neighbor countries. Some block of conventions covered this situation and explain what type of compensation should be paid and other steps. And of course key, one of key political document, it's treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapon. It's also covered to some special system organized by the agency. Every country, each country has safeguard's agreement state and of course safeguard system works, they have a lot of instruments taken into account. Sampling, analysis, control plus not investigation, searching of open sources and some other systems. And so we have relatively strong platform where gaps can be really impediments for innovations. In nuclear security, first of all technology or facilities design could not meet current standards requirements. The current standards requirements were developed on the basis of current practice. And little bit later I will say about some examples. And so some advanced technology could be located in some type of gaps. The similar situation in nuclear security. Facility design also, for example, is not meet security, current security and safeguards requirement. In safeguards, some facility request using of relatively sensitive materials, Heinrich uranium or maybe relatively pure plutonium or uranium 233. And in other point, very difficult point, sorry, it's contradiction between different areas of safety. We have fire safety, we have another system of the safety. In my practice, once we met, I participate in project of high temperature reactor for disposition of plutonium, GTMGR, organized by ACBM. And of course one of idea was to use pilot facility if it was constructed for production of hydrogen. But we found that in Russia, the facility for production of hydrogen should be located on three or five kilometers far from reactor. The transportation of high temperature, high potential heat for three kilometers, it's very expensive. In that case, electrolysis is much better. But if facility can locate near, of course we can use effectively sulfite iodine cycle for production of hydrogen. But it's maybe who works in some facilities, we have sometimes competition between fire safety and nuclear security. First floor windows should be blocked by some special grid. But from fire point of view, first floor window should be easily open for evacuation. It's simple example. So if consider current request for infrastructure for new nuclear power programs, of course if one of newcomer member states would like to construct relatively innovative facility, they will have not headache, but a number of difficulties in area of nuclear safety, legal part. It is not technical legal part. We will framework, take into account that some type of technology cannot be covered current documents. Safeguard, human resource development, you too, you need system for education and preparation, training of personnel specially for innovative reactor of facility. And site and supporting facility, mainly siting also will meet, some specific problem. No, of course nuclear security and problem related nuclear fuel cycle. In the INPRO we have a number of study related legal and institutional aspect of innovation. I mentioned before that INPRO is good hierarchical system where it's easy to find some gaps, not only technical and legal too. And here is example, first study was dedicated to transportable nuclear power plants. Now we close to publishing second part of this study, especially for deployment of factory-fueled transportable nuclear models. Cooperative approach to approaches to the back end of nuclear fuel cycle, also consideration of drivers and impediments, institutional, economic and legal. And just this year we start similar study for consideration of similar aspects for prospective deployment of fusion facility. Some words about floating. First of all, key point, the floating nuclear power plant. Plants do not cover by nuclear safety convention. Nuclear safety convention fix and describe only land-based nuclear power plant. Transportable underwater, transportable for many time or lake location outside of this convention. And of course, all hierarchy of documents has big gap for this system. Next study we considered a lot of other aspects, namely for this nuclear battery. If when supplier filled facility to make some operation for ceiling of reactor and send to host state for production of energy. Electricity, heat, desalinated water. But in that case, as minimum two new participant of the operation. If you, if some countries support and sell construction of nuclear power plant in the land of in new country. Finally, operator and host country has full responsibility for operation and some other things. But here, two states and maybe some third states. Also, it's some problematic point, especially for floating. For example, you can, you will prepare here, send it by sea to another country and operating state will locate here. So now we have a number of design of similar facilities and it's not the same as academic monosov. It's a little bit advanced system. And life cycle also specific. We compare with traditional nuclear power plant, design, construction, operation, decommission. But here another system. You can construct, design and construct, complete design and construction before decision making in host state. And so here you will have some repeated transportation. This system is not described fully by current safety and security documents. We found that safeguards from point of view of documents is enough, but in any case it's necessary to establish new system for control. But for other line and maritime law also very specific. 40 years ago when experts in the world established safety, maritime safety for nuclear power reactors on the sea, they considered only reactor for propulsion, but not transportation of system for fuel. Of course maybe it's easy to consider as transportation of radioactive materials. We have SSR6 that cover transportation of radioactive materials and it's a good established system. No, reactor with loaded fuel cannot be tested as a container for fuel. And so it's also some big gap from one hand. It's very interesting market decision from point of view of safeguards, from point of view of keeping responsibility in the supplier state that have good experience in all areas and providing maybe more expensive electricity but without headache to establish full scale legal infrastructure in new states. But unfortunately it is not easy. We consider it as usual legislation subject safety, security, safeguards, the process of licensing taken to account not only nuclear aspects. Licensing sometimes includes some other points. And no similar system, especially considered staffing and training. It's also interesting. And we suggest it to some splitting of responsibility for these states. So now we start similar discussion about fusion facility due to from technical point of view, from point of view of conception. We have a lot of conceptions. But nobody who works in ETER, nobody who works in international laboratories cannot consider this system as system in the frame of current legal international and national systems. So also a lot of problems due to expected if during deployment period we will we should to make some decision. For example, after our studies related transportable nuclear power plant, safety department start reconsideration of some safety rules regarding adopting them to transportable nuclear power plant. For example, why I joined only on Wednesday, I participate on Monday and Wednesday virtually to another consultant submitting dedicated to this problem. So if I will stop here. So brief simple conclusion nuclear world is very complicated. It is not only technique that you need consider a lot of additional points. It is connected not only with social acceptance. Sometimes it is connected with strong, legal walk and strong understanding of international nuclear safety, nuclear security and the role of non-proliferation treaty. Unfortunately, maybe fortunately the all new technologies should be considered from point of view of this system. And in this way we could try to support member states to consider so complicated questions in not technical, but institutional area. Thank you very much. So. Thank you very much, Alexander. So questions to Dr. Buchkov. Please take the microphone. So there's like various convention for nuclear safety come to join assistance and then early notification so the convention on nuclear safety in 1994 that's not legally binding everyone, among them convention are legally binding but convention on nuclear safety 1994 that's not legally binding, why is it? Oh, it's the question not for me. I'm not expert, I'm not lawyer. Yes, I know that some nuances exist and experts who developed this convention fixed this nuance, I don't know. Unfortunately, I cannot reply to this legal nuance. I'm not expert in legal full legal aspects. I cannot make interpretation of conventions. Close to join conventions. Even Vienna convention is legally binding. It's Vienna conventions. Ah, you mentioned liability. No, six other convention early notification then assistance in case of event, Vienna convention amendment to Vienna convention IMO, maritime convention everything else is legally binding. Yes, I know that some conventions first of all for liability we have two conventions Paris convention and from point of view of practical reason it's possible to adopt if one state and another state has different members of different conventions it's possible to organize the communication in some other cases. But I'm not expert in interpretation of conventions. We as usually invited experts in this area for our study from member states and from the agency for detailed consideration of application of some conventions for specific cases. And another question is like the countries who has like the nuclear fuel supplied from the manufacturers you will see in the future about the back end of that waste and now I'm a little worried about because in Bangladesh we also have like turnkey project so we are getting fuel directly from suppliers so what will happen when we go to decommissioning or hours spent fuel? Here I cannot also make complete reply due to here we should consider additionally national legal system. For example in Rosatom a lot of experts taken to account technological cycle and prepare the procedure of take back fuel from our partners Bangladesh, Turkey, Egypt Belarus maybe in future Uzbekistan we have technological from technological point of view it's understandable and we have capacity but first of all Russia had national low on nuclear energy using of nuclear energy that had also some limitation regarding radioactive waste. Now it's a little bit modified but in any case here we should walk in some parallel lines and we completed new study where we fix these gaps and areas which are necessary for adaptation for realization of similar system or for reprocessing reprocessing without send back of uranium, plutonium or maybe only ready fuel and sezium stronson concentrate only or disposal in some international disposal system for example in frame of IFNEC it's not Russian side it's IFNEC the group walked in a rea of consideration of unique case in neighbor country Slovenia and Croatia has one nuclear power plant under operation by both states 60-40% and they prepared some model for discussion to establishing one repository for spent fuel why for one nuclear power plant is necessary to have two repositories but of course it is a long way for future and no full reply for your answers in the world only tendency thank you dr. we as scientists and engineers we saw all the lectures about the technical aspects of making innovative nuclear energy systems viable but can you say in the legal aspect there is equivalent efforts and advancements to make these systems viable in my opinion of course experts in legal line should work maybe in cooperation with scientists and managers who truly speaking have activity in nuclear power sometimes it is not necessary to have deep knowledge but expectation that you can meet some not technical problem on the your way should be in my career I met regularly some new steps when I should avoid or adopt current situation for example our facility was first facility for separated production of most of us and we need in 90's to prepare some special system for security of facility it was big volume of knowledge later when we adopt expert control system in Russia to other approaches but it was process in many countries in 90's I also received a lot of new information political in other aspects and step by step when I walked in the agency I understood that I have a lot of gaps in my knowledge mainly in legal but in some stages maybe it is not necessary but you should have idea that sometimes please mute your microphones if you want to ask questions please raise the hand sorry it is a long explanation I reply I reply on your question it is more in the sense that is the agency putting as much effort as in the legal aspect as in the technical aspect we are making this maybe we have to wait the technology to develop 50% of the agency activity and political activity truly speaking technical implement into some political yes it is United Nations system ok I saw we have a question ok please it is the last one ok good morning I would like to ask you about the interface of nuclear security and nuclear safety in nuclear infrastructure development and the last question is about limitation area of nuclear safeguard and nuclear safety because in my office that nuclear safeguard handle the new nuclear material accounting control and nuclear security handle it too how to about the limitation area nuclear safeguard and nuclear security thank you it is necessary to prepare one special lecture truly speaking the agency now really have some instruments and recommendation to for harmonization of approach to safety and security take into account safeguards but in security we have two line, two approaches some group of member states consider nuclear security activity as classified activity you too if you will have open communication of course you will have a lot of information for terrorist and some other specific but from other hand communication of efforts of new member states of course on first stage is much better to have unified approach to establish of national systems but it's system and rules it's one point but real technical instruments for security is another point so in any case we will have full scale interface here interface it's mainly documents and as I know in some countries nuclear safety it's a special regulatory office under government but nuclear security or it's some special service organization or ministry of defense but safeguards safeguards here it's it's my opinion I suggest to consider separate line due to it's routine work of group of inspectors who has some specific instruments and if state really have no any secret program related nuclear weapon of course in that case it's much better to follow agency agency now has a lot of recommendations and approaches for countries with different nuclear programs research reactors or some research reactors uranium mining or nuclear power plant or many nuclear power plants so I cannot reply fully for now integrated integrated 3S framework yes, yes it's the same it's this idea this conception works very well for design now it's interesting approach safety by design security by design and safeguardability by design here 3S works very well but for some implementation we can meet difficulties and maybe some states will select traditional way splitting of this activity it is not obvious so ok, again thank you very much thank you very much