 Our next speaker is Michel Foucher. I had an honor to meet him about 10 years ago when he was the ambassador to Riga, wasn't he? And of course, strategic cooperation between Russia and France always was something to reckon with the geopolitics of the world. So your view on what's happening with Russia would be very interesting for us. Yes, Mr. President. In Russia and around Russia. So I have accepted to the challenge of projecting ourself in 2037. This is an interesting exercise for a former director of the policy planning staff of the French Foreign Ministry. I've been working five years with Hubei Bedouin. But I know by experience, and you will see that later on, that it's a very risky exercise. Even if, you know, looking long term, we have to look at long term issue both sides. And to keep in mind fundamental and structural elements in the long life of any state, history and geography matters. And because it's informed about the interplay between internal and international context. So I will start with the international context, no scoop in my speech. But as far as I know, the only country where high level political leaders are projecting in the long term, in open speeches, is China. It's interesting. They have a long term plan until the anniversary of their republic in 2049. And in 2049, the objective is to be the first world power and to have a world class army. This was expressed by Presidency some days after the big play. In between 2020-25, what they call average affluence, which is a realistic view of level of life, but also outdoor projection. Last year I was asked by Thierry de Montréal to be part of the workshop on China, and I made a presentation on one-bed, one-road strategy, Idu Eli. What I look in the new landscape of the new, partly new, permanent office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party is that four of the seven members, all and new, were already active in Idu Eli project. And especially one young, and the other one, Mr. Hu, who is the intellectual of the International Department of the Party, he invented the concept of Chinese. What does it mean? It means that the time of restraint in foreign policy is definitely over, not only because of Donald Trump, and we have to take that into consideration. So the Chinese factor will be decisive in the overall positioning of Russia in 2037, but also for other countries in Eurasia and in Indo-Pacific as well. This is a real game changer. Chinese challenge is even more pressing for the United States, which are confronted with a kind of contradictory situation where the first economic partner and a recent book was published by an American diplomat with the title of China-US co-dependence, the first economic partner is at the same time the first strategic rival. This is absolutely new in the world stage, at least so far in Eastern Asia. So there is a Chinese affirmation, which is also a challenge for the European Union because view from Beijing, the European Union is both a huge market and a target because of its advanced technological industry. It's a target, and we are working now on a system of control, collective control of foreign investment in strategic industrial assets. It's a matter of sovereignty. The problem is the European Union is not a state, so it's difficult to talk about sovereignty at level. A French former prime minister told me recently that a high-ranking member of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party had this formula in private, who controls Europe, controls the world. It's a kind of MacKinder-style affirmation. If you look at the strategic literature in Beijing, you will see that MacKinder is once again on the front page, an article, it's about Eurasia, I'm not sure it's good news. China rise, and I will stop with China, is based on a very solid ground, economy, and now more and more technology. Like Europe, like the US, a bit less in Russia. Russia is lagging behind, it's not my role to talk about internal situation, but from 1955 to 1985, USSR and China had exactly the same GDP. In 2037, according to OECD forecast, Donald, the gap will be between China and Russia in PPG, 6 to 1. At one point, an economic power is tempted to transform its economic and financial capacity into more classical geopolitical power. Second factor is the US, this was addressed, I will not insist on that, but in 2037, I expect US feeling less as a European power. For many reasons, not only is the Chinese challenge, it's also, all of this was mentioned this morning by Hubei Irving. What has started with the end of Obama and with Trump, it's in my view, a deep trend. European people, except maybe in the east and the west coast, doesn't want anymore to pay the heavy cost of being the guardian, the constable of the world order. The sheriff put his star down on the table. This is a long trend. It's beyond Chinese factor. And my view is also in the long-term divergences between Brussels and Washington have ground on many issues, fiscal issues, extra-territoriality of American law, and the EU, I hope so. As ground, we are always in fiction, Mr. President, geopolitical fiction. More autonomous under the leadership of Paris and Berlin to face global challenges, because my view of the European process is that we have to adapt today at a new scale of realities. The previous scales were reconciliation between France and Germany in the context of the Cold War, after that for France decolonization, after that change in central, eastern Europe and USSR. And now there is a new challenge for the European project itself. What is his meaning in the global context, which is new for us. We are not ready today to address that. So the positive outcome of that new landscape in 20 years' time, a common Chinese challenge and an evolution of the transatlantic relation could be a better understanding between EU and Russia, because we have shared interest in the long-term. I say Europe, not the West. The exit of the Cold War was failed. Let's find something else. And with the new international context, we have a very narrow margin of error. Let me take a stupid risk. 2037 will mark the beginning of a fourth presidential mandate in Russia since 2018. And Sergei Shoigu will have found his successor after two terms. Of course, the regime of visit ban to the EU, which is affecting the EU Minister of Defense today, will have been cancelled before the election. We cannot accept a diplomatic scene where a new elected president cannot travel to Brussels, Berlin. So which are the Russian interests in 20 years' time? In 2037, Russian population is more or less 1.7 of the world population. Large territory, the same one, 13% of the land surface. I'm not referring to territorial waters. Russia remains underpopulated, pure density. It's a fact. It means that, like in France, it's not so populated in France. It means that collective equipment have a cost, even if they are expensive, even if digital technology could provide services to remote region in Russia. Russian power in 20 or 30 years' time is strong in military, geopolitical and diplomatic terms. One example I studied recently, the escadra, the navy, is active in the Black Sea. You will have more than 30 warships if the program is completed. Submarines, frigates, patrol boats, corvettes included joint exercise with the Chinese navy. Thank you for Moscow to allow Chinese navy to go to former French-British sea, Marenostrum. You will be active in the Arctic, less active in western Pacific, but improve because in 20 years' time, you have time to sign up a treaty of peace with Japan, which is an obstacle to a real Asia-Pacific policy of Russia, and we will need that. Russia is very active in UN Security Council because you are, like the French, very multilateralist, and you will benefit from successes in mediation, especially in the Middle East, in the 20s. I hope not later. So you will be on the global stage with diplomatic capacities to mediate. Nobody else is able to do that today. It's fascinating. After Shogui is traveling to Israel, the king Salman is traveling to Moscow, and some weeks after, President Putin is in Iran. Nobody is able to do that today, even the French. The asset of energy is real. I don't know you report, as long as oil is a key for transport. But in the next 20 years, things will change slowly if we listen to Patrick Pouyonnais, but I give you just one example. The mayor of Paris, Anid Al-Go, has decided that in 2030, there will be no car anymore in central Paris, in Paris. So a change. So the real issue for Russia is the state of its economy at the global age. Today, its economy is not diversified enough, even if it is changing, to take full benefit from globalization. I quote a remark made by the Russian International Affairs Council in June 2017. The underdevelopment of the Russian economy and its governance institution poses a much more significant threat to the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity than realistic military threats that Russia is already well protected from. It is impossible to overcome this underdevelopment in isolation from the increasingly globalization outside world, quote unquote. So I'd like to prove it with a single example I got from a dinner yesterday night. I was with the president of CNES. I remember that we had cooperation between France and Russia to launch Soyuz rockets in Kuru, Guyana. This is no more the case. The decision not to use our facilities, and by the way, technological cooperation, was taken before sanctions, before. It was a strategy. We will have Russian rockets in Guyana in 2013. At the same time, we have huge interesting capacities on science, technology, research, on climate issue between European and Russian Arctic Ocean. So we have a capacity to have first class cooperation on common issues. You know why Russia is not able, among the bricks, to take benefit from globalization. I think it's basically the structure of the economy in inheritance policies. It's a structural internal problem. But you know, the solution is not only with old-fashioned zero-sum-gen geopolitics. It's not helpful. And the economic interaction between Russia, China, and India due to Western sanctions is very weak. So in my view, the EU should play and may play and should play a role in the modernization of Russia in the new global context, because we have common interests. It's not new. In the past, in the 19th century, we had a huge flow of investment for France, from Germany, from England. To Russia, this was stopped by October Revolution one century ago. After that, flows were partly stopped by sanctions and all this stuff. But why working with Russia to fill the gap between its strong external power and its deficient inclusion into the global stage? First and foremost, because it's our interest, our interest. So it's a huge market next door. Companies are already working in Paris development because there is a new spirit into entrepreneurship. If we conclude we can be optimistic, border quarrels between EU and Russia will be solved. Ukraine will be a neutral country, like Finland, with success. Remember Vasslavavel remarks, Russia doesn't know exactly where it starts and where it ends. The day where we will decide quietly, quietly, where the EU ends and where the Russia Federation starts, half of the tension between them will disappear. So if we can get out of the classical old-fashioned geopolitics and territorial glassy, we will make progress. OEC will resume importance. We will have a more relaxed NATO-Russia Council with a mission to sketch a new framework of security for the continent, a part of Asia. Let's come back to Aviam meeting, 2008. I was there, President Sarkozy. Looking back, the issue of the role and the place of Russia in the European concert, the concert of Europe, it's a very old story. We have to come back to that. We have to come back to that. It's a huge task. You mentioned, Mr. President, the four spaces of St. Petersburg. I wrote it before knowing that. If we don't do that, if we don't do that, if we don't set up a new European order in the next two decades, a new European concert, we will remain weak in the international sphere. We're not able to master a critical neighborhood and we will have a very bleak future. So my view is that we should resume talks at least at track two level. Yes, we can. Thank you very much, Ambassador. And bipolarity with which we started works for you internationally. Your analysis of the role of China and our role together with China and the role of the United States fits into this trajectory of bipolarity. But internal bipolarity of Russia, you decided in favor of Shogu, which is a little bit depressing for some of us, but you decided we will follow. We will try to follow. Thank you.