 I would love to talk about the Brazilian experience in cooperation, but first I'll just talk a little bit about our cartel program, and it's much of what Marcus said. Global economy makes us all globally aware of what others are doing. And we always like to call the Beatles in that. It's just how I get by with a little help of my friends. That's pretty much what we do, so we always try to see what's going on in the rest of the world. And we give it a Brazilian sauce, and that's what's going on to develop our own practices, and especially in our anti-cartel program. This has been very successful, so I'll just. In Brazil, the anti-trust law dates from the first anti-trust law dates from 1962, but we didn't have an open economy, so there was not much point in competition at that time. So we had another anti-trust law in 1994, but it didn't give us initially the power to investigate with down rates and other instruments, and we didn't have the leniency program. This was only an amendment in the year 2000 that brought these powers to the agency, and this was actually our first time when we had some cooperation, because we did that based on DOECD's best practices and recommendations. And we had that since 2000, but until 2003, we had not had many experiences with fighting cartel and with leniency and with down rates and with that sort of investigation. So we had the law, but we had to get things done, and we used a traditional recipe, fear of detection, threat of severe sanctions, and transparency. And that was how we did it. First of all, we developed an E2 for getting tips from society and from other members. It could be done anonymously, and then we launched a series of brochures explaining to undertakens, but also to society what cartel is, what is the harm that they do to the economy and to consumers. And this is a new culture in Brazil, so we spend a lot of time teaching the companies, but especially the society, what are the benefits of competition. So this is a very productive way of teaching them how to investigate and what's the harm and how do you get hints if there is a cartel going on. And then in 2008, we had the first national anti-cartel date created by President Lula. And we had a major event in the Ministry of Justice. President Lula was there himself. Nelly Cruz, who by the time was the head of the European Commission and Scott Heyman, the deputy assistant in DOJ, was there as well. So we had a huge event, and that was a part of our campaign to raise awareness of competition benefits and of cartel harms. And along with the anti-cartel national date, we did these campaigns in airports. And we distributed approximately a million brochures. And we targeted 1.5 million people. And we were distributed in all regions of Brazil. So we had massive media coverage. And we distributed, because the anti-cartel date is at October 8, and the children's day is October 12. So we merged these two dates, and we did something targeted to the children, which I'm going to go and then I come back. This is the comic book. These are very famous characters in Brazil. So we just tried to mix everything up. And this is something that we are trying to invest in competition culture from the beginning. Something like children do with the environment. They just teach their parents. So that's what we are trying to do with competition. And that's an example that this might work. And this is a photo of our campaigns in the airports. This is a very traditional region in Brazil, which is Bahia. And these were major campaigns in the weekly magazines, and especially the biggest magazines, and the business magazines. We had this advertisement that said companies that participate in Cartel to get dirty. This is trying to reach as much attention as we can to say that cartels are bad. And then we had this strategy to target in the threat of severe sanctions. And in Brazil, since 1991, Cartel is a crime according to the law. So we have administrative investigations and we have criminal investigations. They are separate. But our struggle is to make this go on simultaneously. And in the administrative sphere, companies may get fines from one up to 30% of their turnover in the year before the beginning of the investigation. And individuals can be sanctioned with fines as well. And in the criminal arena, companies, individuals only, may get up to five years of jail time or fines. And so far, we haven't had so much experience with individuals going to jail after a final sentencing. They just spent there in the beginning of the investigation, depending on the evidence that the police and the prosecutors have against them. They can spend some days in the prison, but it's only temporary. In most cases, the prosecutors will do also impose fines in the criminal arena. And the criminal investigation, it's done by prosecutors. So we had this huge initiative to approach the public prosecutor's office and make them aware of competition as well. They deal with all kinds of cases. So we had to bring the traditional competition speech like a prayer. And we carried the competition words just spread around the world. So we did that with the prosecutors. And this was a nice initiative. We have had many results. I'll just show you the next. But we developed this national anti-carta strategy, which is a network, a domestic network, where we link all the prosecutors and the police. Because the police starts the investigation and the prosecutor brings the charges. And we are also trying to get judges and everybody that is involved in the process at any time bring to this network so that we can just tell what competition is about. How do you find a cartel? How do you investigate a cartel? Which are the common signs that there is a cartel going on? And this is a major initiative for us. And it has been successful. These are the numbers and the results of our initiative. We have done from 2003 to 2006 30 down rates. And now we have done in from 2007 to 2010. We did 267. In these agreements, we had seven and two 2006. And now we have 11 from 2007 to 2010. And as executives facing criminal charges, we had 13. And now we have 237. So this is a huge result. And this shows very clearly how we have been successful in our initiatives to tell prosecutors, to tell society what's competition about, what's cartel all about. And to bring them along with us in this journey of fighting anti-competitive conflicts. The step three from the world-known recipe of threat of severe sanctions and fear of detection is transparency. We knew that we were not going to be able to develop an efficient leniency program if we did not invest our efforts in transparency. So that's what we did. We sent letters along with the same brochure that you just have, this yellow one in Portuguese. And we just sent them to the 1,000 largest companies in Brazil. And we explained all about how the leniency program would work. This letter was signed by the head of our agency and the head of the competition division. So it would explain clearly how the leniency program work, who they have to contact to, and which were the terms, what was expected from them in terms of cooperation, what would they get in the end if it was immunity, if it was a discount on the fine. Because if you do the leniency before we have any investigation, you will get full immunity. And if we have already an investigation going on, you can come to the leniency program, but then you'll have a discount. You will not have full immunity. And this is Hascot, but we did a roadshow in Brussels and in Washington in the major law firms so that we could talk a little bit about how the program works. So that was a very nice initiative. Also, we have had many companies coming before the agency to apply for the leniency program as a result of this initiative. Some of them were not very happy with the letters. They would just send us back and say, what are you doing? I don't need this letter. I'm inclined by that. But most of the cases, it was a successful initiative. And about our experience in cooperation. Well, as Marcus stressed in his presentation, for us informal cooperation has always proved to be the one giving us the best results. We have had some cooperation with the US. And I think that the most important of this cooperation is their help to build our anti-cartel program. They have given us all the necessary inputs to improve our leniency program. And we have now, as it was mentioned before, we have three agencies. But we are now in the process of merging into one. And for this bill that will change the institutional framework of the Brazilian agency, we also had a very nice input from the US. And the EU and Australia, we have had some informal cooperation about some cases that were going on. Sometimes, we didn't have the results that we wanted to because of legal constraints that they could not give us some of the information that we needed. But the good thing is that they tried very hard. And that's one thing that I feel that is always there. Everybody is doing their best effort to cooperate. Sometimes, they can do it for legal reasons, but they are trying their best. And if they can, they will just make a way to give you the most that they can without infringement of their own laws. And in some cases, we have had the opportunity to exchange non-confidential information that happens a lot by email, by phone. And it's very interesting because it can clarify some issues. Sometimes, the defendants, they are not very, very, how do I put this? They try to make things don't look like exactly as they are. So they are saying that, oh, in Brazil, they do like this and this and that. And we say, no, that's not how things happen here. So sometimes, other jurisdictions, they tend to believe that we do things different that we actually do. And that's a mislead that we always try to undo by talking directly to the other jurisdictions. And this has been proved to be very nice. And we have cooperation agreements with other agencies. And some of them we have already used. Some of them we haven't. US and Chile, we have used already. I don't think we have already an experience with Russia, but I can come back to Dublin to tell you a bit about that. And now, we have cooperated in a very formal and direct and very efficient way in the compressor's case. That was the first Brazilian experience with simultaneous down rates with the commission. And why is that case so symbolic? And why cooperation happened here in a way that they didn't have before? Because the evidence was in Brazil, the best evidence of the cartels was in Brazil. One of the individuals that were organizing this cartel scheme, he was in Brazil. And that's really one point of when are you going to cooperate and when are other agencies going to ask for cooperation? When you will have the easier access to the evidence? We are not going to cooperate if you can't give any help to the investigation. So we had an ICN roundtable in Washington in late March. And we discussed exactly cooperation. And this was a thing that was very highlighted. Agencies that cooperate are the ones that are in the best position to carry on the investigation. And in the compressor's case, that was our position. The evidence was there. And then we had the simultaneous down rates. And before the down rates, we had a lot of period of informal exchange of information, both with the DOJ and with the EU. We were talking about who are the targets, which were the individuals that we have to investigate. What was their role in the cartel? So we exchanged all kind of information. And then we did the down rates in an appropriate Brazilian time. Sometimes we don't cooperate for the oddest reasons. But I think that one of the reasons that it would be very difficult to do a simultaneous down rate in Australia is because if we go in an Australian time, the companies are going to be closed in Brazil. And the same will go in vice versa. So this is something that is difficult to cooperate also because sometimes we just have this time constraints or technology constraints. It's not in any agency disposal to just join a teleconference or a webinar or something like that. So technology time, they're all challenges for a cooperation. And also in the compressor's case, we had the experience after beginning the investigation haven't down rates. This was a case that was also investigated in Chile, which is our closest neighbor. And they just have, they had a hard time to serving the companies and some individuals because they didn't have a residence or they weren't based in Chile, but they were in Brazil. So this was the first time that we received a demand to serve individuals that were in Brazil but not in other jurisdictions. We did that. And it was very successful. Chile had a time constraint that he had to do. He can only investigate up to two years after the facts. And their deadline was in early January. And we got their message, we need to serve these people, I believe, in November. And we were able to speed things up for them and to have the individuals served from November to January. And this was something huge because sometimes it can serve individuals in Brazil. We are in Brazil in this same time. So this was something that we are very proud of. We could actually help another jurisdictions to make up their case. In this ICNR table, it was mentioned a lot that we have to get, pick up the phone cooperation, have to have pick up the phone information. It has to be something easy so that every jurisdiction can do this kind of cooperation. But then you have another problem which is trust and confidence. Those are the major challenges, I think, for cooperation. You have to trust the other agency. You have to trust their personnel. For us in Brazil, this is even harder because we experience a lot of personnel rotation. Someone is in charge and the next day they are not there. So you have always to present yourself to the other agencies as someone trustful. And this is not something automatic. So trust and confidence is something that you have to spend a lot of time to build. And it can be destroyed in any minute. So you have to invest a lot of effort to build this confidence and trust. And this is something that we invest also to get appropriate cooperation. So, and now just to end it, we were first recipients of cooperation and now we are becoming donors. We have had some of our staff in San Salvador and mostly to teach how to gather digital evidence. We have also been in Chile. We were with them, they were having these efforts to have to approve in the Congress a leniency program and we were there to help them. And in Argentina, we are also there giving consultation about how to implement a leniency program. So I think that we have done as much as we could in this capacity and to cooperate with our close neighbors. And that's it. Thank you very much. Thank you.