 Welcome to this Lowy Institute event here in Canberra and welcome to a very special event. The first ever public address that we know of by a serving Director General of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service in the organisation's history. My name is Rory Medkaaf. I direct the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute and it's my real pleasure on behalf of our Executive Director Michael Wesley to welcome you all to this event and to be hosting this event. I must say I don't think we've ever seen such a rapid and overwhelming response to an invitation to any of our events in our slightly shorter history. Now if ASIS recruitment is any reflection of that then I think it's an organisation that's going to have no shortage of talent well into the future. So ASIS at 60 is the I guess the opening theme of today's presentation by Nick Warner the Director General of ASIS and I've now named a serving ASIS officer. Look I think from a national interest point of view it certainly is high time that a speech like this was delivered. We're very proud to host it in that sense. The Lowy Institute values deeply its relationship with the national security community in Canberra. The quality of analysis and information gathering that this community represents and I guess for us this event fills a special gap too as well. Now Nick Warner will be providing an insight into an organisation that is by its nature secret and I think we're especially grateful that he's taken the time to make this presentation this week. A defining characteristic about intelligence services, certainly intelligence gathering services is that we tend only to hear about them when things go wrong so this is a refreshing change from that point of view. If you're expecting cloaks, daggers and an expose of the very deepest secrets of the nation I suspect you'll be disappointed. Our speaker today is one of Australia's most accomplished and experienced senior officials in intelligence, in foreign policy, in defence and I think his deep prudence and common sense are among the credentials that have cemented that reputation. A few words about Nick Warner before he begins. He was appointed as the Director General of ASIS in 2009. Before that he was of course Secretary of the Department of Defence for three years. He's held a number of other senior positions in the Australian Public Service, senior advisor to the Prime Minister, many positions in foreign affairs and trade both in Australia and overseas including High Commissioner to Papua New Guinea, Ambassador to Iran and of course Special Coordinator to the mission Ramsey, the regional assistance mission to the Solomon Islands. He's been awarded the Public Service Medal and more recently an officer of the Order of Australia for his services and I think these awards speak for themselves. So it's my pleasure to welcome Nick Warner and I'll be joining you a little later on to build a conversation around the themes that Mr Warner presents today. Please Nick. Rory, thank you very much for those generous introductory comments. I'm going to start with an apology, an apology because there might be a bit of coughing and spluttering during this presentation, the way things have worked out. I'm the spy that came in with the cold. That could be the only laugh of the afternoon. Conceived in secrecy, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service unsurprisingly spent the past 60 years operating in carefully cultivated shadows. Over that time, no Director-General of ACES has until today made a public address concerning the role or nature of the organisation. Some of you will know the story of our beginning. On a cold Canberra evening in mid-May 1950, Prime Minister Menzies having served martinis to a select group of ministers and senior officials including a colourful former Army officer, Alfred Burrocks penned a letter to his British counterpart Clement Attlee and a copy of this letter, framed copy of this letter hangs outside my office door. Menzies told Attlee and I quote that he had decided to establish a secret intelligence service which when organised in due course will operate in Southeast Asia and the Pacific areas adjacent to Australia. Recent developments in Asia and are near north make this both a prudent and urgent measure. Concerned that the idea might leak, Menzies told Attlee that knowledge regarding this scheme has been restricted to the fewest possible here and for added security I have chosen to write in this way. Attlee provided help with advice and training and in May 1952, just over 60 years ago, ACES was formed. Alfred Burrocks was appointed the first head of the service. Menzies desire for secrecy stuck. Stories about ACES didn't start to appear in the press until 1972 and ACES's existence wasn't formally acknowledged publicly for another five years. For the first couple of decades of its existence, ACES, small and Melbourne based, was actually known to very few in the Canberra bureaucracy. In the 1960s some departments had only one or two officers briefed on the existence of ACES. Few people in government knew of ACES's existence either. In 1960, almost a decade after the organisation's formation, Menzies, backed by his Defence Minister, decided that the then Minister for the Navy, John Gorton, had no need for a formal brief about ACES, even though the service was about to occupy a Navy facility. Gorton eventually got his briefing when he became Prime Minister, but he in turn is said to have refused to allow opposition leader Goff Whitlam to be briefed, as apparently did McMahon when he succeeded Gorton. There have been a few times over the past 60 years when knowledge regarding the scheme, that is, of ACES and its operations, has received widespread publicity in the Australian media. And mostly this has been when things have gone wrong for one reason or another, sometimes the fault of ACES and sometimes not. In 1972 Prime Minister McMahon somehow found himself referring to ACES's codename, MO9, in a TV interview. There was the sacking of one of my predecessors Bill Robertson in 1975, and publicity in 1977 about operations in Chile undertaken on behalf of our allies. And some of you may remember the inconceived and bungled training exercise at the Sheraton Hotel in Melbourne in 1983. So why have I decided today after 60 years to shed some light on ACES's functions and contribution to the national interest? What's changed? The fact is ACES remains at its heart a foreign intelligence collection agency reliant on human sources. Its business always has and always will centre on human interaction, regardless of wider geopolitical or strategic influences. Yet our world has utterly changed since ACES was set up 60 years ago. Britain's empire has disappeared. The Cold War divide ended more than two decades ago and a renaissance East Asia, led by China, is now the prime engine of a truly global economy encompassing 7 billion people, nearly three times the world population at the time of ACES's inception. The growth of new threats to Australia's national security in recent years has redefined and broadened the range of intelligence requirements. From a small, essentially regional body, focused on the Cold War, ACES has evolved into a larger, geographically dispersed organisation helping to safeguard and advance national interest on a broad front. Over the past decade, the changes have been particularly dramatic. The challenges of helping to prevent terrorist attacks and providing the intelligence edge to Australian soldiers in the field have impacted greatly on ACES. Our work has gained a new urgency and importance, undertaking supporting operations that achieve a direct outcome, as distinct from our more traditional information-gathering operations is now of increasing importance. ACES has needed to increase its operational capacity and to be more innovative, creative and flexible. We are now more integrated in our approach than ever before, working very closely with organisations like ASIO, AFP and DSD. Operational and corporate collaboration is close and is getting closer. A consequence of that need for an integrated effort has been enhanced accountability arrangements, which in turn have resulted in wider public awareness of the nature and scale of intelligence activities. Still, there's little public awareness of ACES's contribution to national security in helping to protect and advance Australia's interests in our neighbourhood, of our support for military operations and of our efforts in the areas of counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation to name just a few. This of course stems from the inevitable paradox inherent in publicising the achievements of an organisation whose activities are by design secret. It's against this background that I think it's time to shed some light on the critical work being done by the men and women of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service and the unique contribution ACES makes to our foreign policy and security. I'll focus on three key themes. The changing role of ACES and the contribution it makes to Australia's national security. Secondly, the vital importance of risk management and the positive impact that more robust accountability processes have had on our intelligence effort. And finally, how the changing international order is likely to impact on ACES and its activities over the next 10 to 15 years. First, the role of ACES. ACES's founders and first-generation leaders, Alfred Brooks, Roblin Herder and Bill Robertson, who sadly passed away last year, would barely recognise the ACES of today. In the mid-1950s, ACES consisted of less than 100 people. It had only a handful of very small stations and its operational reach was restricted to a few countries in Asia and the Pacific. And ACES's overwhelming focus during the early Cold War years was contingency planning in the event of another major land conflict in Asia. But its core mission then focused on the collection and distribution of foreign intelligence on those who might seek to undermine Australia's national interests remains essentially the same today, notwithstanding our vastly different circumstances. ACES is mainly in the business of collecting human intelligence or human. That is, covert foreign intelligence obtained largely through intelligence officers managing a network of agents working overseas. Intelligence in our particular realm can be defined as secret information gleaned without the official sanction of the owners of that information. As far back as 1976, Justice Hope, in his review of the intelligence agencies, said that amongst the reporting ACES had issued since its formation, there was, he put it, diamonds, reporting of considerable significance to Australia. Today, we're still producing diamonds, just in greater quantities. Of the thousands of secret intelligence reports now distributed by ACES each year, many are produced by our officers from their contacts with ACES agents, our sources abroad. Other reports are obtained through our liaison and foreign intelligence services. These reports cover everything from political developments, economic growth, defence modernisation and social cohesion in a particular country, to terrorist and insurgent planning and much more. They form many of the building blocks of intelligence analysis by ONA and DIO and are a significant input into DFAT and the formulation of foreign policy advice to government and inform ministers of significant developments worldwide. Good intelligence can assist government in many ways. It can provide early warning of planned terrorist attacks, information on insurgent networks and more broadly, the intentions of potential foreign adversaries. Our intelligence reporting can also improve the quality of strategic decision-making, assisting government in the prosecution of Australia's defence, foreign and trade interests, helping to enhance regional stability and avoiding strategic miscalculation. Intelligence reporting can be invaluable for law enforcement agencies. It can also be vital for Australia's military, helping our special forces and other units achieve tactical success as well as protecting our troops. This kind of intelligence work is now core business for ACES. Intelligence can also become an active tool for disrupting the plans of others, including in areas such as cyber security and people smuggling. At its heart, ACES has a cadre of highly trained intelligence officers who recruit and run agents. Our intelligence officers are supported by specialist officers who bring critical skills in operational analysis and reporting, technical capabilities, training and diverse range of corporate services. Most observers of the espionage game assume that gains come from putting more people on the front line to recruit sources. As important as that is, the complexities and significant risk of the business demand a substantial amount of support in the engine room behind the scenes. As well as collecting foreign intelligence and distributing it to government, ACES also undertakes counterintelligence activities to protect Australia's interests and under ministerial direction. The ability to conduct a range of sensitive operations abroad in support of our foreign and defence policy objectives. I'll say a little bit more about that later on. The undertakings that ACES makes to its agents and the way we deal with them is of central importance to the service. They go to our core values of integrity, honesty and trust. ACES doesn't use violence or blackmail or threats. And under the Intelligence Services Act of 2001, ACES can use weapons and self-defence to protect its officers and agents, but not to collect intelligence. The way ACES usually goes about its work necessarily needs to remain secret. So I won't be talking in detail about the nature of current operations. What I can do though is to give you a broad outline of ACES activities in a range of areas. Let me start with counterterrorism. Over recent years, an important element of ACES's operational effort has been directed at the terrorist threat to Australia. The tragedy of the 2002 Bali bombings provided a great impetus to ACES's work, which continues nearly a decade later. This event in 9-11 have seen ACES intensify its focus on the very real threat posed by organisations like Al Qaeda and the affiliates it has inspired. With a web of links between extremists from Australia to Indonesia to the southern Philippines to the Fata region in Pakistan and to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen and onto Somalia. We know that the intention to conduct mass casualty attacks against Western countries, including Australia, remains very real. We also know that many of these planned attacks are being conceived in places remote from Australia. As the reach of terrorism has spread, so has ACES had to expand its collection capability to the Middle East, South Asia and to Africa. We have for many years been involved in counterterrorism capacity building with a range of intelligence partners to assist them to develop the professional and operation skills needed to tackle the terrorist threat. This training is important because it underpins the Australian whole-of-government strategy of assisting regional partners to have terrorists arrested and prosecuted in their own jurisdictions for the crimes they have plotted or committed. Counterterrorism work involves not only collecting intelligence on the plans and intentions of terrorist groups, but also working actively to disrupt their operations and to facilitate the work of law enforcement agencies. ACES, working with other Australian intelligence agencies and with law enforcement and foreign liaison partners, has been closely involved with the arrest and detention of dozens of terrorists in Southeast Asia over the past decade, including in recent months. Another important part of ACES's efforts is focused on counterproliferation. The risk of nuclear proliferation and the spread of weapons of mass destruction remains a key challenge for Australia. ACES has been tasked to interdict the flow of proliferation-related material and to support UN sanctions. We work actively against companies overseas who attempt to trade in illicit and embargoed goods. This is a challenging target, which requires a concerted effort by like-minded countries. When countries choose to ignore or contraven UN efforts to control proliferation or to act against the letter and spirit of UN Security Council resolutions, there is a role for secret intelligence to expose these activities and to assist international efforts to disrupt the trade in WMD. The threat posed by terrorist groups who might seek to acquire WMD is the ultimate nightmare for security planners and, of course, a prime concern for us and all in the Australian intelligence community. Where terrorism intersects with counterproliferation, there is a key but very challenging role for ACES. Starting with the Iraq War, support for the Australian Defence Force in military combat operations has become an important task for ACES. We have a major commitment in Afghanistan and this will remain as long as the ADF is deployed there. Our work in support of the ADF ranges from force protection reporting at the tactical level through to strategic level reporting on the Taliban leadership. ACES reporting has been instrumental in saving the lives of Australian soldiers and civilians, including kidnapped victims and in enabling operations conducted by Australian special forces. The ACES personnel deployed with the ADF have developed strong bonds and it's difficult to see a situation in future where the ADF would deploy without ACES alongside. The field of cyber operations is one of the most rapidly evolving and potentially serious threats to our national security in the coming decade. Government departments and agencies together with Corporate Australia have been subject to concerted efforts by external actors seeking to infiltrate sensitive computer networks. DSD, ASIO and the Attorney General's department have a lead role in helping to protect the government and business from such attacks as does ACES. Considerable resources are now being invested by the government to counter this threat and harden the defences of departments and agencies. So far as ACES is concerned, HUMANT has a role in identifying the source of these threats and revealing the underlying intentions of those probing our cyber realm. This will become an increasingly important part of ACES's work in the years ahead. ACES also has a role in efforts to counter the activities of people smuggling networks attempting to deliver people to Australia. ACES has contributed intelligence and expertise leading to many significant and unheralded successes in recent years which have disrupted people smuggling syndicates and their operations. ACES provides unique enabling intelligence or exploitation by the AFP and other law enforcement agencies. Having spoken about ACES's contribution to national security, let me also note that intelligence has its limits. As the independent review of the intelligence community noted in its report last year, while government can reasonably expect some success balanced against risk and cost to obtain intelligence that confers strategic and tactical advantage, intelligence is not a panacea for the actions of lone actors or small groups undertaking acts of terrorism. Likewise, the review noted that intelligence can't always predict major discontinuities and events especially in closed societies such as political and social change occurring at the end of the Cold War or more recently during the Arab Spring. And human by its nature is an imperfect art. Let me now turn to ACES's foreign liaison relationships. The independent review of the intelligence community judged the close relations between the six Australian intelligence community agencies and their international partners, especially long-standing allies, had provided an enormous dividend and was a huge multiplier to the capabilities and effectiveness of our intelligence agencies. Australia's national security now depends on a network of international intelligence partnerships that extends well beyond our traditional allies, the US, Britain, Canada and New Zealand, whose contribution remains of critical importance, particularly that of our major ally, the United States. ACES now liaises with over 170 different foreign intelligence services in almost 70 countries. Where many close partnerships and vital links exist with agencies in North and South Asia, ASEAN, Europe and the Middle East. Let me now go to risk and accountability. A core part of ACES business is risk management. Our work is inherently risky because we're asked to do things other arms of government cannot do. We have to manage risk across the whole range of our activity, from keeping our own staff and agents safe, to ensuring the integrity of our operational work and the validation of our sources. A key element of risk management is our ability to remain secret and to operate in secrecy. In this, the protection of our agents is of critical importance. Agents won't work for the service unless they trust that we can protect them and this goes to the methods we use to recruit and to contact them. ACES understands the requirement for a very strong risk management framework and this is something that is central to the way we work. It draws on lessons learned and is guided by the legal framework under which ACES operates. Our approach to managing risk is assisted by strong external oversight mechanisms, including of course close consultation with government. The 2001 Intelligence Services Act for the first time put ACES on a statutory footing. The Act laid down the legislative basis for ACES' work and provided a strong accountability framework to ensure that we operate in a lawful and an ethical manner. Our broad intelligence gathering priorities are set by Cabinet's National Security Committee. Approval for ACES operations is given by the foreign minister and a set of rigorously enforced procedures and guidelines. There is also scrutiny of our finances and administration by Parliament through the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. The Inspector General of Intelligence and Security provides independent scrutiny of ACES operations with the powers of a Royal Commission. O&A regularly reviews the quality of our product and the Australian National Audit Office scrutinizes the ACES budget on an annual basis. Australians expect the actions of their intelligence agencies to be accountable and that ACES act with propriety and in accordance with Australian law. I can assure you ACES is an agency with the highest level of accountability and external oversight. A few words now before I end on what I see as the challenges ahead. When Philip Flood produced his landmark review of Australia's intelligence agencies in 2004, he reported that ACES was going through perhaps the most substantial transition in its history in line with the changing security environment and as its role expanded and diversified. That transition from a small agency whose role was focused almost entirely on the collection of secret foreign intelligence to a fully fledged intelligence service with wide reach was completed successfully under my predecessor, David Irvin. Since the Flood Review, ACES has grown in size, capability, skill and in its positive contribution to Australian interests. From my almost three years in ACES, I can tell you its officers are highly skilled, exceptionally professional in their operational trade craft and with a deep understanding of the issues they work on. They are also acutely aware of the priorities of the government they serve and committed to the kind of intelligence service Australian needs and the Australian people expect. Sixty years on, ACES has evolved into a far-flung organization with representation stretching right through our region to Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the United States. While still a relatively small organization with a budget around $250 million, ACES is now a key component of Australia's national security architecture. It makes a significant, I would argue disproportionate, contribution to Australia's security across a diverse spectrum. Over the next 10 to 15 years, as Australia continues to grow and change and the threats and challenges facing us evolve, ACES will need to continue to adapt. ACES's operational sphere will become more challenging, volatile and dangerous than at any time since the services formation. Australia's strategic geography will dictate a requirement for high-quality, independent intelligence in the face of a much more dynamic international environment. Some of the societies and countries ACES focuses on will be less stable as a result of demographic trends, pervasive corruption and endemically weak government. ACES officers will have to operate in denser, more complex urban environments in both developing and developed societies. The personal risk to our officers has increased in recent years and will continue to increase. The separate yet interrelated revolutions underway in information technology, nanotechnology, biometrics and materials technology will also fundamentally alter the environment in which our officers operate. Developments in cyber are a two-edged sword for an agency like ACES. They offer new ways of collecting information, but the digital fingerprints and footprints which we all now leave behind complicate the task of operating covertly. Global competition for resources, not only for countries in North Asia, will become more acute as populations grow. Competitive tensions across regions will generate an increased demand for human and other intelligence reporting. Terrorist groups will have increasing opportunities to get their hands on WMD-related material. This will be a major concern for us and our partners, and human will have a vital role in monitoring and disrupting the efforts of terrorists trying to obtain WMD. All this underlines the fact that ACES is at a pivotal point in its development. Our history, and in particular the impressive growth of the past decade, provide a strong foundation on which to build. But more needs to be done if ACES is to deal effectively with the new and significant challenges we will face in the future. A program of reform, restructure, and revitalization is now underway in ACES to enhance the skills we will need to operate effectively in a shifting globally networked world. Our biggest asset is our people. We need to focus on building a strong cadre of intelligence officers and specialist officers to enhance our operational structure. About 40 years ago, after I left university as a long-haired and scruffy youth, I went to an interview at Victoria Barracks in Melbourne in an effort to join ACES. It wasn't much of a process, and I wasn't much of a candidate. I sat in a small office and chatted for an hour or so with an elderly, the spectacled man, probably younger than I am now. I clearly didn't impress him. I didn't make the grade, and then went off on a rather more eclectic career. Now, as Director-General, life can sometimes work in mysterious and satisfying ways. I've been gratified to find that ACES continues to be as hard-headed and clear-sighted in its selection decisions. I've also been gratified to find that our selection processes are now rather more comprehensive and sophisticated. Those who join ACES are amongst the best young men and women Australia producers, and I might just note that 45% of the ACES workforce is women. ACES offers unique challenges and a rewarding career for those who have a vital interest in Australia's future. Its staff are first-class. While in films and books, foreign intelligence work carries a reputation for mystique and maybe even glamour, the reality is that those who work for ACES choose to do a complex and difficult job in secrecy, often facing tough environments and without public recognition. 60 years ago, Menzies saw the establishment of ACES as a prudent and urgent measure in response to the many changes taking place in Asia and the Pacific. He was right to do so, and subsequent governments over the past six decades have been right to invest further in the development of ACES's unique capabilities. The coming decades will be demanding for Australia's intelligence community. However much technology continues to change the basis of intelligence collection, there will always be a prime requirement for human intelligence. The kind of intelligence that can really make a difference and the work that is core business for ACES. A professional, capable and accountable secret intelligence service is destined to play an even more central role in securing Australia's future in the decades ahead. Thank you. Thank you very much, Nick. I think you've touched on a few of the more interesting issues or delicate issues that someone in my position was probably going to refer to. I'm not going to have to mention the Sheridan Hotel, thank goodness, and as for the challenge of ACES keeping up with the times, I think you've touched on that as well. I'm just going to introduce a few areas that I think in the remaining 10 or 15 minutes build a conversation around while the Director-General gets wired up here. I think the theme of ACES coming to terms with change is really central not only to the very fact of this presentation today but to the effective use of taxpayers' money, more than $200 million a year of it, on ACES. And there are three themes that really the speech has made me think about and that I might tease you out on in a moment, Nick, when you're wired up. The first of those really is to do with people. I think some of us who've observed the national security community over a reasonable period of time have asked the question, is it representative of Australia today, of the diversity of backgrounds, the diversity of talent of Australia today. So I want to speak to you in a moment about people. The second is the question of really how relevant is the work that ACES does. Because again, those of us who like me work in the, I guess, the public domain, think tanks, the open source sphere are absolutely staggered by the amount of information that you can get for free about the world, often in almost real time. And this does raise questions about the role and value of secret intelligence. And finally, I'd like to speak to you a little bit about really where ACES fits into this sometimes bewildering security community in Canberra, many of whose representatives I see in the room. So I might take a seat and try in the next 10 minutes hear a few thoughts on those. Start off on one of those. Firstly, well, I'd like to start off on people because I don't want to run away from that issue. I mean, you know, the long-haired Nick Warner of 19, I won't chance a guest as 1970-ish of the 70s. You know, there are a lot more colourful and interesting people in Australian society today, dare I say. And I guess, how representative, you know, hand on heart, how representative is ACES of the multi-ethnic, multi-talented Australia today? Yeah, okay. Well, it's a good question. And I think it's a good answer, actually, too. It's a surprising workforce in ACES, surprising in its age, and I think surprising in its diversity as well. In respect of age, something like 65% fall within the age bracket of 25 to 45. So I think we're a young workforce in comparison, at least with the public, the rest of the public service. That's a good question in this room. Secondly, in respect of ethnic diversity, when I look back over the last five years of recruitment into our intelligence officer stream, something just less than about 20% of those officers stated an ethnic background. And to me, a surprising 75% of those officers also came to ACES with a second language. So I think, are we representative of Australian society? Well, in a broad sense, yes. Increasingly, yes. Do I want to see more of that in future? Sure, of course I do. We're actually not having difficulty recruiting the sort of people we need. And the sort of people we need are those with young people, with ability, with good communication skills, whether oral or in writing, with energy and drive, people who are resilient, with good interpersonal skills, and people really who are not looking to make a... who are happy to make a contribution in the quiet of a secret organization like ACES. We can do better, but we're doing extremely well. Just, I mean, it maybe starts off as a young person's game, but of course it strikes me that a lot of the young generation, these are sounding a bit like a little bit old here now, there's a strong desire for public recognition among young people today. It's the Facebook generation. That's a manageable problem for the profile that you seek, the quality that you seek. Well, let's see what happens as the years roll on at this stage. I'd say, no, it's not a problem. I think if we have an issue, it's been getting the ACES brand name out there. Understandably, there hasn't been a brand name. People don't know to apply to ACES, but as I said in my presentation, it's a rewarding career in an organization that does, quite honestly, some extraordinary things for Australia and its national security. It's a pretty classy website, I have to say. The other two issues I wanted to talk to you about was relevance, I guess, really in coordination. In a world of overwhelming and often quite valuable open source information, this sort of digital age, what does secret intelligence do that other forms of information can't do? You're right, the world is awash with information, some of it's accurate, some of it's rubbish, but there's a hell of a lot of it out there. Definitely not alone. What governments need to do and have them and are doing is to use ACES judiciously, to use ACES, if I could put it like this, as the collector of last resort. ACES must not go after open source reporting. It's not in the game of competing with DFAT, and it's not in the game of competing with DSD. We are a unique capability that is and needs to continue to be targeted on the hardest possible collection targets that there are. Let me give you an example. The world history is full of examples of where human has played a key role. An example of what we can bring that others perhaps can't bring is the intent. What is the intent of the leadership of this country or what is the intent of the leadership of this group in respect of some particular issue in respect of Australia? They don't always know themselves. But if anyone is placed to find out, it's ACES. So it's using ACES judiciously in a targeted way. This happens, it has happened for years, it's happening now. But ACES must not be used to compete with open source reporting, to compete with Australia's very fine diplomats. And the third point I wanted to make, the sort of the coordination issue, I think it's fair to say that there have been challenges in Canberra over the years as the security communities involved, the intelligence community has evolved. There have been challenges in improving coordination among agencies, collection agencies, the analysis agencies, I guess the policy arms of government. What sort of progress have you seen in that area? How satisfied are you and what are the challenges there? Where does ACES fit into coordination? You know, when I joined the Australian Intelligence Community in 1973, I joined the joint intelligence organization. It doesn't exist any longer. There were four Australian intelligence organizations. JIO was based in Canberra and the other three, ACES, ASIO and DSD were based in Melbourne. That was no way to run an intelligence community. And it was certainly no way to run a broader bureaucracy to have the intelligence collectors in Melbourne and the bureaucracy, the line departments in Canberra, was a recipe for disaster and there was in my experience plenty of disaster. Things have improved enormously and fundamentally since then. Some of it began slowly, it built slowly. But today, those problems of coordination and cooperation that we had between agencies and between agencies and departments no longer exists. I think a few things have happened. Primarily common sense over the years brought a more collaborative approach. Secondly, I think as agencies began to work more on counter-terrorism, on counter-proliferation, on support for military operations, just by the nature of those issues, it brought us closer, ensured that we had to work more closely together. The heads of intelligence agencies and some of them are here today would agree with me on this. We are all, all six of us, very focused on closer collaboration. Over the past two or three years, we've set up between us amongst us a number of joint teams that work on specific issues that bring the skills and expertise of one agency together with the skills and expertise of another agency. Something that five years ago, maybe certainly ten years ago, would have been inconceivable. Again, we're doing very well. Can we do better? Sure. But I tell you, it's a revolution from the 1970s. The changes are not just driven by shocks and external factors. Is there a sustained appetite for improved coordination that you're seeing? Or is it still a challenge from time to time? Now it's part of the fabric. It's now part of the way that agencies and agency heads think. How can we get the best possible outcome? And generally, it's through closer collaboration. And how does Australia stand up, I guess, in the global, without naming too many names, I guess, but if you look globally, where do we sit in terms of the quality of our coordination? I'd like to give you a straighter answer to that question, but the way intelligence agencies are set up around the world varies enormously. So it's very hard to compare our six agencies with the huge American machine. It's not sensible to compare us with New Zealand. Canada's approach is also different. We're doing it very well. Collaboration, cooperation is part of the lexicon. It's part of the way people think it's working well. Thanks, Nick. I'll leave the interrogation there. You've covered the people relevance and coordination, which for me are three of the really deep challenges for an organisation like ASIS. Look, I think on behalf of all of us, I think you've provided a really valuable service with the presentation today. I think I've certainly learned a lot. I think it's been useful. It's been illuminating at times, and it's been, I guess, tantalising at other times, and that's the way it has to be. I'm really pleased also to hear the tribute you've paid to the people who work for ASIS because, as you've said, a lack of individual public recognition is naturally one of the challenges that they have to deal with in that job. It sounds to me like the kind of organisation that we'd certainly miss if it wasn't there, and I guess I'll just close by saying that I hope ASIS continues to be in the news from time to time for all the right reasons. Can I please ask you to join me in thanking Nick Warner for today's presentation? Thanks very much.