 Ukraine's the magic word today. And Karl Becker is here to help us update on it and get current about what's happening, not happening and how we can connect so many dots. Just when we were thinking, well, maybe we can address the COVID now or this is even more aspirational. Why don't we try to address climate change that's gonna ruin everything? Then we get Ukraine. Surprise, another fantastic global distraction and it is distracting us a lot. And if you look at the press, you see there are various constituencies taking positions that are not necessarily the same. Some of them are more in self-interest and some of them are less. There's the United States administration, there's the Democratic Party, the two factions of the Republican Party that doves and the hawks in the Republican Party. I should say the isolationist, the hawks. And then you get the EU and you get Germany, which is a special case. You get Ukraine, we should consider them. And of course you get Russia, which is mostly propaganda. Wow, what a circus, Karl. Where do we start looking at this? Well, I think we start, you know, where we left off last time we talked about this. And that is, it's really important to make sure that the United States and NATO say the same thing. And actually they've done a pretty good job of that. You know, today, the news story for today is that in fact, they both sent their written response to Russia and they both were consistent in that they said neither one of us is going to commit to never admitting Ukraine or any other country for that matter into NATO. But we're not going to do it anytime soon. And, you know, and so that's an important baseline for both NATO and the United States. And NATO, I understand they're the same thing, but they also sent separate responses. And so, you know, so I think that's an important bottom line. And then I think they also agreed that there was some room to talk about arrangement of forces in Europe. And so hearkening back to some of the things that they did back in the 1970s, trying to forecast exercises and be more transparent about what they're doing with forces moving around the region. So I think that that's positive. It's not gonna satisfy Russia because they want something like a security guarantee that says that NATO is going to pull back from the countries that they did put forces in and let join NATO since 1990. So that's not going to satisfy them. But I think there's room for some discussion at this point, at least as Secretary of State Blinken said, we have given them an opportunity for a diplomatic solution. Well, but if that's a hard position on both sides, how do you soften it? I mean, what is the compromise on that? Guarantee that NATO won't take them or no guarantee. It sounds very binary to me. What is the compromise on that point? Well, the compromise is, is that there's transparency and that the United States and NATO are not going to accept Ukraine into NATO for the foreseeable future. And again, it's about what we're doing with forces in Europe in terms of transparency. So I think that that's, and then another aspect of it was some talk about resuming nuclear dialogue. And so understanding what Russia's position is here, they've said you need to pull back to pre-collapse of the Soviet Union days. So pre-1990 basically. And they know that the United States and NATO aren't going to sign up to that. So that doesn't come as a surprise and that's not really binary. That's binary on the part of Russia saying that that's their demand. And then the other thing is that the United States has said that they're willing to talk about nuclear deployments. And part of the disagreement between the United States and Russia has still been that the United States still has these old gravity nuclear weapons planted around Europe in different places. And that's partly part of the INF agreement that the United States walked away from during the Trump administration. But of course it blamed Russia for violating it first. So again, those two areas really open some room for maneuver on both sides. Because remember Russia knows that they're not going to get NATO or the United States to commit to never allowing the expansion of NATO. I mean, that's just completely inconsistent with the founding of NATO and completely inconsistent with concerns about European security. You know, this seems so different from Crimea. In Crimea, my recollection is fading but I don't think the US was very much involved in the Crimea event. We are involved in this one though. And I guess that makes a big difference. Well, it makes a big difference. And it's also, it also is different from Russia's side. Don't forget Russia basically invaded Crimea without much warning. This time, you know, they've, first of all, Russia has said they're not going to invade Ukraine. What they've said is that they've put forces in the border and then made and then laid out the demands from for the United States and NATO to make some commitments about security in continental Europe and trying to force Ukraine back into negotiations. Remember, I think you have to appreciate what Russia's real bottom lines are here. And it's not actually the pullback of NATO as much as it is having some leverage over Ukraine in the Donbass region. You know, we pointed out last time, you know, that Donbass region is that eastern part of the Ukraine that is largely Russian, ethnic Russians that live in that area. And those two, the two provinces in that area have both made an agreement. Part of the agreement in the agreement with Ukraine was that those two provinces would be, have some degree of separation from Ukraine itself. And so that's the region that Russia is really interested in. It's the Donbass region, you know, and the 2015 agreement between the two really talked about that region. So that's the region that Russia is really interested in. And I think if Russia saw an opportunity, it would probably try to at least take some territory to connect that region into Crimea. I think that would be some satisfaction. That would be some satisfaction and justification of their efforts. Can we see a map of the Ukraine? We have a map of Ukraine. And I'd like to ask you about the Donbass and Kiev because, you know, the media has said that there are Russian forces pointed at Kiev from the Belarus side, or I guess the border of Belarus and also from Russia. And it's a pincer movement, but I'm wondering how close Kiev is to the north-eastern, you know, Donbass. Well, Donbass is this eastern region on the eastern side, on the right-hand side of the map, looking at it. And then the forces in Belarus are stationed up above Kiev. But that isn't a big concentration. The big concentration is in Russia proper. And then, of course, Crimea. And so what Russia would like to do is they would like to get some control over that part of Ukraine. That's the area that's really being contested. I think Russia realizes that taking on a full invasion of Ukraine would not be in their interest at this point. And it is different than when they went into Crimea. Because when they went into Crimea, Ukraine really had a very ragtag force of a military. And since then they've done a lot of work and NATO and the United States have done a lot of work with Ukraine to build up their military capabilities. So it is different from the days of Crimea. And Ukraine is much more prepared today than it was back then. Yeah, I can recall $400 million that Trump was gonna give them. And ultimately, he did give them. So that's not chump change. Furthermore, you have these weapons piling up right now from the U.S. in Ukraine. Including all kinds of anti-air missiles and anti-tank missiles. And I wonder, my question to you, Carl, is that really make Ukraine more powerful in this hypothetical battle? Will they be able to survive? And let me, if there is a war, and let me also ask how can you possibly give these high tech weapons to Ukraine without giving them at least technical advisers, American technical advisers to show the Ukraine Army and Air Force and what, how to use them? Well, there are technical advisers in Ukraine. There are NATO-sponsored technical advisers there and U.S. technical advisers there. So they do have that. And that is part of those packages. So I mean, okay, would that be effective against Russia? Or is it just? Well, sure, yeah. No, it's not just window dressing. It is effective against Russia's capabilities. And that's why Russia would really, would have to think very seriously about whether it's prepared to attack. And those 115,000 troops that they keep talking about in that region, they didn't just show up last week. First of all, they've been talking about this since the middle of December. And so there certainly is no surprise element left to a potential Russian attack. Again, I think we really need to kind of cut through some of the propaganda, as you say. A lot of what's coming out of Russia's propaganda. You need to kind of sort through that and see what is it that Russia's real bottom line is? And just as it was before, the bottom line is still they, if you talk to Russia, Russia was concerned about the Ukrainians using those new weapons to attack the Russian sympathizers in the Donbass. So basically, you have the Russians saying, we're really just trying to protect our interests in that region of Ukraine. And the United States and largely the United States NATO to a lesser degree has been screaming, they're going to invade Iran. They're going to invade Ukraine. So, I guess another constituency, just to touch on it is the Russian people. Because it's an autocratic government. It's Putin. When a Putin decides he had for breakfast, that's what counts. And query, do they care about this? Do the people in Donbass care about this? Or is it all him? Well, actually, I think the people in Donbass are not all that stuck on Ukraine. That's why they're trying to develop some level of understanding of what the provinces in Donbass really represent in terms of Ukrainian unity. Because they want to be separate. They want to move toward Russia, while the rest of Ukraine, Kiev and the Western part are interested in moving toward Europe. And so that's really the dynamic there, is Russia sees the Donbass as very much part of the Russian sphere of influence. And ultimately, that's what I think Putin is looking for, and the Russians are looking for, is that that part of Ukraine really belongs to Russia. And if they thought they could move in and do that, I think they would. But I think they're worried that they really don't have the capability to do that, especially given the statements that NATO and the United States have made about no incursions into the Ukrainian territory. And that's why when Biden said, well, maybe a few, that NATO and the State Department pushed back and said no, zero is the right number. I saw Tony Blinken say that. But why now? You talk about things that are in place, phenomenon that have been going on for a long time, feelings, economic considerations, long time. Why now? Well, I think Putin saw it as an opportunity. I mean, the world is distracted with other things. The United States is wanting to shift to Asia and the competition with China. And so it's winter. And so oil and natural gas specifically is in short supply in Europe. And so this is an opportunity to use that leverage that they have over Europe and especially Germany. So that's another consideration. And another part of it is, like I said, Russia saw Ukraine developing capabilities that threatened their ability to continue to have some say in what happens in the Donbas. And so that's part of the Minsk Accords that Ukraine has not followed through on. And so again, I think that's another factor in Russia's calculus to say, we need to do something now rather than later before Ukraine becomes even stronger and is capable of better defending it. Moving west to Ukraine itself, two or three remarkable things have happened in the past week or so. The one that really interests me is Zelensky said, now, now, just relax, everybody. We're not at risk of imminent attack. So don't hoard food and supplies. Let's just go about our business. That's the one thing you said. And in connection with that, he also said, you know, they have these tents with their ostensible troop gathering on the border. But our information is that the tents are only half filled. And they suggest there's all these troops there, but they're not really there. I love that kind of propaganda. What do you think about that, Carl? I don't know. I mean, I have no idea what that means. You have to kind of accept what he's doing as trying to calm down a country that hears the Western media saying, we're going to war. They're on the border and they're poised to pounce in a pincer move from three directions and all that. So I mean, if you're Zelensky, you have a domestic constituency that is going to panic. I guess they have the same problem that we do with people running to the store for rice and toilet paper the first time they hear there's a problem in the world. So I think that that's quite understandable, that he would do that. And so it's not an unreasonable thing for him to do. And if you're Ukraine, I mean, everybody learns from this process of where they stand in relation to the others. Because I mean, I would make the argument that Putin has done this. And remember, he has been silent on it since late December. He has not said anything. He has just let the Western media ramble on and on about what's happened. And he's taking this in, evaluating what it really means. So I mean, what he's doing, he shores up Russian legitimacy by saying, I've gotten Biden to talk to me as an individual. I've gotten a bilateral with the United States. So Russia's legitimized in that process. The other thing he's trying to do I think is present himself as the successor to the Soviet Union. That's why he goes back and he says, we need to roll back NATO advancement back to 1990. Well, NATO is not leaving Poland. It's not leaving Romania. It's not leaving the Baltics. It's there. It's not going to move back. And so he's playing to his domestic audience too. And basically he's watching the paranoia in the West. And he's really playing on inconsistencies in the NATO commitments and the disagreements between NATO and the United States, specifically Germany as you mentioned at the opening. Germany has said, well, we're not going to send weapons to Ukraine. We're not going to just give up and stop taking natural gas from Europe. They're hesitant to make any firm commitments about the Nord Stream 2 pipeline yet, because they're in a pinch for fuel. So I think that's another aspect of it. And then the other thing is he reminds Ukraine that you go ahead and be with the West, but you better understand you're on your own because all these guys are telling you, look, we'll help Ukraine, but we're not going to send troops into Ukraine to fight Ukraine's wars. So Putin has already taken enough winds in this that he can walk away and with his closed media, he doesn't have to worry about any backlash for how much it costs to put those troops out on the border, whether it's 115 or there's really only half that many out there. It doesn't really matter to him. But he can take it away as a win saying I've done all these things. I've reaffirmed the relevance of Russia to European security. Well, I would be impressed and I think there's a fair chance that he will get more territory out of this without firing a shot. And he will get more influence out of it without firing a shot. Who knows how much he'll get out of it, but I would suspect he's not going to fire a shot. And that takes me to the question of this effort that was reported about bringing someone in to take Zelensky's place, a pro-Russian leader. What was that about? Was that propaganda or more? I don't know. I mean, it came out of British intelligence. The story came out of British intelligence. So why did British intelligence put that out in the public? It's another one of those variables that without some kind of inside information, you're really guessing at what it meant. I mean, because it certainly would be a copy of what happened in Belarus. Remember, I mean, that's how Belarus fell back into Russian control is they basically replaced the leader in Belarus and put in a friend of Putin. So it certainly is a plausible scenario, but I'm at a loss to say the validity because I simply don't have the information to know. The moving to your comments on Germany, actually we ended the last discussion we had, Carl, on the fact that Biden's best move was to ally with Europe. It has to be multilateral with Europe and try to get them activated behind us somehow or with us. But Germany is in different spot. And if it's about gas, we have gas and we could sell them gas. Have we been able to soften the risk of Germany losing gas? Yeah, that's one of the things that Biden has done and beyond just our gas, but they've also been working with UAE in the Middle East to reassure Germany that in fact there are other sources. Of course, it's not as cheap and it's not as easy because you basically have to liquefy it and bring it over in ships rather than a pipeline which is much more efficient and ultimately cheaper. So yeah, no, they've done that. And back to the general point that you're making about the need for coherence. As I said at the beginning, the United States of NATO have done a pretty good job, I think, of sticking together and more or less a unified front. Of course, Olaf Scholz has got, I mean, he's new. So this is another test that I'm sure Putin is watching carefully of how Scholz actually responds. Now that Merkel has gone and Chancellor Scholz is in the seat, this is really his first threat of Russia doing this. And so, I think they're watching him as well of what he's doing, but what the West could have done better, I'll say, is they could have showed a more unified front. They could have worked it out in quiet between the United States and Germany to be more solidified and avoided this whole public discussion about sanctions and all the differences. Instead of doing it more private, and Germany did, Germany sent the foreign minister to Moscow for private talks rather than doing it via the airways, which is always cumbersome and lends itself to propaganda and misinformation. And then the other thing it did is it really rewarded bad behavior by Putin. Instead of going up front early with Biden agreeing to talk to Putin, they would have been better off saying, here's your reward. If you're willing to come to some compromise, then you can talk to Biden. Then you get the bilateral with the United States, but first you deal with NATO. So they could have done that better. And then the other thing is that they didn't really do a particularly good job of including Ukraine. Biden said, if it's about Ukraine, they're going to include Ukraine. But as Zelensky said, look, if you're in Ukraine, there is no small incursion. There's only incursions. You know? So it could have done better, but it didn't do badly either. There is some positive about it that they were able to maintain a fairly coherent position. They both delivered their message to Russia. They were saying, yes, we realized that Russia has an interest in European security. That's ultimately what all that stuff means about willing to talk about nuclear deployments and positioning of forces and transparency and all that. So I think that overall, they've done a pretty good job. And I think we are in fact coming to an end game here now that they've delivered the written responses to Russia. And I think what we'll see that there is some room for compromise and I think diplomacy will win the day. And Russia is probably not going to. Of course, you're always at risk when you say, Russia's not going to invade because that's sort of a fool statement. But I think you can certainly say that it doesn't seem very likely. Well, okay, I want to move further west. I want to move to the United States here for a minute because Biden did not have a good, what do you want to experience in Afghanistan in terms of his popularity? He's still suffering from that. Right now, his popularity, even among Democrats is low. And of course during, with the GOP is lower yet. As I mentioned earlier, the GOP seems to be split between hawks and isolationists, which is interesting. And I don't know if you could say what the Democratic group is thinking. I guess they're really interested in not putting boots on the ground. But one thing is clear, this is a test as far as the political environment is concerned in this country. And maybe in the world, sort of as a global, beyond the EU, sort of a global statement of just effective, how effective is Joe Biden administration in dealing with complex and risky problems. So, you know, he's really under a microscope now and it's not at all clear that he has the support of the country. Well, yeah, because you don't know which country he's trying to get support from at this point. I mean, that's part of the problem. But, you know, Paul Waldman had a good piece in the Washington Post today about the Americans tend to try to reduce everything to, is he showing strength or is he showing weakness? You know, and trying to reduce it to that binary. And I don't think that's very helpful. You know, and so that's a part of his problem is everybody thinks, you know, that the American president has to project weakness or strength. You know, and weakness is always defined as not taking a belligerent approach. And I think that in this case, you know, Biden hasn't taken a very belligerent approach. You know, he's been fairly measured in everything he's done. And he hasn't said, we're gonna send, you know, we're going to send troops tomorrow and we're going to deploy a tank battalion and all that. You know, he's been very measured in what he's done. And so I think that to me is success. But to other people in the United States, as you say, that's not success because he demonstrated weakness. And then you get all this chatter about, you know, appeasement and, you know, it's just like Chamberlain and, you know, all that sort of noise that you get whenever the United States doesn't try to be strong, whatever that means in terms of United States action. And normally it means let's send the military and, you know, throw the military at it and think that solves the problem because that shows strength. So I think, you know, I think that, yes, part of the problem is how do you define success in this case? And I think, again, you know, as I said, as I said the last time, we're past the unipolar moment and we have to recognize that we need to have a consistent, solidified position that is comfortable for both United States and for Europe. You know, somehow the possibility of war looms large in all of this. And yet I want to raise one more thing. And that is Russia has been effective in using cyber attacks against its neighbors, against Ukraine and other countries there who worry about further cyber attacks from Russia. It's part of the Russian approach. It's sort of like radioactive poison, you know? It's part of the Russian approach. Yeah. So at the same time, you know, maybe it's just the press but there has been some rhetoric about how the United States has some remarkable cyber attack capabilities and they could do the same thing in return. So what we might have is a whole brand new experience. It's not with troops, it's not boots on the ground, it's not even bombs and artillery and mortars and drones, it's cyber attacks. And I think that's waiting in the wings. How important is that in this kind of confrontation and confrontations like this later? Well, yeah, I mean, I think that is a new reality that people face. And again, I think Ukraine has done a fairly good job of responding to those kinds of threats. And the United States is learning that that is a potential and it is a risk that you have with Russia and to some extent with China. I think Russia is probably a little more aggressive in that area than the Chinese are, at least in terms of offensive capabilities. And so, yeah, I mean, it's clear. And again, cyber has taken on this sort of broad definition of both influence operations as well as actually, you know, trying to damage infrastructure and things like that. And I think that certainly Russia is in the business of disinformation. You know, I mean, that is very clear. They are certainly the ones that have probably come the closest to perfecting that art form in terms, especially in Donbass and in Kiev itself, I think. And that's why, you know, as you mentioned earlier, you know, Zelensky has to really calm the people in Ukraine because they are very effective in their disinformation campaigns. Yeah, if you divide the public of your adversaries, divide the country from its administration, you're weakening it. I don't know, you sound to do that in the US for sure. One thing you mentioned early on in this discussion, Carol, was the idea that Putin saw this as opportunistic. Indeed, it's clear. And the US was, you know, engaged, trying to protect its interests in Asia, advance its influence, whatever, protect its influence in Asia. And so maybe we were distracted with that and he thought he'd take advantage. But now all the oxygen is on the Eastern frontier every day, the press, how many people are writing a fact and an opinion about this. It's like all the oxygen in the room is going to Putin and his adventures. But how does this is a really interesting thought? How does that affect our initiative in Asia? And how does it affect Xi Jinping, who is also an opportunist? Yeah, I mean, I don't quite know how to answer that because I don't know that there's that close of a connection. I mean, the media has taken this on as a big project. And certainly, you know, the US government has spent a lot of energy on this problem. But in terms of a broader long-term strategy, you know, this is sort of a couple of month annoyance. And like I said, I think we're approaching the end game. And so I don't see Xi Jinping taking advantage of it. You know, there's been some of the stuff that people have been writing about why Russia won't invade is because the Olympics are coming up and Putin doesn't wanna destroy Xi Jinping's Olympics with a war in Europe. And whether that's good analysis or not, I'll leave to you, I guess. But, you know, I mean, you know, I just don't, I don't see that as in Xi Jinping's calculus. You know, I think we've, I've said before when we talked about Russia, you know, Russians play chess and they like to do full frontal in-your-face kind of attacks on the queen. You know, where China plays Weichi, you know, they like to do encirclement and grab you around the edges and do feints and that sort of thing. And so, you know, I think that the strategies aren't all that compatible when it comes to one playing off the other, I don't think. Last, last area of inquiry, just for a minute or two, it just seems to me that so much of this is unprecedented. I mean, you try to find some historical reference and nothing applies directly. You know, of course, the history creates the environment for these things to happen, but these things, these events, these strategies, the clever moves or maybe not so much clever moves are, you know, kind of a new world, a new world of diplomacy, a new world of confrontation. It's hard to find a parallel. And I'm thinking that there's a lot of lessons in here as to how things are going to go in the future. Telecommunications brings us closer. The media brings us closer and there's a wild card everywhere and this kind of confrontation is likely to happen again and we should all be learning a lot from how it is unfolding, am I right? Sure, sure. Yeah, I mean, I don't think it's, honestly, I don't think it's all that unprecedented. I mean, we've had these kinds of confrontations with Russia before, you know, I mean, if you go back into the 70s and 80s, you know, well, look at the 1960s, you know, when they, the human missile crisis and- I knew you were going to mention that card, you know. And by the way, you know, there actually has been some analysis that when Russia says that they're going to take technical military means, what they're really talking about is moving troops into Venezuela and Cuba, you know, that they're going to say, well, if you think you can put weapons on our front door, we're going to put weapons on your front door. So, you know, so in some respects, you know, yeah, history doesn't repeat itself, but sometimes it rhymes, you know. So I'll take that as the response to that. Hopefully we won't have another human missile crisis in 2022. Hopefully. Well, at least we would like it to rhyme anyway. Yeah. Thank you, Carl. Great discussion. I look forward to following up on this with further discussions about this and the echoes of it in various places in the world. Is there anything you want to leave with our viewing audience as to an expectation here? Yeah, don't expect complete success. Expect it to continue to be an iterative process and that if we can get past this current crisis, then hopefully we can begin some level of dialogue and a movement toward some level of accommodation with Russia and Russia's interests protected in Europe's interest protected as well. On an ongoing basis is what I hear you're saying. It's not just one show, one crisis. It's establishing, nurturing, fashioning a relationship that will be better going forward. Right, and it's centered in Europe. It's not centered on the United States and Russia. Yeah, thank you so much. Carl Baker, a senior advisor to Pacific Farm. Thank you so much. Thank you.