 So, OK, let's start off with four quick questions, which we'll do in the polling, just to get the blood flowing to your fingertips. It's the afternoon. We have to do everything we can to counteract the brownies that you had. How prepared are countries to deal with returning foreign fighters? Very prepared through very unprepared. Just a range question. What do you think? I've eliminated all questions that had other as an answer. OK, so 66% are in the prepared to very unprepared, or alternatively, and this is perhaps more salient, only 4% say prepared, 0% say very prepared. So there is a general sense that there is not a lot of preparation for this. Next, on a scale of one to five, how big of a threat are returning foreign fighters? Is a major threat, which warrants it being a priority among national security, police and other policy makers in these countries, or a no threat? There are just a few of them. It's not such a big thing to worry about. Let's try and put it in some perspective in this simplistic way. OK, and this shows 54% on the threat side and 16% on the no threat side. So there's a little bit of a skew towards a threat, perhaps not entirely unexpected given the nature of this discussion. Next, how should go see there's another. Anyway, how should countries deal with returning foreign fighters? Refuse the entry at the border, charge them with the crime in prison, place them in a reintegration program, allow entry and be monitored by the government, or other. By the way, I know you could do many of these things. So that's not other. But if you have something specific that's another, you could do that. So number one in this is place them in a reintegration program and the lagged one is refuse the entry at the border. Who said other? All right. So I think there could be creative plea deals that are developed that put them into former programs to be community outreach to talk about the disillusioned fight. Excellent. We shouldn't conflate foreign fighter with jihadists, right? If we'd said deal with returning foreign fighters who joined terrorist organizations, that's one thing. If we look at the data from from returnees, they're very few foreign fighters who have actually then become jihadists in the West. And so that's that's are still a relevant distinction. And we should think about which groups they belong to and which groups they fought Excellent point. Other others. Yes, I chose other because I mean the first one refused entry at the border for me as an NGO in real life as well, human rights person, entirely unacceptable. It doesn't mean that person can't be monitored. But I mean, obviously, people's motivations just depends. I mean, as has been brought up, these people of different ages, of different backgrounds and what they're going to need and what sort of trauma they come back with should be reflected in the response. OK. So one more. Did I miss one? OK. Is there another question or is it one more question? How effective are rehabilitation and de radicalization programs such as they exist right now from very to very ineffective? OK, well, only one percent say very effective and forty seven percent say something in the nature of ineffective, they're considered to be important in the context of your earlier answer. So this is clearly an area work can be done. Let's move swiftly to the slides now and to a set up this discussion. The idea is combating contagion. What's next for the defeated or homework bound extremist? So we'll go into it and we'll describe it very quickly. There is a significant foreign fighter contingent set to return. Thousands of foreign fighters expected to leave the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq, destined for their home countries or non conflict zones or other conflict zones. And we got to deal with their with their rivals. The numbers of foreign fighters are growing. Some some will will die, perhaps up to one in five of them will die. And some will continue fighting in other places, perhaps 10 to 20 percent of them. But the rest are going to, you know, come home, seek a location. And then the question is, do they return to their home country, travel to a new conflict zone, travel to a third party country? And then how do we deal with the choice between peaceful integration or them engaging in extremist activity? Next. There's a debate over the threat. We've talked about it. You know, historical data shows that one out of nine returning foreign fighters between 1990 and 2010 were later involved in domestic terrorism. There have been some plots. Disrupted authorities have already disrupted 10 to 12 alleged plots organized by fighters who'd returned from Syria. And we have to weigh issues, just as those we've discussed, reintegration versus imprisonment can returnies be deradicalized. If so, how? Next. And there are different approaches. We've talked about the Danish approach at some length here so far today. That's relevant in this context. In Saudi Arabia, there is something called jihadi rehabilitation, where they go to facilities, rehab facilities, potentially after being sent to prison and go into counseling and reintegration. But apparently it has a recidivism rate between 10 and 20 percent. And then in the UK, the UK government passed a legislation that allows for the suspension of passports for people suspected of leaving the UK in connection with terrorism. And then they'd have to be escorted back and potentially face prosecution and deradicalization. So, you know, that's a stronger measure. Next. So we're going to get up to the move and we'll talk about the move and then we'll break into little discussions for perhaps five minutes and then continue on. And the first move here is fictional. We knew that. So here we have a thought, right? We can take Tunisia and use it as an example here. Following a movement, Tunisia offers a 10-day amnesty for returning fighters. And, you know, here we have the president saying we must bring back Tunisian citizens from conflicts. We must reunite sons with their mothers and transition them back. The international community has been asked to develop strategies and provide guidance to the Tunisian government for managing the return of these fighters. So we're just dealing with one country that's welcoming fighters back for a brief period of time. What advice do you have for them that you think will work best with dealing with these foreign fighters? Okay, so again, within the parameters we talked about here, the best possible advice, the most forward-leaning possible advice, not, you know, just rehashing things that have already happened. What advice do you have? What might you suggest? Are there other cooperative things that might be done around this? And we'll reconvene in five minutes. But so talk to each other. Tunisia is here awaiting your discussions. Generosity. And I'd love to get a little bit of the flavor of these discussions after you have them. So in five minutes we'll talk also about what the interactions were like. All right, folks, if you would resume your seats, we will resume our conversation. So I see Tunisia in the clutches of Iran here right at the moment. Embrace, sorry. Did I say clutches? I meant embrace. Yeah, no, I don't know what came over me. No, no. Soleimani, hero of Iraq. Yeah, exactly. So Tunisia, you were launching this program. What kind of advice do you need? What kind of guidance would you like from the international community? First of all, we'd like to define the international community. We saw lots of people we weren't so happy to see, like our Iranian and Syrian colleagues. We did not see the US or the EU, but I'm not going to say anything. I noticed Jim just sort of sitting here looking the other way. And I thought that's very similitude also. And Tunisia was his first posting in the diplomatic service. I don't understand. Must have been a bad couscous or something. Things we did, we were approached by the UAE who offered intelligence cooperation. Intelligence cooperation is obviously something we're going to need. I think we'd probably look to Saudi Arabia and to the European Union for rehabilitation, reintegration advice, but not just advice. Assistance and tangible financial assistance. And part of the problem is because this is not the first time Tunisias had foreign fighters. There are a high number of foreign fighters who went to Iraq last decade. And any that came back, there was a very simple solution. Ben Ali would just throw them into jail. And obviously this government is going to take a different approach. And then longer term to address the problem both of folks leaving and folks coming back, a serious jobs program is going to be necessary. And at this point, that is not something that our government, i.e. the Tunisian government feels it's got the capability to do on its own. It needs both private sector involvement and also assistance from other countries. And you feel good about these offers? Do you feel they're adequate to your needs? Or do you feel that there's some area where there's a glaring need that's unaddressed besides funding, for example, the job? Glaring in terms of, no, no, these, I mean, more jobs are needed, more investments needed. And as far as the reintegration, that's something that Tunisia just, we use, Tunisia just don't have experience with. What did you offer them? I don't know if Tunisia remembers correctly. We just asked for the identification of all these returning fighters to be circulated. See, this is how that's called. We heard a $3 billion investment from them. No, but on a serious note, I think, you know, the amnesty is something that Tunisian government would decide on its own. But I think regional countries would need at least some form of intelligence sharing to be able to deal with the threat. The other conversations we had were about where are these fighters returning from? How is Tunisia going to be able to identify who's coming from where? Are they coming from Syria? Are they Tunisians who are abroad? So I think better intelligence sharing from, you know, Shloma talked about countries, you know, Turkish airports, et cetera. I think, you know, cooperation with these countries from which the fighters enter or leave Syria would be useful for them. And there is an idea in that, right? I mean, if people are in Syria and Iraq, there are likely several routes out for them. There are likely, therefore, several points that are particularly fruitful places to do intelligence gathering and, therefore, can become hubs for intelligence sharing, right? So there is an opportunity in these flows here. Does the intelligence community agree with that? I'd like to just bring up that the monitoring would need to take place for years. So how comfortable are these countries with monitoring said individuals for three to seven years? That's what would be required. Also, we're having to monitor every aspect of their life. So they may not be taking part in attacks, but are they adding to this narrative of the CVE? Are they continuing to do that? Because that collection makes it very broad. The other thing that we had concern about is this off ramping into some kind of physical location to kind of debrief or to kind of reintegrate them into society. We see a lot of concerns with that. Think of it the prison model, Abu Ghraib or anything that you think about that as a place where it brings like-minded individuals, in this case, threat actors together. We would rather have them disperse in the community to have influence from other people in the community. So we don't necessarily support that. We see a lot of concerns in that area. But generally, the surveillance, we suggest that that does happen. But we want to know if the countries, especially EU and others would support that because it won't just be to Tunisia. It will be who those people contact in other countries as well. Okay. There are several places that I can turn to here. Let me turn to- pardon me? Yeah, go ahead. Yeah. She's sort of the American intelligence community, even though she's sitting over there. But the reason I was staring off into the distance when you posted this thing was- That's misdirection. She's embedded over here. But we know she's working for it. The reason I was staring off was that exactly the concerns that Peyton raised based on my own experience is the problems that the U.S. government would have, particularly swept up in all of the talk and examples today. My instincts would be, let's support this thing. I mean, if we're going to get to the bottom of this thing, we're going to have to find ways to reintegrate these people and to deal with this in some kind of broad manner. But once you try to turn that into a specific U.S. government decision, action, telegram going to our embassy in Tunis to tell the Tunisian government what we would do, and you would have to get the clearances. You would have exactly the problems that Peyton raised. There would be so many caveats. There would be so many concerns. There would be so many worries that maybe one of these people would have slipped through and showed up in New York one day that it would have been very high for the United States to come up with anything rational and coherent that would be helpful to the Tunisians. That's why we're steering into the distance. Although, let me just throw one thing out here that you guys can chew on collectively, right? Let's say there are 20,000 foreign fighters out there, and let's say a bunch of them die, and a bunch of them go someplace else to go and fight. Let's say 10,000 of them return home someplace. And let's say that contrary to the prevailing per capita incomes in most of these countries will just stipulate that they need $10,000 a year to support a job. Well, that's $100 million to employ these 10,000 high-risk people for a few years. So maybe it's $500 million. That's not much money. Here, you've got all these people that are this big, giant threat. For half a billion dollars, you could go and give them all a job, surveil them in their job, know where they were, integrate them into this. Isn't that cheap? It's not how the U.S. government works. I can tell by our labor participation rate. Yes, Jonathan. Well, actually, the technology community has a proposal, given that that's not how the U.S. government works. We're happy to come to Tunisia and invest in infrastructure and job training. We have a shortage of technical expertise in the West, and it's just something that can be done remotely. So we'd be happy to train people that are coming back into the country. In return, we want to collect data on all of their behaviors. So once the European Union and intelligence community sorts out whatever they need to, logistically and legally, then you can pay us for the data that we'll have on all of the people that have been working in Tunisia. So it's kind of good for us. It's good for you. It'll eventually be good for you. What do you think? I'm sorry. I just want to clarify. This is the entire labor force that you're going to be, or the ones that have returned and that are being integrated into your work programs. Well, you can use the work programs for whatever you want. We'll come in and set up the work programs, and then you can send either people who are returning as foreign fighters or people that are already living in Tunisia. Frankly, once... I really feel like I've passed through the looking glass into a future where Google is world government. I'm trying to be forward-thinking here. No, no. You're definitely forward-thinking. I'm about to move to the EU. They'll never let this happen in the EU. The EU is very interested in best practice model and has created the RAN Radicalization Awareness Network. And they are creating, testing best practice models. And the emphasis is on they are coming home. So we have to look at the relationship building, on the resilience building, and bringing them back actually to their homes to train the members of the families and the communities to deal with them. Because this will be the emotional support network. And it's not surveillance, it's relationship building. And these family members need mentorship processes as well. So I think investing in a new upcoming relationship model based on family and community relationships would be a way forward in which the European Union could invest. Georgia, I'll come to you. As international police advisers, we do not endorse this program at all to have a 10-day amnesty period. We think it's a short-term solution that's going to bring more problems than solutions. And instead we would advocate legislative and legal reform that works on not criminalizing the act of traveling to Syria and Iraq, but rather seeking evidence-based responses to people who actually have. Okay, that's fine. But you might want to think about in the context of this what the best course of action might be in these kind of cases, right? Except what you're saying is wise. But in the context of the scenario, one of the things we want to do is figure out how you deal with the influx. You know, one of the things that strikes me is, you're a foreign fighter until you're home. What is home? You know, home is your family to some extent. If there is no job, then you are still alienated or if there is no religious community to integrate yourself into, you're still alienated. So a big part of dealing with the foreign fighter is creating the foundations of home somehow. And that requires an investment, Barbara. Yeah, I just wanted to raise the issue of Libya and what the international community can do to try to revive peace talks there. How many of these Tunisian fighters are going to Libya for their initial training before they go on to Iraq or Syria? And how many pass through Libya on the way home? How many of the refugees from Libya in Tunisia are actively involved in this or they merely economic refugees from Libya? So one would hope again that the international community could do a better job of addressing the root causes and the conflicts that are drawing in these foreign fighters. Okay, over here at the NGO corner. I think there are a few things that we need to look at. First of all, what are they coming back to? Are they coming back to the same conditions that actually probably forced them to join ISIS, leave their countries and join ISIS? We need to look at the infrastructure, some of the social services that are being provided, working with the Tunisian government as well as with donors in the UN. We need to look at mental health for the returnees as well as their communities, social services, but also employment. And we need to be very careful with employment. We cannot just target those that have returned. We have to look at the community as a whole and have a community approach because if somebody is unemployed and somebody went out to Syria, fought and came back and suddenly we're targeting them and giving them economic opportunity, that the unemployed will actually go to Syria with the hope to come back and get reintegrated as well. Okay, I'm just trying to do this in the order I saw it. Mary. So we consider our program to be very successful and it's been a model for many other states. So we would be very happy to work with Tunisia on it and send advisors and such and help with funding. One thing we do offer is as a jobs program, we also do offer salaries to some people. And other opportunities of creating an opportunity that's an alternative to fighting. So maybe after the 10 days, they don't go back. So will you help pay for this? Yes, but we've got money. So and then we heard about the families and the strength of the families in utilizing that network. And that's something that we've been doing as well. So to go to the families, but then also social networks. So other outlets, not just religious outlets, but sports participation, other social outings that people can do as alternatives. Okay, but I just, I mean, I wasn't being flip with this. Ultimately, these programs will be as good as the checks that pay for them. In other words, if they're not well funded, they're not going to be big enough. They're not going to be rich enough in a variety of different kinds of ways. And so somebody's got to pay for it. Now one question is who is at the international community at the IFI level? Is it international donors of some other sort? Is it regional donors? And obviously regional countries that do have cash have a greater stake in addressing the issue of these foreign fighters that are returning to the region. Or they're going to settle elsewhere in the region. So that's why I'm asking. I think it's part of the solution. Mix here, Tom. So I have two questions. The first, from the United Nations perspective, I have to raise is impunity. If you're going to have blanket amnesties, some of the people returning from these places will have committed crimes. We have reporting about crimes against humanity and crimes that might amount to genocide. So I would have to raise a flag at any program that was just going to welcome anybody back and say or whitewash now. And so very much in tune there with the law enforcement. Folks, the second thing is I'm just very struck that we seem to be offering these returning fighters a better deal than we offer our own veterans. That might prove quite difficult to sell. Certainly when we talk about programs like this, one of the first things we hear is great. They get breaks. Let me get this straight. You're going to reward people for going to fight in Syria, but I don't get this deal. I don't get this deal as a good citizen. And you could actually be in a situation where you're creating more fractures within society rather than less, simply by privileging a certain experience, which frankly is not one of service to the state. So let's just throw them in jail. I think if they're war criminals, you certainly want to have an investigation. Yes. No, I mean, I think if you're going to have a comprehensive response to returning fighters, it has to be anchored in the rest of society. And we have this tendency to think of it in very linear fashion or very slivered fashion. And if we do offer a good deal to returning fighters, there are going to be other people in society, taxpayers, and so forth who are going to say, hang on a second, that's not fair. And you can't ignore that. That's going to be part of it. And you have to have at least some sort of plan that explains it to your fellow citizens or to your taxpayers. No question about it. Let me say what others are thinking and don't want to say. The Tunisian fighters, when they are in my country, are not a problem for all these other countries. The moment they step out, and this is why this program is so surprising, they are a problem. Because now the UAE, not to speak for them, are scared that they'll come to the UAE. The Libyans who aren't represented here are scared that they'll come across the borders that are coming from Syria. So these fighters are now actually going to be a problem. Now we're happy to get them out of our country and think that this amnesty should be longer. But again, there's no revocation of their passports. They're allowed to travel again. And the doublespeak of calling them fighters, I mean, maybe there's distinctions. Some of these are killers of beheading Christians as part of Daesh. I guess they're called fighters and they're given amnesty. So I don't know if this has been taught through to the full extent. And I'm just speaking on behalf of some of the silent countries who are afraid now of these Tunisians. And I'd be happy to hear what they'd have to say if they're willing to speak up. So speak on behalf of all those people who like to have Bashar al-Assad speak for them. I would ask Egypt, for example, directly. Ask Egypt. It's 90 million people in that country. Go on, Egypt. The issue is not... One of the very few Egyptian leaders, named Shlomo, by the way. But I... Shlomo Mubarak. But I have good relations with some of you. That is also something. I think the issue is not the financial cost of such a program. That is the smaller problem. The issue is the risk of this kind of problem. That it may turn into a program that will encourage recruitment to this kind of GRD organizations. I know from another arena about cases in which people initiate, you know, minor terrorist actions, which are low risk. The probability that they will be killed will not be so high. But they are arrested. Once they are arrested, they're getting a monthly stipend by some organizations. So they can take care of their families and so on. So you can have this kind of program if it is conditioned. First of all, no people that were involved in serious crime. Second, an effective monitoring mechanism to see that they are not reverting back. And third, an effective snapback mechanism. I use the term snapback carefully here. Namely, if they are revered, they are punished strongly. So it's a kind of parole, not amnesty. Okay, one or two more comments here before we're going to go to the next move. Just briefly, I think the return of these fighters or terrorists for some others is a very valuable intelligence gathering source. So I think in part and part of a deal with these returning fighters should be first an assessment of what level of intelligence they can provide in a fight against the groups in Syria and Iraq. Secondly, I think it must be a more comprehensive program. I agree with Shlomo in terms of a parole look at this. And also something like bringing in the tech telecom industry again, more like incubator for change. Now what does that mean? We've got new startups that go through incubators. And I think this will require mentorship, reskilling these new fighters. And possibly a 12-step plan that I can go into detail with our Tunisian counterparts in terms of how we can reverse that tendency for extremism. But I think most importantly, they should become at the end of this rehabilitation program as the ambassadors against extremism. That has to be a condition that they will now we have 3,000 strong former fighters who are going to then disseminate information about how vile extremism is and what is this fight about. So we turn around. Okay. We will continue with other components of this, but let's make the next move. Before we make the next move, Nancy, what do you think of the responses thus far? I think Tunisia got a lot of good advice on this one. We started drilling down some very specific conditions upon which various programs might or might not work. And it is that level of analysis that each country will have to go through to determine the kind of response that will fit those conditions and with the kind of help, both financially and technical, that the region and international community can provide. So I think there were a lot of interesting suggestions, not each of which would be appropriate for each situation, but a number of them that makes sense. Yeah, I thought a lot of the suggestions were very useful, but I also thought one of the things that was quite interesting was the presentation of some solutions that seemed quite useful on the face and then you drill down a little bit and they've got some downside. And so it does suggest a little bit of, you know, well, we've solved this problem, but then you're creating a next problem and you need to look at the unintended consequences of these kind of programs as well. And I think this discussion illustrated that well. If we move to the next stage here, the return of the fighters now has sparked protests by Tunisian secularists. In the wake of the government's recent amnesty program, protests have erupted across the country, largely led by members of the secularists, Nides Tunesk Party, protesters have called for prosecution of returning foreign fighters and urged the government to reverse the amnesty position and there have been counter demonstrations and observers feel the situation could deteriorate. The goal here is let's confront the issue of reintegration and determine the strategies for dealing with fighters in this kind of reintegration environment, okay? And I'm going to just, for the purposes of keeping you guys engaged in this discussion, I would like you access of evil folks here to think, yeah. No, no, two terrorist groups in business. But what I'd like you to do is imagine yourselves now the returning fighters in this case. So they can turn to you and judge your response to the programs that are being created here. Let's take five minutes and talk a little bit about the kind of advice you would offer them. And you can broaden it out if their program's pertaining to your own countries or issues related to this. We can talk about those too. So we'll resume in five minutes. All right, we will begin again in one minute. If you could just wrap up, we will begin again in one minute. Okay, so let's resume our seats and we'll get back into the discussion. I assume by the way, you've all been on your email following all the important news of the day, SEP Blatter's resignation, which just took over the internet, soccer. That was the blankest, completely blank expression. Who's SEP Blatter? There's just also something on the wire saying that Saudi Arabia has just announced an ambassador for Iraq for the first time in 25 years, which is, you know, that's something. And the New York Times has a story saying that Iran has grown its supply of enriched uranium by 20 percent. So the whole, Barbara, Barbara, pardon me. It's low enriched uranium and under the understanding that was reached in Lausanne, they have to get it down to 300 kilograms if there's going to be a deal. Right, there assertion was that the program was not frozen as was asserted. But I'm sure the Iranian government will promise us it's actually the good kind of enriched uranium. Right. Of course it is. All right, so Tunisia. Now there's problems breaking out in the streets. Didn't you, did you expect this when you announced the stupid program of yours? Eda Tunis. Yeah. Did the prime minister expect that his party was going to go against his party's plan? Evidently not. Apparently not. It's not the first political leader in any country to miscalculate. That being said. What could be helpful here? What would you like? What would you look for in this case? Or is this something that just Tunisia has got to solve on its own? I mean to me this is a domestic political issue. I mean I think what this reflects is that as in the first move in this scenario the government took an action because of mounting pressure from civil society. And that's going to continue to be a factor that's going to balance these kind of protests in the second in the second move that we have up on the screen now. And they're going to be faced with all the messiness of democracy which they've had four years of experience dealing with and they're still working out all how to compromise and all the mechanics of that. The track record to date over the last four years is they've done a pretty decent job of two steps forward, one step back. But I welcome all as a government of Tunisia we welcome all good ideas from our friends on how to deal with it but speaking personally I think it's a domestic issue for the domestic political issue for the Tunisians to address. And I'm sure the US government agrees with that. This is their problem. But having said that it does sort of tag on to the tail end of the last discussion we were having. That if you don't take this from a more holistic point of view if you're just dealing with the foreign fighters you're likely to breed resentment elsewhere across the community. And so I think there becomes a question of how does one frame programs for dealing with these because I assume in the EU one of the things that you will also have sorry one of the things that you also have is resentment when foreign fighters come back as reports filter into the media that there's more and more foreign fighters into the communities presumably you're going to have more anti-Muslim feeling right you're going to have that kind of backlash right. Yes the European Union has noted for the past five years an increase in Islamophobia and a backlash in the rise of the far right and we think it's important when dealing with the rise of extremism that we also look at the rise of far right extremism and anti-Semitism as well and how that brings together competing forces sorry that can tear apart communities that otherwise work together we also note that in the United Kingdom a number of years ago there were race riots and as a result of this perception of competing resources amongst local communities and I think it's really important therefore that we reiterate our initial request that we look at training local communities and building relationships so that those that are reintegrated are not necessarily considered a burden by those local communities but also that other communities are not necessarily seen as being excluded so there is in this thesis extremism begets extremism that one if you're going to deal with one kind you need to deal with the other kind is that something you guys would agree with I would agree and I think one thing with the UN and by the way and then how would you deal with it one of the things that the UN has stressed and I think the language to some degree some of the language of the resolution of in 2014 is to not specifically identify one conflict but to talk about the issue of foreign fighters in general I think from a European perspective for example there's a lot of debate on whether the issue is just foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq or the issue of Ukraine you get Europeans fighting on both sides of the conflict in Ukraine there's obviously less focus on that but some of the very same dynamics are there in terms of backlash in terms of returnees and so on so if you focus simply on just one group of foreign fighters that can create certain resentment in certain communities of double standards right within one group of foreign fighters but there's also the issue that if you've got the rise of far-right extremism it feeds into the narrative of the other extremists as well right and first of all absolutely but first of all we don't really have and that's been I'm speaking more from a European Union point of view I'm kind of looking at stepping out of my there's been an imbalance in resources I think I would argue 95% of resources go to Islamic extremism and arguably in some countries zero goes to right-wing as much as the language of a lot of the strategies try to be neutral the hard data point to the fact that there's an over-emphasis on Islamic extremism yeah and I just think one of the reasons I just started out there is you know we're talking about these scenarios but we also as we're doing it and we're trying to look at the context in which peace is going to be made need to think about other potential scenarios and you know if you have major flows of foreign fighters and it produces backlash that backlash produces more right-wing extremism and that right-wing extremism could actually exacerbate the problems you've got at home fairly dramatically which is just another reason to address these things underneath Jocelyn To follow up on this idea of what reintegration means it's not only an individual process I think that the ecosystem of the reintegration has to be taken into account and the scenario here is pointing out to a sort of divide between secularist versus Islamist which I think to a certain extent is still is trying to be overcome in the Tunisian politics I mean what we have seen since the jasmine revolution is an attempt to pull everybody with a Tunisian concern beyond the secular Islamist divide so one way to avoid this tension is really to maintain this level of cohesion and trust building between different groups and it goes beyond the state responsibility it is also the responsibility of the different communities it has been said several times but there is a fantastic tool that the Tunisian government could use which is most of the people who are aware in government are part of a diaspora they were part and are still linked to the one million of Tunisians that are in Europe this is a fantastic tool because they defy right there the narrative of groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS who built on Islam versus the West and I'm not talking about secular actors I'm talking Hanushi spent 25 years of his life in London if this didn't have an impact on the way you see the Islam even in this more consensual way there is a lot of potential here and we should not underestimate the fact that the Tunisian in charge especially on the Islamist side know about that and can use that to help overcome the divide here I have to ask not you you guys you know you come back you're in this situation in Tunisia there are some programs luring you back but there's also this big backlash how do you see it you may be somewhat alienated by your experience in Syria but how do you deal with the situation you find on the ground here I'm deeply concerned and I lived for years under Ben Ali's dictatorship we're just for being religious or growing a beard you could get thrown in prison and now I'm seeing the same people who were part of the regime that were jailing us before I went over to Syria who are protesting as though I have no right to be here in the country it's not only alienating but it makes reintegration frankly extraordinarily difficult for me I think that I'm still struggling with the concept of identity that drew me to Syria and Iraq and when I come home that sense of identity is even more troubled and so the idea that there is within my own society you know protest against me coming home I think that there's a real there's a real trouble within and I wouldn't be surprised if I were to seek out others who were like-minded like me at home you know other disillusioned fighters others that were part of various movements whether they fought in Iraq in the early 2000s or if they fought in other times to try and find that community because my identity doesn't seem to matter to anyone at this point so one of the things we're dealing with here clearly is the consequences of backlash that almost inevitably will come along with this those of you in the international law enforcement community how do you deal with that I mean you've talked about how you integrate people you've talked about how you identify people who are potential threats but clearly if there's any number of people coming back you know you talked about you had 30 go but if there were a newspaper article saying 30 had come back that we're now living in the community you'd have a different kind of problem and the question is how would you deal with it first of all we would say that we warned the Tunisian government against this decision they wouldn't listen I had hoped that they had foreseen the consequences they apparently didn't and so the advice that we can give from a law enforcement point of view is on a very practical level it has to do with the crowd management crowd control and we have some experience in how that is done based on the rule of law and that's just going about managing or controlling people they also have to in order to maintain the credibility they have to go on with the reintegration program and I think one of the lessons that can be learned from from this decision is that you have to foresee all possible impacts and you have to first of all you shouldn't offer benefits to these people that you don't offer everybody else in the society so that is what we are we don't in Denmark we don't just let people in and start a reintegration program unless we feel sure that this is what this is what they want as I said earlier on today if we have reason to believe that they have been involved in in illegal affairs or violating the Danish legislation or legislation whatever they'll be punished and only the people who want to come back and be a part of society we of course we try to offer them some of these benefits that are open to everybody else in the society so getting them back to work getting them back to school or university or whatever it seems like an important point though is to mainstream people you know in other words to bring them into programs that are available to everybody in society not to set these programs apart visibly because that's likely to produce some degree of resentment yes so in that vein I'm happy to report that after over 300 seconds of intense buying multilateral negotiations we are now ready to unveil a collaboration between tech industry the governments of Iran Iraq and even we're in exploratory negotiations with Saudi Arabia for a MENA-based digital Marshall plan that would provide digital literacy training tech training and job placement and we want to unveil this to begin with in Tunisia as a more holistic approach towards providing economic alternatives both to returning fighters as well as the general populace does anybody here have any skepticism towards this plan or critique or questions that you have regarding the people in the audience are walking out but Saudi Arabia and Iran are going to solve the political and economic problems of Tunisia that's the outcome let's put it this way if they move together to do it they might be able to but you said I think Nancy's terms were the outer limits of possibility and so I think we just crossed the outer limits we're into just the outer limits Mary we did not support this we were talked we were talking with him but we did not support it this is just typical Silicon Valley arrogance Masoud speaking for the media I think the media can play an important role here there's always a there's always always a first time yes a couple of things I think there's an excellent opportunity for conflict sensitive reporting you know it's a somewhat controversial concept that has not been really taken up by mainstream media but is practiced by local media and especially in this context where the local media has a lot at stake it's important to to cover this kind of protest with a great deal of sensitivity with a focus on solutions rather than conflict that's number one there's also an opportunity for I'm not sure which is less likely that or the Iranian Saudi cooperation but keep keep going yes a second there's also an opportunity for the media for the local media to educate the public about you know the the highly successful and effective reintegration program of the Tunisian government if in fact they have taken the advice of their friends in the international community so everything to educate the public that while actually these returning fighters will go through a rigorous program of monitoring and education and that they won't be just they're not a bunch of terrorists brought into society to go around and terrorize the public but that they will be monitored and properly reintegrated so an important role for the local media to play yeah now I've been on the editorial side the local media would also editorialize very vigorously and go on a campaign to first of all encourage push the local leaders the Tunisian leaders to take this opportunity to develop their a new national narrative of inclusiveness and of a pluralistic society that where not only the secularists are respected but also those observant Muslims are respected and the returning fighters become part of society and are embraced by society in the same way that everyone else is and we would go on a campaign to press the authorities to finally get their act together to provide the services to provide the explanations and more importantly to communicate to their populace in an effective consistent strong way what the new national narrative will be and how they can be how the citizens can be part of it I've been I've been gently teasing the Iranians here so they should have their chance at the microphone thank you so sorry I just wanted to point out that we have wonderful graduates from places like Sharif University who could contribute a great deal of expertise to a MENA internet project and I'm just questioning the apparent bias of the moderator in always assuming that Iran is the source of instability yes in many cases but Iran also has solutions to propose that's all I embrace that it's just briefly it's the it's the moderator's twisted sense of humor no no absolutely no problem Iran has been used to this type of disrespect but it's perfectly fine we are very patient country and we are very ancient yes no you're noted for your patient um but let me just please let me just please just make a very important point just so that I give my support to the tech telecom industry and this comes back to Farah's comments early on the demographics of the individuals who are involved in extremism all the millennias what do they care most about the reason why you know the extremist propaganda is so effective is it actually watch these videos to like video games they have actually very similar similes to US military videos of recruitment so there is some you know parallels to that however where I want to point to is that the MENA region with the demographics that we're talking about of 70 percent below the age of 30 at some most of these countries requires a shift to a knowledge based economy one that has worked in many emerging markets and I believe that Iran as a major economy of the Middle East actually one of the largest with a very dynamic knowledge based economy that is mushrooming throughout the country can play a major role in driving this shift and including to that will address unemployment under employment new skill sets and introduction of this new generation that are tech savvy but to use that in a more productive constructive manner we have to provide them the tools and I believe the private sector and telecom sector can play a major role Iran supported and I will again stress to our Saudi brothers and sisters that the fighters that are returning are not coming to Iran this ideology is rooted in your country and when they come back to to their masters it will be quite a problem much bigger one for you than for Iran so I hope that you support this regional dialogue and this initiative to move to more knowledge based economy thank you for that and just in future we hope that the Iranian delegation uses the word mushroom less frequently I just want to say this as a returnee and I'm really encouraged to see this focus on a digital economy and I want to point out that a lot of us are coming back with excellent technical skills like I personally ran several official ISIS Twitter feeds and some of my colleagues helped to design games edit fairly beautiful beheading videos and I'm just hoping that we can be reintegrated using some of the skill sets that we picked up on the battlefield by that you mean the technical skill sets yes I mean we have very good digital skills all right so I just want to echo some conversations about regional responses assisting Tunisia with the protests and the backlash against the return of these foreign fighters I guess I don't mean to be pedantic but I suppose there is a question to be asked as to why these protests occurred is it an opposition in principle to the idea of reintegrating foreign fighters or is it born out of a sense of dissatisfaction with the government's economic performance and then on both counts as the UAE and as a country that is extremely close to the current Tunisian government I think we would propose working with the Tunisians to address both sides of the issue so whether it is an economic issue obviously there are investments and programs of economic development if it is a security issue the Tunisian government might approach this amnesty and a tiered approach to the way low enforcement people recommended and obviously in terms of counterterrorism we would strengthen national security strategies we would strengthen our cooperation with them make this public to at least calm some of the backlash that's occurring in Tunisia did Turkey want to intervene here if I may I mean I put my Tunisian hat on for a moment because I work the last two years actually on Tunisia I'm going there on Friday and I want to say just a couple things after the discussion of the domestic response first of all the issue of returnees has been part of the political debate already for two years Tunisia has a range of NGOs that have been going regularly to Syria to try to pull back young people to Tunisia and the very creation of these NGOs became a great political controversy in Tunisia a year and a half ago it created no small amount of dissonance between the Islamists and the secular parties so there's a history there to keep in mind I also think that Tunisians will I think the context of these protests will matter greatly if they're in response to a policy a reintegration I don't think it presents as much of a problem as if they're in response to a series of violent attacks that kind of context would create a much more polarized situation because the sense would be that the situation is deteriorating and we have the return of domestic violence funny funny funny you should bring that up I'd like to move to the next move if I could okay the next move is a bombing in Tunis is attributed to former foreign fighters thank you very much and so you know now why are we raising this move here well clearly the you have foreign fighters returning home that's one thing and how you're integrating them but if any of them act out if any of them start behaving as these frustrated terrorists here might well behave then you've got a different kind of foreign fighter problem you've got a police problem you've got an intelligence problem you've got a backlash problem as well as what do you do about the other foreign fighters you still have the foreign fighters problem so that's what we want to talk about here in this last bit of this round take five minutes talk among yourselves and then we'll resume for about 20 25 minutes of that part of the discussion we will begin again in just one minute so if folks will get back to their seats we'll begin in one minute seen this Boston story the story of Boston today okay ladies and gentlemen if I could encourage you to return to your if I could encourage you to return to your seats you're trying to attract attack the collect millennium Muslim data and sell it back to Coca-Cola yeah exactly exactly okay you know the fragility of societies that have been exposed to even moderate amounts of terror and these circumstances is well illustrated by this story that's taken place in Boston today where a young man was shot dead in the street for possessing a military style knife he was Islamic he was apparently being followed by the FBI counterterrorism task force because there was a suspicion that he had been radicalized by online ISIS messages now we don't know whether he actually has we don't know anything except he had a knife and he's dead now but it gives you a sense in a very palpable way because it's right now and this is the breaking story in Boston of what can happen in a society where there is an attack as it happens there was an attack in Boston by two people one of whom at least was radicalized probably both of whom were radicalized and now Boston is on edge and it's sort of an analogy to this scenario that we are talking about here and I think for the benefit of what this discussion is if you would like to respond to the this scenario move which is to say there is an attack and it's attributed to foreign fighters and how does that change how you handle the issue of foreign fighters do that if you want to try deal with it in a broader sense do that Dan I rudely interrupted you in the middle because you had walked right into the next move this isn't it okay yeah sure wink wink you'll get your check in the mail but why don't you talk a little bit about what how you see the consequence of this kind of thing in in the microphone I think it's first of all it's important to say that in the wake of the Bartle attack we were just talking about this the reassuring thing wasn't this was an attack undertaken by a Tunisian who'd been trained in Libya and came back and undertook the attack that the political response of of both Islamists and secularists was very encouraging they really tamped it down they they they were able to to deflect a a an escalation of Islamist secular confrontation so I that you know there's an empirical basis to feel that the political system is matured enough such that the notion of calm political response is there and has demonstrated the effectiveness so I think that's fairly encouraging but I also think that under the scenario where there is this sort of attack there would be great expectations from the secularists that the police would would come down very hard and the security forces on on Salafists and Islamic radical forces and under those conditions you don't have an Islamist you don't have a police force and George and I have worked worked on this in Tunisia among other places that really has been trained to deal with the situation in an effective way you don't have a domestic political force that police force that's been reformed and in a comprehensive way it's still basically the same guys that protected the previous regime and if it's those guys who will respond to this and are expected to sort of deal with it and their role is increased and and magnified you're going to have a situation in which is going to begin to really tear at the fabric of this kind of political consent so a key point here and a key recommendation that I would take away from what you just said is prepare for failures you are not going to integrate everybody back it is not going to be a perfect process there will be some people who will cause problems and you need to train police forces and train the political class to know how to respond to those things in a way that doesn't inflame the situation even more right so that's a concrete step which we shouldn't plan for the perfect success of our programs jocelyn yeah I would like to say that lots of the intervention have been on what I would call the demand side of the countering extremism you know finding who is attracted how and trying to find a way to dissuade and it's very important to have this approach but it cannot be the only one what is not really addressed is the supply side let's put it a beautiful scenario tomorrow there is a beautiful democracies in different parts of the world but there will still be attraction of some group and some people to this global ideology you know bin laden before he died and before we find the foreign policy issues thanks for bringing that up again he was issuing fatwas on the global planet the weather issue and he was providing responses for people who are not only muslims so there is I mean we say we said al-qaeda is the second of ancient I don't agree with that al-qaeda has still a lot of attraction actually if you look at the quashy brothers in Paris they were following al-qaeda not either so I would not dismiss al-qaeda and I would really be careful on not taking into account this global issue so it's very uncomfortable it's what kind of global responses we provide beyond national strategies and it doesn't have to be theological you know we have how did the communists got defeated how did communists got defeated jihadism is like communism how do we distinguish between islam and jihadism and for this we need not state intervention but also strengthening groups in civil societies at the international level which is the hardest thing to do if not impossible for now although you know the way communism got defeated in some important respects was it was contained and it was allowed to die of its own natural defects no it was also the attraction of the western way of life and the western products that had it it it it dissolved from within well yes I mean that was a component of it as well yeah practical recommendations in this situation practice how do you respond in the law enforcement community in this situation first of all nothing is perfect nothing works 100 so you have to be aware of that enforcement doesn't prevention doesn't I'd like to I think I'd like to make at least two points first of all I'd like to challenge the assumption that seems to lie in the question that deraticalization and reintegration apparently are two different or separated issues I don't I don't think that's the way it works so I think deraticalization comes along with reintegration or perhaps follows a successful reintegration program and the other point I want to make is that your strategy depends of course on the circumstances one strategy applies to the guys coming back who now want to become a part of the society again and another strategy applies to some of these guys who have committed a crime apparently been still enemy of the of the society being convicted being sentenced and there you could do some deraticalization work but it must be put together in quite a different way from than than the the other program I told you about one of the most effective measures that we use is offering a mentorship mentors muslim mentors who are very familiar with islam were able to discuss islamic issues with these these guys and make them understand that you can be a good and faithful islamist islam believer without being an extreme islamist and that has worked in in in several cases okay you know one of the things just listening to your response and thinking about this a little bit that strikes me as another thing we ought to fold into the mix here is that the proportionality of the response really matters in other words if it's disproportionate it feeds into narratives that is extremely unconstructive in fact there is a there is a component to the spread of violent extremism that borrows a little bit from the the uh into fata playbook where you go and people strike out small groups of people anticipating a larger response because then the larger response says see we told you so and drives recruitment now of course that's a very different situation i'm not drawing political analogy but between the two necessarily but proportionality is really hard in situations like this the you know proportionate and and we we we we see it here in in in other kinds of ways I I can only imagine I was just thinking about this and say you know if the foreign fighter comes to the united states and or or london or paris and does something like this the response of the west will be radically different than if it's within the region and and huge and we've seen it we've already seen that we've seen that did you want to say something I was simply saying that I think to reiterate your point is that the importance of maintaining law and order and not having knee-jerk legislation to contain the new threat will be really really important I think having legislating in haste as usually leads to bad policy and bad bad policing as well right right anticipate the problems prepare for the problems legislate before the problems because if you do it a day after it will be out of proportion and will create issues yes I'm struck by the fact I think Catherine's last point is very important especially in a tunisia context we need to build in some resiliency and bandwidth in order for them to both tackle their existing underlying problems of foreign fighters and the root causes of countering violent extremism but going back to the premise that you have to have you have to expand this pie and the pie shrinking and that's creating more tension therefore you're getting this cause and effect of unintended consequences so I'd like to just offer a practical recommendation as we've been talking so the good news is our tech companies have been interested I'll put the Saudi Arabia around to the side but of engaging in Tunisia and as you know I in my capacity as a CEO of this corporation we participate in a public-private partnership we need more people at the table and we need more people to invest in Tunisia but to our government colleagues instead of sort of wild-eyed ideas what how are you going to incentivize and offset the risk that multinationals and US corporations they need some some they need we need to be taking care of and I need to see some skin in the game from the US so what are you proposing they do I want to see a more robust realistic risk insurance program that will allow me to go pick on steroids I'll pick on steroids and accelerate it because right now it is only doing mega projects they do a lot of really really good work but the pipeline is too long so let's shorten the pipeline but let's have a realistic risk insurance that can as I said open this and create some resiliency and bandwidth but we need skin in the game I do think by the way it's a very constructive approach which is you can spend a little bit of money on insurance get a disproportionate return leverage it with private capital produce some of the job creation some of the socially stabilizing elements that you can and it's clear one of the messages from this is you know a lot of the best responses to the security issues are social economic and political issues did you want to say something you don't okay does anybody else have a specific suggestion in this case with regard to the foreign fighter issue jim it's a technical point to tony bestandig the one thing the u.s. government could do the department of state to show that it cares about american businesses particularly in dangerous places is to take the osak which is the overseas uh security initiative that is run by security officers post and put that under the ambassador the ambassador leads that the ambassador he or she meets with these people on a regular basis talks not only about security but all the other issues that are involved in how they're participating in essentially a private partner a public partnership with the u.s. government to help the country that they're involved in you don't need it in paris but you certainly need it in the parts of the world we're talking about can you effectively stop the foreign fighter problem without stopping the conflict in iraq or syria no so i mean another component of this is that the engine that creates foreign fighters are not just the domestic issues they're the international opportunities that draw them there and if it's not iraq and syria it could be yemen it could be libya it could be cyanide there are a lot there are a variety it could be afghanistan yes this was a point i was about to make earlier but i could see we're all hitting for the break it's really hard as we've heard in the course of the day to get down to the super local level as a u.s. government two levels higher we're not even at the nation state we're at the international kind of uh nagging mummy what you all need to do at the local parish level but one area where we can have an influence uh a is trying to deal with these conflicts which involves a significant military component as steve hadley talked about this morning but also david you talked about it several times and it's come up in various contexts this idea of a tipping point in societies and that's where tunisia is so important i'm interested not only in why tunisia sends 3000 people off to syria and iraq but also why nonetheless it's such a stable place compared to not just uh yemen but possibly and lebanon but possibly even jordan uh and we need more stable places and fewer places like libya and uh yemen and that's where the u.s. government leveraging the business sector leveraging its security role in the region leveraging its 150 account because we can't turn the whole region into scandinavia but we can use targeted funds to help governments and to help institutions to maintain that tipping point and we can monitor that so that's an area where the u.s. government can a while trying to deal with the really blatant problems such as iraq and syria and that involves military as well as others try to nurture the tunisia's the moroccos the geordans and some of the other countries in the region towards the green side rather than the red side because otherwise more of them may go the direction of libya and yemen you know this is a circular point which is extremely important to our discussion the hard to hard to admit we're here in the institute of peace this is peace game and you want to focus purely on peaceful means of avoiding future conflict but you can't build i once wrote a book called the price of peace which looked at a long long time ago peacekeeping efforts in places like bosnia in the middle east and so forth and the conclusion i came to is you can't build a political house you can't build an economic house on a security sinkhole you know unless you stabilize the security situation you don't get to these places and you can't work around that because it's the it's the volatility of those places that is the the the the furnace in which these these these fighters get forged and we have to keep that in mind as well uh yes i mean just on that point i mean i think you know it's as you're kind of alluding to it's not zero some you know some of these things are happening in parallel and if you look at a case like libya and you look at yemen the warring factions are not necessarily dash or al qaeda there are other warring factions and because of their destabilizing effect they create a vacuum for for dash to move into so in libya in the case because you have you know the dawn what was it the i forget the something dawn yeah dawn and dignity and and you have the you know the two governments insert and other areas you get isis moving in and so there is an element of peace negotiations diplomacy then creating the conditions for unified military action right so i i don't think it's you know one or the other to create the secure environment and and i think when we're talking about tunas i think it's interesting you know we always look at these issues looking backwards we're looking at it you know as what has happened until now so we're really heavily focused on iraq in syria and meanwhile isis is extremely good at expanding when nobody's looking that's what they did when they went from iraq into syria built up their conditions and then went back into iraq the same thing is now happening in libya in a deep way which is why i think the tunisians are actually very very concerned about what's happening on the border and the foreign fighters are you know coming back is one issue but also those who are in in libya and yemen when we look at what's happening in south arabia we're not talking about as much but there is another conflict where hadir moot the you know eastern side of the country uh you know the fighting has happened with the houthis on the western and northern side and it's in hadir moot where you've had al qaeda and other people come in and now where the attack's happening just north of that up into eastern province so i think you know we we should also be forward looking and anticipating and anticipating also what peace moves we can make to create the uh framework for military action or interdiction etc when if we're dealing with violent extremism on a broad global basis you know we can recognize the different terrorist groups have different modus operandi and so they're like viruses and al qaeda has historically been a virus that has attacked healthy tissue and daish is a virus that attacks unhealthy tissue but both are viruses that are bred in unhealthy tissue they are bred in failed and failing states high stress economies high stress environments places where there's a great deal of alienation where there is some kind of pathology you're shaking your head well i was going to fara up to a point there are 180 americans who love to go to syria there are people who are radicalized in places that are very calm and polite and very pretty outside so i get it gets it gets very dangerous when we start to make generalizations about failed states and non-failed states well but but and environments that okay but but i was saying and forgive me i'm not being defensive i'm trying to elaborate it may i may be being defensive well we'll leave that for psychotherapy later on but um but but what i meant was unhealthy tissue and a lot of those people are coming from places within our society that are not high functioning that are not highly comfortable now i'm you know i know there are exceptions in a lot of these places i mean and i think so it's not the norm most of these people are coming from healthy no wonderful places where they're have great lives i don't think that the um the premise is a correct one you talked about al-qaeda and and i want to say as as and many people in this room were part of the sort of thinking when our country was attacked on 9 11 and i'm speaking as me not in my role here but we had a lot of false premises that people had to be x y or z and everything was debunked the point that catheter made today about everything that's been talked about in terms of men being radicalized that is because we made a premise we had a belief that women who are muslim could not be radicalized and if we continue down the cycle of thinking about things in a very contained fashion that makes it comfortable for us to understand it we will miss the boat and this is our moment to take a look globally at what we're seeing and so to say that's why i'm pushing back on you too you don't want to say failed and on stale failed actors you don't want to say it's just the middle east or not the middle east you want to talk about the demographic across the world because that's the those are the data points that are being connected around that person and to your point about the host i will agree you have a healthy body that begins to get sick and as that and as that person is getting sick that is with where the bad guys come in and start to pull out so we need to keep the bodies healthy and and all the answers to that are multifaceted but it is not because somebody is in a failed state or not failed state it isn't because there's a democracy or there isn't a democracy otherwise we wouldn't have 180 americans that have gone 2 000 brits and so on okay i i i think we have more agreement than disagreement on this we're coming to the last minute or two here of this particular session very briefly yeah i just wanted to point out i you know there have been a couple of times when when we have made these general generalizations about the motivations of the foreign fighters and foreign fighters coming back but then when we did the polls there were two questions about motivation what motivates the foreign fighters and let me backtrack for a second they there we're talking about needing to solve entirely the issue that the conflicts in iraq and syria before we can address the foreign fighter situation completely to a certain extent that may be true but in our polling the role of the syria factor was actually very small in motivating the foreign fighters either coming from the west or from elsewhere okay the end like far i'm gonna speak for myself very quickly um i think what might be useful in the constructive solutions is the concept of civilian protection as being an organizing thought principle for us to think about and it goes to your point about why in the us or in france or in london an attack has a very different character than it does in other parts of the world and that's because the i think one of the theories is the social contract between governments and citizens on civilian protection is much stronger in those places and so for the places where the social contract of civilian protection can be strengthened and we can be thinking about building forces whether they be police intelligence or military forces that are have a surrounding principle of protecting their civilians not just killing terrorists i think we will start to see you know and an ability for a generation to provide something that looks like a safer and more prosper prosperous future as opposed to one that just has less extremism and so i do think the concept of civilian protection can be really useful in constructive solutions going very helpful idea um nancy we're here at the end of this particular session we've got a break i know we've carefully are there snacks in the break there's snacks there's snacks that are carefully calibrated to ensure your blood sugar rises high enough that you can maintain your intellectual engagement through the last session which is going to be quite interesting but to wrap this up as you've been listening to this discussion what have been your big sort of takeaways from all well i think this was a very useful conversation about how how we understand the relationships between where various strains of extremism come from and where they have impact though the one issue that i didn't really hear as much about as i would have wished is the reaction to in tunisia to both the riots and the bombing i think is not only important their reaction is not only important in terms of how they address the foreign fighters and i know that was the narrowly framed question but how they don't backtrack on what has been a more inclusive approach post um uh the jasmine resolution and and so how does the international community that wants tunisia to succeed um help tunisia to maintain that more inclusive approach and i do think that's where some of the business opportunities uh economic development approaches but as well as some of the earlier conversation around policing approaches um are very important and i note you know the the the second move there was there was a political component to the riots that that were underway and so it's it's definitely all parts of of uh the tunisian society that needs to have assistance in staying in focus and imbalance on this sort of treacherous course forward on inclusivity okay really important point now here are your marching orders we have this good panel it's coming up it's going to be a good discussion we're going to talk a little bit about some of our cross-cutting conclusions and then look forward strategically and and talk with with greg creverton who i see is here and and and we are going to talk strategically looking forward at uh you know what the we think the best big ideas that we can embrace are and what that we can recommend are now you have all come to this from your own personal experiences where you have been focusing on ideas on how to address this this problem and how do we counter violent extremism and you may not have heard the idea that you think is most important articulated here the next hour is the time to articulate that the next hour we are out of the scenarios we are into trying to sum up trying to underscore the points we think are most important i'd like to avoid generalizations i'd like to avoid you know the sort of atmospherics of this we've established some of those things and focus on specific policy recommendations that could work for a country the united states or european country or a country in the region could work for the international community could work for an ngo could work for the private sector working with the public sector but what we really want are specific policy solutions that might be of some value that might not have been framed during the course of the day or that may have been framed during the course of the day that you just want to underscore because it's most important we're gonna have to keep it crisp because we've got some great speakers and we've got a lot of ground to cover but i encourage you while you are snacking and replenishing your blood sugar to think this through so you come in here um able to sum this up and really enable us to underline the key points of the discussion thanks for this session please go enjoy yourself and we'll see you in 15 minutes