 Thank you very much everyone for being here with us today. This is a very special day, as you all know. We're celebrating International Ideas 25th anniversary and we have a really terrific panel with us today. My name is Zaid Al-Ali. I'm the Senior Program Officer in Constitution Building. I'm based here at the Tunis office. I'm actually speaking from my home today because of restrictions. So I'm not speaking from the office, but I normally work in our Tunis office and I focus on constitutions and we have a great team here in Tunis. All of them are very dedicated to working on issues relating to democratization in Tunisia and some of us work on countries further afield as well, including in Yemen and Sudan and Mali and in other places too. So today's panel, there was a lot to get through, so we're going to just very briefly, I want to explain who's going to be speaking. So we have our Secretary General, Dr. Gabyn Casas-Tamora, who's going to be speaking first. Then we'll have a video message from Minister Al-Lind, who's Minister of Foreign Affairs from Sweden, from the King of Sweden. Then we'll have our keynote speaker, who's Ambassador Stifan Duel, who's the Special Envoy to the EU and Europe and Canada's Ambassador to Germany, to the Republic of Germany. And then we'll start our first panel, which will have two speakers. So first, Dr. Wafa Zafran-Andorsi, and second, Dr. Waseem Mansoori. Dr. Wafa is from Tunisia, and Dr. Waseem is from Lebanon. And then our second panel, we'll have on it Professor Dr. Heikil bin Mahfoud, who we work with a lot, and I'll introduce more at length perhaps later. So without further ado, I'm going to pass directly to Gabyn, our Secretary General of International Idea, who will speak for around about five minutes in English. Please go ahead. Close yours. Thank you, Said. And thank you all for being here. And good morning. Honor guests, members state representatives, partners, colleagues, and friends. I want to welcome you to International Idea's 25th Anniversary Conference. We are here today to celebrate our achievements, but most of all, to launch a conversation about the future of democracy and the role of International Idea. I would like to thank all the speakers that have accepted to be part of this global conversation, our member states, and especially our current chair and host country, Sweden, which has made democracy a priority of its foreign policy. 25 years ago, 14 countries signed the founding declaration of International Idea. In 1995, the fall of the Berlin Wall, that the solution of the Soviet Union, the first post-apartheid election in South Africa, and the spread of democracy all over Latin America, made the expansion of democracy seem irresistible and irreversible. However, the founders of our institute understood that the progress of democracy was not inevitable. They understood that they had a collective responsibility to nurture it, protect it, and advance it. They understood the need for multilateral action and support. They understood the need for comparative knowledge about the fundamentals of democracy, about elections, constitutions, and political participation. Those insights have defined our mission ever since. Today, International Idea encompasses 33 member states from all regions. In the past 25 years, we have played a decisive role in activating regional and global networks of practitioners and activists. We have contributed through publications, databases, events, and advice to global debates, regional collaborations, and national actions. We have supported dozens of electoral, constitutional, and political reform processes all over the world, where our evidence-based advice has made a difference to our partners on the ground. It is a record that our member states, our donors, and partners, and our wonderfully talented staff can be proud of. And we are proud, but not satisfied. The challenges to democracy are greater today than they were in 1995. Democracy was faced in severe headwinds even before the COVID-19 pandemic. From our global state of democracy report, we know that while the number of democracies kept increasing, the quality of democracy was decreasing. In many democracies, checks and balances were becoming weaker. Civic spaces were shrinking, and freedom of expression was under sustained assault. These challenges have been accentuated by the pandemic. Over the past few months, we have seen many cases where the emergency powers that have been invoked by governments have been invoked to do things that have nothing to do with the pandemic and everything to do with the intention of shutting down critical voices, limiting civic spaces, and harassing minorities. And there are also the problematic political consequences that stem from the global economic crisis, which are only now beginning to be felt. If there is a moment to monitor the health of democratic systems, it is now. And this is precisely what international idea has been doing through our global state of democracy report. And more recently, through our global monitor on the impact of COVID-19 on democracy and human rights supported by the European Union. We need trustworthy information about democracy more than ever. Yet, these times also demand that we use our voice in defense of democracy. Last June, together with our partners from around the world, we launched a call to defend democracy where we argued that the pandemic threatens the future of liberal democracy. This open letter enlisted the support of over 70 pro-democracy organizations and more than 500 global leaders. This is the task in our hands. We must build the global coalitions needed to protect democracy, but we must also strive to revitalize it. Now is the time to help democracies return to the drawing board and renegotiate their social contract. Now is the time to act against the spread of this information an existential threat for democracy. Now is the time to protect the ability of democracies to hold free, fair, and safe elections. Now is the time to discuss how best to equip democracy to tackle intergenerational challenges, such as the fourth industrial revolution, the sustainable development goals, and especially the climate crisis. Above all, now is the time to be unapologetic in defense of democratic values. The good news is that the case for democracy remains strong. To a much greater degree than any other political system, democracy protects our agency and inherent dignity, allows for the correction of policies, and makes a difference for key tenants of sustainable development, particularly for gender equality. Sustainable development requires sustainable democracy, making sure that democracy can reform and revitalize itself. Is the cause that international idea pledges to take forward for the next 25 years. We will do this by teasing out the lessons from democratic experience from all over the world, by leveraging that knowledge and putting it in the hands of leaders and activists, by continuously monitoring the health of political systems, by accompanying democracy-building processes and lending our impartial advice, by building regional and global coalitions of practitioners, activists, and academics, by speaking out in defense of democratic values, by insisting that democracy is a global public good that requires multilateral action, by working closely with member states and ours. This, my friends, is a pledge to you. It is a pledge infused with the hope that the sacrifices made by millions of people in the quest for democracy, from Soweto to Santiago, from Prague to Jakarta, from Yangon to Hartoom, from Hong Kong to Minsk will have not been in vain. Our collective responsibility is to ensure that the memory of those struggles to advance the democratic cause is honored and preserved for generations to come. That is the challenge of our time and we at International IDEA intend to meet it in full. Thank you very much. Thank you, Dr. Geven, for those interim remarks. We're going to pass on, my understanding is my colleagues now are going to play a video message by Foreign Minister and then from the Kingdom of Sweden. Colleagues, please. Twenty-five years ago, representatives of 14 countries met here in Stockholm for the first council meeting of the newly founded International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance or International IDEA. Following the developments around 1990, countries needed an international forum to exchange and learn from others how to shape their form of democracy. Because democracy cannot be exported, it has to grow from within a society. But there are lessons to be learned and experiences to be drawn and the International IDEA was to be the place for countries to do just that. International IDEA has faced a chair of challenges, but is today steadily forging its role as a centre of excellence for the advancement of democracy worldwide as a universal human aspiration and an enabler of sustainable development through supporting the building, strengthening and safeguarding of democratic political institutions and processes, quoting from its mission statement. While the conviction that democracy was the way forward seemed to be uncontested in the 1990s, things have since changed. Democratic backsliding challenges to human rights and the undermining of the rule of law are trends we have witnessed for several years. IDEA's Global State of Democracy report, a reference point when it comes to monitoring the development of democracy around the world, provides an invaluable evidence base in this regard. The most recent addition to IDEA's toolbox, the Global Monitor of COVID-19's impact on democracy and human rights, clearly shows how this negative global trend has been further accentuated the pandemic. Dear friends, we need to act against and formulate a counter narrative to these negative trends. We know that authoritarianism is not the answer to today's challenges. We are as convinced today, as we were in 1995, that democracy is the best form of governance for stability and development, but we need to make the case again. Democracy provides political accountability and therefore a mechanism to correct mistakes and do better. Democracy ensures transparency and access to information without which there can be no progress. While the fear of COVID-19 has understandably triggered dramatic measures, we need to remain vigilant. The current pandemic must not be allowed to become an excuse for governmental overreach to undermine democracy or its institutions. It takes times, sometimes generations, to build up stable and impartial democratic institutions, but they can be dismantled very quickly. Any limitations to the enjoyment of human rights must be in accordance with international law. The response to the pandemic must be based on gender equality, human rights, democracy and the rule of law, because only that can ensure the confidence and credibility in societies to make it sustainable. Democracy allows for civil society to mobilize for inequalities to be confronted, for policy issues to be openly debated, for trustworthy information to freely flow and governments to be accountable to citizens, all essential tools for successfully dealing with the current public health, emergency and its consequences. Precisely for this purpose, the Swedish government last year initiated the campaign Drive for Democracy. Through diplomatic activity and a series of events and democracy talks, it aims to promote and strengthen democracy and the aspects that in our view must be part of a sustainable democracy, equality, participation, sustainable development, inclusive growth, governance, human rights and security. We have particularly focused on supporting civil society actors, human rights defenders and trade union leaders as their role is central to upholding democracy and holding governments to account. This includes strengthening free and independent media and the safety of journalists and media workers. But we must also build global coalitions. In connection with this year's virtual United Nations General Assembly high-level meeting, we launch as a follow-up to our Drive for Democracy, a cross-regional partnership together with a core group of countries called the Friends in Defense of Democracy. With two exceptions, the countries in this partnership are also members of International IDEA and the IC IDEA and its member state as a platform and partner in discontinued struggle of narratives. Dear friends, SWIN is proud to be an initiator, founding member, host country and this year's chair of the Council of Member States of International IDEA and I want to congratulate its current Secretary-General, Mr. Casa Samora and all its dedicated staff around the world on this special occasion. The current circumstances show the absolute necessity of multilateralism and the continued pursuit of rules-based international order. International IDEA will continue to be a central partner in this work and we look forward to the next 25 years of democracy promotion. I will make my presentation in French because this session is in French but I have written copies of my presentation both in English and in French so in both official languages of Canada. But it is good that it is a question of these two countries during a session on democratization because these two countries illustrate the main argument that I will submit here in the introduction of our discussion. I am convinced that in our efforts to promote democracy across the world we should not only criticize the dictatorial regimes and the despotic regimes we should also give an effective support and special to the country and to the government who are forced to hold democracy in conditions that the populations of well-established democracies like the ones we have in Canada cannot even imagine. It is in this spirit that when the Prime Minister Trudeau my name is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada in 2015 I decided to visit officially and Lebanon and Tunisia. I must remember how happy I am that this session that we have today on democratization takes place in the context of the conference that marks the 25th anniversary of Haïdeer the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Why am I happy? It is because I totally agree with the diagnosis Lucide that Mr. Secretary-General has just delivered to us as well as Mrs. Nabilis of Foreign Affairs of the Suez. Mr. Secretary-General I would like to pose on democracy today a look at Lucide that we find particularly in the report of Haïdeer the 2019, the global state of democracy addressing the ills reviving the promise. On the one hand Haïdeer confirms what the other observatories like the Freedom House or the Democracy Index the Economist Intelligence Unit the democracy that Haïdeer defines as the control of the people on public decision-makers and the equality of citizens in the exercise of this control democracy therefore has been around since around 2006. Democracy regresses in what sense? In the sense that the number of countries where the quality of democratic practices is deteriorating exceeds the number of countries where it is getting better. This relative deterioration which affects fundamental freedom the electoral process the judicial independence and the fight for corruption is produced in half of democracy in 2018 according to Haïdeer. On the other hand International Haïdeer reminds us the phenomenal progress that we have traveled over the decades. According to these observations 26% of the countries were democratic in 1975 26%. Comparatively at 62% in 2018. So it's a whole progress. Despite the regression of democratic practices this last decade the number of democratic countries has continued to increase even slower than during the previous two decades. It went from 90 in 2008 to 97 in 2018. We now find democratic countries in all regions of the globe. I remember the world that would offer to me when I was a young student in political science in 1975 Arabia Asia Europe Central Europe East Asia Middle East Africa Latin America all of this was almost entirely under the authoritarian or totalitarian regime. In some democratic countries many voters gave their voices to hostile parties to pluralist democracy and totalitarian ideologies were spreading on the campuses and in the syndicates. American democracy was sucked by the scandal of Watergate. The future of democracy seemed very precarious in 1975. And yet and yet it is then that humanity has launched the greatest wave of democratization of its history. We must be happy at this time we must remember in order to put in perspective the difficulties that we see today. Like many others I believe that an optimism too too euphoric has spread following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War in 1991. The famous prediction of Francis Foucault-Yama that everyone says is to which democracy will impose itself as the universal form of government well they may have reason and day but not a good day. And meanwhile democracy will be seriously concurred by the non-democratic regime and could know to be retreats within democracy the most established for diplomatic reasons which I would not normally mention but we all have it in mind. Together the number of democracies increases but their quality tends to deteriorate. And like the reasons Mr. Secretary-General it is convenient to hear Kevin Casas-Samora despite his current words the vitality of democracy must be recognized and must be celebrated and I am absolutely agree with him. And so and so what is important in these circumstances is both to do like Mr. Secretary-General that we have both a sense of urgency and a feeling of hope and this hope relies a lot on our two countries of our session on Lebanon and Tunisia which despite the contrary comes into extremely unstable regions to maintain democratic systems. When we look at the map of the world I suggest that we must recognize these democracies at high pressure there are a few of them everywhere in the world and consider how we can support them in an effective way in the middle of the bourrasque and the storm. And so despite one of the worst economic crises in its history the corruption that is living in Lebanon despite the sectarianism that fractures its political system it is necessary that Lebanese democracy succeed and that despair would be if it did democracy in the Middle East and if it did it would end because it is important to remember that this democracy this debate for its survival in the region the least democratic in the world according to the international idea and let's not forget that none other country in the world has a larger proportion of refugees than Lebanon the equivalent of the third of its population in a country where the storm hits about a worker on three that's the situation in Lebanon and that would mean that in Canada in the 37 million inhabitants so a dozen of millions of refugees to welcome on our own a dozen of millions of refugees we who have a huge country a rich country with strong institutions we cannot even imagine the colossal effort and that it represented for Canada to achieve such a number of refugees on its own we are lucky to have with us the first governor of the Bank of Lebanon Mr. Vassim Mansoury who will treat the Lebanese issue much better than I could do allow me simply to say that Canada is determined to stay at the cost of the Lebanese to always strengthen the support we bring to the democracy of this country with hope again it is essential to remember the one that represents the Tunisia for democracy in the world it is the Tunisia that made the Arab Spring the Arab Spring but today we would say well that it is in Tunisia that made it flourish the democracy and to talk about it we have an excellent panelist Dr. Wafa Zafran Andulsi advisor to the assembly of the representatives of the people in the introduction of these topics I would simply say that we all have in mind the fundamental challenge to which this democracy is made that we can summarize by this question how this political success can give these socio-economic fruits a political success relative of course but exceptional in this region of the world the democratic index of the intelligence economy is classified in Tunisia to the 140th world rank in 2011 140th comparatively to the 53rd rank in 2019 so a spectacular ascension and according to Haidia Tunisian democracy I distinguish among the best of Africa and the Middle East for the protection of fundamental rights the property of the elections the independence of the judiciary the freedom of the press and the participation of the civil society the constitution of 2014 is recognized as the most progressive and inclusive of the Arab world Tunisia has in fact a process of decentralization of power holding its first municipal elections of its history in 2018 with in addition an obligation of parity representation between women and men so it's a political success but it's a fragile political success and which must be overshadowed the absence of a constitutional court is an anomaly that we are late to correct especially that the crisis engendered by the Covid-19 pandemic makes sure that the pre-election of the parliament of the government and of the president of the republic are taught to debate and debate the electoral system strongly proportional has produced a morseled parliament making it extremely difficult to reach the majority necessary to make difficult decisions to ensure a stable and effective governance and to make efforts the participation rate in the legislative elections which reached 68% in 2014 has dropped to 41% in 2019 illustrating the disenchantment of the population especially among young people this disenchantment of the population is evidently linked to the economic difficulties of the country even before the economic contraction engendered by the restrictions the sanitary restrictions imposed to delay the spread of the Covid-19 virus Tunisia was taken with a low growth a high unemployment rate especially among young people an informal economy evaluated at about 40% of the employment a public deficit equivalent to about 5% of the GDP of serious socio-economic and regional disparities and also a strong emigration of these most qualified workers must be added to this security issues linked to the persistent terrorist threat and to the proximity of armed conflicts in the region Yemen, Iraq, Syria and especially Libya which will counter all these conflicts will be maintained by the professor Aiquel Ben Mahfoud and then we must not forget that Tunisia is in the first line of climate warming with a growing pressure on natural resources on the soil and the important hydric stress it will not be easy to correct all these words in the context of economic and social instability amplified by the Covid-19 pandemic and its ramifications which engender a degradation of the sanitary situation the surcharge of hospital infrastructures the ingravation of poverty the flambé of food prices the tariff of tourism which is there which is angular in the economy and a general economic contraction which will also hit neighboring economies which may not be able to give a stimulus to the Tunisian economy since the Maghreb economy and the European economy are hit Canada is well aware that the donors' countries are at risk of their own economic difficulties risk of reducing their aid to development and to focus on the most urgent needs related to the health emergency we are very aware of that the rain and democratization are therefore at risk of a loss Canada is exhorting the community of democracies to not commit this mistake especially we, Canada, before the last few years strengthened our links with the Tunisian democracy and we are determined to continue in this direction On June 17, 2019 the Tunisian-Canada signed a protocol in the framework which marks the depth of their relationship in terms of development The commercial relations in the Tunisian-Canada are expanding Canada has contributed to the organization and to the financing of the municipal elections of 2018 Canada offers assistance for security measures against terrorism and maintains a close military collaboration The Tunisian is one of the priority countries identified by the Canadian strategy for international education Canada is more than 2,000 Tunisian students each year Our joint partnership with the Francophonie brings us closer as a country and makes it easier for us in all these areas Our foreign policy, Canadian and feminist and it values the promotion of women in Tunisia as elsewhere the main lever of economic and social political development So, in conclusion I would say that in Poland the democratization that countries under high pressure like Libya and Tunisia continue in extremely difficult conditions The well-established democracies have the opportunity to help these countries and help democracy but also to learn about themselves and to push even further their own path in the always perfect way of democracy Now, we will hear three of these courageous democrats and I am very happy to hear what they have to say Thank you very much Thank you, thank you Special thanks to John for your comments for the support you have brought to EDIA to Tunisia, to Lebanon and to all the Arab world for the commitment you have made in terms of democracy and the future of countries in which we live and in which we are So, we will start right away with the first panel who during which we will hear two two speakers So, I present them right away and then I will I will pass the word first to Wafaa So, I start the first speaker will be Wafaa Zafran Andalsi who is from Tunisia who is a parliamentarian and researcher at the University of Tunisia And the second speaker is Dr. Osim Mansouri who is a law professor at the University of Lebanon and also the first vice-governor excuse me of the Bank of Lebanon Each one will speak for about a quarter of an hour I think of Dr. Wafaa for a quarter of an hour and then Dr. Osim for ten minutes And then we will pass our second panel in which the professor Ben Mahfoud will be in and at the end of these three sessions we will have the opportunity to have one and a half hours of discussion and I also want to clarify I think you all know that if one of our speakers someone who is listening online wants to intervene during the discussion please tell us your questions in the chat function you can go in English, in French and in Arabic if one of our speakers wants to participate in the discussion you can go in Arabic and in the chat function you can go in English, in French and then we will pass without wanting to delay Dr. Wafaa please, you have a quarter of an hour we will talk about populism and inequality for Tunisian standards and challenges that these things bring to Tunisia Thank you Dr. Wafaa, go ahead I want to pass the floor Thank you, Mr. Zaid I would first like to congratulate Idéa for her birthday she wished her long life The Tunisian democracy will soon be 10 years 10 years it's not minimal but it's 10 years between hope and despair it would be normal to have transitalogues it's an obligatory passage in democratic transitions but to admit such a perspective it would be helpful to raise a lot of acquis freedom of expression liberal constitution civil society's dynamism so building it is not minimal but the game is essentially on its conservation and ultimately on its consolidation 10 years of democratic experience a non-compliance doesn't seem to be imposed and the state of disenchantment of citizens that Mr. Ambassador has raised is reductive institutional fragility governmental instability parliamentary agitation partisan defiance economic crisis state inefficacy the bill only increases citizens' disarray and the popular feeling that the revolution is betrayed the young democratic experience is visible before a challenge of size the one of its capacity to concretize revolutionary aspirations revolutionaries to freedom and dignity democracy doesn't take itself in this perspective as a political regime but above all as a system of value the question then seems to be a question of legitimacy of power and of the state and in this regard if legitimacy implies the desire to govern the power it presupposes the capacity of the one who access the power to fulfill its promises but in relation to promise realization remains the diapasant of success and consecration of all democratic buildings as much as democracy in its legitimate vocation evokes its own meaning the relationship between the people and the power in the Tunisian context democracy seems to be constrained by the deepening of inequalities especially because of economic problems it also seems circuited by an exacerbated populism which seems well anchored in the revolutionary temporality after the success of the constitutional process and the passage to the phase of institutional consolidation these two anomalies seem to congenital to the democratic transition reveals the fragility of the link governing and governing they feel the Tunisian democratic project in this period around two essential evidence to overcome the public trust crisis first the economic and social disillusionment then we start with the public trust crisis the constant of such a crisis a survey of the national institute of the statistic which is of course a state institution a survey carried out in 2017 by this institute reveals that 72.5% of the interviewed citizens are not satisfied of the democratic process in Tunisia the inefficacity of the post-revolutionary state remains certainly the main cause of such a defiance but the negative image of the political class also explains a good part of this crisis of trust and trust implies just title of essential meaning the first meaning is ethics since it refers to this Paris on the loyalty of the person to whom we trust trust in Paris in this sense with a moral commitment by the way the exponential amount of the crisis came from nowhere in the political world remains the most remarkable manifestation elected to the president of the republic in October 2019 with an impressive score passed to his opponent Nebuchadne was already considered by ethical problems fiscal evasion and corruption so in fact projects the image of the right and own hands even those of those who do not know how to deal with politics in my opinion the vote for Paris-Sahyat expresses rather a vote sanctioned a vote against a political class in a deficit of trust the second meaning of trust is institutional since it implies this belief in the reliability of institutions and this aspect transpired through the citizen perception of the democratic transition itself the democratic transition implies by definition the change of political procedures and the instability of power games precisely institutionalization that is the stabilization of institutions characteristic of the phase of consolidation of democratic institutions does not seem to still reach Tunisia in this case with the delay to put in place several constitutional institutions especially the constitutional court and the six years of constitutional practice shows well that it is not enough of a constitution to establish a passage of the transition to consolidation even if the constitution offers a whole new institutional architecture so promising to be sure determined by the game of involved political actors but this game is characteristically unstable so these two phases of the crisis of trust one of which explains at the same time the populist assault of larger and larger in the Tunisian political life and the consequences of such recuperation of the democratic ecosystem by populists is not far serious especially in terms of the quality of democratic deliberation we must not forget that democratization of the public debate in Tunisia constitutes the most significant aspect of the release of authoritarianism the explosion of freedom of expression and the advent of pluralism allows for the consecration of democratic deliberation as a collective and rational way of political exchange to observe the different debates it brings out some traits that alter the quality of democratic especially the predominance of the polemic to the detriment of the discussion based on the ideas it is enough to come back to the parliamentary debate and to the debate in the media the current state of the political debate underlines such a difficulty to grasp the profound meaning of democracy as the government of diversity a populist syndrome seems to be the guarantor of the stage cultivating a binary logic and reductive which is simply in front of me the other a polarizing conception of the political debate putting limits to the pluralist principle we do not lack in this title of conspiracy theory of the establishment of powers especially the opposition the media or even the civil society for what is the second aspect or the second challenge has raised the one of the economic and social disillusionment this theft, in fact economic and social, is the weak link of the unified democratic process by excellence unable to afford to appropriate the political and moral economy of the social movement based on the revolution the revolutionary political debate did not manage to take the questions of integration of social justice of regional development and of employment in a serious reflection on the re-definition of the contours of the economic and social model of Tunisia the delicacy of the state the trap, every time in the laxist and incomplete responses of global strategic vision contribute to deepen the gap between the population and the power by saying of the revolution the contradiction between the popular imagination on the social role of the state and the progressive implementation of a minimum state is more and more flagrant whether by political will or by submission to the neoliberal dictates or international financial institutions the economic and social policy of the pre-2011 did not take enough consideration the profound encroach of the social element in the historical and socio-cultural construction of the United States and its legitimacy the crisis of public trust is now a large part of this shift reveals precisely the persistence of the popular attachment to the imaginary of the paternalist state generator of coercion and social stability and the ultimate but unique of the social and by denigrating an incapable model of procuring the social the revolution had shown a great demand of the state on the other hand the place of the solicitude at the place of the solicitude the state of independence seems to convert to minimalism it is not a coincidence that the popular anger expressed itself through the condemnation of the social capacity of the state abstracted by its real power to see the social because of the economic situation more and more critical the state is concretely attacked in its elite the whole of the political class is filled and rejected for the same reason either its disconnection of popular demands this anger does not distinguish in its perception of the elite between politicians and technocrats or the administration itself but I find a particularly radical expression in the banishment of political parties the different electoral dates each time signify a loss of attractiveness of political parties but what is most important to observe in the phenomenon is precisely the risk that leads to the collapse of this instance of necessary media in democracy on the same democratic configuration the exponential rise of populism in the Tunisian democracy we are a cause and a direct consequence of this side the social crisis has raised the appearance of two kinds of populism in addition to the identity populism determined by other factors that we will not have time to develop in this case so these two forms a form of contested populism on one side and a form of populism that I would say that I would call mis-erabilist of our side to avoid the contested form of populism it relies on the role of the worker class marginalized youth of the exasperated population of the disadvantaged regions of the devolutionary people the one of the Caspa in 2011 and the one of January 2017 in gasoline and janduba of the city of al-Kamur in Tataoui in the south of movement and mobilization of diplomats and so on and this kind of populism is based on two essential axes the right to work on one side and the right to dispose of wealth and national income of the other by these means of action this contested populism has developed a certain radicality and this is the danger a certain radicality that does not serve the popular attachment to the social state so it aggravates the social and political antagonism the contested populism in effect operates a movement of social re-rendition on the conflictual field subtraction of the sort between the political world and the social world and thus deepening the feeling of exclusion when populism is miserable and this manifest in the successive and sometimes caricatural rise of political figures belonging rather to the U.P. social class and working on the solidarity and charitable meaning of the social by this reductive apprehension of the social this category of populists has contributed, just like the first to circumvent the link between the state and the citizen by feeding the idea of being able to replace the state of the missionary by power by donations, by financial assistance or others this populism takes into account a certain form of clientelism which recalls the practices of the U.P. in any case and we return to the social issue nor the state seems to develop an adequate economic and social model nor the populism due to the absence of programs is able to provide real alternatives the social role of the state as concrete in the popular image risks to decline in a chimera before the popular deception of the democratic process and consequently develop at an important part of the citizens a nostalgia at the time of the pre-revolution this is the spectre of the counter-revolution which seems to threaten the young democratic experience sorry a political conscience is citizen and in this regard, primary perspectives of solutions are sought in a realistic of the youth of politics in a transitional context the current democratic being must not exceed the conjugal level to touch the structural level in our sense the future of the united democracy depends depends on depends on its capacity of resilience and I believe that this capacity exists it is enough to deepen the view on the contribution of the constitutional unison this heritage does not date from 2014 the date of the promulgation of the new constitution this heritage is anchored in the history and culture of the united state for centuries it is enough to think about the fundamental pact reform of the 19th century the united state was the first state in the world to abolish slavery for example and it is precisely this heritage for values ​​that each time serve the state a constitution is not only a normative act a constitution is also and above all a project of society and a project of the state of law but alone the consolidation of a state of law is capable of promoting democratic better a democratic society such a project will require just the title of time and a former citizen on this side is the citizenship as capacity not only a state which requires to be consolidated that is to say this conscientious citizenship of the sense and the contribution of political sharing between citizens and politicians is not this the own democratic idea I ask you the question and I thank you for your attention Thank you Dr. Wafa for your comments and for all the intervention and for your optimism of the future here in Tunisia I call I do not have everyone that Dr. Wafa at the end of the file to support the application of article 49 which is the first article in the Arab world at the constitutional level to create the principle of proportionality in the protection of the rights of individual rights in the Arab world I pass the word now to Dr. Wafa who is Professor of Law at the University of Lebanon and who is also the first vice-governor of the Cuban Republic Dr. Wafa will also talk to us about sectarianism and corruption as a challenge to the constitution I pass the word Thank you Thank you Mr. Yadali Your Excellency Mr. Stevan Dian I was very happy to hear you talk You have a great knowledge of Lebanon and not only Lebanon but you know the small details and problems in Lebanon currently I would be happy to be part of this conference I would also like to say hello to Mr. Kevin and to Mr. Zamora Secretary General of IDEA and I would like to thank Mrs. Wafa Zafran my dear friend who introduced me to IDEA I did not know before I apologize for my ignorance everything I heard talking about the democratic crisis and the problems of democracy and the representation it is subjects around which we have to work long because Mr. Stevan Dian I am completely agree with you if the number of democracies increases the quality of democracy is set and we ask ourselves a lot of questions about it In fact I sent my party this morning so that I can win as I have 10 minutes to talk about the most essential points and then we can talk during a few minutes of discussion if there is a need to deepen some ideas First of all in a short introduction I would like to talk about democracy as it is a subject we talked a lot in the introductions and what I heard as I just said in English music to my ears it is really something very interesting and fascinating to talk about democracy is a concept it is a polysemic concept that seeks the representation of the general public in all its senses the term democracy is mainly linked to politics and is immensely attached to the people but we assist to a regulation of this democratic logic where the sovereign people has become unimaginable the different forms of current democracy that is in the western countries or more essentially in the Arab countries the crisis in which democracy whether it is representative participative deliberative or other comes from a defiance of the people in the eyes of politics which is translated by a push of abstentionism and an erosion of political engagement if we look at the last elections that took place in the United States is that this number of participation is because we want to vote for someone or because we are looking to avoid someone also would it not be judicial to rethink the role of the rulers who today have become elitist and political administrative interventionist by containing their function to a strictly political plan of surveillance control would it not be judicial surveillance and administration in order to try all political interference and by the same possible corruption tourism it is essential to dissociate these two political and administrative functions and avoid basculating in a critical governance of technocrats in the end each one must maintain his role governance and control other actions and administrations there I I put the definition of democracy I do not want to quote it you know it very well but I will say that democracy is not to be confused with populism which is found in the instrumentalization of popular opinion by parties or political personalities who pretend to speak so that it belongs most often to the ruling elites indeed in democracy the people are sovereign their vote or their opinion to properly speak and be qualified populist it is the manipulation of the people who will be guilty of the long politics that raises populism being a key facilitator of sustainable development democracy in itself with its durability and its strength of its aptitude to respond to the expectations of the people who require to ensure a socially inclusive equitable and sustainable without without talking more about democracy I would like to say a few words about corruption so once again I will not read the definition of corruption you know it there are many definitions but on the other hand I will say that corruption is not always easy to be defined I explain in the developing countries the legal arsenal reveals or rather not enough to eradicate the murders the social habits and the practices of the people indeed it is at the level of the governments but also at the level of the people we notice that the daily violation of the laws is chaperoned by a principle that could be called the relativity of the legal rule you heard very well relativity of the legal rule indeed as everyone knows all laws are supposed to be obligatory and applicable equally but it is often necessary to justify the violation of the norm that can be evaluated by the individuals this attitude can come from a feeling of injustice in the face of the legal rule existence or taking away from the idea that this rule is the product of a totalitarian power or rather simply which does not have the legitimacy to be where it is this act leads to difficult disorders to overcome especially in the developing countries that go through popular revolts when the powers replace the most effective way to fight the corruption and to respect the law this can only be effective without the presence of an independent legal power and juicy of the trust of the people it would be ridiculous to try to impose the rules by the state but this effort would remain insufficient without the accompaniment of the legal institute an independent judge who will take the limit between legality and legitimacy in order to effectively fight corruption in Lebanon, of course, the sectarianism is foreseen by the constitution itself so in the first place I will talk about the corruption sectarianism against democracy and development and I want to explain that the structural basis of the Lebanese sectarianism is in the constitution itself if we look at article 24 of the constitution article 24 it is foreseen that the Lebanese parliament is divided between the two great communities of muslim and christian countries and is divided between the two communities and is divided between the regions article 95 of the same constitution foresees the same rule for the Council of Ministers also for the functions of the first category the high functionaries of the state but unfortunately the game that this rule will apply to almost all public functions of the state this system of confectionary sharing or sectarianism has two consequences as much as it is faced on the country the first is on the choice of the functionaries we have just mentioned the second is on the relationship between the citizen and his state this is the choice of the functionaries it is obvious that the choice is made is focused more on the confession of the candidate than on his attitudes the Lebanese experience shows that the incapacity can be more dangerous than corruption and often the front of the father when the relationship between the citizen and the state this confectionary sharing creates a sort of communitarian federalism which makes the citizen inevitably led to go through the chief of his confection to access the public function in other words his first loyalty is turned to the choice and not to his state this behavior causes the image of the state and the general interest hence the dilemma of the definition of corruption once again in these conditions is the search for the interest of his own confection or of his own chief to the detriment of the general interest is an act of corruption or a legitimate and normal act a normality which is consecrated by the constitution of the supreme norm which has predicted this sharing and this sector despite the fact that after the Lebanese civil war we have predicted in the new constitution well in the reform of the constitution that there is only one national objective in this constitution which is the evolution of political confection step by step steps that should have started in 92 until today we are in 2020 nothing has been done on this plan and there are consequences the accumulation of adversities started by the current Syrian war of 9 years the tension and political pressure regional economy the internal political impasse the explosion of the Beirut port and the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic have made the Lebanese economy and the Lebanese political economy reach unprecedented levels of corruption of deterioration and of risk excuse me, I slept well yesterday this situation has been in a large measure the product of the organic relationship between corruption, sectorism and clientelism and the entire economy the last two phenomena to know the sectorism and the clientelism of the entire economy reinforce the corruption and its risk thus forming a triad controlling and inhibiting all reform mechanisms in the destruction of the state of law of responsibility and of autonomous state institutions the consequences of this regime lead to a vicious cycle the public deficit and the public corruption practices will be fed by the bankers and the funds by the expatriates thus increasing the public debt the growth of the entire economy non-productive and monopolist will lead more Lebanese to unemployment or immigration the public sector will continue to develop and at the same time the public finances a lot of numbers a lot of results, I put them in the sheet I don't want to read them and quote them but on the other hand I want to try to address the measures taken to fight corruption the Lebanese government has taken several measures in order to fight corruption by voting new laws and by proposing projects or proposals of law however, it remains ineffective because the laws in vigour are not applied and the independence of judicial powers is not reinforced to go into the details the Lebanese government is deployed of this certain force to set up a legal panel number of dispositions and efforts remains to be deployed in order to implement the execution in the case that I propose I addressed all recent legislative reforms which were the most recent of 2020, 2008, 2015 etc 2017 in fact there are many laws that have been voted on the other hand the question that arises is that all this legislative action is effective it is legitimate to doubt the effectiveness of all measures and the laws voted by this parliament this apprehension is justified for several reasons which I want to say a few some of them the absence of national strategy to fight corruption in fact the laws voted suspended and the projects and proposals of law were not prepared in a harmonious way in favor of a flagrant populism in favor of the populism the proof is for example in the installation of a national committee of the fight against corruption so we have planned a national committee of the fight against corruption several choices several laws refer to this national committee of the fight against corruption and even some laws this is the role of judge by the role of this committee that must fight and sanction corruption and even though this committee has been provided in the laws since 2018 and 2017 until today this committee has not been named and has not seen the day we count this party there are other laws which are in vigour especially the penal law from 350 to 356 this law that exists since 1943 all the new legal system that we see can be summarized in these articles that have not been applied and therefore why we have to say that the new laws will be applied the essential is the judge's independence the judge's independence unfortunately has been deplored but what about the jurisdiction of some of these members the most influential remains in charge of the political powers he would be judicial to reform the judicial service instead of wanting to institute new committees which in the end will never see the day and remains on the table in fact there are many things to do many measures to do as I said but I want to say in conclusion the economic and clientelism of sectarism and olibon corruption involves political, economic and institutional and fundamental reforms in the same way to reinforce democracy and to come to development needs a socio-economic generational fight which involves continuous efforts at the level of the individual and the masses on the other hand I would like to finish with another positive the life in olibon is very real for those who know the olibon that came here the view of everyday life the social life is very real so despite the corruption that I just talked about and despite the deep economic crisis this sharing system also has advantages because it gives an example of common life and the real will to live together on the other hand that the olibon policies are at the height of the expectations of their people I believe that until today the answer unfortunately is not thank you thank you to the professor for your attention we can elaborate the case of olibon and also to have finished on our positive despite the circumstances in which life survives our country at the moment so we have a conclusion of our first panel that raised the current context national context first we heard the words of Dr. Moffat who talked about Tunisia and then we heard more about the professor we will now go to the second panel which will be more about the regional context we will we will have the pleasure to hear a few words from our colleague Professor Hekelbe Mahfouz you are already in doubt Professor Ben Mahfouz and Professor here in Tunisia a specialist in public affairs and all that is related to security also that Professor Ben Mahfouz gives a great support to our work in Yemen giving a support in peace in Yemen and Dr. Ben Mahfouz gives us a support from the start for the years already and the support he brings is really really essential for the work we do and also the Professor Ben Mahfouz and the candidate this year to join the international community so if someone wants to put pressure on their government nationally to give support to Professor Ben Mahfouz no one can do better than him we will now go straight to Professor Ben Mahfouz you have a quarter to go Professor thank you very much dear colleague and friend Zaid Ali and before for this introduction for this call to mobilization and I also want to thank Interventionality for all the fruitful collaboration that we have done together but also to congratulate for this important anniversary the 25th anniversary so congratulations we asked to address the question of the terrorist threat on democratic processes and the war as an obstacle on the voice of democracy in the region trying to cover certain states I would say that are the Yemen, Libya, Iraq, Syria but beyond I would say I would start by saying if we look a little at what I had prepared my proposal in English but it is assumed that the language used is French so I would volunteer in French so if we start if we look a little at the conflict cartography in the region we know that and we see it the region in Africa, North Africa and the Middle East and unfortunately the very opposite of this point of view there are wars and crises persistent and the art of instability to use a vocabulary of the geostrategy affects not only the whole region but also the sub-Saharan Africa and Europe at the level of the North to even touch other regions so the perception that we have of the region our region our perception is quite paradoxical because there are so many political, intellectual, economic, cultural, so many people as producers of crisis, terrorism and structural adversities so the fight for democracy for the region is a fight that is quite old historically speaking and every time there was a momentum with elections that we consider to be free we say to ourselves this is the first democratic experience that will be born 2003 2005 2011 Palestine, Iraq, Tunisia at the point of questioning if democracy and democratization is just an accident in history in this region or is it really a fatality but I would also like to be precise a question of perception and understanding I don't want to go into the context of the definition of the international democracy to help also listen and see what is the perception and the conception of democracy in the populations and the people of the states of the region what kind of democracy before us for decades to seek and try to have and it is particularly constitutional democracy because we must not forget that the countries of the region are deeply anchored in the legacy and the institutional legacy legalist which is profound and sometimes that plans the possibility and I would say to be able to transform institutions and practices so I would only keep in mind a minimalist definition of this constitutional democracy that is relevant to the elections and it operates through three elements that are interrelated the first element is a electoral democratic system or an electoral system democratic which means periodic elections a power change second element rights and freedoms expression and association the third element is a level of integrity of laws and political institutions and juridics the state of law the absence of these three institutional elements I would like to say that democracy in every process will be destroyed and particularly and this is the paradox of the region is that there is a real fight to be able to access this type of democracy and it is particularly this type of democracy that is currently in crisis not only in the region but everywhere in the world so there are challenges dilemmas and challenges to respond a little bit to the problem that was proposed to me so in terms of dilemmas I would say the attempts to adopt a constitutional democracy are under pressure and we know it very well these pressures are socio-economic are political but they are also security because there are structural instability crises, wars, terrorist attacks a violent radicalization in the system we have to ask ourselves if terrorism and wars consolidate or I would say neglect the rights and democratic institutions so to try to give some answers briefly we must not forget that or we should start from the beginning from 2011 if we take a little bit the wave of democratization of 2011 which started in January 2011 there was what we call the friction of classical terrorism in the region so this friction this fall caused a void caused a void she left a void not only legitimacy but a void essentially security that took advantage of many actors as well national as regional without infiltrating more or less in the system and institutions to fill the void and that's what opened the way to either armed groups or terrorist groups jihadists who exerted pressure on the structures of society not only the institutions of society and who nourished throughout the debate and efforts to replace constitutions constitutional orders laws guaranteeing the rights and freedoms, transformations and reform of institutions they nourished the polarization and who went up to the antipodes to the point that in some moments in some countries the efforts and processes of democratization will be turned unfortunately very very violent and we know very well what happened in Libya what is currently happening in Yemen in Syria and even the risks that have been marked as well between Tunisia and Egypt in the summer of 2013 so all this has given that Elan the previous orator as mentioned in the introduction the space of freedom is reduced as a pot of chagrin while we were gone towards an ambition of more freedom so the fight it was inevitable the fight against terrorism the pacification of the territories made that we also arrive to a kind of paradoxical situation it is the territorial partition and I will come back to that later during the discussion so we are in a war state either war in the sense of armed conflict rights or war in the sense where we bring real war against the fleos that threaten us and to preserve the achievements that are fragile states and societies in terms of rights, freedom and capacity to support citizens and what made the state structures to be somehow damaged, we saw it we are seeing it unfortunately where we live with the number of armed groups and also the OEMN as well as the security and military apparatus than even the administrations who are in charge of the situation so this also in our state it is the power of urgency which feels deployed based on the constitutional devices where we adopt laws of exception and which are applied in a fairly large in many countries concerned which makes the operations of democratization which are in charge or which have been without under this pressure of the power of urgency and the power of urgency changes the nature of the political regimes we saw it in Egypt in 2013 and unfortunately allows and justifies derogations to individual rights and freedoms in order to respond to attacks and violence, terrorists war, etc so here are the dilemmas in which we found ourselves with I would say a lack of consensus the national unity and the self-government system which were not taken into account in these emergency situations and that this had an impact even on institutional architecture so in terms of brief challenges in the remaining 5 minutes the main challenge to confront these countries and in the region is the fact that the road to effective democracy and democratic reforms seems very long and badly damaged by a number of abuses in brief these challenges first of all we should be aware that the interventions in the region must be stopped this is the only single way not only for reconciliation to preserve and guarantee the right to self-determination and it is quite paradoxical I would say that in the 21st century since the 50s and 60s we are still talking about the right to self-determination second point we must attack the inequalities socio-economic and maybe in the constitutional order started by the Tunisia which values the constitution one of the aspects is the socio-economic rights and the socio-economic disparities third point rebuild the states by dismantling the infrastructure of the state and we found ourselves as well as in Yemen in the constitutional debate in this logic that to be able to rebuild the states federalism would be the alternative to do it I would like to understand what are the advantages and disadvantages of federalism and if the state structures are already in place and the social structures are able to administer their interests by the federalism to the detriment of a certain form of decentralization and fourth point is the rationalization of the political regimes that are in place in terms of the elite of parties of representation currently there is a debate on the mode of the scrutinizer in Tunisia and of governance and the rationalization in my sense goes in the sense of decreasing the political systems and above all to pull them out of this legalist heritage from a much more flexible and flexible point of view and then I think that there is an element that has been very well discussed is the fact not to attack the reform of the judicial power because the peace can not be installed in these contras without a real process of reform and independence of justice of words the democracy in order to share this goes by itself the democracy is based on sharing but this has a danger because what we have noticed of the experience we had in Yemen, Libya and beyond is that everything becomes negotiable we resolve and we summarize the conflict in Yemen to a question of sharing power and resources to a sharing of territories which makes that everything is agreed and finally everything is fragmented as long as we try to establish even provisional constitutional, political, economic and security and fragmented what is going to count I end with this idea is inclusion in the sense of representation of all political classes women, young all the trends the capacity of governments to respond and to be reliable and it is also the effectiveness of all political systems so its impact on the community concerned and this requires and goes by the restoration of trust in the capacity of democracy to respond to the people's expectations and therefore to fight against impunity trust in my sense and work on this level there will always be challenges and dilemmas to solve here are some points I wanted to submit to your attention not from a conceptual point of view but based on an experience that we shared these last few years and thank you once again for this opportunity Thank you Professor Ben Mahfouz for this very rich segment of all the interviews normally we should have a better discussion but like the presentations the interviews are so rich we don't have we don't have time we only have a few minutes to finish the session so what I'm going to do is I'm going to be able to ask a question that I would ask each of the interviews before we finish I'm going to ask each of the interviews which are in one minute maximum of two I'm going to ask each of you to think about the situation of the South you are all aware that the South is a key country the world has always been and particularly at the moment since the last revolution and the great democratic movement towards peace which took place in the South there is a great movement much more towards a growth of the role of women in this country towards peace there are negotiations that take place this year and towards the reflection of a new constitution there are a lot of challenges you are aware of everything but we have a great history and our office has just opened recently I will ask each of the interviews I will think if you allow me with Professor Ben Marflous and I will turn back then towards Professor Montsouris and then towards Professor Dr. Roy Andolsi also if the special envoy can also ask me a question it would be great to hear some of your thoughts about this if there is one thing, one lesson a piece of advice you could give to our friends in the South what would be this advice to our friends in the South if you could think about your experience about the experience you have experienced personally or about the experience of the others if you could try to sum up your advice to our friends in the South it would be great I will start with your friend Professor Ben Marflous Thank you very much for this question in terms of advice I it is still early in my opinion to produce advice but one clue and briefly I believe that once again of the history of the South and of the involvement of the politics and of the military in this country and of the regional context one of the points on which the issue of all the process which has been put in place this year is the redefinition of civil relations military in similar experiences it has been very important to review the terms of the agreement between the political power and the military power and it is for this reason that I will be brief and if we really succeed to operate a real transformation of military civil relations there we could talk about a perennity and a civilization in the sense of transformation in civil power institutions that hold the state and therefore a new social contract against the society the political power and the military power that is what I would say from this point of view thank you I would like to ask you what is your friend Mansour you are already aware Mansour and Mansour in a certain way he is limited he can be shot by his hair but he is still a sectarian who exists in this country there is a lot of corruption and also this tension between the religion and the race what would it be if we could make a remark an observation or even a piece of advice if you would like to give what would it be I wish to say the consequences of what is currently going on in Sudan. But, as you know, many countries in the region have tried, in some way, the Lebanese model. And I think it's not a good model to follow in terms of sharing and sectarianism. What we have to look for has changed the methodology, in fact. I think democracy is the prosperity of the individual and therefore not the prosperity of society. So what we have to look for right away, in fact, is to work on the issue of administration. The reconstruction of administration, an administration that can really stick to the essential needs of the Sudanese citizens. Secondly, there is the reconstruction and the institutional work, which may be political and constitutional at the same time. And at the level of the institutional work and the institutional reconstruction, there are surely the texts that we need to see. And on the texts, there is no magic potion, in fact. It's everywhere in the world, it's everywhere the same. Because you mentioned this question, the separation between the Church and the State. We can't really promote a good democracy in a country like this, especially in the country in which there are more religions, so even more so in countries where there is only one religion, we can't pretend that there would be a progress in such a country without the separation between the Church and the State for the simple reason, the moment we confirm the two, we sacralize the power and we sacralize the texts. And you never have to do that when you work politically. You have to make sure that these texts can be changed at any time according to the needs of the people. Thank you. Thank you, Professor Mansolli, Professor Marc, very, very important. I will also ask the same question to Dr. Andolsi. So you are aware, I am sure, that Sudan has lived a little bit the same conditions as Tunisia in 2011. So you said it yourself, the Tunisian Revolution took place 10 years ago now. So Sudan has lived a little bit, it's the same moment that we lived here in Tunisia in 2011, and also with the same consequences. So a fall, for example, at a life level, with an explosion of inequality, with huge economic problems for the country. Do you have comments, operations, even advice to give to our friends, to Sudanese, to our brothers and sisters in Sudanese? Yes, indeed, the Lebanese experience reminds me of at least the beginning of the Tunisian experience in 2011, so those who are living, we had already lived it in 2011, and then a little. So you have to say that they are engaged on the basis of a new constitution and of the constitutionalization. And there, if I have an advice to give, it will be the light of what the Tunisian experience has done. So at the level of the process itself and at the level of the content, at the level of the process of things to retain, I think, first of all, what must be realistic, realistic in the sense of not cutting ourselves from the sociological and cultural reality of Sudan, not to come and cover the principles and ideals that have had trouble without creation, without being rooted in the mentality and the Sudanese culture, in the definition, in terms of the definition of priorities. Also, I insist on the idea of dialogue, on the idea of dialogue, which alone will allow you to cool down the ideas and therefore to keep a certain ethic of the discussion. Because everything we do, our friends Sudanese are in the middle of a democratic learning. There will be mistakes, there will be tensions. Intelligence is already there when we know how to manage these tensions. There will be risks and blockages. And it's the dialogue that will solve this. There are a lot of divergences. Well, I don't directly recommend the model of consensus to the Tunisian, it's very clean to the Tunisian. But I'm sure that the Sudanese ingenuity will find its model. That's what the process is. On what is contained, obviously, the Sudanese revolution is a liberal revolution too. Okay? So, the constitution must be a carrier of values of freedom and above all of the state of three, not only a catalog of three and of freedom, but also how to keep and protect this freedom via a law that can be effective afterwards, essentially the independence of justice and the tools to offer for this justice for which it can play its role as a protector of freedom. I recommend living the experience of Article 40 of the Constitution of Tunisia and also you have to go to a real separation of powers. Third thing, you have to be in interaction with the civil society of Sudanese and to treat it with respect. That's all I can say about the light of the Tunisian experience. Thank you very much, Dr. Dulci. So, last word to the Special Envoy Dion. So, if you can bring us some elements, some remarks, some views of the situation of the Sudanese, tell yourself, Special Envoy, that the foreign policy of Canada is a feminist policy. You are aware that the revolution in Sudan also contains this characteristic that wants the Sudanese woman to play a much more important role. So, for example, now the head of the judicial sector, the judge of the most important country in Sudan, is a woman for the first time, I think, in this country, perhaps even among the first time in the Arab world. We have a lot of Sudanese women now who have a very, very important role for the country and there is a cost now that has been integrated into the pay gap that has been signed the last month so that the Sudanese woman represents 40% of all the frames in the country at all levels of the state. So, it was an inspiration. We hope that this ambition is resolved in the coming phase. But is the situation of Canada the experience, of Canada the foreign policy of Canada has anything to add to the views of this situation on the situation of the Sudanese woman and in general on the Sudanese revolution? Thank you very much, Mr. Ali. You have raised one of the three points that I wanted to mention myself to conclude. The first is that the approach of the countries of well-established democracy can have in these countries, I think, has to rely a lot on women. That is very certain. It is the best age we have. When we have the equality of women and men, at least when we are close to each other, because it is always an objective to pursue, it is completely up to us, but when we are close to each other, we are substantial. We see development, we see democracy, we see the fight for the progressive corruption. That is one of the first things. The second thing is that the Sudanese takes a path of democratization and therefore enters into the definition of democracy under the pressure that I mentioned in my presentation. So the donors, the countries that can help, must look at the world, what are these courageous countries that are trying to extract from the dictatorship and progress towards democracy and focus their help to these countries. It is a lever in a region, it is a struggle, and we must continue. We have mentioned the Lebanese-Latunisian and you have mentioned with reason the Sudanese. So I congratulate you on the idea of opening a office in Sudan. It is the thing we must do, Canada must do it all. The third point is a great humility, very difficult to give precise advice to a country, because you have to respect, as it was said by the three other conferences, the culture, the social substrat of the country. What makes the Sudanese-Latunisian, the Lebanese and all the other countries that the professor mentioned, the conflict countries, are the Muslim countries or in the case of Lebanon, half Muslim. And that is a great challenge, because we have all mentioned the necessity of secularism, the fact that the state must not have religion to allow religious freedom in the country and other freedoms in the Muslim countries. We must prove that it is possible. Against an ideology that has unleashed this religion to do something to kill through the world. And this virtual ideology, your countries are in jail with it, like all the countries now. So how to manage that? And how to deal with the populations that are very believers? And that is a huge challenge. And we can hardly give advice. All we can say is that the state must be secure, the state must accept that it has no religion to allow religious freedom in all countries. It must be understood in the Muslim countries. And so Lebanon, Tunisia, must be an hope for the Muslim world and for the entire world. And the South too. Thank you, thank you Special Envoy. So I want to thank all the conferences. We will end, unfortunately, of this session. It was a great pleasure for me personally, because I heard a lot of very interesting things. I learned a lot. Thank you again, Special Envoy, Dr. Andulsi, Professor Mansour and Professor Ben Marfoud. It was really very, very interesting. The case of Tunisia, Lebanon, Sudan, Professor Ben Marfoud also mentioned other countries, Yemen, Libya, the case of my country, Iraq and Syria as well. The situation in which we live in the region is very, very difficult and very, very difficult. We remain optimistic because there are a lot of things to do and certain countries in the region give us a lot of hope. For the others, the day will come that the progress will be achieved. I am sure and I am sure that we will see it during our life, during this generation. So I want to thank all of you, we are coming to the end. And I want to thank all the speakers and I want to thank all those who listen so you can all go out and lean. Many thanks to everyone who's been watching. We're coming to the end of our session. Thank you all for listening and for your thoughts and for your support. Thank you very much. We all want to thank all the viewers who came to the end of the session and we are very grateful to all the speakers and all the viewers. Thank you for supporting me and the foundation of the idea and we are very grateful to you. Thank you. Thank you all. See you soon. Thank you.