 Thank you very much for the invitation to be with you and I'm very delighted and honored to be here seeing the illustrious series of people who have passed through your institution. The Institute for International and European Affairs is, as you will know, a leading think tank and the European Defence Agency on its his side delivers defence capabilities. On the face of it quite different roles, responsibilities and objectives, but in one important respect I would like to say that we have something crucial in common. The International Institute for International and European Affairs acts as a catalyst for new thinking, new solutions and new policy options. We in the Agency act also as a catalyst for change and for identifying new and innovative solutions to complex demands. I hope today to be able to demonstrate to you how we in EDA are working on innovative ways to meet the increasing challenge faced by all our Member States, big and small, in the area of defence capabilities. My talk today will consist of five parts. First, I will start by making the case for Defence Corporation. This is a real necessity rather than a virtue. This will provide some context to the second part and introduction to the European Defence Agency and I will provide you with a virtual tour of it. I will not go into too much detail but rather point out what we do, why we do it and who our main partners are, as well as our place in the European institutional setting. I will also provide you with some examples of concrete projects and programmes. Third, I will deal with industry and the importance of consolidating and enhancing the defence industrial landscape in Europe, including through strengthening innovation and research. Fourth, I will cover the outcome of the European Council just over two weeks ago. And last but not least, and in the light of the issues I have covered, I'd like to explain what the Agency can do for Ireland. Before I start, I would like this to be interactive. I am here also to listen to your views and to answer your questions. There will be plenty of time for that at the end. Strengthening Defence Corporation. Europe is sometimes more comfortable defining itself as a soft power, which we are. And a very successful one at that, which is ever more important in a world where hybrid warfare is once again the challenge ahead of us. But I would say that the choice here is not between hard and soft power. It is between being a relevant power in global terms or a powerless spectator of regional and global events, events that concern we Europeans, whether we like it or not. In addition, if we also want to be a relevant power, then credible and robust defence capabilities are absolutely essential. If the EU is to realise its ambition as a global player, as a provider, not just a consumer of security, we need not only to have the political will to act, but also to be equipped to do so. Efforts to get the Eurozone finances in order have brought about much belt tightening. At a time of reduced public spending, countries are seeking to make economies. This provides Europe with a good opportunity to reshape its defence spending. Recent international crises have prompted many EU members to reassess their threat perceptions. Twelve have increased defence spending or are planning to do so, and several have stopped the free fall. Nevertheless, these increases in spending cannot be compared with those in Russia, China or India, just to take three. But this is not just about increasing defence budgets. It is perfectly possible to spend in excess of 2% of GDP on defence and have limited output. Take a look at the numbers. We Europeans invest about half of what the US does in defence, but we only achieve 50% of the US output. If you make the total sum of all men and women under arms in EU member states, you will arrive at a number similar to that of the US, yet we are only able to deploy a fraction of those outside of EU borders. So it's not just about more money. That of course is crucial, but just as important is what is done with it, how it is spent. For example, is it really necessary to devote over 50% of total EU defence spending on personnel? And does it make sense for Europeans to develop a plethora of different platforms that broadly serve the same purpose? We remain too fragmented. For example, European countries currently have 19 types of armoured fighting vehicles, the US only one. We field 14 types of main battle tanks in Europe. The US has one. Just imagine the economies of scale to exploit. Furthermore, in the face of constrained funding and spiralling costs of major defence systems, cooperation is the key. Major defence systems are not like cars. In the automobile industry, a new version does not cost you much more than the version it replaces. In defence, this is not the case. Advances in technology and increasingly challenging and diversity of threats that the system needs to deal with mean that the cost of new platforms rises exponentially. This is making it very difficult for a single country, other than perhaps the US, to be able to afford to launch a major programme on its own. So the choice is stark. Either cooperate to acquire the necessary capabilities or risk losing them all together. That is why the European Council in December 2013 called on member states to deepen defence cooperation, to improve the development and availability of the required military capabilities supported by a more integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence technological and industrial base. I will come back to this later. So quite simply put, not one single member state in the EU, no, not even the bigger ones, are able to tackle 21st century security challenges single-handedly. Those of you who have read up on the topic will have come across the term shared sovereignty in literature. Indeed, we Europeans will only be able to truly protect our sovereignty by doing so together. Hence, our sovereignty is in a sense shared. Because it is not only the EU members in the east or south who are affected. Ireland, for instance, with large-staking blue water, economy has every interest in keeping shipping lanes safe to name but one example. On the other hand, a simple look at the world map with all its hot spots at the moment already provides ample justification to take action. From our eastern borders to the shores of North Africa to Middle East, we see growing instability, a research of nationalism, protracted conflicts, ethnic strife on controlled refugee flows. Our future challenges completely disregard national borders. They are a lot more elusive and hence require a multinational approach to successfully tackle them. And although 70 years of European integration have left your generation the gift or a careless youth in terms of security at home, we can unfortunately no longer rule out the classical textbook threat to the territorial integrity of some EU member states. So working in splendid isolation is not an option. Now EDA at a glance. Defence is intergovernmental, not supranational. This may be familiar to all of you, but it's a message worth repeating. European Defence Agency is thus an intergovernmental body. You will not hear us speak of a European army. We are owned by our member states. Our budget is paid by their defence ministries. They are shareholders. We are a very result-oriented and program-driven agency. It is our job to reconcile the intergovernmental nature of the EU Defence Corporation with the fruits of cooperation. The agency was established in 2004, we are now 10 years old. Our first core function is to support member states in the development of their defence capabilities. It is for member states to decide how to use them, be it in a national EU, NATO or UN context. We have two other key tasks. They are to support defence technologies and reinforce the industrial and technological base in Europe and to act as the champion of military views in wider EU policies. This is what I call the holy trinity of developing capabilities, reinforcing the industrial base without which we could not have those capabilities, and helping member states through what can sometimes look like a Byzantine mire of EU regulations and policies that have, or could have, implications for defence. The agency is lean, it is about 125 staff and an annual budget of 30.5 million euros. And concerning the budget, we leveraged far greater amounts through the projects and programmes that we manage on behalf of member states. About 500 million euros have been invested in research and programmes through EDA since its inception in 2004. We have 27 member states. Denmark, as you know, is not a member because of its opt-out from CSDP and cooperates with three non-EU countries, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland, through administrative arrangements we have signed with them. We are the only agency in the union that receives guidance and ministerial level from ministers of defence. They set the future representations of the agency. And I am its chief executive and the head of the agency is Federica Mogherini who is also the high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy as well as the vice president of the commission. EDA works closely together with a multitude of other actors in the EU. The council of the EU and its organs, primarily the political and security committee, the European Commission, the external action service, the European military committee, the parliament and of course our shareholders' defence ministries. So much for who we are, but what do we do? I set out our core task a moment ago. Allow me to elaborate on these. EDA has a wide array of activities in the field of capability development, but during the 2013 European Council, heads of state and government identified four key priority areas which needed to be addressed. These are long standing gaps which once again became apparent in recent operations such as Libya and Mali, where we were too dependent on the US. Starting with air to air refuelling, substantive progress has been achieved towards the establishment of a European strategic tanker capability by 2020 under the lead of the Netherlands. Following market research and a request for information, one industrial solution, Airbus has been identified as meeting key requirements in terms of capability and time frame. Discussions with Airbus military will continue with the objective of awarding a contract by the end of this year and an initial operating capability of mid-2020. Of course, inclusiveness is key, other member states are encouraged to join the initiative and there are indications that this may happen. The current focus of work is to identify synergies with similar fleets in Europe, the UK or France and in the in-service support and in the field of training as well as potential additional participants. But EDA is also doing other important work, particularly the certification of non-Italian aircraft refuelling from Italian tankers. Medium altitude, long endurance, remote piloted aircraft systems or observation rooms, the well-called male ARPAS. France, Germany and Italy are preparing the establishment of a program. They are benefiting from EDA's activities in many areas including air traffic insertion, airworthiness certification and operational training. EDA is looking to facilitate interaction with other potential partners. Here I would particularly like to mention the importance of synergies between EDA work and that of the Commission, the European Aviation Safety Agency, EASA and the European Space Agency. There are two areas of particular EDA focus, safe integration of the ARPAS into general air traffic and the development of a consistent airworthiness regulatory framework, both very crucial topics for a successful program. Regulations related to the insertion of ARPAS in non-segregated airspace, which means civilian airspace, should allow for progressive insertion as of 2016. EDA and EASA are working closely in this regard. The development of an ARPAS airworthiness regulatory framework will enable the harmonization of the ARPAS certification process between member states and lead to substantial savings. Now government satellite communications, GOVSATCOM, the development of the next generation of government satellite communications by 2025 is well on track under the lead of Spain. The objective is to assess cooperation models in order to propose to member states various options for a comprehensive program. EDA launched a feasibility study with the active collaboration of the European Space Agency. It results are due by the end of 2016. Finally, cyber activities within EDA are ongoing in the areas of education, training, exercises, human factors and technologies. Adopt projects are on the way to set up a federation of cyber ranges and a deployable cyber defense situational awareness package for headquarters, which are now under preparation. The objective is to promote the development of member states' cyber defense capabilities, research and technologies in accordance with the revised capability development plan. However, it will be important to establish a single cooperative framework program under a lead nation. The sensitive nature of cyber should not be an obstacle to substantive work at the European level. And beyond those four key capability programs, I would like to mention three of the many EDA activities in capability development, which are good examples of what we do and how. EDA is vital for operational effectiveness. EDA runs a number of training activities, for example, air transport crews and helicopter crews. Air transport is an essential enabler for all military operations. And with an ever-increasing number of these operations being carried out jointly, there is a clear need to pool resources and share knowledge and best practice. This also increases interoperability among member states and prepares their armed forces for operations in the framework of CSDP, UN, NATO, or coalitions of the willing in a cost-effective manner. To give you an example, the agency's helicopter exercise program has allowed more than 12,000 personnel to benefit from multinational training. Each military air transport training exercise generates savings of more than 500,000 euros to member states. A more recent addition to our training portfolio is naval training, for which Ireland is the lead nation. This comprises three workstrives, diving, navigation training, and naval mine warfare. As part of this EDA, we'll run a course for naval operations room personnel, which Ireland has offered kindly to host in the Irish naval base. Another important activity of the agency is counter-improvised explosive devices, counter-IED. In 2011, EDA deployed a multinational theater exploitation laboratory demonstrator to Afghanistan, where improvised explosive devices were forensically examined. After all, improvised explosive devices have been the single largest killer of coalition soldiers by significant margin, and have also killed and injured thousands of the local Afghan population. In 2014, the laboratory was deployed in the Netherlands, where it now forms part of a new EDA support group initiative called the Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory, JDE. This provides a permanent technical exploitation training facility to support counter-IED efforts. JDE will also provide up to two deployable labs, which will be available for international missions and operations. This is a real success, thanks in large part to Ireland. The Irish Ordnance School has been a platform for identification of existing gaps in the field of countering IED threats. An Ireland hosted courses last year that were co-organized by the agency and Euriport. Furthermore, Ireland has proposed possible new activities in this important field. Third and last, the M3U initiative. Medical support to CSDP missions. The multinational modular medical unit, that's why I call M3U, assembles contributing member states around the development of a deployable multinational field hospital. These hospitals will be fitted with state-of-the-art equipment and highly trained staff, drawn from across Europe. The field hospital can be deployable to a range of CSDP or other missions, from international peacekeeping to humanitarian assistance, providing every form, everything from vaccinations to emergency surgery, medical care for soldiers and civilians alike. I should also mention the work within EDA on support to operations, through which EU operation commanders can use projects developed within the EDA framework. Some examples. EDA will also support the recently launched operation in the Mediterranean, UNAF format, to which Ireland is contributing. More particularly, with the maritime surveillance, MARSUR, network developed by EDA for 18 member states, including Ireland. MARSUR provides web-based services to exchange maritime information through a standardized federated network, enabling capability using open information. MARSUR could provide the backbone for the sharing of information of this possible CSDP operation. Cyber awareness seminars for the operational headquarters staff will also be provided by the agency. As well, we will set up the headquarters, the operational headquarters, with a human resource management tool developed in the EDA framework. EDA will also offer the EU SATCOM market project for quick and easy access to commercially available satellite communication should there be a need for outsourced additional capacity. Finally, EDA has signed on 27 February a cooperation arranged with ATINA administrator to facilitate contracting support to CSDP military operations. On this basis, EDA is also ready to support the operation at its request to contract supplies or services. The key to our success is flexibility. Most of our projects are what we call opt-in. They require minimum of two member states to launch and run them with our support. All of the activities I have just mentioned fall into this category. This means that individual countries can decide which projects they wish to participate in, which also means that unlike the rest of the common security and defense policy, you do not need unanimity. And now a word on the European defense industry and research. The European defense technological and industrial base, why is it important? Maybe it goes without saying, but I'll say it anyway. To be a credible security provider, the EU needs defense capabilities. And to have these, it needs a strong industrial base. Otherwise, the EU would be deprived of the strategic autonomy needed to make it a relevant partner on the global scene and crucially in the transatlantic context. A healthy industrial base is an essential component of any credible defense policy. It generates cutting-edge programs thereby ensuring Europe's ability to act. It generates innovation with spillover effects into the civil domain and vice versa. It supports a highly skilled workforce of 400,000 direct and over 960,000 indirect jobs across Europe. And it generates exports which give European industry an impressive share of the global market. So much for the good news, but the bad news is that the European defense industrial landscape is characterized by a fragmented demand side, which not only increases cuts, but also does not nothing to improve interoperability. Global shifts in defense spending. Our ratio regarding R&D investment is one to seven as compared to the US, but also one to three in comparison with any of the so-called BRICs. European companies' order books are reducing because of the absence of any new major program. Unless this trend is reversed, our industry risks losing key technologies. The plunge in defense R&D, more than 29% since 2007, is detrimental to innovation and is jeopardizing our ability to produce the equipment our armed forces will require in the future, as well as the competitiveness of our industry. If nothing is done, we risk losing our technological edge. We also face reduced competitiveness with the ultimate loss of production capacities and jobs, leading to increased dependence on foreign supplies, to give you just an example, precision guidance ammunition. The industrial base to produce these capabilities exists in Europe today, but this technology is at real risk in the coming three to five years. With real risk, I mean total loss, unless new development programs are launched. Those EU members that have increased or plan to increase their defense budget have a special responsibility in ensuring that we retain a healthy industrial base when taking defense procurement decisions and that their companies work together in cooperation and not in competition with each other. This is another argument for more cooperative programs. In December 2013, EU heads of state and government highlighted the need for important actions regarding defense industry, ranging from research through support to small and medium enterprises to security supply. They called for more investment in cooperative research programs, more synergies between defense and civil research, and a prepared reaction on CSDP related research. Let me take each of these briefly in turn. The line between civil and defense research, just as the line between security and defense is becoming increasingly blurred, is also suboptimal in terms of investment. The bottom line is that we cannot afford to pay for the same or similar technologies twice. Years of uncoordinated defense spending cuts by EU member states are resulting in the loss of key European defense industrial capabilities. Defense research is not only necessary to underpin the programs of the future, but also for maintaining the necessary technical edge on the battlefield. Let me now turn to support to SMEs. These are vital. Not every member state has a major prime contractor or systems integrator, but every single one of us has SMEs. EDA has played its part in supporting this important sector. We have developed guidelines for facilitating access to the defense market, as well as an action plan to support the opening up of supply chains, increase transparency, and facilitate matchmaking. So what needs to be done? To stimulate R&T, we need to enhance investment in traditional defense-oriented research, particularly in collaborative R&T. And civil military dual-use synergies need to be better exploited, which brings me to the prepared reaction on CSDP-related research. This is a potential game-changer because it will, for the first time, test the viability of defense-oriented and CSDP-related research at union level. And do not forget that defense is a global market in which competitors of European companies receive strong support from their country of origin that has defined strategic goals for its defense industrial policy and put in place instruments in view of protecting and supporting identified strategic assets, either industrial or technological. Let us take the United States as an example with the third offset strategy. The idea is that the Pentagon will offset the growing gap between U.S. capabilities and missions with new technologies that will extend the armed forces' competitive advantages over potential adversaries. A core component of the initiative is the formation of a long-range research and development planning program that will target several promising technological areas, including robotics and system autonomy, as well as advanced manufacturing, while also seeking to improve the U.S. military collaboration with innovative private sector enterprises. I wonder whether EU member states would consider a similar approach to tackle the same challenge that this constant faces. I'd quickly like to come back to defense spending. In the current constrained environment, characterized by shrinking domestic European defense market, it is essential to ensure the effectiveness of defense events. Member states should be encouraged to spend better and more together to ensure EU freedom of action, while accepting a certain degree of interdependency. There is thus a need to prioritize and focus investment and policy instruments in areas considered as strategic at European level. This leads us to the need to define and identify, based on a risk analysis, key strategic activities at European level, which could be a combination of technological, industrial manufacturing capacity, and skills pivotal for the fulfillment of Europe's strategic objectives. EDA has therefore started to work with member states towards a shared understanding of key strategic activities, manufacturing capabilities, technological skills, to be safeguarded and promoted at the European level. We will define together with member states the criteria for it and principles on what we can be deemed as key strategic activity before identifying a limited number of areas to be included in European policies and instruments. Strategic autonomy at European level could thereby mean to focus on those few issues that are vital to ensure that Europe one continues to be able to be a credible respecter and that an interoperable partner in international crisis is able to address the security challenges at its borders, Eastern or Western Franks or the Atlantic in a satisfactory way, as is in a position to adapt its defense capabilities to new needs as they emerge. Just a word on the European Council. I have mentioned the December 2013 European Council a few times already. It was a defining moment for it gave security and defense issues once again the top level attention they deserve. The European Council reverted a couple of weeks ago. There was a short discussion on defense and important conclusions. The upcoming revision of the European Security Strategy will be a valuable instrument, but strategy was important, let's be honest, is not in itself enough. We need proposals, roadmaps and programs. After all, defense cooperation requires long-term thinking. If you want to address capability shortfalls of the future, work should start now. EDA recently revised its capability development plan based on Member States priorities and remains a key tool to identify those shortfalls. The agency's key capability programs resulting from the European Council of 2013, taskings have been progressing well in line with the roadmaps and ministers of defense in May agree that EDA continue to identify capability gaps that should be addressed and invited the agency to develop roadmaps. Two weeks ago, the European Council also called on Member States to allocate a sufficient level of expenditure for defense and to make the most effective use for resources. How much to allocate to defense is clearly a sovereign decision for each Member State. My plea is that whatever they allocate, they maximize the output through cooperation. The bottom line is that they face the stark choice of either acquiring capabilities together or not at all. To finish, a word on EDA in Ireland. Before I conclude, I wanted to offer a few thoughts on how EDA can and does help Ireland and will continue to do so. As I said at the outset, the agency supports all its Member States irrespective of their size. We are not an executing agency. We are simply an enabler to allow Member States to reach their level of ambition. And as I also mentioned earlier, we are flexible. Ireland takes maximum advantage of this flexibility. It participates in a number of our projects, including in areas such as counter improvised explosive devices, CBRN protection, maritime surveillance, cyber and energy and environment. And it leads our important work on naval training. There are other benefits. For example, in the area of CBRN research, the University of Galway recently received a substantial amount of funding for this through EDA. On industrial issues, Ireland is also active in our work on security of supply, support to small and medium enterprises and access to European structural and investment funds. At the more strategic level and as your strategy statement of March this year acknowledged, the international security environment will continue to change rapidly and unpredictably. It goes on to state. No one country acting alone can respond to the collective threats. States must collaborate. Cooperative and collaborative security arrangements are deepening and Ireland must remain an active participant in response to new threats in defence and security environment. In terms of ensuring Ireland's capacity to deliver, the strategy statement states that one of the key strategies is to continue to engage positively in the ongoing development of military and civil crisis management capabilities, including EDA's capability development initiatives. Much if not all of this assessment will also feature in the Irish White Paper on Defence, which is expected to be issued imminently. The preparation of this White Paper has involved public consultation, the zone with other government departments and consultation with international organisations. One of these was, I am delighted to say, the European Defence Agency. Understandably enough, I have not seen the White Paper, but I understand from a statement made by the Defence Minister, Covenay, to the House on 30th of June, that it will assess the future security environment and set out the policy response to security challenges. It will also consider the implications on defence capabilities and set out priorities, including related to command and control, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance and equipment. My message to you is that EDA stands ready to help and support Ireland's efforts, be they purely defence or dual use. We are, as I hope, I have already shown, flexible and output oriented. You have my personal assurance of the Agency's continued commitment to support you now and in the future in this crucial domain. In this context, I particularly subscribe to Minister Covenay's words in Parliament on 30th June. The long-lead time in acquiring capability means that just-in-time approach is not a viable option. We at EDA are ready to start early on. Thank you, and I'm happy to reply to you.