 Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for joining us for our panel to discuss the various views on US-China relations, the outlook for Taiwan. Is Taiwan like Ukraine? What about the bipolar ideological conflict that seems to be developing with China and the outside world? We have done some planning for this session in order to try to make it more interesting for all of you and for ourselves. We're gonna change the format a little bit from the normal presentation and sequence of different points of view on the same subject, but try to develop some interchange. I come from the United States where we've been protected by two oceans, and so the rest of the world always looks very similar. We take a position on terrorism or communism or some other issue when we expect the rest of the world to take the same position because they're all the same out there. What I hope today's panel does is show how different the perspectives are from different national points of view, and we're gonna ask each of our participants on the panel to speak on their particular viewpoints. There's a quality, we're assuming that there's a US position and that it's pretty strong in opposition to China going into this discussion. I'll point out that this afternoon, the czar of American Indo-Pacific policy in Washington, Kurt Campbell made a presentation in which he said, in fact, we're returning, he didn't use the word to engagement because he's the author of the obituary of engagement with China, but he said we're returning to normal interstate relations as a result of China effectively capitulating to American policy over the next year. We can talk about that and many other subjects, of course, but today we have a very distinguished panel that represents a fairly broad range. Unfortunately, it's a mantle, not a panel with men and women representatives. We all apologize in our own way for not being able to reflect the gender differences that we should be on this stage. You have the biographies of our presenters. We've got John Andrews, who is a senior journalist for The Economist, Jean-Pierre Cabastin, who is a longtime China scholar and is at the Institute for Research in Hong Kong. Renaud Girard is from the Figaro in Paris. Mr. Hosoya, professor from CAO University and doing a lot of international policy research. Himin Lee, who is a longtime trade professional for the Korean government and is now working for Kim and Chong, the very distinguished law firm. And we've got Mr. Samir Suran from India, from Delhi, from the Observers Research Forum. And then via the virtual connection, we have Professor Wong Jee Se from Peking University. We're glad to welcome you here. I'm greatly disappointed we can't have you here in person, Jee Se, but we're so happy you could at least participate this way. Now, to get us started, I'm gonna ask panelists to respond to the question about just how far do you think does your government at home think the US will succeed in evoking or forcing your government, the government you watch closely from your perch, to follow the US in its policy of pursuing a bipolar world where we divide between those who are in favor of China's disruption of the liberal international order or support the American position of protecting and developing the international order. Why don't we start, Joe? Well, there's absolutely no doubt that the UK will do whatever the US wants. If you go back to the days of, we've had lots of prime ministers recently, but if you go back to the days of David Cameron, the idea then was a golden era of relations with between the UK and China. Well, that golden era is now long gone. Britain caved in to American pressure over Huawei. When I say caved in, I mean, that's a pejorative phrase. And I think in the end, probably the security people in the UK were happy to have their arms twisted. But I mean, basically the UK is always going to follow the US lead. And I think that is also true essentially of all the countries in NATO. I mean, the thing, if you look at the China, the People's Republic and the USA, I mean, the fact is that the US has lots of allies, but China has lots of trade partners. I was shocked the other day when Col. Bill pointed out that there are only 20 countries in the UN who name the US as their number one trading partner. So essentially that means, you know, Canada, Mexico, a few Caribbean islands and so on. Whereas if you take the reverse, how many countries name China as a lead trading partner, that's at least 120. So if you were to look at this sort of rivalry as a potential conflict, then you're tempted to use the phrase, the might is right. Well, how do you define might? Is it economic pressure, economic links, or is it military pressure, military links? Maybe something that we can get involved in later. But I think what lies behind your question, Douglas, is if push comes to shove, which way will countries, what choice will countries make? Of course, none of the countries want to have that choice. They want to avoid it. And I think common sense should indicate that the choice never has to be made. But that's what we're saying now with the benefit of common sense. Common sense doesn't always work. You have First World War, Second World War, and so on. I think that if you look around the world at the moment, if you take NATO out and say, okay, all the NATO members will follow an American lead. If you look at Africa, there are now something like 10,000 Chinese firms operating in Africa. You've got the Chinese military base in Djibouti. You've got potential bases also. I think China now is developing something like 50 different ports in Africa. That's not necessarily a bad thing. If you take the whole BRI initiative, which is obviously not just Africa, it's Europe, it's Central Asia, and so on, that really does bring real influence to bear. The downside of that, of course, is that you get a sort of debt imperialism. If you take Sri Lanka, for example, there the Rajapaksa government went into some dodgy deal and suffered for it, but it means that the main port is now basically taken over by China. If you take Greece, where I was in Athens last week, I mean, Piraeus, one of the best ports in Europe, is now Chinese-owned, effectively, and works very, very efficiently, very effectively. So one shouldn't see this in a Manichean way. I mean, there are reasons why countries should accept large S from China, but if the large S also does come with some strings attached. I thought it was interesting that Xi Jinping is maybe even now still in Saudi Arabia. I mean, they may be leaving tonight, I'm not sure when. Perhaps he's waiting for the soccer matches to finish in Qatar. But I mean, Xi Jinping is making good friends with Saudi Arabia and really with a whole Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Remember that Saudi Arabia has been a faithful American ally really since the foundation, 1932. So we're talking 90 years. Now that's all up for grabs. I don't want to rub it on too much, but I would think that Africa really does not want to make this choice. And I don't think it really has to. It can be independent. A much more difficult choice, I think, is in Southeast Asia and South Asia. I mean, Pakistan is, I think, really in hawk to China, thanks to the CPC, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. And if you take the countries of Southeast Asia, they all depend on China for their print trade and things like economic growth. The challenge will be over Taiwan and what may happen there. I'm actually fairly optimistic. I think, I don't think Xi Jinping is a madman, nor incidentally do I think Vladimir Putin is a madman. But you can't really meditate too much against what can happen when people make decisions which then lead to other consequences. I think we, I'm talking when I say we, I sort of mean the West here. I think we were lulled into complacency in the era of Jiang Xiaoping and that carried on with Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. I think with Xi, it's a different ballgame and we don't really know how to assess him, how to treat him. And I think that means that the possibility of miscalculation does exist. A final thought, if there were a war, remember that American military really is battle-hardened. So if there were a war between China and the States, regardless of who is on what side, I suspect America would win. But that's sort of a catastrophic concept which I don't think is going to happen. But one lesson I think that she has taken from the UK war is that the American military and NATO in general, but especially the American military, is really very, very good. And I suspect that if you look at the Chinese military, even though it has invested enormous amount into modernizing the military, the Navy is supposedly now bigger than America's Navy, nonetheless, it doesn't have much battle experience. And what it's had is being pretty poor, for example, in Vietnam. So let me leave it there. Well, thank you, John. I think there are a number of things I'd like to probe on that. Is China going to be everybody's leading trade partner forever? Is the disposition of forces the way you've described it or has it been changing? Is the debt policy of China undergoing various changes that were heard this morning in other panels? I'd like to come back to some of that, but now Jean-Pierre. Well, thank you. As a Frenchman based in Asia for many years, my view may be a bit biased because I'm more sensitive to the rise of China, to its growing assertiveness in the region than if I were based in Paris or elsewhere in Europe. Well, of course, the Ukraine war, the Middle East and Africa are much more pressing issues that was going on in the Far East, so what we used to call the Far East in Europe, which is the Indo-Pacific region. I have to say, the short answer to your question, Doug, is that I think the US has been and will remain more successful in the Global North and the Global South in aligning its allies and partners with it on China and the growing tensions in East Asia. John mentioned and I basically agree with him that NATO is a big factor of bringing together the Europeans and the Americans and the Canadians on issues like China. I mean, the fact that China now is one of the issues discussed in NATO is an important move in the direction of more transatlantic coordination on East Asia and China, so that's the thing which I think we can't ignore. Another trend which has taken place even before this recent tension in the Taiwan Strait for some years is the fact that the European Union itself has moved away from the full kind of naive engagement with China to a much more balanced China policy. We know the three pillars of this policy now. One is called economic cooperation. The other one is economic competition. And the third one, which is something which has struck the Chinese when it appeared in 2019, was the idea of we are in a systemic rivalry with China. So China is a systemic rivalry whatever it means. It means that we don't share the same political values, that we don't see the international order the same way. We don't abide by international law in the same manner, in particular for instance, as far as the law of the sea is concerned and many other aspects of international law. So I think here, in other words, China's growing power has brought together more than before the Europeans and the Americans on China. Now it doesn't mean there are no differences. There are quite a number of friction which we mentioned earlier today, like the trade war and how much shall we put sanctions on China, not only for human rights infringements like the question of Xinjiang, which on the Xinjiang issue, I mean, that was two years ago for the first time, the Europeans with the Americans, the British and the Canadians, decided to impose sanctions on some officials in Xinjiang. And that's what, for the European point of view and the European Union point of view, that was unprecedented. So those are changes which tend to bridge the gap between the Europeans and the Americans on China. Now if we look at East Asia, I think you mentioned Southeast Asia, which is, yes, of course, in a very difficult position, but just a word about Southeast Asia is that, of course, they can't publicly and openly criticize China, but they're very happy to have the U.S. around and to keep the U.S. around, all the way from the Vietnamese, of course, which I mean, you know, in the difficult version for 1,000 years with the Chinese, but also with countries like Singapore, which are very happy to have the American, the Tongy and the Malacca straight as well. So, but in addition to those countries, of course, you have countries in East Asia, like Japan, and we're gonna talk about in South Korea, which are also U.S. allies. And these U.S. alliances in the Pacific region have remained a factor of alignment with the U.S. policy position regarding China. Now, of course, the burning issue, I mean, we may come back to that later, but it's a Taiwan issue. And I have to say what has triggered the growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait has been not only China's clear assertiveness, but also is more obvious haste to unify China, Taiwan with China. And that has been, to me, a major disabilizing factor in the region because most of the countries in the region are attached to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. And for the first time since, it started actually 10 years ago or less, more or less in 2013 when Xi Jinping decided that we can't leave this question and solve and transmit it from one generation to another. So now, clearly, China's policy towards Taiwan has been to mix much more carrot and stick and to use much more coercion against Taiwan in order to try to convince Taiwan to unify with China. But the problem with these policies is badly backfired and actually rally a number of countries which are not that close to the US and to support of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. So now, we may come back later to the comparison between Ukraine and Taiwan. I would just say a word about the global staff because in the last 10 years, I've worked quite a lot on China-Africa relations. I've done quite a number of field works in Africa. And clearly, the Africans don't want to choose between the US and China. But one thing I will remind everyone, I mean, for the one coming from Africa, they're very familiar with Afrobarometer, is that both China and the US are pretty popular in Africa in terms of favorable views. They're more or less at the same level. 60% of the Africans are favorable of China, but also 58% of the Africans are favorable view of the US, much more than the view of the former colonial powers. And they clearly don't want to choose. Even today, I think most countries in the South, they think they can get away with this new so-called Cold War between the US and China and remain neutral and still benefit from cooperating with both sides. The problem with the, you know, talk about Africa is the fact that the US is much less present in Africa. And that's the American diplomacy has deserted Africa. And that's been, I think, a big weak point of the Americans in that continent. And that's opened the way, opened the boulevard, actually, to China, to becoming much more active from a diplomatic point of view, military point of view, but also with the BRI, the Belt and Road Initiative, economic point of view. So that's where we are now. Well, thank you very much, Nopir. As a parent of diplomats who are self-professed Africanists, I recognize your last remark very clearly. Brenoud, can you, last week, President Macron declared himself having conducted a highly successful state visit to Washington. Can you comment on the French view of this? Merci, Doug. Effectivement, j'ai voulu m'exprimer sur prendre cet aspect de la rivalité sino-américaine, de prendre uniquement l'angle de la France. Et quand j'ai regardé cette question, je me suis dit qu'en fait, il y avait un problème français de cul entre deux chaises. Et alors je vais essayer de vous expliquer en quelques minutes pourquoi la France a le cul entre deux chaises dans cette affaire. Et pourquoi et comment... Et quelles sont les conséquences de cette politique de cul entre deux chaises? Alors, il est évident que la France ne veut pas être et l'inaconscience victime collatérale de cette rivalité entre la Chine et l'Amérique pour devenir la première puissance mondiale. Elle ne veut pas être la victime collatérale d'un quelconque piège de Tucydides. Ça, c'est certain. Par ailleurs, la France comprend qu'elle, en elle-même, dans le grand jeu mondial, elle ne pèse plus suffisamment ni par sa démographie, ni économiquement, ni par son commerce extérieur, ni par sa force militaire, elle ne peut pas peser par son propre poids et influencer le grand jeu mondial parce que ce n'est plus, effectivement, une grande puissance. En revanche, elle comprend que, par sa tradition, elle a été elle-même la première puissance du monde jusqu'à Waterloo, elle comprend qu'elle peut être entendue. Et ça, je crois que le président français Emmanuel Macron veut se faire entendre. Il veut, en fait, jouer un rôle d'intermédiaire, de Honest Broker, on dit ça, en anglais, dans tous les conflits du monde. Et il a essayé, d'ailleurs. Et on peut lui rendre grâce d'avoir essayé. Il a essayé, notamment, sur l'Iran, à Biaritz. Ce n'est pas de sa faute si ça n'a pas marché. Trump était prêt à rencontrer à New York le président Rouhani et c'est le guide suprême Kamenei qui n'a pas voulu. Donc, il a essayé. Il a essayé sur la Libye, il a essayé sur le Liban. Il a essayé sur beaucoup de crises. Il a essayé sur l'Ukraine, évidemment. Il a été voir Poutine 10 jours avant l'invasion ou 15 jours avant l'invasion. Ça n'a pas marché, mais c'est pas parce que ça n'a pas marché qu'il faut le blâmer. Il a, évidemment, raison de faire tous les efforts qu'il faut pour la paix. Alors, maintenant, effectivement, il aimerait sans doute être l'honnest broker entre la Chine et les Américains, mais je pense que, si il ne change pas de politique, il ne va pas y arriver. Je vais essayer de vous expliquer pourquoi. D'abord, il a vu Xi Jinping à Bali. C'était le 15 novembre dernier. Il y a eu un entretien entre les deux délégations chinoises et françaises. Alors, c'est vrai qu'il n'était pas très à l'aise le président Macron, quant à sa politique chinoise, parce qu'elle venait de s'effondrer. C'est-à-dire, la politique récente venait de s'effondrer. La politique récente de la France à l'Egard de la Chine, c'était, je fais tout avec l'Allemagne. Donc, quand Xi Jinping était venu en mars 2019 en visite d'État en France, il avait la surprise de voir dans le bureau de Macron le président de la Commission, qui était, je crois, Juncker à l'époque, et la chancelière d'Allemagne, Merkel, parce qu'on va être entendus. On est plus forts quand on est dans l'ensemble face à la Chine. Et quand lui-même est allé faire une visite en Chine, Macron, en novembre 2019, il a fait une conférence avec les industriels français pour défendre les intérêts de la France et un peu son boulot, mais il a aussi invité les industriels allemands. Donc, il était comme le défenseur de l'industrie allemande. Et là, le Schultz, qui n'a pas la reconnaissance du ventre allemand, quand Macron lui demande, et c'est un camouflé, parce que Macron lui a demandé publiquement, lui demande d'aller avec lui en Chine. Il dit, non, non, non, j'y vais tout seul. Et évidemment, il était hors de question pour le chancelière de Schultz d'aller, même imaginer, défendre les intérêts industriels français lors de sa visite en Chine. Donc, il n'est pas, lorsqu'il voit Xi Jinping le 15 novembre en tête à tête, effectivement, il n'est pas très à l'aise, Emmanuel Macron. Mais la conversation commence et que lui demande Xi Jinping? Que dit Xi Jinping, Macron? Il dit deux choses. Il parle, les deux mots importants dans la location de Xi Jinping, on peut voir d'ailleurs sur YouTube, c'est indépendance et ouverture. Alors ça, c'est une leçon à la France. C'est indépendance. Bon, vous, la France, vous êtes le premier européen à avoir reconnu la Chine populaire. C'était la politique d'indépendance du général de Gaulle. On en est où de votre indépendance? Et l'ouverture, ça veut dire quoi? Ça veut dire ne faites pas comme les Américains. Ne vous fermez pas au commerce avec nous. Ne vous fermez pas aux échanges technologiques avec nous, comme le font les Américains. Et là Macron, en fait, ne répond pas. Il ne répond pas à Xi Jinping. Et pourquoi il ne répond pas sur ces questions à Xi Jinping? Parce qu'en fait, il n'a pas vraiment choisi. Est-ce que je suis, moi Français, la France, aligné sur l'Amérique? Et on peut très bien être aligné. Le Japon et la Corée sont tout à fait alignés sur la politique américaine et peuvent très bien faire parfaitement du commerce avec la Chine. Ou est-ce que je suis totalement indépendant? Il n'a pas choisi. On peut choisir. On peut choisir. Et on n'est pas forcément puni sur le Vietnam, par exemple, par rapport à l'Amérique. Gaulle a choisi. Il a été avec l'Amérique sur la crise de Cuba. Mais sur le Vietnam, il n'a pas été neutre. Il n'a pas été comme les anglais de travaillistes qui, à l'époque, étaient extrêmement disériens sur le Vietnam. Lui, il a critiqué. C'est le discours d'Opnopen. Mais, finalement, ça a marché puisque on a décidé d'ouvrir des négociations de paix à Paris. Elles se sont faites à Paris. Puisque Nixon a fait sa première visite pour de Gaulle en 1969, c'était la première visite de Nixon qui venait être élu président. C'est pour de Gaulle. Et c'est là que de Gaulle lui conseille de reconnaître la Chine populaire et ce que va faire un peu plus tard Nixon. Donc, c'est une politique qui peut réussir, même si elle est tranchée. Et la France n'a pas été punie par les États-Unis pour cette politique indépendante. Là, en fait, on sent que Macron n'a pas tout à fait choisi. Alors, au lieu de répondre à Xi Jinping dans ce dialogue de Bali, qui va durer 40 minutes seulement, il lui dit qu'il faut, et c'est une bonne idée, qu'il faut que vous nous aidez sur l'Ukraine. Et effectivement, la Chine a beaucoup plus de poids sur la Russie que la France. Et donc, c'est une bonne idée d'essayer de prendre la Chine avec soi pour essayer d'influencer la Russie. Mais le problème, c'est que Macron, il demande un service. Donc, à la Chine, il demande quelque chose. La veille, Biden a vu Xi Jinping, mais Biden, il n'a rien demandé. Il n'a rien demandé à Xi Jinping. Il lui a dit simplement, bon, tous les deux, là, on va fixer les lignes rouges. C'est la diplomatie des lignes rouges, très bien. Macron, il demande quelque chose. Ben, tu demandes quelque chose, mais qu'est-ce que tu donnes en échange? C'est la base de la diplomatie. Tu demandes un truc. Mais tu donnes quoi en échange? Et ça, Macron, il n'y a pas pensé parce qu'il a le cul entre deux chaises, parce qu'il n'a pas décidé. Il aurait pu dire, bon, OK. Si tu me donnes ton appui sur l'Ukraine pour vraiment faire en sorte que Putin se retire des territoires qu'il a conquis, moi, je vais aller voir Biden en visite d'Etat. D'ailleurs, c'était déjà prévu en Amérique. Et je dirais, on va faire peut-être une discussion, même à trois, qu'est-ce que tu veux? Qu'est-ce que tu veux des Américains, exactement? Bon, les Américains n'exporteront pas de puces électroniques, ne t'aideront pas dans ta technologie, mais peut-être qu'on peut obtenir une vraie discussion. Et moi, Français, je vais être l'honneuse broker de cette décision. Tu m'aides sur l'Ukraine et moi je t'aide face aux États-Unis. Et bien non, il ne l'a pas fait. Et j'ai écouté la conférence de presse de Macron et de Biden. Il n'y a pas la moindre allusion sur la Chine. Hier, le mot n'est même pas prononcé, le mot chine. Et il y a aussi une émission qui a fait Macron à la télévision française de 20 minutes, où il résume, en fait, pour la télévision, pour TF1 son voyage. Il n'en parle pas du tout. Et donc, tant qu'il n'aura pas tranché, tant qu'il n'aura pas une position claire, je pense qu'il n'arrivera pas à faire ce qu'il veut faire, c'est-à-dire être l'honneuse broker entre la Chine et les États-Unis, et de ne pas être une victime collatérale. Et c'est un défaut, si vous voulez, qui n'est pas nouveau dans la diplomatie française. Nous avons eu ce même défaut lors du sommet de l'OTAN en avril 2008, où nous avons mis notre veto à l'entrée de l'Ukraine dans l'OTAN. Mais c'était pas un vrai veto. C'était un veto, le cul entre deux chaises, c'est-à-dire on disait, bon, pas tout de suite, mais peut-être demain. Il faut choisir. Et la diplomatie qui ne choisit pas est une mauvaise diplomatie. Oui, l'Ukraine entre tout de suite, Bouche l'a demandé, entre tout de suite dans l'OTAN et à toi, Poutine, qui est là, parce que Poutine était présent au sommet de Bucharest d'avril 2008, toi, Poutine, je lui dis, attention, ne t'avises pas d'attaquer l'Ukraine, parce que maintenant, elle est dans l'OTAN. Ou bien je dis, l'OTAN n'entrera jamais dans l'OTAN, et c'est clair. Et donc, tu dis à Poutine, ne prends pas prétexte de l'extension de l'OTAN pour faire des malheurs à Kiev, puisque nous avons été très clairs, nous avons mis notre veto éternel à l'entrée de l'Ukraine. Et donc, ma conclusion, c'est qu'aujourd'hui, nous avons hélas une politique que j'estimène, elle va peut-être être changée, j'espère qu'elle va être changée de cette politique. Je pense que Macron a tout à fait raison de vouloir un honnest broker, de vouloir être un feuseur de paix. C'est quelque chose qui est à la portée de la France à cause de la réputation de la France, à cause de l'histoire de la France. Mais je trouve qu'il s'y prend mal, parce que quand vous ne choisissez pas, quand vous restez le cul entre deux chaises, et bien, en fait, le résultat, c'est que vous m'écontentez les uns et les autres. Thank you very much. I think we may want to come back to you and ask to what extent economic factors may be playing a role, too, in the position of France and its relations with China. I'd like now to turn to Yuichi, how's that? Thank you, Doug. Let me present a Japanese viewpoint on this difficult question. Japan is the number three economy in the world after the United States and China, but at the same time, I define Japan as a kind of a front line state. Front line means that Japan is located at the front line of the confrontation, structural confrontation between the United States and China. That's why Japan's position is quite vulnerable. Japan can benefit from its close relationship with both the United States and China, because China is Japan's biggest trading partner while the United States is the only Japan's security alliance partner. But at the same time, if what happens, Japan would be in a really difficult situation because Japan would be vulnerable, not just economically and financially, but militarily as well. That's why Japan need to respond to this dilemma, difficult question, but Japan doesn't have any clear answer to this question. On the other hand, I think that the Prime Minister Abe presented two strategies to this difficult question. Number one, Abe created the Quad. Quad is a kind of a collaboration among the four leading democracies in the region, in the Indo-Pacific, United States, Japan, India, and Australia. By collaborating together, the four countries' democracies can respond to the rising China. This is one thing. The other strategy is for free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. With it, Japan presented much more inclusive strategy fit connect subregions in the Pacific region. Subregions mean North-East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Middle East, and also East Africa. Of course, the EU can join in the region and also the other powers as well, like China or Russia or any other country can join in the region because Japan's free and open Indo-Pacific strategy is quite inclusive strategy. Why it is inclusive? Because in the beginning, Prime Minister Abe presented Quad strategy, but it seems that Japan is trying to encircle China. If Japan try to encircle China, the ASEAN cannot join in. If ASEAN cannot join in the regional vision, it means that there is a hole in the middle of the region. That's why it is really necessary for Japan to try to invite ASEAN at the middle of the regional cooperation, I mean the FOIP. But at the same time, ASEAN clearly disliked the idea of dividing the bloc into the two opposing camps. That's why to try to attract ASEAN, it was necessary for Japanese government, particularly under Prime Minister Abe's diplomatic initiative, to try to invite ASEAN into the regional cooperation of free and open Indo-Pacific. That's why I think that Prime Minister Abe revised the original regional strategy of the Quad, focusing on the Asian Security Democratic Dialogue to try to revise it to present much more inclusive strategy to embrace not just ASEAN, but other countries as well, or regional cooperation as well. So in this way, I think that Japan has been in a very important position to promote regional cooperation in the area, I mean the Indo-Pacific region, particularly by presenting two different strategies. On one hand, Japan still stick to the Quad strategy which focus on the importance of norms and ideas of democracy, freedom, rule of law, and human rights and so on. But at the same time, it is necessary for Japan to present much more inclusive strategy by promoting the free and open Indo-Pacific vision which can embrace China as well. So in this way, I think that Japan has been in a very important position to try to mitigate the tension between two sides. But at the same time, it is also important to note that Japan is sided with the United States in the field of emphasizing on the importance of norms and ideas. Because Japan shares important norms of democracy, freedom, and rule of law and human rights with other like-minded partners, particularly the United States. So in this way, I think Japan has been promoting two different strategies, but combining two different strategies, I think that Japan has been in a very important position to promote the regional cooperation in the area. Thank you very much. I mean, we probably will have a little difference in the view from Korea, these. Thank you, doc. The intensifying and expanding tension between the U.S. and China is a very serious issue to all of the world, but much more serious to Korea. Because of history and geography, as you know, China is our immediate neighbor. And the military alliance with the United States is a backbone of Korea's foreign policy. But more than 30 percent of Korea's total exports go to China and Hong Kong. And Korea is the largest source of China's import. In addition, the United States and China are two indispensable partners for Korea to manage the threat from North Korea, maintaining peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. The international political order that Korea wants to pursue is non-exclusive. And we highly value cooperation with every country of the world, including China. Therefore, it would be difficult for Korea to join initiative explicitly targeting in China, though Korea shares the concerns of United States of China's economic outreach and its foreign policy. I would like to add one more thing about the Korean companies. Korean companies are global players. And we must note that Korean companies make their investment and business decisions rather independently from the policy of the Korean government. This means even if Korean government follows the U.S. strategic trend as an ally of the United States, business decisions may differ as long as they do not violate relevant laws and regulations. And actually, Korean companies are actively pursuing supply chain diversification, recognizing the importance, more importance of political risk rather than efficiency or cost nowadays. I'd like to add one more thing about Korea's specific concern on the expanding China-U.S. conflict. The consequence of China-U.S. conflict leads to the increasing subsidy of the United States, European Union, and Japan. It's a very serious concern to Korea. Those countries are increasing subsidies, especially in the field of the electric vehicle batteries and semiconductors. The reason is to correspond to the state capital of China. However, it is distruding international trade order, definitely. So we now currently, WTO dispute settlement mechanism is totally paralyzed and we have no means of addressing those distorting international trade practices. So it's a very serious concern. And for Korean companies, in order to respond to increasing subsidies provided by the United States through inflation reduction act and infrastructure and jobs act, they are increasing their investment in the United States. And Korean businessmen are fully aware that U.S.-China conflict is a long way to go and it's a constant factor for their decision-making. Thank you. Thank you very much. You've had to wait a long time, but I hope you'll be able to jump in. I was thinking, should I respond to your question or to what I've heard? You're welcome to do either. So first of all, I think our engagement with China is for ourselves. It's, we are logged in a Himalayan face-off. We have close to about 100,000 troops. If you count both the armies together across the line of actual control. So U.S. does not have to motivate us to face off against China. China does that pretty well by itself. So it is China that has motivated us to face off in some sense against it. But having said that, I think there are two interesting projects, trends, tendencies underway concurrently. The first, of course, is what you mentioned, the chair in the very beginning, the U.S. perhaps trying to shape the world into two camps, perhaps. I'm not sure that U.S. has the consensus inside it. So I don't think there is a U.S. position that it is trying to preach in any case. I think you may find that the discord within U.S. may become louder as it tries to pursue that line if it ever does. So that's the first part. But even if we were to assume that U.S. has some, the deep state has some great idea of carving the world into two camps, I think that's not new for India. We have faced that idea for a very long time and successive governments have pursued non-alignment, strategic autonomy, multi-alignment, choose the word you want. But in many ways we have, it's not a new phenomenon. It's new for Europe, not for us. In fact, now Europeans tell us, how did you do that? Can you give us some secret recipe? We want to learn from India on how to be able to manage your own strategic affairs. So American design or European design and making us choose sides is not going to work with us. We don't work in the Manichaean sense, right? For us we work in grace, we love grace, right? So that's the first project. The second project is the Chinese. Themselves are trying to distort the character of Asia. So Chinese want a multipolar world, but a unipolar Asia, and that is what we are fighting against. So in a sense, we are rejecting the Chinese attempt to create a unipolar Asia. Why would we want a hegemonic world where a set of actors dominate it? So I don't think India is going to buy into either of the two projects. I think, and obviously for us, a very good strategic outcome would be that we could partner with France and EU and the US in ensuring that China is not able to carve up Asia as it wants at one level, but also to ensure that the world is not forced into certain corners, that the big two may want the world to resettle. So I think that's one answer. Now let me respond to what I heard. What I heard is that my European colleagues are worried about what Asia might do, what Africa might do, what other parts of the world may do. The truth is, it is Europe which is the weak link in this debate, and that is the reality. The lure of money, the lure of return, has made Europe incompetent and incapable to take a unified position against China. If you think you're going to see a Russia-styled mobilization against China, we are all living in La La Land. Europe is the weak link for the US if it has to mobilize any sort of consortium against China. So please don't do whataboutry. I heard lots of people talk about Africa, it doesn't want this, Southeast Asia doesn't want this, it's Europe that doesn't want it, let's be honest here. And all my European friends have told me that don't want it. They don't want to be in a position when the Germans are told to stop selling cars to China, or the French are told to stop selling handbags to China. Let's be very clear, it's your handbags and your cars that are dictating your strategic priorities, don't blame your own frilities on someone else. So that's the first thing. I think the question to be asked is that is the question that I'm going to answer is that if the Chinese were to invade Taiwan, what would be the European position? And I can tell you that, in fact, I just told you, right? So that's the first part. The second thing that I heard, which is quite interesting, is about the, in some sense, the relentlessness of the Chinese project expansion, economy and partnerships. And I think that is a very frail assumption to base your future foreign policy on. I would argue that the idea that China would be this 100-feet gorilla is exaggerated. I also would argue that the fact that they would continue to enjoy these balance of favorable trading relationships with these countries in the next decade is also to be seen. In fact, I would argue that we may already have seen them peak. And now what emerges post in the coming years may see a very different, more vulnerable and more messy China. And in that sense, maybe this whole idea of mobilizing the world to take on this great monster may itself be a futile project. And countries through niche arrangements, collaborations, partnerships, can take them on in different sectors. I think the idea that the Chinese are going to dominate the world and therefore we need to start worrying about it itself may be foolhardy in the first instance. I think the Chinese are quite good at destroying their own credibility and economy and integrity in the days ahead. You have to believe in your friends as well as your enemies. And I think you should give them a chance to do that. My simple proposition for many of us is that if your neighbors want to hug China, allow them. Allow them to do it. Many of our neighbors did it. And they have realized the cost of that hug. It doesn't end. Geopolitics is not about the moment. It's about decades and centuries. And I think people must make their own decisions, come to their own conclusions. And I do believe that this is a decade where we will see some sort of a rethinking on part of many countries that today we believe are in the red corner. I think even that is likely to change in the coming days. But our response to China is because we need to respond to China. We are not going to allow Beijing to shape Asia, put the political map of Asia to suit its purpose. And we will, of course, invite all of you to join us in that endeavor to prevent them from doing that. But don't expect us to stand in the corner of Uncle Sam. We are happy taking on the dragon by ourselves. And of course, we seek partnerships as well. Well, thank you very much for addressing the heart of the question. And now we turn to our good friend in Beijing, Wang Jisi. Thank you very much, Doc. Could you hear me? Yes, very hard. Okay, I apologize for not being able to take the conference in person because of the COVID regulations in Beijing. I actually just returned to Beijing from Berlin. And I talked to a number of German officials and scholars there. So I could even provide a German perspective on this picture. The Europeans continue to be strongly interested in trading with and investing in China. Chancellor Schultz went to Beijing last month and Shia, the European Council President, was in Beijing in early December. They will be followed probably by President Macron of France. So Beijing is very happy with all these visits. But in Berlin, some business leaders told me that their commercial interests in China have met with public opinion posts and media reports in Germany that are increasingly negative about China. Chancellor Schultz went to Beijing was somewhat controversial because of a problem. Not only because of a problem in Germany. He belongs to one party and four minutes and his father happened to be on another green party. So there are some problems there. And I also heard in Germany the draft of German's first China strategy report was leaked to the press last month. And the German foreign ministry and the political pressure from home has to modify it to appear somewhat more hawkish toward China. I hope that is not the case, but I'm not sure. Some officials said to me that Germany will increase its military budget be closer to the United States in geopolitical terms and try to strengthen NATO. Europeans and Americans hold similar views on China in ideological terms, being critical of China's human rights and some other domestic policies. So on the one hand, Europe will keep its strategic autonomy, especially in the economic and technological dimensions in dealing with China. Climate change is another dimension for China and Europe to work together. On the other hand, the EU and Britain will lean to the US as far as geopolitics and ideology are concerned. I want to mention the recent visit by Xi Jinping to Saudi Arabia. I think it is not simply a bilateral visit. Xi Jinping joined Arab leaders in the first China-Era states summit and China GCC summit. So I think China has more ambitions than simply bilateral relations with Arab countries. It is trying to establish one to multiple platform with Arab countries and the countries in the region as a whole. And the Chinese say that we are more open. We are more inclusive. They are comparing their scheme with American, some American projects. For instance, Americans have I2U2 mechanism. That is India, Israel, United States and UAE. China says that we should be more inclusive. Our platform can include the United States, European countries, Russia, India, everybody. And we are open to include them in Shanghai Cooperation Organization or BRICS. So probably we'll see a more proactive China's approach to the Middle East and to the third world countries at large. Now a few things about Taiwan. I agree with some others that a massive military action or a full-scale military takeover of Taiwan is not likely in any foreseeable future. The reference to Taiwan in the Chinese Party Congress is milder than most observers expected. The report continues to emphasize peaceful invocation and the one country, two system. Despite the uproars, we often hear from some more militant and the belligerent nationalistic voices in social media. And my, I think China's top priorities at this moment are not Taiwan, they are two-fold. Two-fold, first Omicron or COVID. Beijing's COVID policy changed dramatically since last week and people in Beijing like myself are perplexed to see confusing and conflicting regulations and signals announced by the government. Infection cases are surging alarmingly in my neighborhood and in the whole city of Beijing. Unless and until we successfully deal with this problem, we are not ready to focus on Taiwan. It's hard to imagine that the PLA soldiers landing on Taiwan have to wear masks. Second, the economy, the economic growth is low, the record low this year and unemployment is terribly high. I don't want to expand that because there are more many media reports on China's economy. This is why I think Taiwan is not high on Beijing's political agenda. And recently Xi Jinping met with Biden in Bali, Indonesia and their summit went quite well and they achieved the agreement that they don't want to fight each other with each other and Biden went back saying that he doesn't see the immediate conflict over Taiwan, that is a good sign. However, we in China have to worry about two things on Taiwan. First, US approach to Taiwan is moving from assuring Beijing that Washington will stick to his one China policy to assuring Taipei that it will be given more assistance to the island's defense. We are seeing increased danger that one day Washington would give up his one China policy and instead recognize an independent Taiwan. I'm not thinking this as a reality but they are fierce in China this way. Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan triggered a major military crisis and political crisis. Kevin McCarthy, the prospective, a prospective House speaker in the United States announced he would lead a large congressional delegation to Taiwan early in 2023. If that happened, Beijing would have no choice but to respond with more deciphered military moves which could result in an uncontrollable confrontation. The second hidden danger is Taiwan's internal audience. The opposition party, KMT, won more seats in the last election but even the KMT would not support Taiwan, a type of support reunification with the mainland. I hope that Paul will say more about Taiwan's internal part because he knows a great deal. That is what I'm going to say. Thank you. Thank you very much, Jisoo. You've given us a very concise tour of the horizon on Chinese policy toward Europe, Taiwan and foreign policy generally and domestic politics. I want to turn to my panel now and ask you, starting with the observation that I have which is the invasion of Ukraine by Russia precipitated quite unexpectedly a cascade of commentary in the U.S. about how Ukraine and Taiwan have a lot in common and China will take the lesson from what Putin did. This was mostly in the early months of 2022 after the invasion. There seemed to be a direct relationship between prediction of a coming invasion of Taiwan by China to the lack of knowledge of the person writing the commentary. We have a lot of non-experts offering so-called expert opinion on this. You're all experts on your own countries and attitudes. What do you think are the prospects for this kind of conflict over Taiwan? Jisoo has just reminded us that the U.S. is going through change with the return of the Republicans in Congress. We have an election coming up. Taiwan has a presidential election coming in January 2024 which invites all sorts of new political games to go on in Taiwan. China has just sort of stabilized after the 20th Party Congress. So the action is more likely to be outside China than in in terms of changing the relationship among the three parties. From your individual perspectives, how do you see the situation with respect to Taiwan? Well, don't you think that there are experts and experts and not all policies are made by the right experts? I mean, I don't think if you've gone back way back beyond before February the 24th, a few people would have thought of the invasion, even the Russian invasion of Ukraine, even though there had been a battle over the war in Georgia in 2008. Lasted over five days. I mean, we've got used to the idea that states do not get war against other states. They fight against non-state actors. So that's one thing. Secondly, I think that Donald Trump, now I wouldn't call Donald Trump an expert on anything, but he really did change the whole, perhaps advised by people like Peter Navarro, picture vis-a-vis China and the USA. And the measures that Trump brought in, basically a trade war, they're there and Biden hasn't taken away most of them. And now you have the chip choke. So I think with all due respect to Samir, I mean, yes, everybody wants to avoid things going wrong, but they can go wrong. And one of the problems of, I mean, Biden likes to think of this as democracies against authoritarian states, which I think is a pretty simplistic way of looking at it. But the problem with democracies is that they have very short-term horizons. The experts may not, but the politicians do. And I worry that things, you get a sort of inexorable slide towards something which is worse than you'd want. We'd, nobody in their right minds really would want to have a cold war between the US and China, but it's not exactly a warm feeling at the moment and it's hard to see how the warmth will return. That, I think, is the real problem. And there's no real analogy with the old Cold War. You have the non-aligned movement, but in fact, the non-aligned movement really had to sort of change two sides in the end. I don't think that's going to happen this time because history is not going to repeat itself, but nonetheless, I don't think we're in a happy place. And if, I mean, God forbid Donald Trump were to become president again, all bets are off. Plus, just a last thing. We really do not, I think, understand Xi Jinping. We don't have a real picture of him. If you are in East Asia or in India and South Asia, yes, you have this security architecture. You've got alliances between the US and individual countries and you've got the quad and so on, which I think was an excellent idea. So it's better to talk, but I think it was Lee Kuan Yew who once said when elephants fight, the grass gets trampled and when they make love, the grass gets trampled as well. So we're not really in a terribly happy position. Anyone else want to jump? Okay, well, I think there are many differences between Taiwan and Ukraine. The first one we have to keep in mind is Taiwan is an island. There is no territorial continuity between men in China and Taiwan. So to take control of an island, even with the very modern and sophisticated military, it's a very complicated task. I don't think that the PLA today is ready to launch a landing operation against Taiwan. It can launch missile strikes. It can maybe impose a blocade, but the problem with a blocade is how long you can hold it. And the big difference between Ukraine and Taiwan is I don't think that the US can conduct a proxy war in Taiwan. It's very likely, it's highly likely that the US will be involved in the war in Taiwan with those risks attached to the fact that you have two nuclear power involved in a direct confrontation. So I think that will continue to sort of compel China to think twice before launching an attack against Taiwan. What I see and I agree with this one on that is that it's more likely that China will continue to, it's what has been called, it's a gray zone strategy of coercion against Taiwan than to start a full-fledged invasion of Taiwan. Now the problem with the gray zone strategy is that it's not without risks. And what I'm worried about, of course, is that as I think it was alluded to by T-SIR, it's the fact that the gray zone strategy can get out of control. Imagine if the PLA Air Force enters Taiwan's airspace. The Taiwanese fighter will have to scramble and to force these fighters to move out of the airspace in one way or another. So there are risks of incidents and even of military crisis. The big question is how we both, I mean the US and Taiwan and China, first of all, will be able to manage that crisis. There is no child of communication now between China and Taiwan. I mean, because China has refused to talk to the Taiwanese when. And that's a real issue. You know, on Taiwan, there is a growing, you know, Taiwanese identity, which doesn't mean that everyone is favor independence, but I think the idea is that Taiwan is not the PRC. It's another entity which has an official name which is the Republic of China. And even if it does recognize the nation's status, it's a de facto state. So we have to admit the reality that they actually, even if there is one China, there are two states or two governments which should interact on equal footing. And even if the KMT comes back to power in Taiwan, I don't think that the issue will be solved because everyone in Taiwan is against the idea that Taiwan becomes a special industry region of the PRC. Taiwan is very part of the PRC. So it will, I mean, both sides will have to negotiate another deal. And here, I think it will be much more productive of the part of China to sort of open a China of communication with the Chinese authorities, whoever sits in the presidential palace in Taipei. And here, we far from it. So if there is a rule of honest broker that the US could place to sort of convince China to talk to the authorities in Taiwan, whoever they are. It was Hano who mentioned the Thucydides trap. And I mean, Graham Allison, of course, says it's not inevitable, but it's likely. Which I think is rather worrying. Yes, but the fact that we are having two nuclear powers, I think it's a disincentive. It should sober people up. But we don't know, because that was true under the time of the Orchal War, whether it's gonna be, we meant truly the Nukal War. It's another story, I mean. From your two responses, I get that you'd say, you'd say 60% unlikely there'll be an attack on Taiwan, but there's enough unusual circumstances and potential conflict opportunities that it might be 40% lead us into an undesired conflict. I just have a reaction to that. I don't think at all that there's gonna be an attack in, as our Chinese colleague said, in the near future of Taiwan for several reasons. The first is that it doesn't correspond to the Chinese strategy. The Chinese strategy is to win the war without a battle. And so, to arrive at a moment where the Chinese fleet will be so considerable that the Taiwanese themselves will say, well, okay, we're going to go and get rid of the Apecan babush and the Chinese will respond, well, my dear friends, but of course, you can keep your autonomy and manage yourself. I think that's the Chinese strategy. The Chinese were merchants, they weren't warriors. So, when they wanted to play the warriors, it went very badly. It was against Vietnam in 1979, when they had to give you a lesson. It's rather the Vietnam that gave a lesson to China. So, I think it's not their idea that, by the way, they are merchants and they want to protect their trade. They know very well that if they attack Taiwan, there will be repercussions, considerable sanctions, and they avoid them. And I noticed that the great Chinese societies, and we can contradict here, but the great Chinese societies that are very afraid of the sanctions of Washington and Brussels respect the sanctions. I'm talking about the great societies that were decided against Russia on the war in Ukraine. So, obviously, an attack from Taiwan would be possible. It would be possible when the Americans would have the head elsewhere. We have already had this phenomenon. We have already had Turkey, which took 40% of the island of Cyprus in the summer of 1974. Why was Turkey able to take 38% of the island of Cyprus? Because Washington's power was completely paralyzed by the Wattegate affair today. So, I think that if the Chinese attacked Taiwan, they would do it, for example, during an American election or a contested election or something like that. But it's not their... Today, it doesn't seem to me to be their first policy. It seems to me, but I can be wrong, it seems to me to be to, first of all, protect their trade. Thank you for introducing those factors right now. Listening to Jisoo and all of the conversations and thinking about, you know, we say we don't know Xi Jinping after 10 years in office, well, if we don't know him after 10 years, I'm worried because we ought to know something about the man by now. It strikes me that... But I don't think he's had any single interview with a length interview. No, that's not going to happen. But I would propose that this is a good time, if China wants to change its tactics. We're seeing in various subtle ways China pulling back on its aggressiveness in the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands and others. They're not changing fundamental positions, but they're being less aggressive. Maybe that'll be true on the Indian line of actual control as well, I don't know, at this point. But it would be... For me, it would be a great time for China to show some tactical flexibility if Kevin McCarthy shows up in Taipei with a delegation. China says, what, another speaker of the House shows up? Who cares? We're not going to have an active... Secondly, China can quietly begin to recommence communication with Taiwan's authorities, send some faxes with their former contacts who were in regular contact with the mainland before Tsai Ing-Wen got elected as president. China could lower the temperature a lot during this crisis or to head off a crisis in the time ahead, if it wants to think creatively. Yeah, I mean, do you have a point? I want to turn some to the audience in a couple of minutes so please be brief. I think, you see, this year, the US has made two very important declarations regarding China. One is made by Janet Yellen, US trade secretary in April that US will pursue free but secure trade with French showing. It's a very significant declaration. That means the US will not address China issues within the context of WTO. Second, the important declaration was made in October by US National Security Strategy, which designated China as the only competitor which both have intent and capability to reshape international order. It was preceded by sweeping ban on sales of advance chips to China a week earlier. You know, Thomas Friedman of New York Times described that it is the factor declaration of war of the United States against China. But I would like to draw your attention that US rhetoric is very strong. However, with regard to IPF, the core strategy of US Indo-Pacific strategy, Indo-Pacific economy framework, US has not invited Taiwan. IPF is the factor, FTA negotiations minus market access. However, it's a FTA which is totally legal under the WTO even if US invited Taiwan because since FTA is negotiated under the framework WTO, WTO membership is not for sovereign states, it's for customs territory. So it is totally legal for US to include Taiwan in IPF, but they do not. They instead pursue bilateral trade and investment agreement with Taiwan, which I think US is mindful of the red line with regard to Taiwan by China. US strong rhetoric against possibility of China's aggression to Taiwan is to deter China's aggression into Taiwan, I may suspect. Thank you. Two short points and I think we can go to the audience. The first, I am really worried when very wise people around the world somehow assume that she is a very rational and sane actor. And there are no data points to prove that. Nothing that he has done since he has taken charge would lead you to believe that you're dealing with someone who is rational and mature. And yet, we are painting him in the colors of great wisdom. Well, he did have wolf warrior diplomacy. Yeah, so that is quite wise, right? So if that is the data point that makes you believe that he is a wise actor, I am worried. Now that's one part of it. So I think let's not be premature in our assessment that we are dealing with someone who's wise and sage and will bide his time. He's not interested in biding his time anymore. I think that is the only single message that is coming out of she is China. No need to hide, no need to bide. It is time to take claim and it's time to reshape the politics of the world. I think that is the single message. If you're not hearing it, then I want you to come to some conferences we host in Delhi and start hearing that because I think some of us don't get the message. That's number one. Number two, and this is important. I think, forget about Tehwan. The question should be what do you do when China decides to change the territorial map of any country in the world? I think that's the question you should ask. They gave you a fate, a compliance, how China see what did you do? They disregarded the tribunal verdict, what did you do? They decided to change the map of the Himalayas, what did you do? You told us trade more with China, I have a dialogue. If I was Tehwan, I should be very worried. None of your behavior should give any sort of confidence to Tehwan that there is going to be any sort of response from any quarter. You will tell Tehwan, we will have a new trade deal with you, join them. I suspect that is going to be the voice coming out of Europe, because that is what we heard. Now, I'm not even going further west, ask the Afghanistan folks what they think about believing in anyone who believed that they were going to create order and value-based foreign policies. You threw them under the truck. In prime-time television, who is in that part of the world going to rely on any sort of, anyway, sorry. Well, thank you for those two interjections. Now, we are ready to take questions from the audience. I hope the microphones are ready. We have questions here in the front row. This is handed out for a while, then we'll first hear and then there. Thank you. Yeah, my name is Zakhil Aidyam, special advisor to the higher representative of the European Union. I do believe that it's quite naive to think that China will never use force because they are from a merchant tradition. Apart from that, I wanted to hear from our Asian colleagues their reading on the 7 October decision taken by the United States, which we regard in Europe as an extremely, extremely, extremely important declaration with huge implications. First, because the impact is wide, fundamentally the United States is trying to replicate the Hawaii way model to the whole semiconductor industry. It had been done largely on a unilateral basis and the point in common that we have with the Chinese, with the Japanese, sorry, is that one of their firm is like our Dutch firm, ASML, largely concerned by the decision. So I didn't read precise assessment on this, so I would be really happy to hear about the assessment you made, I mean, in all three countries on this decision, which in my view is one of the most fundamental decision taken by the administration on the line of the Trump administration. Thank you. Thank you for that question about the Tom Friedman's declaration of war. We have a question here and then one across the room. Oui. Une question. Curiously, on a part of Hong Kong, est-ce que la cause de Hong Kong est totalement oubliée? Est-ce que la messe est complètement dite? Ça, c'est ma première question pour Jean-Pierre Camestan. La deuxième est peut-être plus une remarque, peut-être pour notre ami chinois. La Chine est confrontée à un recul économique majeur, parce que je prends l'hypothèse que 4% de croissance en Chine c'est l'équivalent de la croissance zéro pour nous, à peu près. Est-ce qu'il n'y a pas quand même un risque que face à cet presque échec économique, il n'y a eu une montée en puissance d'un discours nationaliste et, comme l'a dit notre ami indien, il n'est pas du tout sûr que Xi Jinping soit aussi rationnel que nous ne le pensons. One more question across here, to the end of the road. Alors, sans remettre en cause la justesse du sujet et en l'occurrence la rivalité sino-américaine, vous me permettrez de me poser en votre présence des questions. En fait, le sujet essentiel est aussi les nouveaux mondes qui viennent. Réduire l'intégralité de la dynamique des changements actuels à la seule rivalité sino-américaine est à mon sens d'abord frustrante pour tout le reste. Cela veut dire que, dans l'inconscient des gens qui l'abordent, le monde qui vient va toujours à un monde rivalité et domination, donc très sympathique pour l'intégralité des autres pays. Mais au-delà de cette problématique, quand on s'intéresse de très près aux grands acteurs, d'abord l'acteur américain, il emporte avec lui son monde, sa vision, sa philosophie, son espace financier. Il a évolué, il se pose des questions, il essaye de rebâtir d'autres alliances, il le projette. Donc c'est déjà un monde. C'est un système monde, le G7. En face, les Chinois sont loin d'être inintelligent. Ils ne réduisent pas leur évolution à la seule rivalité sino-américaine. Ils se posent la question, si face à un système monde, ils peuvent à eux tout seul prétendre le remettre en question. Et que font-ils ? Ils essayent de structurer un nouveau monde contre un sein terrestre à la route de la soie, la réduire à une seule dimension commerciale c'est me connaître totalement la pensée politique des uns et des autres. Ils savent, et ils ne sont pas les seuls, que face à un monde essayé de triompher ou de faire basculer, il faut un autre monde, d'où d'ailleurs les instruments des uns et des autres qui s'appellent embargo, qui s'appellent contenir, qui s'appellent... Et en mon sens, s'intéresser au monde qui vient, aux stratégies développées par les uns et les autres pour mieux comprendre les évolutions qui viennent et quelles sont les stratégies des acteurs, serait certainement plus opportun. Je vous remercie. Well, we have three questions, which the October to 7 decision, which is very Trumpist-like from the Biden administration, to constrain China's future science, high-tech growth. Is China getting weaker? Or is China going to dictate the world order? Last weekend, there was a conference in Washington where the Secretary of State, Blinken, spoke, and he said that China is now so strong, we have to worry they're going to try to take over Taiwan. And a few hours later, his deputy spoke and said, China is so weak now, we have to worry they may want to come and take over Taiwan. So that's, we've got full circularity in our thinking about how to deal with it. Questions give the panel a chance to respond. Do any of you want to speak? And Gisele, there was a question directed to you as well. We'd like to go first. Well, yes, but I don't speak, I don't understand French, and so I didn't get the questions to me. Anyway, I would intervene by saying, first of all, there's a great deal of concern in China when you compare Ukraine with Taiwan. To all the Chinese, Taiwan is part of China. Ukraine is a sovereign state. So whatever we do to Taiwan is a domestic affairs. Whatever we do is the legal and the legitimate. So that's why we don't take Taiwan and Ukraine together. This of course is your official position and also the public sentiment that makes some sense. The problem is, of course, most people in, people in most countries in the United States recognize one China and Taiwan is part of China. There's a great distinction between US position and US-Chinese position on this issue. That is, the United States says it has one China policy and we say we have a one China principle. The difference is whether Taiwan is part of China. US one China policy says the United States only recognize the PRC as the representative of China and there's only one China. But what is Taiwan? It doesn't say, it is sometimes very ambiguous about this, but another problem we have to worry about is that there is a very strong military commitment made by the United States in defending Taiwan. And the United States does not and did not make such a commitment to Ukraine. That is also a very meaningful difference. Thank you, Gisa. I think you also touched in your earlier remarks on the difficulties of overcoming COVID, Omicron challenges inside China and the challenges to the Chinese economy's growth in the current period, which I think partly addresses the question that was addressed to you. Now to the October 7th and other issues, please. Panel. May I? Yes. Well, relating to realignment of supply chain in the region, I think that the many Japanese business companies are now thinking about several important factors. Number one, Chinese population is shrinking while the United States and India population are expanding. This is a new trend. The other thing is that domestic politics in China becomes much more unpredictable than before. This is number two. Number three is that there are some geoeconomic risks in the United States, not just in China. It means that as long as the United States government or the Congress is introducing more legal actions to try to decouple the area, I mean, that's why Japanese business companies need to consider these new risks to export goods to the United States. Because of this, I think that the Japanese business companies, more and more Japanese business companies are now diversifying the direction of Japanese investments in other countries, particularly in Indonesia and India, together with other countries. So this is a new trend. Even though China remains really important Japanese trading partner, but relatively speaking, I think that the Japanese business company are now diversifying its trading strategy unlike before, considering American decoupling policy which introduced more legal actions to try to decouple the two economic blocks. So can I just very quickly respond to your question? I think it's an important question that you asked. If you were to remove Xi Jinping era and go back, say, 10 years, you would find much of India's anxiety centered around American control of critical sectors that could be inimical to our growth in the future. And it's a fact. Whether it's the control of the ICANN, whether it's control of some of the key electronic and energy supplies, that was true. Today, because of the behavior of Xi Jinping, there might be a tendency for some to see this as a good political choice to make and perhaps see the U.S. as the lesser of the problem vis-a-vis what China offers today. But for a country of our size where I'm sitting, I think we will have to diversify and we will have to build some of our own capabilities alongside. So I think for us, having anyone control the single most important, whiter ingredient for our economic growth and having only one source as an option is not very comfortable. Like I said, go back 10 years and Indian anxiety would be about best in control of key inputs. Come in, Xi Jinping comes in and suddenly we start seeing the world in a different way. But on a longer term, I agree with the Japanese colleague. Diversification, investments into multiple different geographies and building certain critical capabilities for countries that have size and scale is vital. So I think Korean companies are very mindful of the U.S. sanctions and especially the October 7th is a sweeping ban on advanced ship sale to China. Definitely, Korea will abide by U.S. sanctions and relevant laws and regulations. However, in view of the fact that China is the largest market of the world, Korean companies will not give it up. Therefore, Korean companies from now on will be in China but only just for China. They will not use China as a hub for exporting to certain countries. Well, thank you for that. Ladies and gentlemen, we've reached the end of our time and we are the last. I jump here on Hong Kong, which I thought was a very good one. You are on Hong Kong? Oh, very, very, very quickly, please. Very, very quickly. I would say from a political point of view, it's game over. I don't think there is any meaningful political life in Hong Kong anymore. So I think it's the Communist Party and its local representatives, the so-called Hong Kong patriots who are running the place. Now, it doesn't mean that Hong Kong is slowly aligned to China in terms of public freedoms. We still have a free access to internet. I think we still enjoy more academic freedom than in China, but it's part of China and I think the Communist Party is really much in a driving seat in Hong Kong now. Well, thank you. And thank you audience for staying with us. Please join me in thanking our panel for their observations.