 LOFAT H Jones, يерв. The real world began. My name is Katherine Beannon and I'm chair of the Germany Group. We're very lucky I think judging by our conversation at lunchtime and his reputation to have Dr Stefan Meister with us today. He's head of the Robert Bosch centre for Into Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia at the German Council on Foreign Relations at the Degae Aberfe whom we know very well in this house. Previously he worked as a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He served several times as an election observer for the OSCE in post-Soviet countries, and was responsible for university projects in Russian regions, particularly interestingly in Kili-Nengrad. Cyfnodol 1516, mae'n ddiwedd i'n ffrwng iddo o'r Llanffan transatladau ymddangos i Washington i rhai i ddweudio'r ddysgu i'r ddim yn Ffrodd Llyfrin ac i'r droparadau. Felly, mae'n fawr o'i amlion ffordd o'r rhaglen o'r rhaglen o'r rhaglen o'r rhaglen o'r rhaglen i normalig. A chydw i ddim yn ychydig i ddim yn ffoddiwch i ffoddiwch arbennig neu y gwirioneddau'n ddysgu. Felly, rydw i'n rhaid i ddim yn rhaid i gael y cwestiwn ar gyfer y rhaid i gael y cwestiwn, y gall wedi'i ddynnu'r rhaid. Felly, ddau'r cymdeithas. Felly, rydw i'n ddim yn ddod? Felly, ddau'r cymdeithiol. Felly, ddau'r cymdeithiol ar y mynd i ddim yn rhaid i'r cymdeithio, ddau'r cymdeithiol. Mae'r cymdeithiol yn ystod yw'r cymdeithio, mae'n cymdeithio o fewn i'r cymdeithiol, G clicking, the German Council on foreign relations. It has been built in the 1950s on the model of Chatham House at this time. So I'm in particular, happy to be here in Dublin and also happy to discuss with you Russia at this place which is maybe not the key topic in Ireland, but I think the Russian topic and German-Russian relations, Danielport smiles the whole Europe. Amt y prydd stands ar rimio pwysig effeithy o'n eich cyutoedd tre Collin, ac wedi gwneud y Llanig Y绵r Rh Annisiau. Y cip dda'n sèryd alw'r rhaglen rhywbeth yn yr ei geisnig gyda gweld I will look on particular issues like North Stream 2, Syria and so on. So I first give you the framework and where are we with Russia at the moment. Germany's Eastern policy has been traditionally driven by a Russia-first approach. This is due to the close historical relations, but it's also about the guild complex of World War II and the thankfulness of the peaceful German unification that shapes the perception of the German society towards the East until now. So it's very strongly historically driven. There is a substantial social basis for the German-Russian relations with corporations of societies, schools, universities and cities. There's no other language in the world except English where we have been so much translated from Russian into German. So there's just a huge social interest also in this big neighbor. Partnership for Modernisation has become the main instrument of relations with Russia in the 2000s. The main idea is that economic cooperation will support political change in Russia. It will create a middle class, like in the German model, that demands a political democratisation and rule of law in Russia. That was the German idea. This approach stands in the tradition of Western German Ostpolitik of the 1970s towards the Soviet Union with the approach of change through interweavement. The more real politic-like approach in the 1970s by accepting the realities of the Cold War and the new borders in the East of after World War II and start a dialogue with economic and energy relations and the improvement of exchange of societies has been replaced by an approach in the 2000s that ignored, in my opinion, the reality of the Putin system and wanted, first of all, change through trade. So we wanted to do trade and we had a nice wording in doing trade with an authoritarian regime. This policy has failed with the Putin system. The current Russian regime has neither interest in political change nor democratisation because it would lead to a loss of power and a loss of rent seeking options for the ruling elites. It was first of all the Ukraine conflict which became a reality check for the German Eastern policy. As a result, we observe the failure of the partnership of modernisation but also a deep loss of trust and the fundamental alienation on the top political level between both countries. I think this is the deepest loss of trust since the end of the Cold War, what we have seen in 2014. With regard to Russia, we observe in German politics since 2014 a shift from the dominance of the economy over politics to a dominance of politics over the economy. The German economy had to accept sanctions towards Russia and lost impact on the decision making in the Russia and Eastern Europe policy of the German leadership. This is really a shift. The German-Russian trade halved in 2015 and 2016 compared to 2008 but it is growing since this time and has reached now 30 billion euro in the first half of 2018. So we are back to annually 55, 58, 60 billion US dollar trade turnover between Russia and Germany. But Russia is still behind Poland and Czech Republic in its trade turnover. For Germany, Poland is much more important than Russia in trade and even Czech Republic. Company leaders like the CEO of Siemens, Joe Kaiser, have been much criticized in the public and political circles for their trips to Moscow and meeting with Mr Putin at this time. We observed the securitisation of many areas in the relations with Russia for the first time Russia has become in the German political and public perception more a security threat than an economic or energy partner. So you even see it in a discourse, this change. But the old mantra of the German-Aust politic is still more or less consensus among German elites. There is no peace and security in Europe without Russia. Every German foreign minister has said this when they started. But we might see now even there a change. It has been argued by Mr Steinmeier and by Mr Gabriel, still not by Mr Heiko Maas, the current foreign minister. The Minsk Negotiations on Donbas became a top priority for German politics. Berlin took ownership and responsibility in the relations with Ukraine to stop the war on its territory. This has even become a personal issue for Angela Merkel. So she really was very much personally involved in these Minsk Negotiations. She talked with Putin on the telephone daily or weekly for a time. So there was very much ownership by the chancellor. At the same time we observed fundamental differences and I think these are structural differences in the German-Russian relations with regard to values and interests. This is about domestic and foreign policy. If you look to the German side, rule of law, open markets, competition and transparency. Versals on the Russian side, corruption, intransparency, lack of rule of law, which both expressed the differences between both countries. I think it's very interesting to look to the review of a German foreign policy in 2014. There was a big review by the foreign office which had two key results. The first thing was that they created also new departments in the German MFA, strengthening institutions of international law and multilateral instruments for crisis management. Both have become a key issue in the German foreign policy. If you see the last announcements from the US undermining international court system, I think we can also see that there is also a growing conflict also with regard to Germany's and US interests with this regard. The German legal approach stands in conflict with Russian politics which undermines international institutions and international law and argues for a multipolar world against multilateralism. Russian leadership wants to renegotiate the European security order and does not accept any more the Paris Charter and the Budapest memorandum. This is against German and EU interests because it would mean the acceptance of zones of influence and the limited sovereignty of states, particularly in the common neighbourhood with Russia and the EU. As I said, we have a similar tendency with US President Donald Trump at the moment who also undermines existing international order. You might have seen the article and speeches of Foreign Minister Heiko Maas who argues for more independence and less vulnerability from the US and for Europe United policy. So, Russian disinformation, cyber attacks, I think this is also an issue we should not underestimate. So disinformation and cyber attacks on the Bundestag have even more alienated German-Russian relations and increased the fundamental loss of trust. Chancellor Merkel has become the leader on sanctions against Russia, holding EU member states here also together. This was not expected in Moscow. The current policy towards Russia is based on a double approach, containment where necessary and cooperation where possible. But there's a lack of a long-term approach for Russia and Eastern European neighbourhood policy. The reforms in the EU will impact on the future of the neighbourhood policy and there's no consensus about any enlargement at the moment but a tendency for a multi-speed EU or for multi-speed Europe. Germany is even willing to increase its defence budget and deploy troops and has deployed troops already in one of the Baltic states to reassure NATO Allies. I think this is really something new from a German perspective. And there was not really a big discussion when this happened which underlines also a kind of normalisation of Germany's policy. But a 2% discussion in NATO is highly controversial in Germany. This is one of the key, beside migration at the moment, one of the key discussions we observe. Nevertheless, Angela Merkel's approach on Russia is criticised in the German society, which is still pretty pacifistic, increasingly anti-Americanistic and her tough approach towards Russia is not popular among all parts of the society. Polls show for 80% of the Germans, Putin is a threat and Putin's Russia is a threat, but only 45 of the Germans who have been asked support the sanctions. So less than 50% support sanctions against Russia. There are now more Germans who trust Vladimir Putin than Donald Trump. Maybe it's not a big surprise, but according to the second German TV, only 14% of the Germans see in the US under Trump a reliable partner. 14%, 36% in Putin's Russia and 43% in China under Xi. So really strange numbers. We observe a growing right-wing and left-wing populist, which sees Russia as an alternative to US influence in Germany and Europe. And we have a split between Eastern and Western Germany. Eastern Germans' heads of lender promote to stop sanctions and to criticise markets' Russia policy, which is a big issue here for parties like alternative for Germany to get additional votes in Eastern Germany. So there's a very pro-Putin, I call it not pro-Russian, but a Putin-friendly or Russia maybe also can say Russia-friendly part in Eastern Germany. And this is used by left parties or left-wing populists and by right-wing party alternative for Germany. AfD is now, Alternative for Germany, is now the biggest opposition party in the Bundestag, which promotes parts of the Russian propaganda and disinformation in the Bundestag. It has developed close networks with the Kremlin party Ydynia Russia, United Russia, and its youth organisation. In the same poll I just mentioned, 61% of AfD proponents see in Russia a reliable partner for Germany. So there are even more different numbers. So this brings me to the second part. What are the latest developments in the German-Russian relations? So what have we seen in the last month on key issues of international relations? My first point is what we observed since a couple of months is again a shift in the German-Russian relations in my opinion. After Ukraine has impacted on every topic in the relations with Russia, we now observe a partly de-Ukrainisation of the German-Russian relations and the interest on both sides to establish functioning working relations. So there is a kind of a normalisation of the relations. The meeting of Vladimir Putin and Angela Merkel in Sochi in May this year, the visit of General Staff Gerasimov and Foreign Minister Lavrov in July in Berlin, and again Putin and Merkel in Miseberg in August, mark a new, more pragmatic, interest-oriented approach in the bilateral relations. My second point is because of the changing international environment, and I think this is the reason why we observe this change, and the current US policy, both sides understand that Germany and Russia have overlapping interests and are in some areas interdependent, and that they need to develop functioning working relations. We observe the development of two parallel tracks. On the one side, there is still Ukraine, the Minsk Agreement, where Germany will take its responsibility and sticks to the agreed sanctions on Crimea and Donbass. On the other side, there are other topics like the future of Syria, the impact of US sanctions on the German-Russian trade, Nord Stream 2 and the future of the Iran nuclear agreement, which needs to be discussed by both leaders without interference of the Ukraine issue. Both countries have an interest that the GCPOA stays alive. Both are too weak to stop US President Trump, so it's more rhetorical support, but in reality I think we cannot do much against it. German companies already withdraw from Iran because of the importance of the US market. Russia is economically too weak to make a difference, and I think China will be in the end the winner of the developments and it's more able to ignore US pressure. The situation in Syria has become a key topic in the relations. This is my third point. While Vladimir Putin wants to have the acceptance of al-Assad as the future leader and needs European money to rebuild Syria, Germany sets conditions how this political process has to set up with regard to democratic change and human rights. At the same time, Berlin has an interest to stabilise Syria, that refugees can return not only from Germany, but in particular from the neighbouring countries. This is really a big threat which is seen in Germany at the moment. The main threat from the German perspective in the region is a destabilisation of countries like Jordan, Lebanon or even Turkey, which could result in a new migration wave to Europe. This is what the German government is afraid of the most. Against strength and populace and so on. Migration is the main issue in the German domestic and also now in the German foreign policy. Germany will have to accept at least a transition period with Assad, but the way how Idlib will be retaken by Russia, Syria and Iran will impact on any agreement with the EU. So the third point in the latest US-Russia sanctions which now really hurt the Russian economy, but have been coordinated neither with the EU nor Berlin. We had the latest Scripal US sanctions by the end of August, which focus on military equipment and technology, but they are linked and this is more important with a new wave of sanctions after 90 days. If Russia shows no visible steps in its behaviour toward chemical weapons, these sanctions will come, which might target companies participating in Nord Stream 2, the financial sector refinancing of debts for Russian banks and even the Russian participation in the Swift system. So all these sanctions are there, which of them will be used, we still don't know. This all will impact German-Russian trade and German companies directly. Donald Trump is using Nord Stream 2 as a bargaining chip against Germany to get a trade deal with the EU. Angela Merkel works on an agreement with the Russian president to get volumes of gas through Ukraine after Nord Stream 2 has been built to sell this to Washington but also the critical EU countries to soften their position. But she will never, in my opinion, she will never become a reliable agreement with Mr Putin on these volumes because it's not in Russia's interest. I think one of the main aims for Mr Putin is to build Nord Stream 2, is to cut off drunted dependency from Ukraine and to punish Ukrainian leadership. Angela Merkel underestimates looking more deeper into the Nord Stream 2 issue. She has underestimated the distracting effects of Nord Stream 2 in the EU. She tried to ignore the project more or less, but in the end she supported it by ignoring the EU support project. German companies lobbied the project with its beneficials for the country because it's becoming an energy hub of Russian gas to the EU. Merkel's support of the pipeline is the result of a domestic bargaining in Germany where not only the German energy companies but also the lender like Mecklenburg and Prandenburg lobbied the project and she made a deal for the support of her coalition partner, SPD, to support sanctions towards Russia, which is also an irony in itself. At the same time, also US sanctions will not stop Nord Stream 2. Now only Gazprom owns the project, participating European companies only give money and Gazprom will finish the pipeline also if the US decides to make us sanction the project and the European companies withdraw completely from the project. So I think and also if I talk to Russian colleagues, I think Putin wants to have the project, he will build the project and he will not care in the end about US sanctions. Looking for the relations with Russia and an additional trend is a generation change in the German foreign policy elite. Heiko Maas is the first foreign minister who has no personal relations with Russia, who is not linked with the social democratic politics and has more ties with France and EU. He has a strong legacy in human rights and rule of law which impacts his policy style. I think this opens opportunities for Russia policy which is more sober and more oriented on how Russia under Putin has developed than a Russia which we would like to have like in the past. I think there was always this idealistic approach of the Germans we would like to have a different Russia than we have. He is more close with his approach to Angela Merkel than to parts of his own party. So he is very much under pressure in his own party, the social democratic rights. At the same time, and I think he is also a negative side, Germany is increasingly lacking stakeholders who have networks and ties with Russia, who speak the language and can develop these personal relations which might be sometimes important. The pressure in the social democratic party to improve relations with Russia to gradually lift sanctions have proposed by foreign ministers is growing. So there is also a split in the party landscape and in the parties inside and in German society. We are in a stalemate in relations with Russia at the moment where both sides wait that the other side moves and make compromises. But for Mr Putin compromises are weaknesses. He will only make a step forward from a position of strength and does not see any reason to make compromises in Ukraine when the EU is weak and the split in the transatlantic relations is growing. And I don't think that further US sanctions will change this approach. It will even harden the position. Putin wants to bargain with Germany on the topics I have mentioned but does not see Europe as a model anymore. But the main problem for Germany and the EU is in my opinion the current US policy under Donald Trump. Russian leader feels under attack by the West and also instrumentalizes the conflict with the West as a source of legitimization for the Putin system and the lack of reforms. Moscow has an interest to renegotiate the security order in Europe but this is something Moscow will not discuss with Berlin or Brussels but only with Washington. So we are not a serious security player for the ruling elites in Russia. Moscow wants to renegotiate arms control treaties like INF and New START but the current US president has no interest in this topic. We are lacking all the instruments of the Cold War who have helped to build confidence measures, communication channels for dangerous military situations or accidents and try to limit arms race. Both Washington and Moscow invest in the modernization of their nuclear arsenal but fail to talk about how to control each other and to build a certain level of trust. I think this is first of all dangerous for the security in Europe especially in times of a growing alienation in the transatlantic relations. So I am nearly finished to sum up. Germany's Russia policy is key for the EU but needs to be coordinated with the other EU member states. Germany had its reality check and has changed assessment of Putin's Russia but it still acts partly in the framework of old-ost politic which with for instance projects like Nord Stream 2. We are still in a transition period to a new Russia and Eastern Europe policy and need to talk with Moscow about international conflicts like in Syria. At the same time, Moscow is often more spoiler than a partner to solve the conflicts. It fools conflicts instead of solving them. Russia's internal weakness, the lack of economic modernization, the ongoing economic crisis and the social change will not lead to more compromises but to more conflict to distract from the internal weaknesses. The conflict with the West has become a key source of legitimization of the Putin system which means there is no interest in the Kremlin to solve this conflict at the moment. This is my final point. Therefore, peaceful coexistence is the only positive outcome we can reach with the current Russian leadership to prevent military accidents, to improve communication and confidence-building measures, to invest in social exchange with Russia also through visa-ease should be crucial part of our policy. That means the combination of robust military containment and engagement at least in the areas where overlapping interests will be a part of our relationship with Russia within the next years. Thank you very much.