 Our next speaker also does not need an introduction. However, he slipped me 20 bucks, so I'm going to give you a brief one here. So Michael Oslam is recognized as one of the nation's leading experts on Asia's regional and political issues. He's a resident scholar and the director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He's the author of several books, including the most recent, The End of the Asia Century, War, Stagnation, and the Risk to the World's Most Dynamic Region. His awards include being named the Young Global Leader by the World Economic Forum, a Fulbright Scholar, and a Marshall Memorial Fellow by the German Marshall Fund. He is a frequent contributor to Wall Street Journal, Forbes, and National Group. Dr. Oslam received his PhD from the University of Illinois and a bachelor's degree from Georgetown University. Please join me in welcoming Dr. Michael Oslam. Mike, thank you very much, Admiral. Admiral's, Congressman Forbes, ladies and gentlemen. It's a pleasure to be here. I really appreciate the energy, the passion, the humor that General Neller brought to the conference. That's over now. So I do. It's always a pleasure to be here. Come back to Newport, people say it. I can tell you as a member of the non-defense community in Washington, D.C., just how important the work that the Naval War College does, which you do here, the way that you train leaders, is becoming not only in a capital but in a world of increasing uncertainty and complexity. And that's really what I want to talk to you about today. I actually wanted to come in and give you a good news story. A few years ago I went out to Asia because I wanted to understand the future. I had worked on Asia for decades, like probably a lot of you in this room. I had lived there. I had studied it. I taught it and I was working on it in policy ways in Washington, D.C. And like everyone, I had watched it go from this city, like Shanghai back in the 1980s, to this. And there were good reasons why in just the space of a couple decades, we thought that the 21st century was going to be the Asian century. Whether you looked at economics and trade, 40% of global output, for example. Whether you looked at the growth of militaries, the world's largest militaries and some of its most advanced militaries. When you looked at the increasing political influence of Asia across the globe, its cultural reach, whatever you looked at, you thought this was the dynamic region. This was the part of the globe that was going to define our future. And I wanted to go and not do what everyone was doing, which is just write a book about the inexorable shift of power from West to East, but actually talk about how our future, our American future, had to be an Asian one. That we had to discard our Atlanticist DNA and embrace the Pacific within us so that we too could take advantage of those opportunities that we all saw represented by cities like Shanghai. So I went out to Asia to write all that. And a funny thing happened on the way to the book. And that is that everyone I talked to, from heads of state down to, yeah, the cab drivers on the streets, talked to me about their fears, their worries, the problems they were facing. It wasn't trying to sell me on the idea of the Asian century. It wasn't saying, hey, your time in the sun is over and you got to get used to it. Instead, they were saying to me, these are the things that you guys in America aren't paying attention to. So of course I ignored them because I knew the book that I wanted to write. You know, you go out there, you have your idea. I got five days, I got to get it done. But I kept hearing it over and over and over, over months that I would be going back, whether it was India, whether it was China, Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, name it, any of the countries. And after a while, it sunk in and I realized that this was the great untold side of the Asian miracle. The thing that we had become used to had another side to it. It was as the late great radio commentator Paul Harvey used to say, it was the rest of the story. And so ultimately that's the story that I wound up telling, that I wanted to bring to us to say, you know what, we have to change our mindset because if we don't, we're not going to be able to deal with the reality of the Asia that is out there. So I had a couple of problems then on the way to figuring out how to do this. The first one seemed sort of simple, but it actually wasn't. And that was the basic question. What's Asia? If you ask two people, you get three different definitions. When I was at Yale, we used to have a, or still do, have an East Asian studies department, a South Asian studies department, Central Asia, maybe Southeast Asia would sneak in there somewhere. The US government does it the same way. You have assistant secretaries for East Asia and South Asia, or eventually you will, but generally you do. They'll be there. So everything's divided up. But that wasn't the Asia that I heard the Asians talking about. And granting that however you defined Asia, and we heard one earlier definition today, it was going to be a judgment call. The Asia that I kept hearing the Asians talk about was this Asia. It's what I call the Indo-Pacific region. It's that great sweeping arc from India up to Japan. It's continental. It's peninsular. It's archipelagic. It's the world's largest countries down to smallest city-states. It's political regime from totalitarian North Korea to free-wheeling democratic Taiwan and South Korea. Biggest economies to non-existent economies. Nuclear powers to countries that basically don't even have a military force. And that doesn't even account for the thousands, when you add it all up, the thousands of religions, languages, dialects, microcultures that make up the most dynamic region on Earth. And of all the places, by the way, that I've either worked with or talked to Asia about or deal with Asia, there's only one that I think gets it right and gets this right. And not surprisingly, it's U.S. Pacific Command. The AOR of Pacific Command is essentially this, of course, stretched out mostly to the west coast of the United States. Navy, of course, you got it right. But everywhere else, we still divide up Asia, even as the Asians begin to think of it differently. And by the way, if you take a circle, you draw a circle around that area that I just delineated. I think you guys know this, but most Americans don't. More people live inside that circle on Earth than live outside that circle. Today, nearly one out of every three persons on Earth is of Indian or Chinese heritage descent. So to paraphrase Leon Trotsky, probably something you don't do too much here at the Naval War College, to paraphrase Leon Trotsky, you may not be interested in Asia, but Asia is interested in you. It's more than half your world. But again, it wasn't the Asia that I saw unfolding before me as I was going through it trying to figure out how to write about it. It was a different Asia than what we saw on MSNBC or on the Wall Street Journal and the pages of our magazines. So I knew the Asia I wanted to talk about. The problem was what exactly was I going to say? I'm a historian. I didn't want to be predictive, try to predict a war, predict a revolution. I did learn, by the way, that that's the way to write a bestseller. I will never make that mistake again. I will write a predictive book. But I did want to be diagnostic. I wanted to analyze the trends that we had not paid attention to. And at the end of the day, I realized what I really was talking about was a story of risk. We heard a little bit, Tom Mink, and talked a little bit about risk today earlier. But it was really a story about risk and different kinds of risk. And so then the problem became, if I'm going to tell a different story about Asia than what we're used to hearing, a different story about half our world. If it's a story about risk, first of all, what kinds of risk? And secondly, and more difficultly, how do you conceptualize risk? I mean, this is a great map. I see what the countries look like and the oceans look like. I know what the geographic map looks like. Ultimately, I figured out that it sounded too simplistic, but it helped me work through it all, that maybe we should think about Asia in a different way. Maybe we should try to create a risk map of Asia. What would that look like? So we came up with this sort of Lord of the Rings style looking map here. Just a different way to think about it. And if you'll join me on a short tour of this continent of risk Asia, this skull island of risk, I'll walk you through what I discovered as I spent several months going through Asia. And the five big, bold regions that you see are what I call the risk regions. They're really the risk trends that correspond to what I would consider the biggest dangers that Asia faces. Also the five main chapters of the book. And then I'll let you know what some of the prescriptions were at the end of it and then hopefully have time for a few questions. The book starts up there and that quadrant up in the north failed economic reform. And I think that really gets to the story we've told ourselves about Asia for the past half century. A land where all the roads eventually would be paved in gold. That whether it was going to be Japan back in the 1970s and 80s, the four tigers in the 80s and 90s, China since then, that this was the area where all you had to do to make money would show up. If you wanted to hit water, just fall out of the boat. That's what Asia was for probably half a century in our mindset. Today, we have a very different Asia. And I think those days are over again without being predictive. But you think about how our debate over China has changed in just a couple of years when we know that China's gone from 10% growth down to 6.5% growth to wherever it's going now. Where you look at Japan, 25 years of being unable to get out of economic stagnation. Or you look at India, supposedly the world's fastest growth rate now, but with enormous structural problems that seem in many cases unlikely to be solved or Southeast Asia, which may never reach that takeoff stage that we assume. Massive and crippling debt throughout the region. With a $20 trillion debt bomb. Labor shortages in countries you wouldn't think about it like China, for example, Japan obviously, South Korea. I'll talk a little bit more about that in a second. Environmental devastation. Problems with innovation. The macroeconomic picture and the microeconomic picture. For example, in China today, net private wealth is shrinking. Even as we're told that it's the largest economy in the world, China is falling behind the United States in net private wealth, which is probably the most important way of actually gauging how healthy an economy is. So our mindset has to change when we think that all we got to do to make money in Asia is show up, because we're about to enter, or the young people, let's say, who are about to go into their professions, are going to deal with a very different Asia. We're going to have to be smarter in making money. We're going to have to be more strategic in making money, and we're going to have to recognize that the countries that we thought might develop to a position where they could actually play an influential role on the world stage might just not ever get there. That's a big chunk of the book. But I realized there were other risk regions that actually were affected by economics, or they themselves affected economics. In the middle one, there are the next one that I talk about. I don't know if there's a thing there. No. Oh, that's not what I wanted to do. Sorry, guys. The next one I talk about is, thank you, is demographics, which is something that we just don't pay nearly enough attention to in Washington, D.C. It's what I call the Goldilocks Dilemma. You either have too many people or too few people. And demographics is going to be the single greatest driver for political systems, economies, diplomatic relations, and even security over the next generation. On the one side, you have countries with too few people. Countries like Japan, which is already losing people year on year, has been doing so for almost a decade. Its demographic rate below replacement level was crossed back in the 1970s. 45 years where Japan has known that its demographic downturn is coming and has done nothing about it. Hot on its heels is South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan. Every advanced society, developed society, better way to put it, developed society in Asia, faces a demographic stagnation or demographic decline. But because they're wealthy, because they're rich, they've been able to deal with the demands of an aging population for entitlements, services, and the like. It's going to be very different for China. About 2030, China's population is going to level off. I mentioned a second ago, China already has a labor shortage because all the available skilled labor has been sopped up by the market. Right now, that labor market is actually, the labor pool is actually shrinking in China. About 2030, that population is going to begin to decline. China's not going to be wealthy. We know that. Per capita, it's not going to be wealthy. It will not be able to respond to the demands of an elderly or an aging population who want entitlements and social services. Things that the Communist Party and the government have never been known for giving. This will be, I would argue, the single greatest issue in Chinese politics going forward, bigger than the South China Sea, bigger than dealing with the United States on trade. It's going to be, how do you account for an aging population? Now, on the flip side of that, too many people. Again, these are crude categories, but too many people. Countries like India, Indonesia, Vietnam, young countries where, again, people are demanding from the government, things government is ill-equipped to provide. Education, infrastructure, jobs, opportunity, stressing these governments, many of which are democratic or are trying to move in democratic ways. Not Vietnam, but others. Demographics spills over into the economics, as you can see. It's something we should pay a lot more attention to. But it also spills over into that big region down in the south there. Unfinished political revolutions. Now, I guess it probably sounds a little bit counterintuitive, right? Chinese Revolution was 1949. Japan's major restoration was 1868, so on and so forth. It doesn't go down the list. But if you look at the political regimes in place in Asia today, almost all of them are under one kind of major stress or another. One of the greatest problems that political regimes in Asia face is corruption. It eats away at their legitimacy. We just had a million young South Koreans in the streets of Seoul demanding the impeachment and removal of the former president, Park Geun-hae. They were not out there simply because they were upset that she was embroiled in some sort of pay-for-play scandal. They were there because they no longer believe in their system. It's what they call hell Korea, or hell Josson, the old name for Korea. They don't believe it offers them any future. In Japan, voter participation rates have been cratering for decades because of a general apathy, a sense that nothing's going to change and no matter what you do, it really doesn't matter, which interestingly actually accounts for these wide swings in the vote, the popular vote, giving all the power to one party and then all the power to another party. Not a healthy two-party system, but Hail Mary passes to try to get someone to solve these problems. You look at China, a massive crackdown happening on civil society today. NGOs, lawyers, the media, because the party is worried about its legitimacy as that economic rate comes down and that implicit social contract is called into question. Unfinished political revolutions in countries like Thailand under its second military coup in a decade, or unfinished in the case of Burma, which we rightly celebrated as having a democratic free election, but if you've looked carefully, it's only gone part of the way. It's still repressing minorities. The military still has a huge role to play in that country, enshrined in the political settlement, and we have a lot of questions about how democratic Aung San Suu Kyi and her party actually is. So don't take it for granted that Asia's political regimes are stable, but at least be aware that the strains on them is causing them to try to deal with their problems in a variety of ways, two of which I'll mention as I close up the comments that deal with region-wide problems. We move from unfinished political revolutions over there to the East, lack of political community, running counter to our narrative of modernization, which is that as nations develop, create a middle class, often though not always liberalized, as they trade with each other, trade with the world, they create a regional sense of identity, an Asia that we could clearly define. Our model for this, of course, is post-World War II Europe. You often ask an American what they think about Asia, and they'll say, why isn't there an Asian Union, like the EU? Why isn't there a NATO? Why is Asia just still sort of seemingly stuck in the 19th century? And it's true. Today, despite a new plethora of different types of talk shops and initiatives, be it the East Asian Summit or APEC or the ASEAN Processes Association of Southeast Asian Nations, everything in Asia today regionally is done either on an ad hoc basis or bilaterally. And one of the best examples I'll just mention it is the Rohingyan humanitarian crisis. The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic group from Burma that have been oppressed by both the junta and the current democratic government that have been fleeing in boats, floating out in the middle of the Indian Ocean, trying to get away. And the response from both ASEAN and the entire region is to throw up their hands and say, there's nothing we can do about it. So the Rohingyans are dying on their boats. They're dying on the beaches. We're discovering mass graves in Thailand and other places because Asia is not able to form an effective community and what we don't have, interestingly, is any type of central leadership in Asia. The three largest countries in Asia, Japan, China, and India, have no allies. They have no real partners. Japan's gone a little bit forward on creating some relationships, but not one of them is trusted by their neighbors for two reasons. One, their size. They're either too big geographically or too big economically. Two, that each of them, in their own recent past, was a colonizer. Japan, India, and China. There's simply no trust. There is a leadership gap, a trust gap that prevents Asia from forming the type of community that could solve or begin to talk about or address its problems collectively. And that's particularly difficult for the last region, that little Cyprus-like looking island off the coast there. The threat of war. Again, running counter to the stories we tell ourselves about how nations modernize, they get rich and wealthy, check in Asia, got a middle-class check, integrate with the world, check. They should figure out that it makes absolutely no sense whatsoever to fight over rocks in the sea or imaginary lines on a map. But today, the problems that Asia has territorially, borders, history questions remind us more of 19th century Europe than we do the 21st century. Every major nation in Asia has a territorial dispute with its neighbors, and some, like Japan, have territorial disputes with all of their neighbors. But worse than that, these are disputes that have festered for decades. We are now in a full decade of talking about the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, and we are nowhere closer to having them solved than we were 10 years ago. In fact, I would argue, we are closer instead to some type of violent encounter, armed encounter, because of a mistake, a miscalculation. You have air forces buzzing each other at 600 miles an hour in the skies over the Senkakus. You have Navy ships, paramilitaries, coast guards, fishing fleets all coming together around the Senkakus, around the Spratlys, around the Paracels. Ships have already been sunk. Fishing boats have already been lost. One day there's going to be a loss of life, and with a trust deficit, no working relationships, no Asian Union or Asian NATO to deal with it, we could easily find Asia spiraling into some type of conflict. The data points that we use, which we should be using to chart stability in Asia, I think only point, unfortunately, in one direction. They're going downward now. Again, I said I wasn't going to be predictive. That does not mean there will be war. It does not mean there will be economic collapse. It does not mean there will be revolution. But we've accustomed ourselves to thinking about Asia in one way. And I think the task for the next generation, certainly the next decade, certainly the young people here who are just starting their careers, if you're in the Navy, you're certainly going to deal with this region at some point in your career, is to create different tool sets. We've gotten pretty good, I think, over the past 25 years about thinking about a rising China. And we heard a little bit about that earlier today. We have to create a different tool set now. What does a moderating China look like? What does a declining China look like? What does a potentially unstable China look like? That can be just as challenging and dangerous, if not more so, than a China that's growing and is confident. Nations that worry about their future, worry about their stability, feel existential threats lash out in unpredictable ways. They use trade as a weapon. Now they have other means, cyber, things that we've heard about today. It does not mean that it will happen. It means that the bottom line of all of this is don't be surprised. Don't be surprised by a crisis happening in one of these risk regions. We need to understand it, we need to think about it and prepare for it in order that what we hoped would happen in Asian century of growth and prosperity, and most importantly, I would argue, American participation in all of that can actually take place instead of dealing with something that would actually dwarf all of the problems we have today. So I know you're looking forward to a break now. There is a bar outside. But I will be happy. I've got about 15 minutes to take any questions that really walks you through most of the book as well as the arguments I have about why we should be thinking about Asia in a different way. I'm also happy to talk really briefly about some of the ideas and suggestions that I came up with to how would we deal with this. So yes, sir, in the front. So if you all heard the question, it was about... Yeah, the question was... I'm not going to repeat the whole question. The summary is the lack of trust due to Japan's unwillingness to come to grips with the war and essentially war guilt and apology. Partly, yes. There's no question that Japan has not done what Germany has. This predates the current Prime Minister, Prime Minister Abe. But it's also interesting that China and South Korea actually did not make a big deal of the enshrinement of the 18 Class A war criminals at Yasukuni Shrine when it happened in 1978. They only started making a big deal of it much later, actually in the 2000s. So last decade, when they felt that Japan was starting to get a little too uppity, that Japan was starting to break some of those post-war bounds that had kept it from rearming fully or participating abroad. And there's no question that Japan struggles to address the war. Prime Minister Abe, I think, has gone as far as any Japanese leader can or will go. Part of this, actually, sir, interestingly, it is partly a linguistic issue. The words that Japan uses to apologize do not translate in the same way that our word of sorry does. There are different words that are used that carry the same meaning, but you don't say sorry. You express remorse and regret. But if you speak Japanese, you understand that's as deep as you can go. The textbook issue is a problem. On the other hand, it's a free market for textbooks. They are not government textbooks. There are free market textbooks. Schools get to choose from a variety of textbooks. Not to condone it. I've seen those textbooks. I've taught in Japanese high schools. Those are issues and problems. But we also have to recognize that China and South Korea find this a convenient political stick with which to beat Japan when necessary. 70 years. The Prime Minister expressed his remorse before Congress at Canberra, at Pearl Harbor. It's actually been done since 1996. It does take all sides to come together. But I would argue that the real distrust is more structural. It's some of the things I talked about here. Thank you. Other questions? Yes, sir. Let me summarize. North Korea and Russia. Let me start with Russia and then get back to North Korea because I'm not sure exactly what you're asking on the North Korea problem. It's easy to summarize. There are no good answers. I think everyone in this room knows it. I think I'll start with North Korea then. Our strategy is containment. It's the right strategy. We don't phrase it as such. It is increasingly going to be one of deterrence. But we have to make sure that we don't get trapped into thinking it's like Cold War style deterrence. It won't be. It's going to be new models of deterrence. I'm not a nuclear expert. We have some in the audience. I mean, I've dabbled in it as many of us do. But we will have to think in different ways about deterrence. We cannot wheel out the old Cold War models. We have to think that the North Korean regime is rational. That's why it still exists. And there is a recognition on the part of China that... Let me put it this way. They don't like the current leader, the current dictator of North Korea, Kim Jong-un, but they like North Korea. So we can't conflate the idea that they're really getting angry this time with Kim Jong-un, that they want North Korea to go away because they don't want North Korea to go away. They like it as a buffer state. They want Kim Jong-un to go away. And if that happens, I wouldn't be surprised at all. On Russia, it's very interesting. I started off. I got into this whole business doing Russia in Asia because it was the Cold War and no one was talking about it. We can only think about Russia in a European context here in the States. But it has just as long and important... Well, not just as long, but a long and important context in history in Asia. But it plays a very different role. In fact, the real spur for Japanese modernization in the 19th century wasn't Commodore Perry and it wasn't the British, it was the Russians. Coming down actually in the late 1700s from the north, threatening the home islands, what became defined as the home islands. They weren't even defined back then. Russia has always played a role, but it's played a role of spoiler. It's played a role of maneuvering between the powers. It doesn't have a... You know, it had a brief moment, you guys know, a brief moment in the Cold War. We had to keep the subs in their bastions. We couldn't let them out. We had to keep them up in the Sea of Ohotsk and other areas. That was the only time that Russia was a really major player, geostrategically in Asia. But they still have lots of relationships. They still sell a lot of arms and armaments. They still have enormous energy supplies that Japan and China argue over and tussle over to get access to. Putin is playing a weak hand fairly well in Asia. And if we wanted to really push the edge of the envelope, in which you might have thought might be the case early here in this year, 2017 or so, because of Russia's different geopolitical role in Asia, you could see the United States, Washington and Moscow getting together and saying, you know, we face the same concerns. We worry about freedom of navigation. Russia doesn't want anyone else owning that Arctic route that opens up. But other countries want that Arctic route because it cuts three weeks off the trip from Shanghai to Hamburg. And so you could see us talking about maritime security relations with Russia. Maritime domain awareness, information sharing. Really hard to do after 2012, 2013, 2014, almost impossible. But it could happen because Russia plays a fundamentally different role. Yes, sir. We have seen over a long period of history as well as going on right now today with China and Russia. The use of nationalism by leaders to take the people's minds off domestic problems and they focus outward. So Putin's doing it, Xi Jinping is doing it. I wonder, rather than having a long question, if you could just apply the term nationalism to what you're talking about and tell us how you see that playing out and what the risks are. Yeah, it's a good question. I think it's natural. You know, I think governments use all means of attempts to both unite, unite their populations, get them on board with their plans because as you say, there's often a disconnect between the governments and their peoples. Anything that accrues to national power. I'm never surprised that a government is going to use nationalism. We use it, other countries use it. It can take virulent forms. It can be directed back in the last decade there were some riots in China against Japan because of the Senkaku's issue that's been boiling, set at the boil for a few years. But what wasn't really reported in the press is that if you went to the protests there were signs going this way to the protest, this way out of the protest, all set up by the government so that they could channel it and get everybody where they wanted them to be at that moment and get them on camera and show the Japanese that boy, you better not tangle with us because there's a million Shanghaiers who's really upset, but it was all being manufactured. I just returned from Beijing and we're 70 years after the war. Well, just two years ago, Xi Jinping introduced two new national holidays in China. One, to commemorate the defeat of Japan and two, to commemorate the Nanjing massacre. Now, it's your country. It's entirely fine to do that. We should celebrate more of the victories that we've had in our conflicts overseas. But you do have to ask, why now, why 70 years later? What are you getting out of it 70 years later than you were? And if you go to China and you go into any of the hotels, I was staying in the Hilton. It's as beautiful. I want to live there. It's as western as you can possibly get. But you start flipping through the TV and they've got great TV. They have all the different provinces have their official TV stations. So you can be in Beijing and watch TV coming from Xinjiang or TV coming from Kunming or wherever it is. A scientific estimate that at least 40% of the prime time shows night after night for the entire week-plus that I was there were wartime anti-Japanese dramas. Still being played, and that's not anything new. That has been going on for decades. You flip on the TV, you see perfect Japanese, I don't know if they're Japanese actors or whomever, perfect Japanese coming out of their mouths and it is just night after night after night. So it is stoked up. The thing that I think we should question a little bit more, we haven't looked at it as carefully, is not nationalism in Asia to populism. I think we should begin to investigate populism and populism can shade over into religious populism. We have to think much more carefully. We have done a terrible job overall looking at the rise of radical Islamism in Southeast Asia. But we just had a city taken over in the southern Philippines. We just had the mayor, he's actually the governor of Jakarta, defeated in his bid for reelection for supposedly slandering Islam and now sentenced to two years in prison in the country that we said was the most moderate Muslim country in the world. We have a province in Indonesia, Ache, in which Sharia law is the law and so we have video, regular video of public canings and beatings of people for transgressing Sharia law. We need to think very carefully about this and then regular populism, regular populism. The populism that swept Rodrigo Duterte into office in the Philippines. Why? Because of this unfinished political revolution, this sense of corruption that the system wasn't working for the ordinary people, we now have a radical populist firebrand in office in the Philippines which affects our U.S. Navy and our U.S. Marines and Air Force and Army who were hoping to have access to new bases and work with a long-standing partner and all of that's been put on hold. So ultimately all of this gets tied together. Time for just a couple other questions if you have them. Yes, sir. I have a question about disputed borders, if you will. A number of scholars and analysts among them, I believe, Robert Kaplan have suggested that one of the reasons that China is able to build up its navy and to develop a maritime strategy is that its borders are now secure for the first time. Are you saying that its borders are not secure? China. So China looks at it in different ways. Secure borders versus territorial disputes is a different issue. So the expansion of Chinese claims into the South China Sea over the Paracels and Spratlys creates new borders that have to be integrated into defense doctrine. That's something I don't think we've talked about that much. And I actually think of it, I gave a talk out at U.S. Strategic Command a couple years ago at their strategy forum or the deterrence forum which by the way was very interesting. We've talked a lot about Asia and China here in Omaha, it was all Russia. Not surprisingly. It's StratCom, but it was all Russia, nothing about China. But we haven't thought at all about China. You talked to China about these islands where they've built schools, they've built hospitals, people are coming in for tourist visits, they've got post office boxes. It's Chinese territory to them. So is that covered by a nuclear umbrella? Does that rise to the level of sovereign national territory that the Chinese are asking those questions or asked our Chinese interlocutors about those questions? So their borders are changing, but not all of their borders are set. Taiwan, the best example of the border that is not set. You know, movements in Tibet, movements in Xinjiang, all these different areas where the Chinese know that should they break away, Hong Kong, it's an existential threat to the party and to the government. But they see any crack in those borders as potentially leading to an existential threat which would have spillover effects on a level that we couldn't yet, I think, fully contemplate. Am I done? That's it. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. Thank you. Okay, 15 minute break. Back in the seats, 17 minute break. Two, three, 15.