 The topic for discussion today is an extremely important one. And I was one of the participants about three weeks ago in Paris at a similar seminar where the relations between Europe and Africa were being looked at in a slightly different context. But in looking at institutional relationships in what we call is a strategic partnership between Africa, the EU, and the EU, it becomes important for us all to remember that this partnership at a bilateral level, in many instances, has gone on for centuries. At a multilateral level, it has been around for a few decades. But the most important step was in Lisbon in December 2007. And since Lisbon, we have tried to give impetus to a relationship that is strategic for both continents, for the membership of both institutions, simply because it is impossible for us to not see ourselves in a geopolitical relationship. It is there, it's going to remain with us at infinity. Now, as all relationships, ours has had its ups and downs. We've tried, I think, from both sides, the EU as well as the EU to make a go of it. And in many instances, the ecological role displayed, as well as the commitment that we have given to making our partnership work in areas that come from a broad spectrum, we have met with mixed successes at best. And at worst, I think we did not make any progress at all, not entirely across the board, in certain sections of our cooperation. Now, since the fourth summit of the EU and Africa held in Brussels in April 2014, we agreed on five broad areas of cooperation. And each of these are extremely important and interrelated. The first being peace and security. The second being governance, democracy, and human rights. The third, the area of human development, the fourth, sustainable and inclusive economic growth, and the fifth on global issues. Now, none of these broad areas are new to our partnership, our cooperation. We've had since the first action plan which followed our first summit. But the mechanism and the modalities we had in place were slightly different. We spoke of interim joint expert groups, where at a technical level, we had representatives of member states and two commissions coming together and discussing the implementation of joint strategies. It depended a lot on the will of member states, the interest of member states to participate. And very often, we found from either the one side or the other, or from both sides, you didn't have member state participation. And so both commissions would become frustrated at the lack of movement, the lack of progress. Let's say, for example, one which worked very well and then was the peace and security sector. It has taken up a lot of time, a lot of resources, a lot of energy on both sides. But in pursuit of our mandate to maintain international peace and security under the UN, the EU has been investing a lot of resources into preventing conflicts, mediating in conflicts, and in peace missions on the African continent. The African Union has, through the true contributions made by its member states, been providing the human bodies to grow and participate in such peace missions. The cost, of course, I think we all would appreciate, has been rather high to both parties, particularly if we look at the situation that the European Union member states were facing since 2008. It hasn't been easy, but we have still received a fair amount in excess of, I think, 800 million euros towards peace operations. On the African side, you will, and I'm sure you have read, on many occasions reports of the casualties that have suffered on the ground in the field. And this is perhaps a rather high price for our troops to pay in pursuit of peace. Nonetheless, we, 90% of the time, are able to communicate, to consult, to formulate joint strategies, and to move forward implementing that. Whether it is in Somalia or the Amazon in its fight against al-Shabaab, whether it is in the Sahel with violent extremism, whether it is piracy off the coast of Somalia, off the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, whether it is the situation as it obtains in Libya, we all are committed to collective action in pursuit of common objectives. And as Antonio said, we work on that common understanding that there is a nexus between peace, development, and what is currently being experienced as a crisis within the EU of migration. Now, I'm sure that as scholars or practitioners or parties were interested in EU-Africa relations, you would have come across, in recent times, a few tropical issues. And amongst these would have been the three major conferences we had last year internationally, the first one being the financing for development in al-Shabaab, which came out to be al-Shabaab action plan. This is a very instructive paper for both the EU and the Africa in the context of our partnership. We also had the SDGs being agreed to in September of last year. Again, there was very close consultation between the European Union and African Union on the processes and the goals for the SDGs, Agenda 2030. And of course, lastly, but not least, the COP 21 in Paris in December, all three of these international conferences and the outcomes would have direct impact on EU-Africa relations. And all three of these are central in the achievement of Africa's Agenda 2063. If I may just take the opportunity to introduce Agenda 2063, this is a broad consultative effort that the African Union Commission undertook to develop a 50-year plan for the continent on the occasion of its 50th anniversary in 2013. The opportunity was used to reflect upon what had the OAU, slash AU, achieved during the 50 years of existence and what was yet to be done. Where did we have shortcomings? Why did we have those shortcomings? What is the way forward? And so all sectors of African society stakeholders were consulted, invited to submit opinions, views, governments participated, until we had a very comprehensive document that emerged. And this basically looks at what Africans would like their lives to be like in 2063. What are the goals that they want to achieve? What is the type of life they want to live? What is the Africa that they want? And so it's a long, long process to draw a mass appeal across grassroots. And this becomes quite instructive in our partnership with the EU for us to agree on what Africa has to set itself as priorities. I think when my colleague and friend, Kristin Depearon from the DEAS speaks, she may very well have learned the importance of the synergy and harmonization of African strategies and European strategies. African priorities, European priorities. And this is the year of implementation, referred to the three major outcomes of the conferences held last year. I have referred to agenda 2063, which has been widely publicized and circulated. We actually have a first 10-year plan in the implementation of agenda 2063. So the policies are in place. What we need now is, I think, a way in which both the EU and the EU can come together and work towards implementation, achievement of deliverables, tangible, measurable results. So there has to be a monitoring and evaluation aspect to this partnership. Otherwise, we would have sound bites on TV and big summits at great cost. And then five years down the line, we haven't made sufficient progress. And then we have mass movement of people who are desperate to seek a better life for themselves, moving from one continent to another. I wanted to use this opportunity also to just talk about the African-Caribbean and Pacific group of states and the relationship with the EU. Because Africa, the ACP, a stand for Africa, Africa makes up the largest component of the ACP. Out of 79 countries, we are more than 47, I think 48. So in this context, why do we have a separate grouping that was formed under different circumstances in a different global order in the 1970s? It's supposed to come to an end in 2020. And there's debates taking place in a number of fora about what should happen when this current continue agreement ends in 2020. Can the valuable resources that are invested into the ACP-EU relations not be better served if it is redistributed to other partnerships that the EU has with strategic partners, including that of the African Union? Now, many of us have been hearing about the tea tips. Tea tips is the transatlantic trade and investment that he is talking about, a partnership between the US and the EU. And many think tanks in Europe have been commissioned at times to do research into the tea tips and what it will bring to the EU member states and what it will bring to the US, et cetera, et cetera. Will it leave the EU better off or worse off? But I wonder if anyone has given attention to the impact of tea tips on Africa. Have there been any studies done on what tea tips would do when we look at working towards achieving the SDGs? When we look towards the development agenda that Africa has? Will tea tips support it? Will tea tips undermine it? Will tea tips delay it? Will tea tips erode it? What is the impact? And we all confess and we admit Africa has a shortage of think tanks who can do this work themselves. But is there enough information in the public sphere, in the public domain, for anyone to give a correct assessment of the impact of tea tips on the EU-Africa partnership? So sometimes we need to have a bit of cohesion between what the EU does with China, with Japan, with the US, and what the EU does with the EU. Institution to institution may need to have some confidence in discussing issues before decisions may be taken so that the partners may be aware, may prepare for an impact, may factor it into future policy development, et cetera. And this is what I think we need to move towards. Thank you very much. I'm absolutely delighted to be here. And I'm very, very glad that you, EUIAS, is driving this together with EAS and going out and having dialogues with a large range of stakeholders. This is in developing something as important as the global strategy that can't remain within four jobs in Brussels. It has to be in discussion of the faith that everybody takes part in. We often have the pleasure of partnering up with AJ and I. So AJ will excuse me if he recognizes something that I will say, that I usually say. Clearly, Africa is an absolutely unique political, economic, and strategic, and a stressor-strategic partner for the European Union and will remain so for quite some time. We are the first regions of the European Union who are also impacted and concerned by developments on the African continent. That's clear. Positive or negative? Because the positive has impacts also in terms of our relationships in terms of trade, investment, and in turn impacts on growth and opportunities in Africa, but also opportunities for European companies. And negative crises and how they spill over. And we are, of course, evidently all concerned by radicalization, terrorism, wherever it is. And it exists in Africa. It's expanding in Africa, but also climate change and those effects, the amount of effects they have in terms of migration, et cetera. So clearly, we are in a relationship with the law and law. There are two main frameworks that govern our relations. First of all, AJ spoke about the joint strategy. He spoke about the five priorities under that. So I want to repeat that. But then clearly, as AJ also alluded to, the continent agreement and the place of Africa, which is a very important part of the continent agreement. And we're right now involved in a reflection, trying to, both on the ACP side and on the EU side, reflect on what should the future relationship be posed to February 2020 when the current agreement expires. And it's very, very relevant to think about the relationship with Africa in this context. And I'll come back to that towards the end, obviously. There is, of course, all of us follow the developments we see, the investments of China, other new actors who come in on the scene in Africa, and also more and more politically from time to time. It's not just about building roads, hospitals, and then extracting the resources. It's at the same time, it is important to remember that our economic relations and our trade relations remain the most important. The biggest investment stocks are still European in Africa. And many European companies are committed. And there are also some of our Eastern, Central and Eastern European member states who are relatively new to relations with Africa, but who are very keen because they have edge competence in some areas, for instance, in IT, which is evidently a very developing sector. So I think it's true to say that there is a strong interest in Africa, in the European Union. It's also an important strategic partner for us in global issues. A J-group alluded to agenda 2030, where we forged very clear, I mean, Elias has a strong word, but we work very closely together. And some of the results that we obtained in the 2013 and the Esteges, notably around the importance of looking at peace and inclusive societies as part of this, that was our partnership with Africa. Because this resonated very strongly with our African partners, as it did with us. And it was contested by many others. I mean, I know that there are colleagues who have been involved in that discussion, but I think it's not, I'm glad to say that it was largely because of all the fact that there were commonalities of use in Africa. We had a summit in 2014, which was also referred to. This was incredibly important to give momentum to the cooperation we have under the strategy, or we set out a long roadmap of actions that we want to take. And it was referred to very rightly so, that setting all the objectives is fine, but you also need to monitor them and see what to do. We've done that quite recently. Look at what we're doing. And it's quite impressive how far we've come. We can do much better in a number of areas, but we certainly have come a long way. The next summit is in next year, 2017. It will take place in Africa. And we're building up to that now. And through our partnership where we have a strong political dialogue that has developed, our two commissions meet together every year. And they can also take the temperature or relationship and where it's gone and what we need to do better together. And I think this year they will have some particularly hot issues to debate surrounding migration, climate change, and a number of other issues. But clearly, one of the issues that will come into focus in when we're discussing our cooperation together for coming years will clearly be backwards. Looking at the demographic situation in Africa, we need to cooperate on growth, investment, providing opportunities for youth. And so also, how can we better engage with youth around our spaces? We do have instruments to support our work on priorities. The area of peace and security being the one that is perhaps the most developed, as Ambassador Brandi also said, is an area where we have an African peace facility which is an important instrument to us, but it is there to support the building of African-owned capacities to deal with peace and security. It's been in place now since some 11, 12 years and we've actually channeled some 1.6 billion euros through that instrument to supporting African peace operations, but also to supporting the African peace and security architecture and to work increasingly on conflict prevention, mediation, et cetera. It's an important instrument, but it's important to remember as well that this is part of a development instrument. It's funded under the European Development Fund. And this is not uncontroversial. It wasn't at the time when this facility was created or we needed an instrument on there. There was nothing else. And it remains in question for some of our own member states because it goes into areas which are not classical development areas but which are clearly extremely important. And there is a whole discussion now about how can we find the means to work together in partnership with Africa and others on building capabilities or building capacities, both in terms of prevention, mediation, but also on the peace and security side in terms of operations, et cetera, and reflection on whether in the future we can continue to do this within a development framework or whether we need something separate. But that's a bit of a parenthesis. But this has been important and we have been there for a long time now in terms of supporting Amazon, which is a hugely important, strategically important operation to fight al-Shabaab and it will remain, unfortunately, for some time, a challenge. We are engaging when it comes to the fight against Oppoharam, where a multinational job task process is set up. But as I said, we will also try to focus more and more on the building of capabilities, capacities, and also on prevention and mediation. When it comes to the issues of human rights, democracy, and governors, I think the African Union has come a very long way in terms of the normative framework that they set up. There is a whole set up of treaties that are quite remarkable when you look at the text and how far they go. The trouble is that they're not ratified by many of the member states in the African Union and they're certainly not domesticated or implemented on a national level. So this is also something you want to cooperate on even more strongly in the coming years to try to see how African values, standards and norms, which of course derive from universal values that we all subscribe to through the international human rights commitments, et cetera, how they can be translated into action on the ground and provide a better environment which contributes to the situation of root causes from any of the instabilities that exist as well. If you don't have human rights in place, if you don't have the governance in place, if you don't fight corruption, et cetera, you will have insecurity going in. This is the year of human rights for the African Union, which is very welcome, after a year that has focused on the empowerment of women. So this is a golden opportunity for us to work more strongly together on human rights and governance issues. And this is not about exporting European values, it's about supporting African values and norms, but many of those are shared, they are shared. So we need also to find the balance in the way of how we do this. We also know that in the reality of the situation is that we do have challenges when it comes to the governance and respecting constitutions and we have these issues about leaders who have been in place for a long time in a number of countries who seek new mandates and want to change constitutions. This is a challenging issue, but it is also one on which the African Union itself has quite a strong position online, although it's not an easy one to tackle. So it certainly is one on which we dial up as well and to see how we can be supportive in a number of areas. Migration, there will be a specific discussion on development, security and migration, but clearly this is an area where we can do more in terms of our cooperation. We had a very good cooperation with the African Union in the build-up to and the process to go improve the financial summit on migration in November last year. Now we're in the face of implementing, we have a cartoon process, we have a robot process, but clearly there is a role for the African Union as well and we need to define that together and see how we work on this. And we'll have opportunity, as I said, at a political level to go through this. To come to a post-continue, as we call it, the relationship with the ACP after the World War II in the 20th century. This seems far off, but it's actually very close if you want to think through what you've done in the past and what you've done well and not, but also if you want to think through what kind of relationship you want to have in the future. We are approaching this from the point of view of institutions, the European Commission and the EAS, with an entirely open approach. And our member states have a majority of them who have asked us to have an open approach to this and to ask questions. There is no given that we would roll over a relationship with a group of ACP states at the moment today. We need to ask ourselves what are our interests from both sides? What are our aspirations? What is it that we're going to do and with whom and through which means? So there are many possibilities and we need to factor into this. The partnerships we have with Africa, I say with Africa because it's a partnership with Africa that we have a strategy. We also have a partnership with the African Union, but the strategy we have with Africa has the whole continent, while Morocco, for instance, is not part of the African Union, but this is an equation that we work our way through. But a little bit of Caribbean and we look at that. And where are our interests on both sides, our common interests when it comes to Africa? Well, peace and security clearly, migration might be a little bit less of an issue for some of the others. Everybody's impacted by climate change, so how does that then equate into the relationship in the future and in forms? And a future relationship can have many forms. It can be one with ACP as a group, it can be one more regionalised, but it can be one which is a combination. And it can also be a relationship which is focused around themes and partners and relevance of cooperation with various areas. So it's a very open reflection. But we have conducted together with European Commission a public consultation, and many European institutes and think tanks but also governments have taken part, a bit fewer, sadly, from the ACP countries themselves that some particularly African have. And it's clear coming out from that that there are some issues that emerge that are seen as highly relevant, trade and investment, but also the migration issue, for instance, came up quite strongly. But that's one element of the analysis we're conducting. We're evaluating the whole partnership, we've interviewed all our heads of delegations and their feedback. We've looked at all the evaluations that have been done over a 10-year period on the cooperation we've had in various ways with ACP countries, and including the specifics of relationships with Africa. So this is something we're going to table to member states hopefully this summer. The next step of what we're going to do is that we will put forward a recommendation to member states on the way forward in our relationships with the A's and the C's and the P's, with the ACP. And that will be accompanied by an analysis of the options that's time ahead of us, and then we will try to distill one. And that will come in the autumn. In the whole process of this, it's incredibly important that we continue to dialogue with our member states. We do that, of course, but also that we have a wide outreach, like here you're having on the global strategy, but evidently also with our ACP partners who are themselves thinking this through, but also Africa, African Union, and the Caribbean and Pacific. And so clearly this is a debate that we'll be having with the African Union as well as to how we see the future relationship and in relation to this ACP relationship. So let me just end by saying that as we see it, 2016 in itself will be a demanding year when it comes to Africa because there are political challenges and these are impacted by developments on the economic side. We've seen the global downturn, we've seen rebalancing of China, but in the end, and of course we've also seen El Nino, which has impacts in human terms and humanitarian terms, but also in economic terms because of the impact it has on our country, for instance. So there are vulnerabilities. There's also the vulnerability to threats from extremism and terrorism. And there are challenges in the area of governance, although there are also positive developments in other countries on that side. But all of this for us sort of tend to underline that the partnership with the EU is more relevant than ever. For us, for Africa and for us together as partners. But as we move ahead in looking at a partnership, we also need to work even more on how we can actually have a real balanced partnership. And that means working yet more to come away from some of the old mindsets that exist. Where we are reminded of behaviors of the past, which are there, which are part of the history, but which need not perhaps come into the discourse every time today. And the same thing from our side that we perhaps sometimes should ourselves not impose a feeling that we owe to somebody to do something, but that we both define interests and what we can do together. So a real partnership, you also challenge each other who have a current dialogue. And I think we're getting there, but I think we can do it yet more strongly. Thank you. I'd like to begin by thanking the Institute for the invitation to come and speak. Just to devound ourselves, I said this much since it gets to the sort of reason we're talking today is to identify the successes and failures of the partnership between the European Union and the African Union. In many respects, there's been a parallel history between the two organizations. But then OAU was established in 1963, just six years after the creation of the then EDC. And the modern African Union was born at the Durban Summit in 2002, just 10 years after the European Union was set up by the Master's Treaty. In looking at the current state of relations, historical context is highly relevant. And the OAU was set up at the height of the Cold War. This was a war which began in Europe and moved out to the most unlikely of places, Mozambique, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Angola. And as Western Europe and the United States on the one hand exported 19th century liberal ideas and institutions to the developing world, the Soviet Union engaged in similar trade, exporting other 19th century ideology, Marxist socialism. The Cold War was, of course, not the first European war to intrude on Africa at the end of the First World War. For example, Ethiopians made a big impression when they turned up in Versailles in their white robes. And the Battle of Teren in 1941 was the Allies' first victory in the Second World War. It's easy to miss the Cold War context when we look at the history of the OAU, which was against this backdrop that the founding four of the fathers came together and the main founding fathers could hardly have had less in common. Ali Silesi was a feudal emperor backed by the US and Kwame Nkroma, the president of Ghana, was, in his own words, a scientific socialist and a Marxist. What brought them together was Africanism, an ideology that encourages the solidarity of Africans worldwide and believes that unity is vital to economic, social and political progress. Unity, solidarity and cooperation were all there for the heart of the OAU project. So too was ridding the continent of colonisation and apartheid. The vision of the African Union, which succeeded it, is an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena. When we come to assessing the current state of our relations with the African Union, I would argue that our own apartheid has been defeated. The legacy of the colonial and combed warrior has still cast a shadow over Europe's relationship with the continent and the institution. That might come as a surprise to anybody who looks at the figures. The European Union is Africa's biggest trading partner and about 150 of FBI in Africa comes from European companies. It will also surprise anyone who discovers that the EU is investing 40 billion euros in Africa between 2014 and 2020. But 40% of the EUA goes to Africa and that the EU and its member states are the biggest contributors to the African Union's programme budget, supporting about 80% of it. Indeed, payments from the European Union to the African Union jumped from 91 million euros in 2010 to 330 million euros last year, most of it for peace and security operations. With figures like these, one would have thought the relationship would be flourishing and in many respects it is. But in the three and a half years that I've been following the African Union, I've been surprised by the world like the colonial issue continues to surface. It first caught me by surprise the African Union jubilee celebrations in 2013. The celebration was built as an opportunity to reclaim the African narrative that passed the president and the future. But the narrative dwelled more on the past. A video projection explained that if Africa was quote, a continental ghetto, a phrase first coined by an African leader, then we could blame it on, quote, the English, the French, the Portuguese and the Germans, unquote. Somehow the Italians and the Belgians were spurred on in it. Later, when President Moussaveni of Uganda explained that there was no disease in Africa until the Europeans arrived, the audience loved it. In my report at the time, I wrote that all of the European engagement, the 40 billion, the 330 billion, the 40% of aid and the 20% of FTI was seen by the Africans themselves as some form of reparations for colonialism rather than the expression of the partnership. Now rightly or wrongly, that was my reaction at the time. And as an Irishman, I was difficult to swallow. Having grown up here in great stories about the fantastic work of Irish missionaries and others whose contribution to Africa was altruistic at its core. Here in Ireland, we remember one of the key figures of the struggle for our freedom. We remember it was Roger Casement, who dedicated much effort to investigating the rootland dehumanizing effects of colonialism in Africa. Casement was an advocate for self-government. And when the President, Michael D. Higgins, spoke at Africa Hall in Alisaba in 2014, he said, I think about Roger Casement and many men and women like him whenever I read the opening lines of the Salon Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which invoked the unalienable right of all people to control their own destiny. Of course, the African Union Jubilee celebration took place three years ago and maybe I was wrong in my reaction at the time. But in January, we had another summit, the African Union Summit, and the plenary hall was packed for the opening speeches, including the address that the outgoing president of the Assembly, Robert Mugabe, a man educated like myself by Irish genusments. I felt uncomfortable listening to his speech and I suspect the U.N. Secretary-General did too. The official press release for the session said, loud cheers are up to when President Mugabe called for the reform of the United Nations. And that's true, but there was also loud applause and much laughter when he asked Ben Kibun to tell the Europeans, quote, with their white faces and pink noses to shut their mouths. So if the speech for the president, speaking as president of the African Union, suddenly was shocking, the enthusiastic reception in the hall was what disturbed us most. Outbursts like this, by President Buscupini and President Mugabe, are not unusual. Each of them has four of these matters, but the joke can out of sound that was that Robert Mugabe is Africa's Donald Trump. He says in public that many think he's private. And it's worth pausing there for a type of look at the underlying messages hiding behind the rhetoric. There were two major themes in the Mugabe speech, Africa's colonial legacy and Africa's place in the world. Now to say that the past is a foreign country, but where are we going to pass gets mixed up in the present. And many of today's borders across the continent started out as lines drawn in colonial era. And the first 10-year action plan for the agenda of 2063, which is Africa's vision for the future, is predicated on, quote, the removal by 2020 of all remnants of colonialization. I'm not convinced that the most prominent of these is outdetermination of people as Western Sahara is necessarily the colonial issue that's sometimes built to be. But the fact that an entity known as the Sahara Republic is a member of the AU and Morocco is not, which means that strictly speaking, the EU's partnership is with Africa rather than the African Union. The AU line in Western Sahara is to ask the UN to sort it out and support the UN process, but I sometimes wonder how this fits with the oft-repeated mantra of African solutions to African problems. In any event, a solution acceptable to all key players would have the added advantage of simplifying and enhancing our strategic partnership with the African Union. Now, 52 years after the founding of the AU, it would be nice to think that we have already entered into a new post-colonial era. But if we, the Irish, look at our history, we can see immediately how difficult it can be to shed the baggage of the past. I think it's fair to say that we've forgiven the Vikings and even the Normans. But even as we mark the centenary of 1916, we have to admit that it's taken a long time to make man this with our dearest neighbors. The uncomfortable truth is that thanks to the Lisbon Treaty arrangements, Ireland is now embedded in the form of colonialists. We need to be conscious of this when we love that Africa, a continent whose colonial experience is much more recent than our own. But equally, it would be good if the African Union could remember that there are 28 member states in the European Union and that 18 of them have never set a colonial flush on their continent. Obviously, in the country-right history, there would be naive things that we could somehow work together to draw a line on this issue. This time, of course, it would be a different line to the type of lines Europeans have been drawing across the continent. But a clearing of the air on the issue might lead to a new life in the existing landscape. President Bugabby also spoke about UN reform. I would have preferred if he cast his remarks in less antique and epipaganistic terms, but he has a point. And together we have an opportunity now that the Sustainable Development who goes include a target to broaden and strengthen the participation of development countries in the institutions of global governance. Discussions on this have taken place recently in New York and Ireland has made its own imaginative contribution to the debate. The common African position is a claim for two additional non-permanencies and two permanencies with the right of leaders. This, of course, will have to be negotiated, but let's not keep talking about it until 2030. The African Union works best when it adopts common African positions. This has worked well on the climate change agenda and also worked well on the STGs when the UN Economic Commission for Africa offered the AU some technical backup. In the same vein, the ownership discussions on a continental free trade agreement is a welcome initiative. We know the figures. Inter-African trade is as low as 13% of African trade and the intention to boost this is enormous. When we look at the origins of the European Union, I tend to focus on the creation of the Coal and Steel Community when the six original member states wanted to prevent a monopoly on the instruments of war. We tend to forget, though, that the economies of the same six states were exhausted after the Second World War and that they recognized that they had a better chance of boosting the growth if they come together at the same applies to Africa. The strength of the dollar and the falling commodity prices have dented the African rising narrative and research is showing that industrialization is not happening at pace that was expected. Growth across the continent has fallen from 5% to 3.5%. Africa needs to generate 18 million jobs each year to meet the needs of its growing population, but it's only generating 2 million each year at the moment. The continental free trade agreement, which the European Union is supporting, could therefore be a game changer. And ultimately, it's likely to mean that our economic partnership agreements that there are turbulence could be negotiated with the African Union, rather than with a variety of regional economic communities. The executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, Carlos Lopez, is one of the best interpreters of economic and social issues in the continent. And for him, the glass is normally half full, rather than half empty. But at the end, somewhat in January, he took the need for a wake-up call. Apart from the fall in commodity prices, his main message was around the enormous economic cost of conflicts, which he put at an average annual loss of GDP of 15% for the 23 countries affected between 1990 and 2005. According to Carlos, only eight of the AU's 58 member states have not experienced armed conflict since independence. And in his opinion, inequality between groups, rather than between individuals, is the main cause of conflict. Evidence suggests he said, a higher incidence of conflict among countries with lower per capita incomes, lower life expectancy, and weaker economic opportunities. All of this points to the importance of democracy, good governance, and human rights, issues which are at the heart of the EU-Africa partnership. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance is the key element of the African governance architecture. The Charter entered into force in 2012, but to date only 23 of the 54 member states have ratified it. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Dr. Dlamini Zuma, often says that there can be no development without peace and no peace without development. And she's right. And there will be little progress along as the governance Charter remains a nice paper exercise. The Europeans were often seen as the awkward squad with our emphasis on governance and human rights issues. To some extent, this sets us apart from some of Africa's other partners who see Africa solely through the prism of commercial opportunities. But in events, but events in South Sudan, for example, have demonstrated to them that a broader view is sometimes necessary when their investments are affected. In drafting our new global strategy, I don't think we should be shy of the values-based approach to our foreign and security policy. The constitutive act of the African Union, for example, says the organization is determined to promote and protect human and people's rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and determined to ensure good governance and the rule of law. It's only natural, therefore, that these issues are prioritized in the Africa-EU partnership. And indeed, the EU-Human Rights Dialogue has become more active and wide-ranging since 2012. The African Union has declared 2016 as the year of human rights with focus on the rights of women. It did so in its own initiative without anybody from the EU that is the way it should be. In the next session, the panel will look at how to trigger a virtuous circle in the development and security migration nexus. Similar connections can be made between good governance, conflict prevention, and economic prosperity. And despite the historical baggage, our African Union partners can be sure to have only few days in working with them to make progress on what's right. Thank you.