 appointment in April 2019, after 35 years in the UK defence medical services. And I'm joined on this seminar with the author of the book Age Clulow. He served in the British Army for 25 years, reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel. And during his military career he served across the world, including on operations in Baghdad and Kosovo, of which his book is the subject. After attending staff college and becoming a master's graduate of King's College London and commanding his regiment, he then led the UK's defence policy and planning for the Horn of Africa over the period 2010 to 2012, deploying to the region on several occasions. And since leaving the military, he's worked on a number of security sector related roles, including delivering strategic communications in Somalia for the United Nations and conducting defence reform in the Middle East. And he currently works in the cybersecurity industry. And he started writing this book in 2015, and it's been recently published and it's his first book. So what we'll do is aid will provide a short overview of the book. And then I'll ask him some more detailed questions about the content of the book, in particular his own personal experiences. And then we will open up for question and answer session. This seminar is being recorded. And so if you don't want that to be involved in that, then please log out. And if you want to pose questions, please can you pose them in the question and answer section in the Zoom. And I will read out your questions for aid to give a response. We have in the past tried to do this by clicking on people for visual and verbal cues, but that becomes very complicated. And so we've found it much easier just to be able to do this by text. So with that as an introduction, I'll hand over to aid to give us a short overview to his book and his experiences from the time that he was in Kosovo during the period that he wrote about which he's written his book. So aid over to you. Martin, thank you very much indeed. And hopefully you can hear me okay. I think before I do the or give the introduction to the book, I just want to thank everybody for joining the the event this evening. I know that there are people who certainly intended to join from from the States, from Europeans and from Kosovo as well, as well as here in the UK. So for all of you for taking the time to come and come and join us, I really appreciate that. So thank you very much indeed. Under a feathered sky, the untold story of NATO's role in newly independent Kosovo was like most people will say about a book, an absolute labor of love and and took about four or five years to get to the stage where I was able to be comfortable publishing it. It is a narrative non-fiction, first-hand account of NATO's new tasks, security sector transition in Kosovo in 2008-2009. I was very well placed to to see this transition in action. I was posted to Kosovo after staff college as the effectively NATO's liaison officer to the much revered Kosovo Protection Corps, the KPC, which by quirk of international agreement was in decline in terms of it was on its way out and it was going to be replaced by a new civilian-led multi-ethnic security force with about two and a half thousand personnel. At the time that I arrived there were about 3,200 or so in the Kosovo Protection Corps and it was never going to be a like-for-like transition. It was a case of you had to apply from one to get into the into the other. So why was the KPC having to close? Kosovo declared independence on the 17th of February 2008 and as part of the Atasari plan which was signed off by the United Nations. On Kosovo declaring independence the UN administered Kosovo Protection Corps, which had its roots back in 1999 post-war with Serbia, the UN administered KPC had to close at a certain date in 2009 in June 2009 to be replaced by the civilian-led security force. So when I arrived in August the pressure was already on for the organisation to be closed but decisions still hadn't been made about whether or not the mechanism for that to take place and about a week after I arrived in Kosovo. There was a what was called in NATO circles a change of command ceremony and the NATO force in Kosovo what was called the international military presence which was led by NATO forces was 16,000 strong in August 2008 and the leadership of K4 as it was called Kosovo force rotated annually. So I arrived with a French three-star general commanding with his command team and I arrived and then a week later there was a change of command ceremony and an Italian three-star general and his command team moved in and it was going to be on this particular command team's watch that the new tasks security sector transition was going to be was going to be was going to have to happen. And so my role as the as the liaison officer was was to be embedded effectively embedded with the commander of the KPC a three-star general and with his deputy who was a two-star. I would live I was living in the NATO barracks in Pristina but spending all my time with my driver my driver bodyguard and our car and my interpreter we would spend all our time supporting the KPC generals. So that's the context of really I suppose the question of why I was able to write this book and why I had such a good view of what was happening. The most important thing or one of the most more important things was when the Atosari plan set out that a security force would be established and that the KPC would be dissolved it laid executive authority at the door of the international military presence. So in other words K4 when NATO made their announcement in June of 2008 that they were going to conduct the new tasks security sector transition they changed the language and they used the word supervise. Now although that may not appear to be a particularly important differential in terms of English language but to supervise essentially to choose that language meant that K4 had a had much more uh wriggle room if if you understand that phrase in terms of how much they had to get involved in making these this security transition actually work because of course dissolving and closing the KPC and and setting up and putting in place everything that needed to happen to to create a new force was incredibly interlinked and dependent on one another. So it was it was the dissolving of the KPC the setting up of the KSF the Kosovo Security Force and the third task in the new tasks was to establish a ministry a government ministry that would oversee and lead the KSF. So I was in the heart of this the decision to supervise essentially meant that in my view it gave it it allowed the command team in in Kosovo at the time to they were off the hook basically and my observations were that there was a a lack of leadership and commitment to those new tasks which led to quite a severe impact on the very people who the security transition was was focused and as I'm sure we're going to discuss as we go through this talk I wasn't willing to stand by and see that happen and as a result of that I realized within a couple of weeks that what I was seeing was bookworthy so from that moment on I kept extensive notes and and the book is is a result of spending my six months in that role in Kosovo over that period and and I hope that that sets the context for for what's to come Martin. So thanks Abe for that introduction perhaps you might be able to just provide a little bit of sort of wider context as to why that why the six months you were describing was so important is of course the the actual combat operation was in 1999 when the NATO forces effectively using the threat of military power persuaded the Serbians to withdraw and yet a decade later you're talking about now a sort of security and political transition so how how do how does that sort of time period link both to that time of transition from 1999 to 2000 and 809 and indeed you know where we are now a further decade later. So the the when I arrived in Kosovo and joined effectively got to know the KPC as well as I did there was still a degree of euphoria post independence the the decision to to to declare independence from Serbia was something that most Kosovens had been looking forward to for quite a long time but they also knew that that once that decision was was made there would be some implications for the KPC and and maybe it's worth a moment just to go back to where the KPC came from in in the years leading up to 1999 the Kosovo Liberation Army had grown in importance as a as a means of demonstrating resistance to to the activities of of Serbian forces in Kosovo. Post war it became clear that there were a lot of members of the Kosovo Liberation Army who who needed to be who needed to undergo demobilization disarmament and reintegration into society and follow the sort of classic DDR process and the commander of K4 troops at the time was a British general who whose team came up with the idea of creating the Kosovo Protection Corps which was essentially a civil emergency organization and and over the course of its 10 year life had demonstrated it's worth both inside Kosovo in times of crisis but also cross border particularly in Albania where they deployed to support Albanian forces when there was a crisis over the border so the the complications of having a thousands of uniformed individuals knowing that their fate was was was not guaranteed in terms of of the imposition of the new tasks this created an environment of quite a lot of nervousness and and actually there was also a degree of apathy because those who were within the Kosovo Protection Corps could see the the what they were trying to achieve and there were others who perhaps didn't necessarily believe that they would be part of the future and as I said at the beginning although there were over 3 000 members of the KPC and although the new force was going to be two and a half thousand strong the idea was not to recruit two and a half thousand straight away from the Kosovo Protection Corps it was to recruit about 1500 who would go from one organization to the other um of course the any we may touch on this in questions perhaps but that they the desire of Kosovoans is for them to have an army but of course with with current the current sensitivities around negotiations over a sustainable arrangement for Kosovo's future in relation to Serbia and and the challenges that exist around that particular issue the the Kosovo Security Force was seen as a good stepping stone on the journey towards declaring an army and and so there was a great deal of commitment from those who wish to make this work from within the Kosovan community and it needed strong leadership to to make the as I say very complex transition work one that was completely independent from the KPC and the KSF and and so that context itself really I was thrown into the deep end of that and and even by the time I left as as perhaps those who've read the book it was still we were still in a place of of considerable chaos even at the very the very beginning of the KSS existence in early 2009 hopefully that's answered the question so that very nicely sets the sort of strategic context and the effectively the importance of getting the the culture of security organizations right both in terms of the the individual people and also their their role within the constitution I wonder if you could now perhaps unpick a little bit more about your very specific role and the the nature of your loyalties in regard to you know what job you were there to do and whom you were there to support so I arrived in Kosovo very keen to make a difference to those who I was going to be working with that was my primary aim I'd read extensively before arriving in Kosovo so the the historical and cultural context was forefront of my mind but I was also very aware that the Kosovo Protection Corps had been something of a creation of of in a way the British although I wouldn't wish to to make that claim that it was only a British idea but but we had a very close relationship the British military and the KPC we had a very close relationship and therefore my you know I had a degree of loyalty even you know on the very first day when I stepped off the plane to making the the closed essentially the closed down of the KPC I wish to make that as dignified as possible and to make the the creation of the KSF as far as my influence would would allow to be efficient effective and successful and and so that's how when I arrived in Kosovo that was that was my start point um I've already said that within a couple of weeks I realized that I what I was seeing was bookworthy and the reason I made that decision was because I was quite bemused by the behaviors of of the new command team that had arrived in Kosovo a week after I'd arrived I very quickly got a sense that they were not really committed to the new tasks um it was the biggest security transition biggest event in security terms that had happened in Kosovo for many years and although and although the the K4's mission in Kosovo and it remains so was to to ensure safe and secure to ensure a safe and secure environment and a freedom of movement what was colloquially known as safe form I very quickly got the impression that that's the security transition the new tasks was going to impact on what was pretty much a you know a routine tour everybody doing their best to make sure that that that safe form was was delivered um but but leading and providing the leadership and ensuring that the new tasks were implemented successfully I I definitely got a sense that that wasn't on their agenda and and whilst they perhaps paid lip service to it um I could see that that things would would go wrong very quickly and and so I was I suppose I was faced with a dilemma because quite early on in my tour I was I was pulled up by one individual who said uh your job as a liaison officer is to sit and be quiet in a corner and just report on what you see um and it was clear I was never going to do that uh and I needed to make a decision uh about whether I was going to essentially follow follow orders or um ensure that that I could shape events in in the favor uh in favor of the Kosovans who were subject to this transition and and that really that set the course for the for the remainder of my of my tour so one of the things that comes out in your book is the quite complicated nature of the stakeholder we call it the stakeholder environment that you are operating in um that's uh not only between you and NATO but of course NATO is composed of um nations not all of whom would necessarily have um a unified perspective on the political intention and then even inside uh the sort of Kosovo political elite that you were able to to work with there were competing factions uh in that type in that grouping as well so how how do you did you get your sense of sort of compass to to navigate across these competing uh political stakeholders uh I was um you're right it was a very complex stakeholder map and I think I made it I made it a lot more complex than perhaps um previous incumbents into my in my position had perhaps enjoyed um yes I needed to maintain relations with my NATO superiors because I was working for them I was reporting to them and I was their eyes and ears within the organization that was subject to the transition um things weren't particularly good in the KPC at that time and there were uh there were worries and concerns about the impact of their of their attitude and behavior on um the safety of a secure environment within Kosovo and so you know this was the this was the the lens through which they were looking at this transition um but I was blessed with having a an absolutely brilliant interpreter who had been the had been the interpreter to to my role uh over the previous 18 liaison officers over the previous nine years and he was um who he didn't know uh in Kosovo in this little black book well really they weren't worth knowing and so we were able to and I I felt that I needed to get a greater context about what was happening and a greater context to understand as much as I could new in country having read up in advance but there were so many subtleties um within within the society itself and where there were um family relations of course and and so there was a uh there was a kind of a light you know a life underneath what most I suppose most visitors to Kosovo would see and I wanted to get a sense of what was happening so I was able to through my interpreter Simi I was able to reach out to the political leaders and I met them initially nervously and um trying to do it in a sort of relatively incognito way but it became clear to me that you know politics local politics was also being was also playing a part in the behaviors that started to appear as we went through this this process and so whether it was my place or not and I suspect it probably wasn't my place to deliver certain messages but I I had to deliver them nonetheless um I I described one 30-minute meeting as probably the most uncomfortable I've ever had in my life and I think even now even to this very day I I still stand by that because it was a because it was it was a very challenging subject to talk to somebody about somebody who was very important in in Kosovo society but what drove me when my compass was as you describe it was that I wanted to ensure that this whole process was done with as much dignity as possible and that I wanted the people I was working with the Kosovens I was working with to know that I was on their side that whereas there were many many examples where frankly the behavior and attitudes were were very poor towards the Kosoven people I was not going to be part of that and I absolutely made a point that that would be that that wouldn't be how I behave and and so I suppose that that's what drove me and that sense of you know of of understanding we we had a strategic relationship the UK and Kosovo and I wanted to maintain that as as best I could. I'll just pose you one more question there's a couple of questions now coming up on the in the Q&A box I'll then move on to those so so my sort of final question to you is how would you see this book fitting into you know the picture of security sector reform and you know why might somebody read this rather than a book by a retired general or a senior politician? Okay good question so I mean I I wanted to write a book that could be read by people who perhaps have got absolutely nothing have had no experience of security sector reform no experience of of of even the military or diplomacy overseas I just I wanted to write it in a way that told a story about a particular period in a particular country but to tell it in a way that was as engaging as I could make it but also entirely true to life and and whilst I was I also of course wanted to to attract other audiences primarily I wanted to write a book that was accessible because the book is for the people of Kosovo and I wanted the people of Kosovo to have the opportunity perhaps when it's translated to understand what really happened over that period because there was so much going into the news through headlines and there was so much there was so much activity in the media people who perhaps didn't have very much to do with the KPC or indeed the KSF probably got the wrong impression of what was happening and and I I feel very strongly or I felt very strongly that actually what what I wanted to do was was kind of put the real story out there because you know that definitely hadn't been told at the time now in terms of professionals who are studying security sector reform military folk who are going to potentially deploy into these environments where you're trying to win the peace post conflict I mean there there are some key lessons I think that that fall out of that and I think primarily it's to be successful where there is ambiguity where there is there is you know a real sense of of a conflict of interests and and priorities within the stakeholder community and we haven't talked about the the non-rec the role of the non-recognizing countries in in K4 and and how that's impacted on things but without leadership and without a very clear mandate then you are going to find that things don't work as well as they should do and at that particular time it was clear to me that there was a lack of leadership there was a lack of commitment and there was also there were also I think some very poor decisions made whether in Brussels whether in Naples which which was the the immediate higher of authority to to to K4 in Pristina but the the the the comms that underpinned what we were trying to do were absent and as the book explains I try to fill that gap and fill that vacuum but but without explaining to people what it is that you are trying to do without being committed to what it is that you want to do and taking people with you and understanding the culture in which you are operating particularly when dealing with with local politicians and senior senior politicians within the country that you are deployed to you're really on a hiding to nothing and I and I think you you may well read in a general's a book about a general's reflections on on various campaigns you will see it from a a very senior bird's eye view but I know that there is no book similar to this about Kosovo that tells a story of really what was happening on the ground and and I think it's is vitally important that that people get a sense of of what's really happening behind the headlines and and I suppose although this is 12 years ago that that these events were taking place they're still very relevant and they're particularly relevant I think because Kosovo remains in a a a state of of a flux in a way because it's still we're still waiting to to be able to to move forward with with Kosovo so that it can and grow and develop into a a respected independent independent nation so let me pick up some questions and indeed if anybody else wants to type some questions into the q&a please do so it would be helpful if you could make them attributable in some way so that a table to understand perhaps a bit of the background to the question so the first question is from somebody you mentioned your book Colonel Terry Anderson who was a US military attache in Kosovo 2008 2009 and his question is has your assessment of k4's reasoning for accommodating what they considered the bigger picture of non-recognizing countries for instance keeping Serbia from going becoming further aligned to Russia adjusted over time so I put the question again so has your assessment of K4's reasoning at the time for accommodating what they considered to be the bigger picture of non-recognizing countries changed and as you know your assessment of what it looks like 2008 to how you've seen things since and in your book you you mentioned about going back to Kosovo yourself I think 2018 or something Terry thanks for the question and that's a very good question so really I was quite exasperated as I'm sure you remember at the time by the the preference to accommodate the non-recognizing countries within K4 and to essentially play a role that kept them quiet and content but as a result of that there was this lack of commitment that I talked about to the new tasks lots of rumours abounded about certain countries and how they were less than supportive of all the work in the background that was required to set up and launch the Kosovo security force at the time there was a degree of I guess understanding that Serbia was quite keen to be moving closer to the European Union and to Europe and I would imagine that there was some influence over certain individuals' behaviours because they didn't want to upset Serbia but of course over time that has shifted significantly whether or not the attitudes and behaviours of those non-recognizing countries within NATO, within K4 and now within the European Union whether that has in any way changed well the only way that that can materially change is for those countries to recognise Kosovo and to pin their flag to the mast so to speak but I think if anything the situation has become more complex to try and resolve over time and although there's been a push in the last few months to make some progress there are significant blockers that still exist which I suspect will be generational in their resolution. I hope that answers your question Terry but please do come back to me if I didn't quite I didn't quite answer. So the next questions posted by a person by the name of Elliot it reads you clearly took stock of the situation on arrival and developed your strategy for the role by the looks of it with limited oversight or guardrails. Do you think that such independent thinking is a tradition of British militaries and is this admired locally or externally or is it usually restricted or perhaps more directly guided and I guess this touches on the sort of philosophy of mission command and perhaps you know a little bit of cultural difference between different militaries. So Elliot thank you that's a brilliant question. Mission command is very much a case of and it's very it's entirely embedded within British military culture that you very clearly understand what it is that you need to achieve and with perhaps a few restrictions you're expected to get on and find a way of achieving that and of course that that mission command is effective from a sort of large set piece type of military action right down to a single individual who understands what needs to be done and also but is willing to do whatever it takes to achieve that and I suppose that's where I was in that sort of spectrum of what mission command means. I was it does go back actually to when I was doing my MA at Staff College that I read extensively about the great game and 19th century Afghanistan and the role of British army officers who would who knew the big picture they knew what they needed to achieve but with absolutely no oversight at all barely any resources in place for them they would they would head off into the hinterland of Afghanistan and do what they needed to do to achieve what they believed to be the strategic goal and I suppose romantically I was quite impressed by that and I do say in the book that I really wanted to find somewhere post Staff College where I could perhaps try and you know enact this a little bit but actually I found that in Kosovo it was entirely appropriate to to have that freedom of action because if you are constrained by what your orders are then you you are you are by the very nature of of that phrase you are going to be very constrained in how effective you can be now as Martin suggested there was a there was a clash of cultures in Kosovo pretty much everywhere you looked there was a clash of cultures between between the British military and other militaries within that K4 environment and what I mean by that is that I saw my role as as the liaison officer much more as a mentor as a as a guide as somebody who was going to be able to give advice and somebody who could you know absorb the you know the the the frustrations as much as offer solutions but as I said earlier the I was told very clearly very early on that was absolutely not what was expected of me and and I was certainly not going to abide by that and so I think if you know what it is that you need to achieve frankly you know within the realms of keeping yourself safe I think you will do whatever it is that you can to achieve that and and that was the approach that I took and and who knows I'm probably not the one to judge whether it was successful or not but but the the Kosovo security force 10 years on 10 years plus since it was formed is in rude health and is itching to become an army and and it's you know what we went through over that winter perhaps did demonstrate that you know we did in the end produce something that has become very very good and I'm very proud of what the KSF has become. So further question this is from a person called Magda from Albania who thanks you for your presentation there are major in the Albanian armed forces and has deployed four times to Kosovo as part of K4 and there are three questions what I'll do is give them to you individually so you can answer them in turn the first one which is what looking back what was the most challenging issues that you faced in your role in that transition from the Kosovo protection force to the Kosovo security forces and you described a lot of challenges is there any one that particularly you know is the biggest highlight. Magda thank you very much indeed for that question yes there were there were many I think one of the probably one of the most important issues that I picked up quite early on and the reason that I'm probably giving this as the answer now was because it had such an impact on so many people and that was the fact that there was no effective comms campaign there was no real strategic messaging that was coming out of NATO slash K4 even though I think there were plans for that to be happening but it never really materialized on the ground and so the people in the members of the Kosovo protection corps who frankly were very nervous about their future because Kosovo didn't have a great employment record opportunities were very limited and they genuinely didn't know what was going to be happening to them and so I think the most challenging thing was trying to get the message out there and I turned to some fairly interesting methods to do that but but but I felt that that was one of the most one of the most the most important actually I've got two can I say two Martin can I say so there were two things that I found challenging that was the first from a professional perspective but I found maintaining my relationships back home to my family also very very difficult because I was under such pressure on a day-to-day basis I was often phoning at the wrong time my children were very young at the time and there were times when a bad phone call with my family back home or with my kids would have a disproportionate effect on me in Kosovo and and those were some very some very difficult times for me so hopefully well you've got two answers for the price of one okay so the second question is is are you able to give any sort of practical or or sort of precise descriptions of where you know the behavior of representatives of NATO states that didn't recognize Kosovo seem to be a constraint or an obstacle to this transition process um when the Kosovo Protection Corps was operating normally the the way that K4 was organized it was organized geographically in line with the the KPC protection zones so a Kosovo a KPC protection zone would have a sort of a partner K4 unit that would provide them with support with military support and and the relationship was always very good there was also a fund that had been set up a NATO fund that had been set up for the Kosovo Protection Corps to to support the payment of pensions the the to allow them to undergo resettlement training if they were not successful in getting into the KSF and that fund was was full it was there was a target amount and it was full but there was also a NATO fund for the Kosovo Security Force and that wasn't very well supported um it was not full of money um because it because it it was not because it was too politically sensitive for some countries to commit to it yet they did commit to the KPC trust fund when the Kosovo Protection Corps closed at midnight on on on that on that midnight in January 2009 and the Kosovo Security Force um came into being a minute later um some of these K4 units stopped supporting the KSF and in terms of their local what would were their local protection zones in the KPC era the following day there was a reluctance to do so because the KSF for anybody in Kosovo was a an instrument of government um but the for those who didn't recognise Kosovo um nobody would ever refer to Kosovo as the government of Kosovo they would only ever refer to the institutions of Kosovo and that that pervaded K4 and so so that that's an example of of of how um how how I guess what we were trying to achieve with the Kosovo Security Force was undermined by um by some of these these these behaviours that as I said were quite pervasive at the time and the final question is the three so so you went back in I think it was 2018 to uh to catch up with some various people how how did you um sort of detect the um the progress that had been made in in setting up the the KSF and how it was operating and and do you think that um there is a reasonable possibility of it becoming more than it currently is um so again thank you thank you thank you Magda for that um I I was uh I was in the land versus command headquarters on its first day in 2009 and it was chaos and of course a lot of the behaviours that had crept into life within the Kosovo Protection Corps um just clearly just immediately just uh continued the following day uh even though uh I'd I'd had had many conversations with the the now commander of the KSF uh General Rahma about how things needed to be different from day one and he was absolutely determined to ensure that that was the case um and I and I left within two three two within a month or so of that uh of the start of the start of the KSF uh and and the as I say that it was it was still a fairly chaotic environment for a number of reasons and so when I left I I felt quite down in the mouth about what we had done I didn't really get a sense of of of it becoming anything uh particularly effective but then I I went back in 2018 I went I went back to meet the land force commander who I knew who I'd known nine years previously um I arrived at exactly the same barracks it was smart it was ordered um you know just a small thing uh for even for the Balkans there was no smoking in or around the buildings there was a a real sense of purpose and and so much had progressed that I got a real sense that actually this was perfect for Kosovo what um what the the Kosovo Security Force had done and created this opportunity as a as I guess a stepping stone to to much greater things um their their their um program of of sending um young officers out to training institutions around the world particularly in the states at West Point it's Sandhurst in the UK and and elsewhere in other capitals and and winning best international students I mean these are great accolades for what is a very small country a relatively small country and so they have I think they have to be um really congratulated for their determination to make the the Kosovo Security Force as it is actually I think the the most respected um government organization in Kosovo uh and so I was really heartened by that and it did give me a sense that um that it had all been worth things so what about the future well I was I was um I was interviewed by um by Bern the Balkans media um online media organization a few weeks ago and I was asked the question and do I think that um the status of of Kosovo's army and the ability to create an army um should be part of the negotiations over its it's the issue of mutual recognition with Serbia and and I said absolutely not um Kosovo has the right to have its own army um it has the right to self-defense and and I think that they have grown and matured as an organization to the stage now that um it is a natural next step for them to to to do that and um and I I certainly I certainly would support um that initiative there's a there's a few more questions so we'll keep running for um you know probably another tunnel 15 minutes next questions from um Agami uh Pristina um and the question is do you think that the local officers and officials that you interacted with noticed um a lack of commitment from the international presence towards this transition um thank you Agmi and I hope Pristina's still a still hasn't been um I hope you haven't had the snowfall I think that's what I mean because it's probably going to be coming around this sort of time of the year isn't it um but thank you for the question um the the honest answer is I don't honestly think that many people got a sense of it um I talked to Rama on a number of occasions General Rama um and recalled some of the in my role as a liaison officer I would pass messages from one side to the other but I would also give us give a sense of what was happening and um and when I raised this with him he uh he had a bit of a trademark shrug of his shoulders who just he would just what can we do because they General Rama General Salimi at the time they knew that they were unequal partners with K4 therefore they had no real say at the table I mean to a degree they did of course but but when it came down to it the some of these behaviors that I describe in the book um frankly as as Rama did say to me there were bigger things to worry about and and so I think the answer to your question is I don't really think that many people got a sense of it outside of just uh you know a handful who were at the very I guess at the very heart of those discussions between between K4 and the KBC at the time okay the next question is from Florian Shekhaya I hope I pronounced that correctly from the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies and a recent member of RCDS Broad College of Defence Studies here in London and the question is this behavior amongst some NATO nations led to increased distrust of the locals towards NATO and in short there is much lower leverage now towards international stakeholders in Kosovo than during your time in 2008 2009 from a Kosovo perspective do you think they're better off pursuing bilateral partnerships rather than um going with multinational organizations Florian that's uh that is I can tell you've been to RCDS that's so that's a very uh very good question I think you have to accept that there are going to be organizations like the United like like the European Union are always going to have an interest in in Kosovo as NATO has a a responsibility to deploy troops as well as non-nato nations in Kosovo so the the way to unlock the impasse that exists at the moment is is going to take something pretty special from somebody but I would urge um Kosovo to not to necessarily put all their eggs in one basket but you want to have people on your side you want to have people who are genuinely committed to seeing an independent sovereign nation in Kosovo and whilst that is a laudable aim you are going to you are still going to have to rely on the support of of groups of nations um in in in in trying to achieve that um but I I've back in 2008 2009 um the influence of those non-recognizing countries was quite clear um and I think that's you know you clearly want to be partnering with those who you think can can make a difference for you because they believe in you and I think if you adopt that approach then eventually you will you will achieve what it is that you need to achieve and and so um so yeah I think that's that there is a there's certainly a place for bilateral relations and strong bilateral relations as long as they are they are doing it for the the benefit of Kosovo and not for any other any other motive and uh and the final question uh from um Russell Mottler uh really concerns concerns about you really is you've spoken about the military impact but how would you say your time in Kosovo affected you personally obviously enough to to be motivated to write a book but and in terms of um you know the nature of being away from your family for six months and having this stress and stuff some thoughts about you know the longer term impact beyond the six months you were there um so thank thank you Russell that was a that is uh that is also um I guess got an apt question in many ways when I um when I eventually got back from Kosovo in February 2009 I really was in a bit of a state actually because um because the the pressure that I felt throughout the tour which actually had manifested itself into an illness for me throughout and and just an illness that I just needed to ignore because um because I I knew I needed to you know keep on focused on what my mission was but um but I had been unwell throughout the the time and and um so when I and that pressure was right up to the very last almost the last day so I came back uh landed in the UK um I went off to go in to do the school run that afternoon and I stood at the gates of the primary school uh and and I honestly felt like a complete alien because I didn't feel like I belonged uh there I my head was still in Kosovo I and I was still um I was quite a mess to be honest um I think the the challenges on on military military personnel when they serve abroad particularly if they do so in an individual post which is what I was doing I think sometimes if you deploy with a company a regiment a brigade you know you're surrounded by others and and you have a camaraderie and rapport and you can you know you can you can deal with issues I suppose by talking to them and getting it off your chest but um I was definitely lacking in uh in in an ability to offload what was happening and I found it impossible to have those types of conversations um with home for the for the simple reason that it was so complex and it was so difficult to explain um it you know in itself that caused some some real challenges and and you know it it is it is a feature of I guess anybody who serves overseas um I was in the military but uh diplomats do the same and and others who who are working as contractors finding a release valve is uh is is often the most challenging thing and and then when you come back into your normal life um you don't want to feel like an alien every single day that you go to this on the school run you want to um you want to fit back in where you left off but the more um stressful and pressured the tour uh the longer that takes and and sometimes perhaps we never really get over it and maybe we still carry some of it with us today and maybe I do um it's uh it's a question that I think you know it's a subject of another 90-minute conversation to be honest so but thanks for asking it so let's uh close with one final question actually links to um a question that's been also posted in the last you last few minutes so from from this book and indeed from your own experiences what do you think you can take forward to um you know the question relates to your corporate career and what you have learned but also you know what sort of other things can be extrapolated from the from the specific into you know the more general aspects of um operating in a very complex um social and political environment you mean for for for me personally and then also for you know for a reader um well I would I would always I actually would absolutely guarantee that sorry recommends that people if people are in a position to um to make any sort of difference at all outside of their normal environment I would always encourage them to try and do so um for all of the uh the stress and the pressure that I I lived through uh in that six months and and you know you you have your own experiences Martin and I'm sure others on the who are watching uh have also done that if you feel that you are making a difference it is it is the most wonderful feeling and it's a it's a great sense of satisfaction it doesn't happen every day and sometimes you actually need to look back with some context before you can get a sense of actually I did move the dial a little bit forward in that in that way so when you've done it once or twice before you do in a way once I'm not really clear at the moment but what what it has made me think I guess within uh is that um you can do a lot more than you perhaps believe and you can have um more influence in in certain environments than perhaps you believe that actually you you you can do before because you've lived with others who are different to you who have different cultures to you but there is a common language and and much of that is about establishing relationships and and listening and understanding what it is that they are trying to achieve and I think you know you can pick that up and you can just you can drop it into your own life and and so um I think that's probably probably where where I would I would say I'm sitting at the moment well with that um I thank you very much indeed for sharing under a feathered sky I think um and to discuss or uh you're exactly encouraging who's interested in the process of security sector reform and the the peace building uh after conflict to consider buying it and reading it as just one source of um a very personal record of your experiences uh in your role in uh Kosovo 2008-2009 and um with that thank you again and thank you everybody for for joining us for this webinar and um and without thank you session down thank you very much indeed