 45 THE CRITIC OF PURE REASON BY MANUAL CONT TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRON OF METHOD CHAPTER II THE CANON OF PURE REASON SECTION II OF THE IDEAL OF THE SUMUM BONUM AS A DETERMINING GROUND OF THE ULTIMATE END OF PURE REASON Read by M. L. Cohen, Cleveland, Ohio, April 2007 SECTION II OF THE IDEAL OF THE SUMUM BONUM AS A DETERMINING GROUND OF THE ULTIMATE END OF PURE REASON Reason conducted us in its speculative use through the field of experience and as it can never find complete satisfaction in that sphere from thence to speculative ideas, which, however, in the end brought us back again to experience and thus fulfilled the purpose of reason in a manner which, though useful, was not at all in accordance with our expectations. It now remains for us to consider whether pure reason can be employed in a practical sphere and whether it will here conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure reason as we have just stated them. We shall thus ascertain whether, from the point of view of its practical interest, reason may not be able to supply us with that which, on the speculative side, it wholly denies us. The whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is centered into three following questions. 1. What can I know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What may I hope? The first question is purely speculative. What we have, as I flatter myself, exhausted all the replies of which it is susceptible, and have at last found the reply to which reason must contend itself, and with which it ought to be content, so long as it pays no regard to the practical. But from the two great ends of the attainment of which all these efforts of pure reason were, in fact, directed, remain just as far removed as if we had consulted our ease and declined the task at the outset. So far then, as knowledge is concerned, this much, at least, is established that, in regard to those two problems, it lies beyond our reach. The second question is purely practical. As such, it may indeed fall within the province of pure reason, but still it is not transcendental, but moral, and consequently cannot in itself form the subject of our criticism. The third question, if I act as I ought to do, and what may I then hope, is at once practical and theoretical. The practical forms a clue to the answer of the theoretical and, in its highest form, speculative question. For all hoping is happiness for its object, and stands in precisely the same relation to the practical and the law of morality as knowing to the theoretical cognition of things and the law of nature. The former arrives finally at the conclusion that something is, prins, which determines the ultimate end, and prins, because something ought to take place. The latter, that something is, prins, which operates as the highest cause, and prins, because something does take place. Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires. Extensive, in regard to their multiplicity, intensive, in regard to their degree, and protensive, in regard to their duration. The practical law, based on the motive of happiness, I term pragmetical law, prins, or prudential rule, close prins. But that law, assuming such to exist, which has no other motive than the worthiness of being happy, I term immoral or ethical law. The first tells us what we have to do if we wish to become possessed of happiness. The second dictates how we ought to act in order to deserve happiness. The first is based upon empirical principles, for it is only by experience that I can learn either what inclinations exist which desire satisfaction, or what are the natural means of satisfying them. The second takes no account of our desires or the means of satisfying them, in regards only the freedom of a rational being, and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom can harmonize with the distribution of happiness according to the principles. The second law may therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure reason, and may be cognized a priori. I assume that there are pure moral laws which determine entirely a priori, prins, that regard to empirical motives, that is the happiness, close prins. The conduct of a rational being, or in other words, to use which it makes of its freedom, and that these laws are absolutely imperative, prins, not merely hypothetically on the supposition of other empirical lens, close prins, and therefore in all respects necessary. I am warranted in assuming this not only by the arguments of the most enlightened moralists, but by the moral judgment of every man who will make the attempt to form a distinct conception of such a law. Pure reason then contains not indeed in its speculative, but in its practical or more strictly its moral use. Principles of the possibility of experience, of such actions namely as in accordance with ethical precepts, might be met within the history of man. For since reason commands that such actions should take place, it must be possible for them to take place, and hence a particular kind of systematic unity, the moral, must be possible. We have found it is true that the systematic unity of nature could not be established according to speculative principles of reason because, while reason possesses a causal power in relation to freedom, it has none in relation to the whole sphere of nature. And, while moral principles of reason can produce free actions, they cannot produce natural laws. It is then, in its practical, but especially in its moral use, that the principles of pure reason possess objective reality. I call the world a moral world insofar as it may be in accordance with all the ethical laws, which, by virtue of the freedom of reasonable beings, it can be and according to the necessary laws of morality it ought to be. But this world must be conceived only as an intelligible world, in as much as abstraction is there and made of all conditions, prens ends and prens, and even of all impediments to morality, prens the weakness or poverty of human nature and prens. So far then, it is a mere idea, though still a practical idea, which may have and ought to have an influence on the world of sense, so as to bring it as far as possible into conformity with itself. The idea of a moral world has therefore objective reality, not as referring to an object of intelligible intuition, for of such an object we can form no conception whatever. But to the world of sense, conceived, however, as an object of pure reason in its practical use, into a corpus mysticum of rational beings in it, insofar as the liberum arbitrium of the individual is placed under and by virtue of moral laws in complete systematic unity both with itself and with the freedom of all others. That is the answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason, which relate to its practical interest. Do that which will render the worthy of happiness? The second question is this. If I conduct myself so as not to be unworthy of happiness, may I hope thereby to obtain happiness? In order to arrive at the solution of this question, we must inquire whether the principles of pure reason, which prescriber of priori the law, necessarily also connect this hope with it. I say then that just as the moral principles are necessary according to reason in its practical use, so is it equally necessary according to reason in its theoretical use to assume that everyone has a ground to hope for happiness in the measure in which he has made himself worthy of it in his conduct, and that therefore the system of morality is inseparably, prens, though only in the idea of pure reason close prens, connected with that of happiness. Now, in an intelligible, that is, in the moral world, in the conception of which we make abstraction of all the impediments to morality, prens, sensuous desires, and prens, such a system of happiness connected with and proportion to morality may be conceived as necessary, because freedom of volition, partially incited and partially restrained by moral laws, would be itself the cause of general happiness, and thus rational beings under the guidance of such principles would be themselves the authors both of their own enduring welfare and that of others. But such a system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the carrying out of which depends upon the condition that everyone acts as he ought, in other words, that all actions of reasonable beings be such as they would be if they sprung from a supreme will, comprehending in or under itself all particular wills. But since the moral law is binding on each individual in the use of his freedom of volition, even if others should not act in conformity with this law, neither the nature of things nor the causality of actions in the relation to morality determine how the consequences of these actions will be related to happiness, and the necessary connection of the hope of happiness with the unceasing endeavor to become worthy of happiness cannot be cognized by reason, if we take nature alone for our guide. This connection can be hoped for only on the assumption that the cause of nature is a supreme reason which governs according to moral laws. I term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most perfect will, united with supreme blessedness, is the cause of all happiness in the world so far as happiness stands in strict relation to morality, prens as the worthiness of being happy, close prens, the ideal of the supreme good. It is only then, in the ideal of the supreme original good, the pure reason can find the ground of the practically necessary connection of both elements of the highest derivative good, and accordingly of an intelligible, that is, moral world. Now since we are necessitated by reason to conceive ourselves as belonging to such a world, while the senses present to us nothing but a world of phenomena, we must assume the former as a consequence of our conduct in the world of sense, prens, since the world of sense gives us no hint of it in prens, and therefore as future in relation to us. Thus God and the future life are two hypotheses which, according to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the obligation which this reason imposes upon us. Morality per se constitutes a system, but we can form no system of happiness except insofar as it is dispensed in strict proportion to morality, but this is only possible in the intelligible world under a wise author and ruler. Such a ruler, together with life in such a world, which we must look upon as future, reason finds itself compelled to assume, or must regard the moral laws as idle dreams, since the necessary consequence which the same reason connects with them must, without this hypothesis, fall to the ground. Hence also the moral laws are universally regarded as commands, which they could not be, did they not connect a priori adequate consequences with their dictates, and thus carry with them promises and threats. But this again they could not do, did they not reside in a necessary being, as the supreme good, which alone can render such a teleological unity possible. Leibniz termed the world when viewed in relation to the rational being which it contains, and the moral relations in which they stand to each other under government of the supreme good, the kingdom of grace, and distinguished it from the kingdom of nature in which these rational beings live under moral laws indeed, but expect no other consequences from their actions and such as follows according to the course of nature in the world of sense. To view ourselves therefore as in the kingdom of grace, in which all happiness awaits us except insofar as we ourselves limit our participation in it by actions which render us unworthy of happiness, is a practically necessary idea of reason. Practical laws, insofar as they are subjective grounds of action, that is subjective principles, are termed maxims. The judgments of morality, in its purity and ultimate results, are framed according to ideas, the observance of its laws according to maxims. The whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims, but this is impossible unless with the moral law, which is a mere idea, reason connects an efficient cause which ordains to all conduct, which is in conformity with the moral law, an issue either in this or in another life, which is in exact conformity with our highest aims. Thus, without a God and without a world invisible to us now but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are indeed objects of approbation of admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose and action, for they do not satisfy all the aims which are natural to every rational being and which are determined a prior by pure reason itself and necessary. Happiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from being the complete good. Reason does not approve of it, friends, however much inclination may desire it, and friends, except as united with dessert. On the other hand, morality alone, and with it, mere dessert, is likewise far from being the complete good. To make it complete, he who conducts himself in a manner not unworthy of happiness, must be able to hope for the possession of happiness. Even reason, unbiased by private ends or interested considerations, cannot just otherwise, if it puts itself in the place of being whose business it is to dispense all happiness to others. For in the practical idea, both points are essentially combined, though in such a way that participation in happiness is rendered possible by the moral disposition, as its condition, and not conversely, the moral disposition by the prospect of happiness. For a disposition which would require the prospect of happiness as its necessary condition, would not be moral, and hence also would not be worthy of complete happiness, a happiness which, in the view of reason, recognizes no limitation but such as arises from its own immoral conduct. Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings, prens, whereby they are made worthy of happiness and prens, constitutes alone the supreme good of a world to which we absolutely must transport ourselves according to commands of pure but practical reason. The world is, it is true, only an intelligible world, for of such a systematic unity of ends as it requires, the world of sense gives us no hint. Its reality can be based on nothing else but the hypothesis of a supreme original good. In it, independent reason, equipped with all the sufficiency of the supreme cause, founds, maintains, and fulfills the universal order of things with the most perfect teleological harmony. However much this order may be hidden from us in the world of sense. This moral theology has the peculiar advantage, in contrast with speculative theology, of leading inevitably to the conception of a sole, perfect, and rational first cause, whereof speculative theology does not give us any indication on objective grounds far less any convincing evidence. For we find neither intranscendental nor natural theology, however far reason may lead us in these, any ground to warrant us in assuming the existence of one only being, which stands at the head of all natural causes and on which these are entirely dependent. On the other hand, if we take our stand on moral unity as a necessary law of the universe, and from this point of view consider what is necessary to give this law adequate efficiency and, for us, obligatory force, we must come to the conclusion that there is one only supreme will, which comprehends all these laws in itself, for how, under different wills, should we find complete unity of ends. This will must be omnipotent, that all nature in relation to morality in the world may be subject to it, omniscient, that it may have knowledge of the most secret feelings in their moral worth, omnipresent, that it may be at hand to supply every necessity to which the highest wheel of the world may give rise, eternal, that this harmony of nature and liberty may never fail, and so on. But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences, which, as mere nature, is only a world of sense, but as a system of freedom of volition may be termed an intelligible, that is, moral world, Perenn's Ragnum Gracie, close Perenns, leads inevitably also to the teleological unity of all things which constitute this great whole, according to universal natural laws, just as the unity of the former is according to universal and necessary moral laws, and unites the practical with the speculative reason. The world must be represented at having originated from an idea, if it is to harmonize with the use of reason, without which we cannot even consider ourselves as worthy of reason, namely, the moral use, which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme good. Hence, the investigation of nature receives a teleological direction, and becomes, in its widest extension, physical theology. But this, taking its rise in moral order as a unity founded on the essence of freedom, and not accidentally instituted by external commands, establishes the teleological view of nature on grounds which must be inseparably connected with the internal possibility of things. This could rise to a transcendental theology, which takes the ideal of the highest ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity, and this principle connects all things according to universal and necessary natural laws, because all things have their origin in the absolute necessity of the one only primal being. What use can we make of our understanding, even in respect of experience, if we do not propose ends to ourselves? But the highest ends are those of morality, and it is only pure reason that can give us the knowledge of these. Though supplied with these, and putting ourselves under their guidance, we can make no teleological use of the knowledge of nature as regards cognition, unless nature itself has established teleological unity. For without this unity, we should not even possess reason, because we should have no school for reason, and no cultivation through objects which afford the materials for its conception. But ideological unity is a necessary unity, and founded on the essence of the individual will itself. Hence this will, which is the condition of the application of this unity in concreto, must be so likewise. In this way, the transcendental enlargement of our rational cognition would be not the cause, but merely the effect of the practical teleology which pure reason imposes upon us. Hence also, we find in the history of human reason that before the moral conceptions were sufficiently purified and determined, and before men had attended to the perception of systematic unity of ends according to the conceptions and from necessary principles, the knowledge of nature, and even a considerable amount of intellectual culture and many other sciences could produce only rude and vague conceptions of the deity, sometimes even admitting of an astonishing indifference with regard to this question altogether. But the more enlarged treatment of moral ideas, which was rendered necessary by the extremely pure moral law of our religion, awakened the interest, and thereby quickened the perception of reason in relation to this object. In this way, without the help either of an extended acquaintance with nature or of a reliable transcendental insight, parense, for these having been wanting in all ages close parense, a conception of the divine being was arrived at, which we now hold to be the correct one, not because speculative reason convinces us of its correctness, but because it accords with the moral principles of reason. Thus it is the pure reason, but only in its practical use, that we must describe the merit of having connected with our highest interest to cognition, of which mere speculation was able only to form a conjecture, but the validity of which it was unable to establish, and of having thereby rendered it, not indeed a demonstrated dogma, but a hypothesis absolutely necessary to the essential ends of reason. But a practical reason has reached its elevation, and is attained to the conception of a sole primal being as a supreme good. It must not, therefore, imagine that it has transcended the empirical conditions of its application, and risen to the immediate cognition of new objects. It must not presume to start from the conception which it has gained, and to deduce from it the moral laws themselves. For it was these very laws, the internal practical necessity of which led us to the hypothesis of an independent cause, or of a wise ruler of the universe, who should give them effect. Hence we are not entitled to regard them as accidental, and derived from the mere will of the ruler, especially as we have no conception of such a will, except as formed in accordance with these laws. So far then, as practical reason has the right to conduct us, we shall not look upon actions as binding on us, because they are the commands of God, but we shall regard them as divine commands, because we are internally bound by them. We shall study freedom under the teleological unity which accords with the principles of reason. We shall look upon ourselves as acting in conformity with the divine will only insofar as we hold sacred the moral law, which reason teaches us from the nature of actions themselves, and we shall believe that we can obey that will only by promoting the wheel of the universe in ourselves and in others. Moral theology is therefore only of imminent use. It teaches us to fulfill our destiny here in the world by placing ourselves in harmony with the general system of ends, and warns us against the fanaticism, nay the crime of the priving reason of its legitimate authority in the moral conduct of life, for the purpose of directly connecting this authority with the idea of the supreme being. For this would be not an imminent but a transcendent use of moral theology, and like to transcendent use of mere speculation would inevitably pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason. The Canon of Pure Reason Section 3 Of Opinion, Knowledge and Belief This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information ought to volunteer visit LibriVox.org. This reading by Carl Manchester 2007 The Critique of Pure Reason by Emanuel Kant Book 2, Chapter 3, Section 3 Of Opinion, Knowledge and Belief The holding of a thing to be true is a phenomenon in our understanding which may rest upon objective grounds, but requires also subjective causes in the mind of the person judging. If a judgment is valid for every rational being, then its ground is objectively sufficient, and it is termed a conviction. If, on the other hand, it has its ground in the particular character of the subject, it is termed a persuasion. Persuasion is a mere illusion, the ground of the judgment which lies solely in the subject being regarded as objective. Hence a judgment of this kind has only private validity, it is only valid for the individual who judges, and the holding of a thing to be true in this way cannot be communicated. But truth depends upon agreement with the object, and consequently the judgments of all understandings, if true, must be in agreement with each other, consentientia unitertio consentient interse. Conviction may, therefore, be distinguished from an external point of view, from persuasion, by the possibility of communicating it, and by showing its validity for the reason of every man. For in this case, the presumption, at least, arises that the agreement of all judgments with each other, in spite of the different characters of individuals, rests upon the common ground of the agreement of each with the object, and thus the correctness of the judgment is established. Persuasion, accordingly, cannot be subjectively distinguished from conviction, that is, so long as the subject views its judgment simply as a phenomenon of its own mind. But if we inquire whether the grounds of our judgment, which are valid for us, produce the same effect on the reason of others as on our own, we have then the means, though only subjective means, not indeed of producing conviction, but of detecting the merely private validity of the judgment, in other words, of discovering that there is in it the element of mere persuasion. If we can, in addition to this, develop the subjective causes of the judgment, which we have taken for its objective grounds, and thus explain the deceptive judgment as a phenomenon in our mind, apart altogether from the objective character of the object, we can then expose the illusion, and need be no longer deceived by it, although, if its subjective cause lies in our nature, we cannot hope altogether to escape its influence. I can only maintain, that is, a firm as necessarily valid for everyone, that which produces conviction. Persuasion, I may keep for myself if it is agreeable to me, but I cannot, and ought not, to attempt to impose it as binding upon others. Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgment in relation to conviction, which is, at the same time, objectively valid, has the three following degrees. Opinion, belief and knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgment, subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction for myself. Objective sufficiency is termed certainty for all. I need not dwell longer on the explanation of such simple conceptions. I must never venture to be of opinion without knowing something, at least, by which my judgment, in itself merely problematical, is brought into connection with the truth, which connection, although not perfect, is still something more than an arbitrary fiction. Moreover, the law of such a connection must be certain. For if, in relation to this law, I have nothing more than opinion, my judgment is but a play of the imagination, without the least relation to truth. In the judgments of pure reason, opinion has no place. For as they do not rest on empirical grounds, and as the sphere of pure reason is that of necessary truth and a priori cognition, the principle of connection in it requires universality and necessity, and consequently perfect certainty, otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at all. Hence it is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics. We must know or abstain from forming a judgment altogether. The case is the same with the maxims of morality, for we must not hazard an action on the mere opinion that it is allowed, but we must know it to be so. In the transcendental sphere of reason, on the other hand, the term opinion is too weak, while the word knowledge is too strong. From the merely speculative point of view therefore, we cannot form a judgment at all. For the subjective grounds of a judgment, such as produced belief, cannot be admitted in speculative inquiries in as much as they cannot stand without empirical support and are incapable of being communicated to others in equal measure. But it is only from the practical point of view that a theoretically insufficient judgment can be termed belief. Now the practical reference is either to skill or to morality, to the former, when the end proposed is arbitrary and accidental, to the latter when it is absolutely necessary. If we propose to ourselves any end whatever, the conditions of its attainment are hypothetically necessary. The necessity is subjectively, but still only comparatively, sufficient. If I am acquainted with no other conditions under which the end can be attained, on the other hand, it is sufficient absolutely and for everyone, if I know for certain that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions under which the attainment of the proposed end would be possible. In the former case, my supposition, my judgment with regard to certain conditions, is a merely accidental belief. In the latter, it is a necessary belief. The physician may pursue some course in the case of a patient who is in danger, but is ignorant of the nature of the disease. He observes the symptoms and concludes, according to the best of his judgment, that it is a case of pathitis. His belief is, even in his own judgment, only contingent. Another man might perhaps come nearer the truth. Such a belief, contingent indeed, but still forming the ground of the actual use of means for the attainment of certain ends, I term pragmatical belief. The usual test, whether that which anyone maintains is merely his persuasion or his subjective conviction, at least, that is, his firm belief, is a bet. It frequently happens that a man delivers his opinions with so much boldness and assurance that he appears to be under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error. The offer of a bet startles him and makes him pause. Sometimes it turns out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat, but not at ten. For he does not hesitate, perhaps, to venture a ducat, but if it is proposed to stake ten, he immediately becomes aware of the possibility of his being mistaken, a possibility which has hitherto escaped his observation. If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposition, our judgment drops its air of triumph, and we take the alarm and discover the actual strength of our belief. Thus, pragmatical belief has degrees varying in proportion to the interests at stake. Now, in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in reference to some object, and where, accordingly, our judgment is purely theoretical, we can still represent to ourselves, in thought, the possibility of a course of action, for which we suppose that we have sufficient grounds, if any means existed, of ascertaining the truth of the matter. Thus we find in purely theoretical judgments an analogon of practical judgments, to which the word belief may properly be applied, and which we may term doctrinal belief. I should not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition, if there were any possibility of bringing it to the test of experience, that at least some one of the planets, which we see, is inhabited. Hence I say that I have not merely the opinion, but the strong belief, on the correctness of which I would stake even many of the advantages of life, that there are inhabitants in other worlds. Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal belief. Four, although in respect to the theoretical cognition of the universe, I do not require to form any theory which necessarily involves this idea, as the condition of my explanation of the phenomena which the universe presents. But on the contrary, I am rather bound so to use my reason, as if everything were mere nature. Still teleological unity is so important a condition of the application of my reason to nature, that it is impossible for me to ignore it, especially since, in addition to these considerations, abundant examples of it are supplied by experience. But the sole condition, so far as my knowledge extends, under which this unity can be my guide in the investigation of nature, is the assumption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things according to the wisest ends. Consequently, the hypothesis of a wise author of the universe is necessary for my guidance in the investigation of nature, is the sole condition under which I can fulfil an end which is contingent indeed, but by no means unimportant. Moreover, since the result of my attempt so frequently confirms the unity of this assumption, and since nothing decisive can be induced against it, it follows that it would be saying far too little to turn my judgment, in this case, a mere opinion, and that even in this theoretical connection, I may assert that I firmly believe in God. Still, if we use words strictly, this must not be called a practical but a doctrinal belief, which the theology of nature, physical theology, must also produce in my mind. In the wisdom of a supreme being, and in the shortness of life so inadequate to the development of the glorious powers of human nature, we may find equally sufficient grounds for a doctrinal belief in the future life of the human soul. The expression of belief is, in such cases, an expression of modesty from the objective point of view, but at the same time of firm confidence from the subjective. If I should venture to term this merely theoretical judgment, even so much as a hypothesis which I am entitled to assume, a more complete conception with regard to another world and to the cause of the world might then be justly required of me than I am, in reality, able to give. For, if I assume anything, even as a mere hypothesis, I must at least know so much of the properties of such a being as will enable me not to form the conception, but to imagine the existence of it. But the word belief refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence on the conduct of my reason, which forces me to hold it fast, though I may not be in a position to give a speculative account of it. But mere doctrinal belief is, to some extent, wanting instability. We often quit our hold of it in consequence of the difficulties which occur in speculation, though in the end we inevitably return to it again. It is quite otherwise with moral belief. For in this fear, action is absolutely necessary, that is, I must act in obedience with the moral law in all points. The end is here incontrovertibly established, and there is only one condition possible, according to the best of my perception, under which this end can harmonise with all other ends and so have practical validity, namely the existence of a God and of a future world. I know also, to a certainty, that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions which conduct to the same unity of ends under the moral law. But since the moral precept is, at the same time, my maxim, as reason requires that it should be, I am irresistibly constrained to believe in the existence of God and in a future life. And I am sure that nothing can make me waver in this belief, since I should thereby overthrow my moral maxims, the renunciation of which would render me hateful in my own eyes. Thus, while all the ambitious attempts of reason to penetrate beyond the limits of experience end in disappointment, there is still enough left to satisfy us in a practical point of view. No one, it is true, will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God and a future life, for if he knows this, he is just the man whom I have long wished to find. All knowledge regarding an object of mere reason can be communicated, and I should thus be enabled to hope that my own knowledge would receive this wonderful extension through the instrumentality of his instruction. No, my conviction is not logical, but moral certainty, and since it rests on subjective grounds of the moral sentiment, I must not even say it is morally certain that there is a God etc. But I am morally certain, that is, my belief in God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature that I am under as little apprehension of having the former taunt from me as of losing the latter. The only point in this argument that may appear open to suspicion is that this rational belief presupposes the existence of moral sentiments. If we give up this assumption and take a man who is entirely indifferent with regard to moral laws, the question which reason proposes becomes then merely a problem for speculation and may indeed be supported by strong grounds from analogy, but not by such as will compel the most obstinate skepticism to give way. The human mind, as I believe every rational being must of necessity do, takes a natural interest in morality. Although this interest is not undivided and may not be practically in preponderance, if you strengthen and increase it, you will find the reason become docile, more enlightened and more capable of uniting the speculative interest with the practical. But if you do not take care at the outset or at least midway to make men good, you will never force them into an honest belief. End footnote But in these questions no man is free from all interest, for though the wants of good sentiments may place him beyond the influence of moral interests, still even in this case, enough may be left to make him fear the existence of God and a future life, for he cannot pretend to any certainty of the non-existence of God and of a future life, unless, since it could only be proved by mere reason and therefore apodactically, he is prepared to establish the impossibility of both which certainly no reasonable man would undertake to do. This would be a negative belief which could not indeed produce morality and good sentiments, but still could produce an analogue of these by operating as a powerful restraint on the outbreak of evil dispositions. But it will be said, is this all that pure reason can affect in opening up prospects beyond the limits of experience? Nothing more than two articles of belief. Common sense could have done as much as this, without taking the philosophers to counsel in the matter. I shall not hear eulogised philosophy for the benefits which the laborious efforts of its criticism have conferred on human reason, even granting that its merit should turn out in the end to be only negative. For on this point, something more will be said in the next section. But I ask, do you require that that knowledge which concerns all men should transcend the common understanding and should only be revealed to you by philosophers? The very circumstance which has called forth your censure is the best confirmation of the correctness of our previous assertions, since it discloses what could not have been foreseen, that nature is not chargeable with any partial distribution of her gifts in those matters which concern all men without distinction, and that in respect to the essential ends of human nature we cannot advance further with the help of the highest philosophy than under the guidance which nature has vouchsafed to the meanest understanding. Read by ML Cohen, Cleveland, Ohio, April 2007 The Architectonic of Pure Reason By the term architectonic, I mean the art of constructing a system. Without systematic unity, our knowledge cannot become science. It will be an aggregate and not a system. Thus architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific incognition and therefore necessarily forms part of our methodology. Reason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an unconnected and rhapsodistic state, but requires that the sum of our cognitions should constitute a system. It is thus alone that they can advance the end of reason. By a system, I mean the unity of various cognitions under one idea. The idea is the conception, given by reason, of the form of a whole insofar as the conception determines a priori not only the limits of its content, but the place which each of its parts is to occupy. The scientific idea contains therefore the end and the form of the whole which is in accordance with that end. The unity of the end to which all parts of the system relate and through which all have a relation to each other communicates unity to the whole system, so that the absence of any part can be immediately detected from our knowledge of the rest. And it determines a priori the limits of the system, thus excluding all contingent or arbitrary additions. The whole is thus an organism, parense articulatio and parense, and not an aggregate. Parense conservatio, parense. It may grow from within, parense per inter-susceptionem, parense, but it cannot increase by external additions. Parense per appasinsinem. It is thus like an animal body, the growth of which does not add any limb, but without changing their proportions makes each in its sphere stronger and more active. We require for the execution of the idea of a system a schema, that is, a content and an arrangement of parts determined a priori by the principle which the aim of the system prescribes. A schema which is not projected in accordance with an idea, that is, from the standpoint of the highest aim of reason, but merely empirically in accordance with the accidental aims and purposes, parense, the number of which cannot be predetermined in close parense, can give us nothing more than a technical unity. But the schema, which is originated from an idea, parense, in which case reason presents us with aims a priori and does not look for them to experience close parense, forms the basis of an architectonical unity. A science, in the proper exception of that term, cannot be formed technically, that is, from observation of the similarity existing between different objects and the purely contingent use we make of our knowledge in concreto with reference to all kinds of arbitrary external aims. Its constitution must be framed on architectonical principles, that is, its parts must be shown to possess an essential affinity and be capable of being deduced from one supreme and internal aim or end, which forms the condition of the possibility of the scientific whole. The schema of a science must give a priori the plan of it, parense, monogramma, close parense, and a division of the whole into parts in conformity with the idea of the science, and it must also distinguish this whole from all others according to certain understood principles. No one will attempt to construct a science unless they have some idea to rest on as a proper basis. But in the elaboration of the science he finds that the schema, and even the definition which he at first gave of the science, rarely corresponds with his idea. For this idea lies, like a germ, in our reason. Its parts undeveloped and hid even from microscopic observation. For this reason, we ought to explain and define sciences not according to description which the originator gives of them, but according to the idea which we find based in reason itself, and which is suggested by the natural unity of the parts of the science already accumulated. For it will often be found that the originator of a science, and even his latest successors, remain attached to an erroneous idea which they cannot render clear to themselves, and that they thus file in determining the true content, the articulation or systematic unity, and the limits of their science. It is unfortunate that only after having occupied ourselves for a long time in the collection of materials, under the guidance of an idea which lies undeveloped in the mind, but not according to any definite plan of arrangement, nay only after we have spent much time and labor in the technical disposition of our materials does it become possible to view the idea of a science in a clear light, and to project, according to architectonical principles, a plan of the whole in accordance with the aims of reason. Systems seem, like certain worms, to be formed by a kind of generatio equivica, by the mere confluence of conceptions, and to gain completeness only with the progress of time. But the schema or germ of all lies in reason, and thus is not only every system organized according to its own idea, but all are united into one grand system of human knowledge, of which they form members. For this reason, it is possible to frame an architectonic of all human cognition, the formation of which at the present time, considering the immense materials collected or to be found in the ruins of all system, would not indeed be very difficult. Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan of the architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason, and we begin from the point where the main root of human knowledge divides into two, one of which is reason. By reason, I understand here the whole higher faculty of cognition, the rational being, placed in contradistinction to the empirical. If I make complete abstraction of the content of cognition objectively considered, all cognition is, from a subjective point of view, either historical or rational. Historical cognition is cognitorex status, rational cognitorex principias. Whatever may be the original source of a cognition, it is in relation to the person who possesses it merely historical, if he knows only what has been given him from another quarter, whether that knowledge was communicated by direct experience or by instruction. Thus, the person who has learned a system of philosophy, say the Wolfian, he has a perfect knowledge of all the principles, definitions, and arguments in that philosophy, as well as of the divisions that have been made by the system, he possesses really no more than a historical knowledge of the Wolfian system. He knows only what has been told to him, his judgments are only those which he has received from his teachers. Dispute the validity of a definition, and he is completely at a loss to find another. He has formed his mind on another's, but the imitative faculty is not the productive. His knowledge has not been drawn from reason, and although objectively considered it is rational knowledge, subjectively it is merely historical. He has learned this or that philosophy, and is merely a plaster cast of a living man. Rational cognitions which are objective, that is which have their source and reason, can be so termed from a subjective point of view only when they have been drawn by the individual himself from the sources of reason, that is from principles. And it is in this way alone that criticism, or even the rejection of what has been already learned, can spring up in the mind. All rational cognition is, again, based either on conceptions or on the construction of conceptions. The former's term philosophical, the latter mathematical. I have already shown the essential difference of these two methods of cognition in the first chapter. A cognition may be objectively philosophical and subjectively historical, as is the case with the majority of scholars and those who cannot look beyond the limits of their system, and who remain in a state of pupillage all their lives. But it is remarkable that mathematical knowledge, when committed to memory, is valid from the subjective point of view, as rational knowledge also, and that the same distinction cannot be drawn here, as is the case of philosophical cognition. The reason is that the only way of arriving at this knowledge is through the essential principles of reason, and thus it is always certain and indisputable, because reason is employed in concreto. But at the same time a priori, that is, in pure and therefore infallible intuition, and thus all causes of illusion and error are excluded. Of all the a priori sciences of reason therefore, mathematics alone can be learned. Philosophy, unless it be in an historical manner, cannot be learned. We can, at most, learn to philosophize. Philosophy is a system of all philosophical cognition. We must use this term in an objective sense, if we understand by it the archetype of all attempts at philosophizing, and the standard by which all subjective philosophies are to be judged. In this sense, philosophy is merely the idea of a possible science, which does not exist in concreto, but to which we endeavor in various ways to approximate, until we have discovered the right path to pursue. A path overgrown by the errors and illusion of sense, and the image we have hitherto tried to shape in vain, has become a perfect copy of the great prototype. Until that time, we cannot learn philosophy. It does not exist. If it does, where is it? Who possesses it? And how shall we know it? We can only learn to philosophize. In other words, we can only exercise our powers of reasoning, in accordance with the general principles, retaining, at the same time, the right of investigating the sources of these principles, of testing, and even of rejecting them. Until then, our conception of philosophy is only a scholastic conception. A conception, that is, of a system of cognition which we are trying to elaborate into a science. All that we are present know, being the systematic unity of that's cognition, and consequently the logical completeness of the cognition for the desired end. But there is also a cosmical conception, Perin's conceptus cosmicus, close Perin's, of philosophy, which has always formed the true basis of this term. Especially when philosophy was personified and presented to us in the ideal of a philosopher. In this view, philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to the ultimate and essential aims of human reason. Open Perin's teleological rationalis humani, close Perin's, and a philosopher is not merely an artist, who occupies himself with conceptions, but a law giver, legislating for human reason. In this sense of the word, it would be in the highest degree arrogant to assume the title of philosopher, and to pretend that we had reached the perfection of the prototype which lies in the idea alone. The mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the logician. How far the first may have advanced in rational, and the two latter in philosophical knowledge, are merely artists engaged in the arrangement and formation of conceptions. They cannot be termed philosophers. Above them all, there is the ideal teacher, who employs them as instruments for the advancement of the essential aims of human reason. Him alone can we call philosopher, but he nowhere exists. But the idea of his legislative power resides in the mind of every man, and it alone teaches us what kind of systematic unity philosophy demands in view of the ultimate aims of reason. This idea is therefore a Cosmical Conception. Footnote By a Cosmical Conception, I mean one in which all men necessarily take an interest. The aim of a science must accordingly be determined according to scholastic conceptions, if it is regarded merely as a means to certain arbitrary proposed ends. End Footnote In view of the complete systematic unity of reason, there can only be one ultimate end of all the operations of the mind. To this, all other aims are subordinate, and nothing more than means for its attainment. This ultimate end is the destination of man, and the philosophy which relates to it is termed Moral Philosophy. The superior position occupied by Moral Philosophy, above all others for the operations of reason, sufficiently indicates the reason why the ancients always included the idea, and in a special manner, a moralist in that of philosopher. Even at the present day, we call a man who appears to have the power of self-government, even although his knowledge may be very limited, by the name of philosopher. The legislation of human reason, or philosophy, has two objects, nature and freedom, and thus contains not only the laws of nature, but also those of ethics, at first and to separate system, which finally, merge into one grand philosophical system of cognition. The philosophy of nature relates to that which is, that of ethics, to that which ought to be. But all philosophy is either cognition on the basis of pure reason, or the cognition of reason on the basis of empirical principles. The former is termed pure, the latter empirical philosophy. The philosophy of pure reason is either propodotic, that is, an inquiry into the powers of reason in regard to pure apiary cognition, and is termed critical philosophy, or it is, secondly, the system of pure reason. A science containing the systematic presentation of the whole body of philosophical knowledge, true as well as illusory, given by pure reason, and is called metaphysic. This name may, however, be also given to the whole system of pure philosophy, critical philosophy included, and may designate the investigation into the sources or possibility of apiary cognition, as well as the presentation of the apiary cognitions which form a system of pure philosophy, excluding at the same time all empirical and mathematical elements. Metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative, and that of the practical use of pure reason, and is accordingly, either the metaphysic of nature, or the metaphysic of ethics. The former contains all the pure rational principles, based upon conceptions alone, perenned in thus excluding mathematics, of all the theoretical cognition, the latter, the principles which determine and necessitate apiary all action. Now moral philosophy alone contains a code of laws, for the regulation of our actions, which are deduced from principles entirely apiary. Hence the metaphysic of ethics is the only pure moral philosophy, as it is not based upon anthropological or other empirical considerations. The metaphysic of speculative reason is what is commonly called metaphysic in the more limited sense. But as pure moral philosophy properly forms a part of the system of cognition, we must allow it to retain the name of metaphysic, although it is not requisite that we should insist on so terming it in our present discussion. It is of highest importance to separate those cognitions which differ from others, both in kind and in origin, and to take great care that they are not confounded with those with which they are generally found connected. What the chemist does in the analysis of substrates, what the mathematician in pure mathematics is, in still higher degree, the duty of the philosopher, that of the value of each different kind of cognition, the heart it takes and the operations of the mind may be clearly defined. Human reason has never wanted a metaphysic of some kind, since it attained a power of thought, or rather a reflection, but it has never been able to keep this fear of thought and cognition pure from all admixture of foreign elements. The idea of a science of this kind is as old as speculation itself, and what mind does not speculate, either in a scholastic or in the popular fashion? At the same time, it must be admitted that even thinkers by profession have been unable clearly to explain the distinction between the two elements of our cognition, the one completely a priori, the other a posteriori, and hence the proper definition of a peculiar kind of cognition, and with it the just idea of a science which has so long and so deeply engaged the attention of the human mind has never been established. When it was said, quote, metaphysics is a science of the first principles of human cognition, end quote, this definition did not signalize a peculiarity in kind, but only a difference in degree. These first principles were thus declared to be more general than others, but no criterion of distinction from empirical principles was given. Of these some are more general, and therefore higher than others, and as we cannot distinguish what is completely a priori, from that which is known to be a posteriori, where shall we draw the line which is to separate the higher and so-called first principles from the lower and subordinate principles of cognition? What would be said if we were asked to be satisfied with the division of the epochs of the world into the earlier centuries and those following them? Quote, does the fifth or the tenth century belong to the earlier centuries? End quote. It would be asked, in the same way I asked, does the conception of extension belong to metaphysics? You answer yes. That of body too? Yes. And that of a fluid body? You stop. You are unprepared to admit this, for if you do, everything will belong to metaphysics. From this it is evident that the mere degree of subordination of the particular to the general cannot determine the limits of assigns, and that in the present case, we must expect to find a difference in the conceptions of metaphysics both in kind and in origin. The fundamental idea of metaphysics was obscured on another side by the fact that this kind of a prior cognition shows certain similarity in character with the science of mathematics. Both have the property in common of possessing an a prior origin, but in the one our knowledge is based upon conceptions, in the other on a construction of conceptions. Thus the decided dissimilarity between philosophical and mathematic cognition comes out, a dissimilarity which was always felt, but which could not be made distinct for one of an insight into the criteria of the difference. And thus it happened that, as philosophers themselves failed in the proper development of the idea of their science, the elaboration of the science could not proceed with the definite aim or under trustworthy guidance. Thus too, philosophers ignorant of the path they ought to pursue and always disputing with each other regarding the discoveries which each asserted he had made brought their science into dispute with the rest of the world and finally even among themselves. All pure a prior cognition forms, therefore, in the view of the peculiar faculty which originates it, a peculiar and distinct unity. And metaphysic is the term applied to the philosophy which attempts to represent that cognition in this systematic unity. The speculative part of metaphysic, which has especially appropriated this appellation, that which we have called the metaphysic of nature in which considers everything as it is, prins not as it ought to be in prins, by means of a prior conceptions is divided in the following manner. Metaphysic, in the more limited exception of the term, consists of two parts, transcendental philosophy and the physiology of pure reason. The former presents the system of all the conceptions and principles belonging to the understanding and the reason in which relate to the objects in general, but not to any particular given objects, prins ontologia, close prins. The latter has nature for its subject matter, that is, the sum of given objects, whether given to the senses or if we will to some other kind of intuition, and is accordingly physiology, although only rationalis. But the use of the faculty of reason in this rational motive regarding nature is either physical or hyperphysical or, properly speaking, imminent or transcendent. The former relates to nature and so far as our knowledge regarding it may be applied in experience, prins inconcrito, close prins, the latter to that connection of the objects of experience which transcends all experience. Transcendent philosophy has, again, an internal and an external connection with its object, both, however, transcending possible experience. The former is the physiology of nature as a whole of transcendental cognition of the world, the latter of the connection with the whole of nature with a being above nature or transcendental cognition of God. Imminent physiology, on the contrary, considers nature as the sum of all sensuous objects, consequently, as it is presented to us, but still according to a priori conditions, for it is under these alone that nature can be presented to our minds at all. The metaphysics of imminent physiology are of two kinds. One, those of the external senses or corporeal nature. Two, the object of the internal sense, the soul, or in accordance with our fundamental conceptions of it, thinking nature. The metaphysics of corporeal nature is called physics, but as it must contain only the principles of an a priori cognition of nature, we must term it rational physics. The reason why nature is called psychology, and for the same reason is to be regarded as merely the rational cognition of the soul. Thus, the whole system of metaphysics consists of four principal parts. One, ontology. Two, rational physiology. Three, rational cosmology. And four, rational theology. The second part, that of the rational doctrine of nature, may be subdivided into two. Physical rationales and psychological rationales. Footnote. It must not be supposed that I mean by this appellation what is generally called physical generalis, and which is rather mathematics than a philosophy of nature. For the metaphysics of nature is completely different from mathematics nor is it so rich in results, although it is of great importance as a critical test of the application of pure understanding and cognition to nature. For want of its guidance, even mathematicians adopting certain common notions which are in fact metaphysical, have unconsciously crowded the theories of nature with hypotheses, the fallacy of which becomes evident upon the application of the principles of this metaphysics without detriment, however, to the employment of mathematics in the sphere of cognition. And footnote. The fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason of necessity dictates this division. It is therefore architectonical, in accordance with the highest aims of reason and not merely technical, or according to certain accidentally observed similarities existing between the different parts of the whole science. For this reason though, is the division immutable and of legislative authority. But the reader may observe in it a few points to which he ought to demur and which may weaken his conviction of its truth and legitimacy. In the first place, how can I desire an a priori cognition or metaphysics of objects insofar as they are given a posteriori? And how is it possible to cognize the nature of things according to a priori principles and to attain to a rational physiology? The answer is this. We take from experience nothing more than as requisite to present us with an object, friends in general, close friends, of the external or of the internal sense. In the former case, by the mere conception of matter, friends, impenetrable and inanimate extension close friends, in the latter by the conception of a thinking being given in the internal empirical representation, I think. As to the rest, we must not employ in our metaphysics of these objects any empirical principles, friends which add to the content of our conceptions by means of experience for the purpose of forming by their help any judgments respecting these objects. Secondly, what place shall we assign to empirical psychology, which has always been considered a part of metaphysics and from which in our time such important philosophical results have been expected after the hope of constructing an a priori system of knowledge had been abandoned? I answer, it must be placed by the side of empirical physics or physics proper. That is, must be regarded as forming a part of applied philosophy, the a priori principles of which are contained in pure philosophy, which is therefore connected, although it must not be confounded, with psychology. Empirical psychology must therefore be banished from the sphere of metaphysics and is indeed excluded by the very idea of that science. In conformity, however, with scholastic usage, we must permit it to occupy a place in metaphysics, but only as an appendix to it. We adopt this course from motives of economy as psychology is not yet full enough to occupy our attention as an independent study, while it is at the same time of two great importance to be entirely excluded or placed where it has still less affinity that it has with the subject of metaphysics. It is a stranger who has been long a guest and we make it welcome to stay until it can take up a more suitable abode in a complete system of anthropology dependent to empirical physics. The above is the general idea of metaphysics, which, as more was expected from it than could be looked for with justice, and as these pleasant expectations were unfortunately never realized, fell into general disrepute. Our critique must have fully convinced the reader that, although metaphysics cannot form the foundation of religion, it must always be one of its most important bulwarks, and that human reason, which naturally pursues a dialectical course, cannot do without this science, which checks its tendency towards dialectic and, by elevating reason to a scientific and clear self-knowledge, prevents the ravages which a lawless speculative reason would installably commit in the sphere of morals, as well as in that of religion. We may be sure, therefore, whatever contempt may be thrown upon metaphysics by those who judge a science as its own nature, but according to the accidental effects it may have produced, that it can never be completely abandoned, that we must always return to it as a beloved one who has, for a time, been estranged, because the questions with which it is engaged relate to the highest aims of humanity, and reason must always labor either to attain to settled views in regard to these, or to destroy those which others have already established. Metaphysics, therefore, that of nature as well as that of ethics, but in a special manner the criticism which forms the propodotic to all the operations of reason forms properly that department of knowledge which may be termed in the truest sense of the word philosophy. The path which it pursues is that of science, which, when it has once been discovered, is never lost and never misleads. Mathematics, natural science, the common experience of men have a high value as means for the most part to accidental ends, but at last also to those which are inessential to the existence of humanity. But to guide them to this high goal they require the aid of rational cognition on the basis of pure conceptions, which, be it termed as it may, is properly nothing but metaphysics. For the same reason, metaphysics forms likewise the completion of the culture of human reason. In this respect it is indispensable, setting aside altogether the influence which it exerts as a science. For its subject matter is the elements and highest maxims of reason which form the basis of the possibility of some sciences and of the use of all. That, as a purely speculative science, it is more useful in preventing error than in the extension of knowledge does not detract from its value. On the contrary, the supreme office of censor which it occupies assures to it the highest authority and importance. This office it administers for the purpose of securing order, harmony, and well-being to science, and of directing its noble and fruitful labours to the highest possible aim, the happiness of all mankind. End of Section 47 Section 48 The Critique of Pure Reason by Emmanuel Kant Transcendental Doctrine of Method Chapter 4 The History of Pure Reason Recorded by Gesine The History of Pure Reason This title is placed here merely for the purpose of designating a division of the system of pure reason of which I do not intend to treat at present. I shall content myself with casting a cursory glance from a purely transcendental point of view that of the nature of the world. I shall point a view that of the nature of pure reason on the labours of philosophers up to the present time. They have aimed at erecting an edifice of philosophy, but to my eye this edifice appears to be in a very ruinous condition. It is very remarkable although naturally it could not have been otherwise that in the infancy of the study of the nature of God and the constitution of a future world formed the commencement rather than the conclusion as we should have it of the speculative efforts of the human mind. However rude the religious conceptions generated by the remains of the old manners and customs of a less cultivated time, the intelligent classes were not thereby prevented from devoting themselves to free inquiry into the existence and nature of God. And they easily saw that there could be no sure way of pleasing the invisible ruler of the world and of attaining to happiness in another world at least than a good and honest course of life in this. Thus theology and morals formed two chief motives or rather the points of attraction in all abstract inquiries. But it was the former that especially occupied the attention of speculative reason and which afterwards became so celebrated under the name of metaphysics. I shall not at present indicate the periods of time at which the greatest changes in metaphysics took place but shall merely give a hasty sketch of the different ideas which occasioned the most important revolutions in this sphere of thought. There are three different ends in relation to which these revolutions have taken place. One. In relation to the object of the cognition of reason philosophers may be divided into sensualists and intellectualists. Epicurus may be regarded as the head of the former Plato of the latter. The distinction here signalized, subtle as it is, dates from the earliest times and was long maintained. The former asserted that reality resides in sensuous objects alone and that everything else is merely imaginary. The latter that the senses are the parents of illusion and that truth is to be found in the understanding alone. The former did not deny to the conceptions of the understanding a certain kind of reality but with them it was merely logical with the others it was mystical. The former admitted intellectual conceptions but declared that sensuous objects alone possessed real existence. The latter maintained that all real objects were intelligible and believed that the pure understanding possessed a faculty of intuition apart from sense which in their opinion served only to confuse the ideas of the understanding. Two. In relation to the origin of pure cognitions of reason we find one school maintaining that they are derived entirely from experience and another that they have their origin in reason alone. Aristotle may be regarded as the head of the empiricists and Plato of the neurologists. Locke, the follower of Aristotle in modern times and Leipniz of Plato although he cannot be said to have imitated him in his mysticism have not been able to bring to a settled conclusion. The procedure of Epicurus in his sensual system in which he always restricted his conclusions to the sphere of experience was much more consequent than that of Aristotle and Locke. The latter especially after having derived all the conceptions and principles of the mind from experience goes so far in the employment of these conceptions and principles as to maintain that we can prove the existence of God and the existence of God and the immortality of the objects lying beyond the soul both of them of possible experience with the same force of demonstration as any mathematical proposition. Three. In relation to method method is procedure according to principles we may divide the method at present employed in the field of inquiry into the naturalistic and the scientific. The naturalist of pure reason lays down as his principle that common reason without the aid of science which he calls sound reason or common sense can give a more satisfactory answer to the most important questions of metaphysics than speculation is able to do. He must maintain therefore that we can determine the content and circumference of the moon more certainly by the naked eye than by the aid of mathematical reasoning. But this system is mere mythology reduced to principles and what is the most absurd thing in this doctrine the neglect of all scientific means is paraded as a peculiar method of extending our cognition as regards those who are naturalists because they know no better they are certainly not to be blamed. They follow common sense without parading their ignorance as a method which is to teach us the wonderful secret how we are to find the truth which lies at the bottom Quadsapiosatis est mihi non ego quiro esse quod archesalis eramnosicue solones Perseus is their motto under which they may lead a pleasant and praiseworthy life without troubling themselves with the science or troubling science with them. Footnote Satire 28 to 79 What I know is enough for I don't care to be what archesalis was and the wretched solones. End of footnote As regards those who wish to pursue a scientific method they have now the choice of following either the dogmatical or the skeptical while they are bound never to desert the systematic mode of procedure. When I mention in relation to the former the celebrated wolf and as regards the latter David Hume I may leave in accordance with my present intention all others unnamed the critical path alone is still open If my reader has been kind and patient enough to accompany me on this hitherto untraveled route he can now judge whether if he and others will contribute their exertions towards making this narrow footpath a high road of thought. That which many centuries have failed to accomplish may not be executed before the close of the present namely to bring reason to perfect contentment in regard to that which has always but without permanent results occupied her powers and engaged her ardent desire for knowledge end of chapter 4 and end of the critique of pure reason by Immanuel Kant recorded by Gesine in January 2007